The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783

163

This mishap of the French was largely due to mismanagement by De Guichen, a skilful and usually a careful admiral. When Kempenfeldt fell in with him, all the French ships-of-war were to leeward of their convoy, while the English were to windward of it. The former, therefore, were unable to interpose in time; and the alternative remedy, of the convoy running down to leeward of their escort, could not be applied by all the merchant-ships in so large a body.

164

"In the spring of 1780 the British admiralty had assembled in the Channel ports forty-five ships-of-the-line. The squadron at Brest was reduced to twelve or fifteen.... To please Spain, twenty French ships-of-the-line had joined the flag of Admiral Cordova in Cadiz. In consequence of these dispositions, the English with their Channel fleet held in check the forces which we had in Brest and in Cadiz. Enemy's cruisers traversed freely the space between the Lizard and the Straits of Gibraltar." (Chevalier, p. 202.)

In 1781 "the Cabinet of Versailles called the attention of Holland and Spain to the necessity of assembling at Brest a fleet strong enough to impose upon the ships which Great Britain kept in the Channel. The Dutch remained in the Texel, and the Spaniards did not leave Cadiz. From this state of things it resulted that the English, with forty ships-of-the-line, blocked seventy belonging to the allied powers." (p. 265.)

165

"A question was very much agitated both in and out of Parliament; namely, Whether the intercepting of the French fleet under the Count de Grasse should not have been the first object of the British fleet under Vice-Admiral Darby, instead of losing time in going to Ireland, by which that opportunity was missed. The defeat of the French fleet would certainly totally have disconcerted the great plans which the enemies had formed in the East and West Indies. It would have insured the safety of the British West India islands; the Cape of Good Hope must have fallen into the hands of Britain; and the campaign in North America might have had a very different termination." (Beatson's Memoirs, vol. v. p. 341, where the contrary arguments are also stated.)

166

This is one of the most common and flagrant violations of the principles of war,—stretching a thin line, everywhere inadequate, over an immense frontier. The clamors of trade and local interests make popular governments especially liable to it.

167

Annual Register, 1782.

168

This Commodore Johnstone, more commonly known as Governor Johnstone, was one of the three commissioners sent by Lord North in 1778 to promote a reconciliation with America. Owing to certain suspicious proceedings on his part, Congress declared it was incompatible with their honor to hold any manner of correspondence or intercourse with him. His title of Governor arose from his being at one time governor of Pensacola. He had a most unenviable reputation in the English navy. (See Charnock's Biog. Navalis.)

169

This plate is taken almost wholly from Cunat's "Vie de Suffren."

170

Page 299.

171

La Serre: Essais Hist. et Critiques sur la Marine Française.

172

The question of attacking the English squadron at its anchors was debated in a council of war. Its opinion confirmed Suffren's decision not to do so. In contrasting this with the failure of the English to attack the French detachment in Newport (p. 394), it must be borne in mind that in the latter case there was no means of forcing the ships to leave their strong position; whereas by threatening Trincomalee, or other less important points, Suffren could rely upon drawing Hughes out. He was therefore right in not attacking, while the English before Newport were probably wrong.

173

The dependence of Trincomalee upon the English fleet in this campaign affords an excellent illustration of the embarrassment and false position in which a navy finds itself when the defence of its seaports rests upon it. This bears upon a much debated point of the present day, and is worthy the study of those who maintain, too unqualifiedly, that the best coast defence is a navy. In one sense this is doubtless true,—to attack the enemy abroad is the best of defences; but in the narrow sense of the word "defence" it is not true. Trincomalee unfortified was simply a centre round which Hughes had to revolve like a tethered animal; and the same will always happen under like conditions.

174

Plate XIV., Fig. D, shows the order of battle Suffren intended in this action. The five rear ships of the enemy would each have two opponents close aboard. The leading French ship on the weather side was to be kept farther off, so that while attacking the sixth Englishman she could "contain" the van ships if they attempted to reinforce the rear by tacking.

175

Troude: Batailles Navales.

176

Between four and five hundred yards.

177

The English and French flag-ships are denoted in the plan by their exceptional size.

178

The "Victory," Nelson's ship at Trafalgar, a 100-gun ship, lost 57 killed and 102 wounded; Hughes's ship, a 74, lost 59 killed and 96 wounded. Collingwood's ship, the "Royal Sovereign," also of 100 guns, lost 47 killed and 94 wounded; the "Monmouth," a 64, in Hughes's action lost 45 killed and 102 wounded.

179

Troude: Batailles Navales; Chevalier: Hist. de la Marine Française.

180

This remark seems too self-evident to need emphasis; yet it may be questioned whether naval men generally carry it in their stock of axioms.

181

As always.

182

That is turned their side to the enemy instead of approaching him.

183

Chevalier.

184

Annual Register, 1782.

185

The British account differs materially as to the cause of the distance separating the two rears. "In this action it did not fall to the 'Monmouth's' lot to sustain a very considerable share, the enemy's rear being so far to leeward that the ships of the British rear could not, even whilst the wind was favorable, close with them without considerably breaking the order of their own line" (Memoir of Captain Alms, Naval Chronicle, vol. ii). Such contradictions are common, and, except for a particular purpose, need not to be reconciled. Alms seems to have been not only a first-rate seaman, but an officer capable of resolute and independent action; his account is probably correct.

186

Troude: Batailles Navales. It was seen from Suffren's ship that the "Sévère's" flag was down; but it was supposed that the ensign halliards had been shot away. The next day Hughes sent the captain of the "Sultan" to demand the delivery to him of the ship which had struck. The demand, of course, could not be complied with. "The 'Sultan,'" Troude says, "which had hove-to to take possession of the 'Sévère,' was the victim of this action; she received during some time, without replying, the whole fire of the French ship."

187

Annual Register, 1782.

188

Cunat: Vie de Suffren.

189

The curves in (B) represent the movements of the ships after the shift of wind, which practically ended the battle. The ships themselves show the order in fighting.

190

The enemy formed a semicircle around us and raked us ahead and astern, as the ship came up and fell off, with the helm to leeward.—Journal de Bord du Bailli de Suffren.

191

See page 435. He added: "It is frightful to have had four times in our power to destroy the English squadron, and that it still exists."

192

There was not a single ship of Suffren's which had more than three-fourths of her regular complement of men. It must be added that soldiers and sepoys made up half of these reduced crews.—Chevalier, p. 463.

193

You will have learned my promotion to commodore and rear-admiral. Now, I tell you in the sincerity of my heart and for your own ear alone, that what I have done since then is worth infinitely more than what I had done before. You know the capture and battle of Trincomalee; but the end of the campaign, and that which took place between the month of March and the end of June, is far above anything that has been done in the navy since I entered it. The result has been very advantageous to the State, for the squadron was endangered and the army lost.—Private Letter of Suffren, Sept. 13, 1783; quoted in the "Journal de Bord du Bailli de Suffren."

194

The curve, a, a’, a’’, represents the line which Hood proposed to follow with his fleet, the wind being supposed east-southeast. The positions B, B, B, refer to the proceedings of a subsequent day and have nothing to do with the diagram at A.

195

When a fleet is in line ahead, close to the wind, on one tack, and the ships go about together, they will, on the other tack, be on the same line, but not one ahead of the other. This formation was called bow-and-quarter line.

196

A spring is a rope taken from the stern or quarter of a ship at anchor, to an anchor properly placed, by which means the ship can be turned in a desired direction.

197

In the council of war of the allied fleets on the expediency of attacking the English squadron anchored at Torbay (p. 408) an opponent of the measure urged "that the whole of the combined fleets could not bear down upon the English in a line-of-battle abreast, that of course they must form the line-of-battle ahead, and go down upon the enemy singly, by which they would run the greatest risk of being shattered and torn to pieces," etc. (Beatson, vol. v. p. 396).

198

In war, as in cards, the state of the score must at times dictate the play; and the chief who never takes into consideration the effect which his particular action will have on the general result, nor what is demanded of him by the condition of things elsewhere, both political and military, lacks an essential quality of a great general. "The audacious manner in which Wellington stormed the redoubt of Francisco [at Ciudad Rodrigo], and broke ground on the first night of the investment, the more audacious manner in which he assaulted the place before the fire of the defence had in any way lessened, and before the counterscarp had been blown in, were the true causes of the sudden fall of the place. Both the military and political state of affairs warranted this neglect of rules. When the general terminated his order for the assault with this sentence, 'Ciudad Rodrigo must be stormed this evening,' he knew well that it would be nobly understood" (Napier's Peninsular War). "Judging that the honour of his Majesty's arms, and the circumstances of the war in these seas, required a considerable degree of enterprise, I felt myself justified in departing from the regular system" (Sir John Jervis's Report of the Battle of Cape St. Vincent).

199

By Kempenfeldt's attack upon De Guichen's convoy, and the following gale in December, 1781. See p. 408.

200

Kerguelen: Guerre Maritime de 1778. Letter of De Grasse to Kerguelen, dated Paris. January 8, 1783. p. 263.

201

See pp. 366, 426.

202

See Map IV. of the Atlantic Ocean, p. 532.

203

Weather quarter is behind, but on the windward side.

204

April 29, 1781, off Martinique, twenty-four ships to eighteen; January, 1782, thirty to twenty-two; April 9, 1782, thirty to twenty.

205

The difference of time from Trincomalee to the Saints is nine hours and a half.

206

The account of the transactions from April 9 to April 12 is based mainly upon the contemporary plates and descriptions of Lieutenant Matthews, R.N., and the much later "Naval Researches" of Capt. Thomas White, also of the British Navy, who were eye-witnesses, both being checked by French and other English narratives. Matthews and White are at variance with Rodney's official report as to the tack on which the English were at daybreak; but the latter is explicitly confirmed by private letters of Sir Charles Douglas, sent immediately after the battle to prominent persons, and is followed in the text.

207

Letter of Sir Charles Douglas, Rodney's chief-of-staff: "United Service Journal," 1833, Part I. p. 515.

208

De Grasse calls this distance three leagues, while some of his captains estimated it to be as great as five.

209

The French, in mid-channel, had the wind more to the eastward.

210

The positions of the French ships captured are shown by a cross in each of the three successive stages of the battle, B, C, D.

211

The distance of the weathermost French ships from the "Ville de Paris," when the signal to form line-of-battle was made, is variously stated at from six to nine miles.

212

The other two French ships taken were the "Ville de Paris," which, in her isolated condition, and bearing the flag of the commander-in-chief, became the quarry around which the enemy's ships naturally gathered, and the "Ardent," of sixty-four guns, which appears to have been intercepted in a gallant attempt to pass from the van to the side of her admiral in his extremity. The latter was the solitary prize taken by the allied Great Armada in the English Channel, in 1779.

213

Official letter of the Marquis de Vaudreuil. Guérin: Histoire de la Marine Française, vol. v. p. 513.

214

See United Service Journal, 1834, Part II. pp. 109 and following.

215

See letter of Sir Howard Douglas in United Service Journal, 1834, Part II. p. 97; also "Naval Evolutions," by same author. The letters of Sir Samuel Hood have not come under the author's eye.

216

Rodney's Life, vol. ii. p. 248.

217

There were only twenty-five in all.

218

Guérin, vol. v. p. 511.

219

Rodney's Life, vol. ii. p. 246.

220

Annual Register, 1783, p. 151.

221

Annual Register, 1783, p. 157; Life of Admiral Keppel, vol. ii. p. 403.

222

Naval Chronicle, vol. xxv. p. 404.

223

Page 404. Yet here also the gossip of the day, as reflected in the Naval Atalantis, imputed the chief credit to Young, the captain of the flag-ship. Sir Gilbert Blane stated, many years later, "When it was close upon sunset, it became a question whether the chase should be continued. After some discussion between the admiral and captain, at which I was present, the admiral being confined with the gout, it was decided to persist in the same course with the signal to engage to leeward." (United Service Journal, 1830, Part II. p. 479.)

224

Rodney was a strong Tory. Almost all the other distinguished admirals of the day, notably Keppel, Howe, and Barrington, were Whigs,—a fact unfortunate for the naval power of England.

225

Rodney's Life, vol. ii. p. 242.

226

Chevalier, p. 311.

227

Kerguelen: Guerre Maritime de 1778. Letter of De Grasse to Kerguelen, p. 263.

228

Troude: Batailles Navales. It is interesting to note in this connection that one of the ships near the French admiral, when he surrendered, was the "Pluton," which, though the extreme rear ship, had nevertheless thus reached a position worthy of the high reputation of her captain, D'Albert de Rions.

229

Troude, vol. ii. p. 147

230

That is, commanders of single ships.

231

Jurien de la Gravière: Guerres Maritimes, vol. ii. p. 255.

232

See map of the Atlantic Ocean, p. 532.

233

It may be said here in passing, that the key to the English possessions in what was then called West Florida was at Pensacola and Mobile, which depended upon Jamaica for support; the conditions of the country, of navigation, and of the general continental war forbidding assistance from the Atlantic. The English force, military and naval, at Jamaica was only adequate to the defence of the island and of trade, and could not afford sufficient relief to Florida. The capture of the latter and of the Bahamas was effected with little difficulty by overwhelming Spanish forces, as many as fifteen ships-of-the-line and seven thousand troops having been employed against Pensacola. These events will receive no other mention. Their only bearing upon the general war was the diversion of this imposing force from joint operations with the French, Spain here, as at Gibraltar, pursuing her own aims instead of concentrating upon the common enemy,—a policy as shortsighted as it was selfish.

234

In other words, having considered the objects for which the belligerents were at war and the proper objectives upon which their military efforts should have been directed to compass the objects, the discussion now considers how the military forces should have been handled; by what means and at what point the objective, being mobile, should have been assailed.

235

Orders of Admiral Villeneuve to the captains of his fleet, Dec. 20, 1804.

236

Letter of Villeneuve, January, 1805.

237

Letters and Despatches of Lord Nelson.

238

Life and Letters of Lord Collingwood.

239

Burrows: Life of Lord Hawke.

240

Of this Rodney said: "The evacuating Rhode Island was the most fatal measure that could possibly be adopted. It gave up the best and noblest harbor in America, from whence squadrons, in forty-eight hours, could blockade the three capital cities of America, namely, Boston, New York, and Philadelphia." The whole letter, private to the First Lord of the Admiralty, is worth reading. (Life of Rodney, vol. ii. p. 429.)

241

The loss of Sta. Lucia does not militate against this statement, being due to happy audacity and skill on the part of the English admiral, and the professional incapacity of the commander of the greatly superior French fleet.

242

The plan of campaign traced by the Directory for Bruix became impossible of execution; the delay in the junction of the French and Spanish squadrons having permitted England to concentrate sixty ships in the Mediterranean.—Troude, vol. iii. p. 158.

243

The combined squadrons of France and Spain, under Bruix, reached Brest on their return only twenty-four hours before Lord Keith, who had followed them from the Mediterranean. (James: Naval History of Great Britain.)

244

The high professional attainments of many of the French officers is not overlooked in this statement. The quality of the personnel was diluted by an inferior element, owing to the insufficient number of good men. "The personnel of our crews had been seriously affected by the events of the campaign of 1779. At the beginning of 1780 it was necessary either to disarm some ships, or to increase the proportion of soldiers entering into the composition of the crews. The minister adopted the latter alternative. New regiments, drawn from the land army, were put at the disposal of the navy. The corps of officers, far from numerous at the beginning of hostilities, had become completely inadequate. Rear-Admiral de Guichen met the greatest difficulty in forming the complements, both officers and crews, for his squadron. He took the sea, February 3, with ships 'badly manned,' as he wrote to the minister." (Chevalier: Hist. de la Marine Française, p. 184.) "During the last war [of 1778] we had met the greatest difficulty in supplying officers to our ships. If it had been easy to name admirals, commodores, and captains, it had been impossible to fill the vacancies caused by death, sickness, or promotion among officers of the rank of lieutenant and ensign." (Chevalier: Marine Française sous la République, p. 20.)

245

The vital centre of English commerce is in the waters surrounding the British Islands; and as the United Kingdom now depends largely upon external sources of food-supply, it follows that France is the nation most favourably situated to harass it by commerce-destroying, on account of her nearness and her possession of ports both on the Atlantic and the North Sea. From these issued the privateers which in the past preyed upon English shipping. The position is stronger now than formerly, Cherbourg presenting a good Channel port which France lacked in the old wars. On the other hand steam and railroads have made the ports on the northern coasts of the United Kingdom more available, and British shipping need not, as formerly, focus about the Channel.

Much importance has been attached to the captures made during the late summer manœuvres (1888) by cruisers in and near the English Channel. The United States must remember that such cruisers were near their home ports. Their line of coal-supply may have been two hundred miles; it would be a very different thing to maintain them in activity three thousand miles from home. The furnishing of coal, or of such facilities as cleaning the bottom or necessary repairs, in such a case, would be so unfriendly to Great Britain, that it may well be doubted if any neighboring neutral nation would allow them.

Commerce-destroying by independent cruisers depends upon wide dissemination of force. Commerce-destroying through control of a strategic centre by a great fleet depends upon concentration of force. Regarded as a primary, not as a secondary, operation, the former is condemned, the latter justified, by the experience of centuries.