The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783

In the conduct of their offensive war the allied courts suffered from the divergent counsels and jealousies which have hampered the movements of most naval coalitions. The conduct of Spain appears to have been selfish almost to disloyalty, that of France more faithful, and therefore also militarily sounder; for hearty co-operation and concerted action against a common objective, wisely chosen, would have better forwarded the objects of both. It must be admitted, too, that the indications point to inefficient administration and preparation on the part of the allies, of Spain especially; and that the quality of the personnel244 was inferior to that of England. Questions of preparation and administration, however, though of deep military interest and importance, are very different from the strategic plan or method adopted by the allied courts in selecting and attacking their objectives, and so compassing the objects of the war; and their examination would not only extend this discussion unreasonably, but would also obscure the strategic question by heaping up unnecessary details foreign to its subject.

As regards the strategic question, it may be said pithily that the phrase "ulterior objects" embodies the cardinal fault of the naval policy. Ulterior objects brought to nought the hopes of the allies, because, by fastening their eyes upon them, they thoughtlessly passed the road which led to them. Desire eagerly directed upon the ends in view—or rather upon the partial, though great, advantages which they constituted their ends—blinded them to the means by which alone they could be surely attained; hence, as the result of the war, everywhere failure to attain them. To quote again the summary before given, their object was "to avenge their respective injuries, and to put an end to that tyrannical empire which England claims to maintain upon the ocean." The revenge they had obtained was barren of benefit to themselves. They had, so that generation thought, injured England by liberating America; but they had not righted their wrongs in Gibraltar and Jamaica, the English fleet had not received any such treatment as would lessen its haughty self-reliance, the armed neutrality of the northern powers had been allowed to pass fruitlessly away, and the English empire over the seas soon became as tyrannical and more absolute than before.

Barring questions of preparation and administration, of the fighting quality of the allied fleets as compared with the English, and looking only to the indisputable fact of largely superior numbers, it must be noted as the supreme factor in the military conduct of the war, that, while the allied powers were on the offensive and England on the defensive, the attitude of the allied fleets in presence of the English navy was habitually defensive. Neither in the greater strategic combinations, nor upon the battlefield, does there appear any serious purpose of using superior numbers to crush fractions of the enemy's fleet, to make the disparity of numbers yet greater, to put an end to the empire of the seas by the destruction of the organized force which sustained it. With the single brilliant exception of Suffren, the allied navies avoided or accepted action; they never imposed it. Yet so long as the English navy was permitted thus with impunity to range the seas, not only was there no security that it would not frustrate the ulterior objects of the campaign, as it did again and again, but there was always the possibility that by some happy chance it would, by winning an important victory, restore the balance of strength. That it did not do so is to be imputed as a fault to the English ministry; but if England was wrong in permitting her European fleet to fall so far below that of the allies, the latter were yet more to blame for their failure to profit by the mistake. The stronger party, assuming the offensive, cannot plead the perplexities which account for, though they do not justify, the undue dispersal of forces by the defence anxious about many points.

The national bias of the French, which found expression in the line of action here again and for the last time criticised, appears to have been shared by both the government and the naval officers of the day. It is the key to the course of the French navy, and, in the opinion of the author, to its failure to achieve more substantial results to France from this war. It is instructive, as showing how strong a hold tradition has over the minds of men, that a body of highly accomplished and gallant seamen should have accepted, apparently without a murmur, so inferior a rôle for their noble profession. It carries also a warning, if these criticisms are correct, that current opinions and plausible impressions should always be thoroughly tested; for if erroneous they work sure failure, and perhaps disaster.

There was such an impression largely held by French officers of that day, and yet more widely spread in the United States now, of the efficacy of commerce-destroying as a main reliance in war, especially when directed against a commercial country like Great Britain. "The surest means in my opinion," wrote a distinguished officer, Lamotte-Picquet, "to conquer the English is to attack them in their commerce." The harassment and distress caused to a country by serious interference with its commerce will be conceded by all. It is doubtless a most important secondary operation of naval war, and is not likely to be abandoned till war itself shall cease; but regarded as a primary and fundamental measure, sufficient in itself to crush an enemy, it is probably a delusion, and a most dangerous delusion, when presented in the fascinating garb of cheapness to the representatives of a people. Especially is it misleading when the nation against whom it is to be directed possesses, as Great Britain did and does, the two requisites of a strong sea power,—a wide-spread healthy commerce and a powerful navy. Where the revenues and industries of a country can be concentrated into a few treasure-ships, like the flota of Spanish galleons, the sinew of war may perhaps be cut by a stroke; but when its wealth is scattered in thousands of going and coming ships, when the roots of the system spread wide and far, and strike deep, it can stand many a cruel shock and lose many a goodly bough without the life being touched. Only by military command of the sea by prolonged control of the strategic centres of commerce, can such an attack be fatal;245 and such control can be wrung from a powerful navy only by fighting and overcoming it. For two hundred years England has been the great commercial nation of the world. More than any other her wealth has been intrusted to the sea in war as in peace; yet of all nations she has ever been most reluctant to concede the immunities of commerce and the rights of neutrals. Regarded not as a matter of right, but of policy, history has justified the refusal; and if she maintain her navy in full strength, the future will doubtless repeat the lesson of the past.

The preliminaries of the peace between Great Britain and the allied courts, which brought to an end this great war, were signed at Versailles, January 20, 1783, an arrangement having been concluded between Great Britain and the American Commissioners two months before, by which the independence of the United States was conceded. This was the great outcome of the war. As between the European belligerents, Great Britain received back from France all the West India Islands she had lost, except Tobago, and gave up Sta. Lucia. The French stations in India were restored; and Trincomalee being in the possession of the enemy, England could not dispute its return to Holland, but she refused to cede Negapatam. To Spain, England surrendered the two Floridas and Minorca, the latter a serious loss had the naval power of Spain been sufficient to maintain possession of it; as it was, it again fell into the hands of Great Britain in the next war. Some unimportant redistribution of trading-posts on the west coast of Africa was also made.

Trivial in themselves, there is but one comment that need be made upon these arrangements. In any coming war their permanency would depend wholly upon the balance of sea power, upon that empire of the seas concerning which nothing conclusive had been established by the war.

The definitive treaties of peace were signed at Versailles, September 3, 1783.

INDEX

Alberoni, Cardinal, minister to Philip V. of Spain, 233;

naval and general policy of, 234-236;

failure of his schemes, 238;

dismissed, 239.

Anson, British Admiral, expedition to the Pacific, 261;

captures a French squadron, 271.

Arbuthnot, British Admiral, engagement with French fleet off the Chesapeake, 385-387.

Armed Neutrality, the, of the Baltic powers, 405.

Arnold, Benedict, treason of, 382;

expedition to James River, 385.

Barbadoes, strategic value of, 348, 393, 518;

ineffectual attempt of the French against, 469.

Barrington, British Admiral, energy of, 365;

takes Sta. Lucia and resists an attack by superior French fleet, 366;

second in command at battle of Grenada, 368;

refuses the command of the Channel fleet, 404;

a whig in politics, 500.

Battles, Land, Austerlitz, 24, 47;

Blenheim, 213;

Boyne, 41, 185-187;

Camden, 382, 384;

Ciudad Rodrigo, storming of, 475 (note);

Jena, 47;

Metaurus, 19, 20;

Plassey, 306;

Savannah, assault on, 376;

Yorktown, capitulation of, 390.

Battles, Naval (the list of the principal naval battles, with plans, will be found on pp. xxiii, xxiv),

Actium, 13;

Agosta, 165;

Boscawen and De la Clue, 299;

Byng off Minorca, 286,

plan 265;

Cape Passaro, 63, 237;

Chesapeake. 372-374, 389, 391;

Copenhagen, 361;

La Hougue, 189-191,

plan 183;

Lepanto, 13, 50;

Lowestoft, 108;

Malaga, 110, 211, 229;

Mobile, 287, 354, 355, 361;

Navarino, 13 (note);

New Orleans, 354-356;

Nile, 10, 11, 80, 81, 358, 361, 366, 533;

Pocock and D'Aché, 307-310,

plan 162;

Port Hudson, 355, 361;

Rio de Janeiro, expedition against, 230;

Rodney and Langara, 404, 500 (and note);

Schoneveldt 152;

Sta. Lucia, 366, 425, 478;

St Vincent, 11, 356, 358, 476 (note),

plan 146;

Suffren and Hughes, fifth action, 463;

Trafalgar, 9, 11, 12, 23 (note), 24, 47, 85, 353, 354, 357, 438;

Vigo galleons, 207.

Benbow, British Admiral,

sent to West Indies, 207;

treason of his captains, 207;

killed in battle. 207.

Bickerton, British Admiral,

conducts a powerful convoy to the East Indies, 452;

arrived in India, 458;

activity of, 458, 520;

effects of arrival of, 459, 461.

Blane, Sir Gilbert, physician to British fleet, letters of, 497, 499, 500(note), 501.

Blockade,

of French ports by English fleets, 23 (note), 30, 210, 296, 297, 383, 387, 402 (and note), 413, 525-527, 532, 533;

of Southern coast of United States, 43, 44, 87 (note);

Napoleon forces England to, 81;

with consequent effect on American privateering, 137;

definition of efficient, 85;

dangers to United States from, 86, 87;

offensive and defensive use of, 87 (note);

declaration of the Armed Neutrality concerning, 405;

position taken off an enemy's port not necessarily a blockade in strict sense of the word, 532.

Boscawen, British Admiral,

expedition to India, failure of, 277;

intercepts French ships off the St. Lawrence, 284;

takes Louisburg, 294;

disperses or destroys French fleet from Toulon, 298.

Burgoyne, British General,

expedition from Canada, 343;

effect of his surrender, 346.

Bussy, French General,

second to Dupleix in India, 305;

intrigues with nabob of Bengal, 306;

invades Orissa, 307;

again sent to India during American Revolution, 459;

delayed en route, 460;

reaches India, 461;

besieged in Cuddalore by the English, 462;

relieved by Suffren, 463.

Byng, Sir George, British Admiral,

sent to Mediterranean, 236;

destroys Spanish fleet at Cape Passaro, 237;

policy at Messina, 238.

Byng, John, British Admiral,

sails to relieve Port Mahon, 286;

action with the French fleet, 286-288;

returns to Gibraltar, is relieved, tried, 290,

and shot, 291.

Byron, British Admiral,

commander-in-chief at Battle of Grenada, 367-371.

Cape of Good Hope,

a half-way naval station, 28, 514;

discovery of passage round, 37, 38, 141;

acquired by Holland, 97;

acquired by England during the Napoleonic wars, 327;

English expedition against, 421;

saved by Suffren, 422-425, 427;

utility to France, 460, 520;

Suffren's reception at, 464, 465.

Carlos III.,

King of the Two Sicilies, 248, 249;

enters into Bourbon Family Compact, 249;

forced to withdraw his troops by a British commodore, 252, 264, 304;

succeeds to the Spanish throne, 304;

enters into secret alliance with France, 312, 313;

losses in Seven Years' War, 315, 317;

again enters alliance with France against England, 401, 402.

Charles, Archduke,

claimant to Spanish throne as Carlos III., 206;

lands at Lisbon, 208;

lands in Catalonia and takes Barcelona, 213;

takes and loses Madrid, 214;

antipathy of Spaniards to, 214, 216;

inherits empire of Austria and elected Emperor Charles VI. of Germany, 217;

makes, as king of Spain, secret commercial treaty with England, 221;

discontented with Treaty of Utrecht, 222, 234;

renounces claim to Spanish throne, 235;

joins Quadruple Alliance, 236;

obtains Naples and Sicily, 239;

loses Naples and Sicily, 248;

dies, leaving no son, 262;

succeeded by Maria Theresa, 262.

Charles II., naval policy of, 60, 61;

restoration of, 90;

political motives, 100;

cedes Dunkirk, 105;

policy of commerce-destroying, 131;

bargains with Louis XIV., 143;

declares war against Holland, 144;

makes peace with Holland, 158;

forms alliance with Holland, 166;

dies, 175.

Choiseul, minister to Louis XV., 297;

plans for invading England and Scotland, 297, 300;

makes close alliance with Spain, 311-313;

policy after Seven Years' War, 330-336;

naval reforms, 331-333;

supports Spain in dispute with England over the Falkland Islands, 336;

dismissed, 336.

Clerk, John,

work on Naval Tactics, 77 (and note), 163-165, 289.

Clinton, Sir Henry, British General,

expedition up the Hudson, 343;

commander-in-chief in America, 360, 365, 401;

opinions as to influence of sea power, 385, 401;

sends detachments to the Chesapeake, 385, 387;

directs Cornwallis to occupy Yorktown, 387;

outwitted by Washington and Rochambeau, 387.

Clive, Robert, afterward Lord,

letter of. 275 (note);

Indian career begins, 282;

retakes Calcutta, 305;

defeats nabob of Bengal, takes Chandernagore, and wins battle of Plassey, 306;

reduces Bengal, 306.

Colbert

becomes minister under Louis XIV., 70;

commercial and naval policy, 70-74, 105, 106, 169, 174;

thwarted by the king, 170;

his trust in the resources of France, 198.

Collingwood, British Admiral,

leads a column at Trafalgar, 353;

his conduct at battle of Cape St. Vincent, 355, 356;

reverses Nelson's orders after his death, 358;

loss in his ship at Trafalgar, 438 (note);

blockading duty off French coast (letters), 526.

Colonies:

origin of, 27;

character of, 28;

effect on England of, 29, 82, 83, 255, 326-328, 392-394, 396, 414;

weakness of Spain through, 30, 41, 42, 202, 261, 312, 327, 345, 346;

effect of national character on, 55-58, 255, 256;

growth of English colonial system, 60, 62, 64, 217, 220, 228, 251, 291, 305-307, 310, 321, 327;

Colbert's policy, 70, 71, 106;

navy essential to security of, 41, 42, 74, 75, 82, 329, 367, 373, 401, 416, 424, 434, 511, 529, 541;

support to sea power by, 83, 212, 329, 415, 510, 511, 514, 520, 521;

Dutch, 96, 97, 258;

New York and New Jersey seized by English, 107, 132;

loss of French colonies, 219, 291, 294, 295, 304, 314, 321, 322;

loss of Spanish colonies, 219, 315-317, 321;

French colonial policy, 242, 254, 255, 257, 258, 273-278, 282, 283, 306;

Spanish colonial policy, 245-247, 250;

colonial expansion the characteristic motive of the wars from 1739 to 1783, 254, 281-284, 291, 508-510;

value of smaller West India islands, 256, 374, 512, 513;

the English in India, 257, 282, 305, 307, 348, 349, 419, 420, 459;

Vernon's and Anson's expedition against Spanish, 261;

Florida and the Bahamas recovered by Spain, 517 (note).

British North American, character of, 255, 283;

extension over all the continent east of the Mississippi, 65, 321;

quarrel with mother-country, 334, 341;

military situation of, 341-344;

alliance with France, 350;

effect of sea power upon their struggle, 397, 524;

object of, 507, 508;

policy of France in their struggle, 359, 511, 512;

distribution of colonial possessions at peace of 1783, 540.

Commander-in-chief,

position of a naval, in battle, 353-358;

question raised by action of the Due de Chartres, 352;

illustrated by practice of Howe, Nelson, Farragut, 353-358;

orders of French government, 353.

Commerce,

attempts to control by force, 1, 62, 63, 100, 101, 107, 245, 247;

trade routes, 25, 32, 33, 37, 38, 141, 142;

water carriage easier and cheaper than land, 25;

advantages of rivers and inlets to, 25, 35, 36;

secure seaports and a navy necessary to security of, 26-28, 74-76, 82, 83, 134, 135;

the basis of a healthy navy, 28, 45, 46, 82;

war upon (see commerce-destroying);

influence of Baltic trade upon sea power, 32, 62, 239, 240, 405;

effect of Central American Canal on, 33, 325;

effect of physical conditions on, 36-39;

decay of Spanish, 41, 50-52;

effect of national character on, 50-55;

solicitude of English government concerning, 60, 62, 63, 65, 66, 143, 206, 218, 220, 240, 241, 247, 269, 270;

the Navigation Act, 60;

influence of the wealth of England on history, 64, 187, 197, 216, 218, 227, 279, 295;

commercial spirit of the Dutch, 49, 52, 55, 57, 68, 69, 98;

Colbert's policy for developing, 70, 71, 101, 102, 105, 106, 169;

decay of French, under Louis XIV., 73, 107, 167, 169, 170, 198, 199, 219, 226-228;

improvement of French, under Louis XV., 74, 242, 243;

government influence on, 70, 71, 82, 101, 105, 106;

dangers to United States, by blockades, 84-87;

commercial policy of United States, 84, 88;

French, in 1660, 93;

Dutch, in 1660, 95-97, 131;

rivalry of English and Dutch, 100, 107;

Leibnitz's proposition to Louis XIV. to seize Egypt, 141, 142;

influence of Dutch wealth, 167, 176, 187, 197, 270, 279;

sufferings of Dutch, 38, 160, 167, 168;

gains to English, by policy of Louis XIV. 167, 170;

effect of injury to, in hastening war, 176, 177;

bearing of, upon War of Spanish Succession, 201-204, 207, 209;

Methuen Treaty of, with Portugal, 206, 228;

concession to England of the Asiento, or slave trade, 217, 220, 245;

growth of English, during eighteenth century, 220, 223-226, 228, 229, 233, 241, 245, 319, 323, 328;

secret treaty of, made with England by claimant to Spanish throne, 221;

decay of Dutch, in early part of eighteenth century, 69, 220-222, 224;

English, contraband with Spanish America, 240, 241, 245-247;

sufferings of, 1740-1748, 279, 280;

sufferings of, 1756-1763, 311, 312, 317-319;

prosperity of English commerce, 1756-1763, 297, 318, 319, 323;

effect of commercial interests on the results at Yorktown, 392;

great centre of English, 539 (note);

policy of Great Britain as to neutral, 540.

Commerce-Destroying (Cruising Warfare),

a strategic question, 8;

dependence on geographical position, 31;

diffusion of effort, 31;

disadvantageous position of United States, 31, 540 (note);

Spanish treasure-ships, 41, 51, 207, 262, 313, 316;

English and Dutch commerce defy, 51, 133, 134, 135, 206, 229, 297, 317, 318, 319, 539, 540;

Charles II. resorts to it as a substitute for great fleets, 131;

disastrous results, 132;

discussion of, as a principal mode of warfare, 132-136;

dependent upon a near base or upon powerful fleets, 132, 196, 230, 314;

illustrations, 1652-1783, 133-136;

injurious reaction on the nation relying upon it, 136;

illustrations, 136-138;

mistaken conclusions drawn from American privateering in 1812, and from the Confederate cruisers, 137, 138;

effect of great navies, 138;

illustrations, after battle of Solebay, 148;

after battle of Texel, 154;

decline of Dutch navy, 160,

and consequent increase of commerce-destroying by French privateers, 167;

in the war of 1689-1697, discussion, 193-196;

in the war of 1702-1713, 228-230;

in war of 1739-1748, 280;

in Seven Years' War, 295, 297, 311, 314, 316, 317-319 (discussion), 329 (note);

in American Revolution, 344, 382, 392, 400, 404, 408 (and note), 409, 443, 445, 452, 460, 530, 539, 540 (and note);

French privateering, 133, 135, 167, 195, 196, 229, 280, 314, 317-319;

peculiar character of French privateering, 1689-1713, 194-196, 229, 230.

Conflans, French Admiral,

commands fleet intended for invasion of England, 300;

sails from Brest, 301;

encounters Hawke and is defeated by him, 302-304.

Cornwallis, British General,

wins battle of Camden, 382;

overruns Southern States, 384;

marches into Virginia, 385;

takes position at Yorktown, 387;

surrounded by enemies, 389,

capitulates, 390.

Cornwallis, Captain British navy,

gallant conduct in Hood's action at St. Christopher, 472.

Corsica,

island of, naturally Italian, 32;

a dependency of Genoa, 201;

Genoa cedes fortified harbors to France, 292;

whole island ceded to France, 334;

strategic value, 335.

Cromwell, Oliver,

naval policy of, 60;

issues Navigation Act, 60;

condition of navy under, 60, 61, 101, 127;

takes Jamaica, 60;

takes Dunkirk, 105.

D'Aché, French Commodore,

reaches India, 307;

first and second battles with Pocock, 308;

ill-will to the French governor, Lally, 307, 309;

goes to the Isle of France, 309;

return to the peninsula, and third battle with Pocock, 310;

abandons the peninsula, 310.

De Barras, French Commodore,

commands French squadron at Newport, and takes part in operations against Cornwallis, 389-392.

De la Clue, French Commodore,

sails from Toulon to join Brest fleet, 298;

encounters and beaten by Boscawen, 299.

D'Estaing, French Admiral,

transferred from the army to the navy, 371;

long passage from Toulon to the Delaware, 359;

fails to attack the British fleet in New York, 361;

runs British batteries at Newport, 361;

sails in pursuit of Howe's fleet, and receives injuries in a gale, 362;

goes to Boston, 363;

foiled by Howe on all points, 363, 364;

goes to West Indies, 365;

failure at Sta. Lucia, 366;

capture of St. Vincent and Grenada, 367;

action with Byron's fleet, 367-371;

professional character, 371, 375;

ineffectual assault on Savannah, 376;

return to France, 376.

D'Estrées, French Admiral,

commands French contingent to the allied fleet at Solebay, 147;

at Schoneveldt, 151;

at the Texel, 152;

equivocal action at the battle of the Texel, 153, 155;

notice of, 170.