The Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and Course of Nature

8. That one Jesus, of Jewish extraction, arose at the time when the Jews expected a Messiah, was rejected by them, as was prophesied, and was received by the Gentiles, as was prophesied.

9. That the religion of this Jesus spread till it became the religion of the world, notwithstanding every sort of resistance; and has continued till now.

10. That the Jewish government was destroyed, and the people dispersed into all lands; and still for many centuries, continue to be a distinct race, professing the law of Moses. If this separateness be accounted for, in any way, it does not destroy the fact that it was predicted.

CONCLUSION

1. Recapitulation of the preceding ten observations.

2. Add the fact that there are obvious appearances in the world, aside from the Jews, which correspond to prophetic history.

3. These appearances, compared with Bible history, and with each other, in a joint view, will appear to be of great weight, and would impress one who regarded them for the first time, more than they do us who have been familiar with them.

4. The preceding discussion, though not thorough, amounts to proof of something more than human in this matter.

1.) The sufficiency of these proofs may be denied, but the existence of them cannot be.

2.) The conformity of prophecies to events may be said to be accidental, but the conformity itself cannot be denied.

3.) These collateral proofs may be pronounced fanciful, but it cannot be said they are nothing. Probabilities may not amount to demonstration, but they remain probabilities.

5. Those who will set down all seeming completions of prophecy, and judge of them by the common rules of evidence, will find that together they amount to strong proof. Because probable proofs, added together, not only increase evidence, but multiply it.

6. It is very well to observe objections; but it should be remembered that a mistake on one side is far more dangerous than a mistake on the other; and the safest conclusion is the best.

7. Religion, like other things, is to be judged by all the evidence taken together. Unless all its proofs be overthrown, it remains proved. If no proof singly were sufficient, the whole taken together might be.

8. It is much easier to start an objection, than to comprehend the united force of a whole argument.

9. Thus it appears that the positive evidence of revelation cannot be destroyed, though it should be lessened.

CHAPTER VIIIOBJECTIONS AGAINST THE ANALOGICAL ARGUMENT

If all made up their minds with proper care and candor, there would be no need of this chapter. But some do not try to understand what they condemn; and our mode of argument is open to objections, especially in the minds of those who judge without thinking. The chief objections will therefore be considered. They are these: – it does not solve difficulties in revelation to say that there are as great in natural religion: – it will not make men religious to show them that it is as important as worldly prudence, for showing that, does not make them prudent: – the justice of God in the system of religion, is not proved by showing it is as apparent as in his natural providence: – no reasoning from analogy can carry full conviction: – mankind will not renounce present pleasures, for a religion which is not free from doubt. To each of which a reply will now be given.

I. As to requiring a solution of all difficulties

1. This is but resolving to comprehend the nature of God, and the whole plan of his government throughout eternity.

2. It is always right to argue from what is known, to what is disputed. We are constantly so doing. The most eminent physician does not understand all diseases, yet we do not despise what he does know.

3. It is very important to find that objections against revelation are just as strong, not only against natural religion, but against the course of nature.

II. As to men’s having as little reason for worldly pursuits, as they have for being religious

1. If men can be convinced that they have as much reason to be religious as they have to practise worldly prudence, then there is a reason for being religious.

2. If religion proposes greater than worldly interests, and has the same reasons for belief, then it has proportionally a greater claim.

3. If religion being left doubtful, proves it to be false, then doubts as to the success of any worldly pursuit show it to be wrong. Yet we constantly act, even in the most important affairs, without certainty of being right.

III. As to the justice and goodness of God in religion

1. Our business is not to vindicate God, but to learn our duty, governed as we are; which is a very different thing. It has been shown that if we knew all things, present, past, and future, and the relations of each thing to all other things, we might see to be just and good what now do not seem so: and it is probable we should.

2. We do not say that objections against God’s justice and goodness are removed by showing the like objections against natural providence, but that they are not conclusive, because they apply equally to what we know to be facts.

3. The existence of objections does not destroy the evidence of facts. The fact for instance that God rewards and punishes, though men may think it unjust. Even necessity, plead for human acts, does no more to abolish justice than it does injustice.

4. Though the reasonableness of Christianity cannot be shown from analogy, the truth of it may. The truth of a fact may be proved without regard to its quality. The reasonableness of obeying Christianity is proved, if we barely prove Christianity itself to be possible.

5. Though analogy may not show Christian precepts to be good, it proves them to be credible.

IV. The analogical argument does not remove doubt

1. What opinion does any man hold, about which there can be no doubt? Even the best way of preserving and enjoying this life, is not agreed upon. Whether our measures will accomplish our objects, is always uncertain; and still more whether the objects, if accomplished, will give us happiness. Yet men do not on this account refuse to make exertion.

2. This objection overlooks the very nature of religion. The embracing of it presupposes a certain degree of candor and integrity, to try which, and exercise, and improve it, is its intention. Just as warning a man of danger, presupposes a disposition to avoid danger.

3. Religion is a probation, and has evidence enough as such; and would not be such, if it compelled assent.

4. We never mean by sufficient evidence, such an amount as necessarily determines a man to act, but only such as will show an action to be prudent.

V. As to the small influence of the analogical argument

1. As just observed, religion is a test, and an exercise, of character; and that some reject it is nothing to our purpose. We are inquiring not what sort of creature man is, but what he should be. This is each man’s own concern.

2. Religion, as a probation, accomplishes its end, whether individuals believe or not.

3. Even this objection admits that religion has some weight, and of course it should have some influence; and if so, there is the same reason, though not so strong, for publishing it, that there would be, if it were likely to have greater influence.

Further. It must be considered that the reasoning in this treatise is on the principles of other men, and arguments of the utmost importance are omitted, because not universally admitted. Thus as to Fatalism, and the abstract fitness or unfitness of actions. The general argument is just a question of fact, and is here so treated. Abstract truths are usually advanced as proof; but in this work, only facts are adduced. That the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, is an abstract truth: but that they so appear to us, is only a matter of fact. That there is such a thing as abstract right and wrong, which determines the will of God in rewarding and punishing, is an assertion of an abstract truth, as well as a fact. Suppose God in this world rewarded and punished every man exactly as he obeyed or disobeyed his conscience, this would not be an abstract truth, but a fact. And if all acknowledged this as a fact, all would not see it to be right. If, instead of his doing it now, we say he will do it hereafter, this too is not an abstract truth, but a question of fact. This fact could be fully proved on the abstract principles of moral fitness; but without them, there has now been given a conclusive practical proof; which though it may be cavilled at, and shown not to amount to demonstration, cannot be answered.

Hence it may be said as to the force of this treatise,

1. To such as are convinced of the truth of revelation, as proved on the principles of liberty and moral fitness, it will furnish a full confirmation. To such as do not admit those principles it is an original proof.

2. Those who believe will find objections removed, and those who disbelieve will find they have no grounds for their scepticism; and a good deal beside.

3. Thus though some may think too much is here made of analogy, yet there can be no denying that the argument is real. It confirms all facts to which it can be applied; and of many is the only proof. It is strong on the side of religion, and ought to be regarded by such as prefer facts to abstract reasonings.

CONCLUSION

Recapitulates the general structure and design of the argument, the classes of persons for whose benefit it is particularly adopted, and declares those who reject Christianity to be wholly without excuse.

Advertisement prefixed to the First Edition

If the reader should here meet with any thing which he had not before attended to, it will not be in the observations upon the constitution and course of nature, these being all obvious, but in the application of them; in which, though there is nothing but what appears to me of some real weight, and therefore of great importance, yet he will observe several things, which will appear to him of very little, if he can think things to be of little importance, which are of any real weight at all, upon such a subject of religion. However, the proper force of the following treatise lies in the whole general analogy considered together.

It is come, I know not how to be taken for granted, by many persons, that Christianity is not so much as a subject of inquiry; but that it is, now at length, discovered to be fictitious. Accordingly they treat it, as if, in the present age, this were an agreed point among all people of discernment; and nothing remained, but to set it up as a principal subject of mirth and ridicule, as it were by way of reprisals, for its having so long interrupted the pleasures of the world. On the contrary, thus much at least, will be here found, not taken for granted but proved, that any reasonable man, who will thoroughly consider the matter, may be as much assured, as he is of his own being, that it is not so clear a case, that there is nothing in it. There is, I think, strong evidence of its truth; but it is certain no one can, upon principles of reason, be satisfied of the contrary. The practical consequence to be drawn from this, is not attended to by every one who is concerned in it.

May, 1736.

INTRODUCTION

Probable evidence is essentially distinguished from demonstrative by this, that it admits of degrees; and of all variety of them, from the highest moral certainty, to the very lowest presumption. We cannot indeed say a thing is probably true upon one very slight presumption for it; because, as there may be probabilities on both sides of a question, there may be some against it; and though there be not, yet a slight presumption does not beget that degree of conviction, which is implied in saying a thing is probably true. But that the slightest possible presumption is of the nature of a probability, appears from hence; that such low presumption, often repeated, will amount even to moral certainty. Thus a man’s having observed the ebb and flow of the tide to-day, affords some sort of presumption, though the lowest imaginable, that it may happen again to-morrow: but the observation of this event for so many days, and months, and ages together, as it has been observed by mankind, gives us a full assurance that it will.

That which chiefly constitutes probability is expressed in the word likely, i. e. like some truth,6 or true event; like it, in itself, in its evidence, in some (more or fewer) of its circumstances.7 For when we determine a thing to be probably true, suppose that an event has or will come to pass, it is from the mind’s remarking in it a likeness to some other event, which we have observed has come to pass. This observation forms, in numberless daily instances, a presumption, opinion, or full conviction, that such event has or will come to pass; according as the observation is, that the like event has sometimes, most commonly, or always, so far as our observation reaches, come to pass at like distances of time, or place, or upon like occasions. Hence arises the belief, that a child, if it lives twenty years, will grow up to the stature and strength of a man; that food will contribute to the preservation of its life, and the want of it for such a number of days, be its certain destruction. So likewise the rule and measure of our hopes and fears concerning the success of our pursuits; our expectations that others will act so and so in such circumstances; and our judgment that such actions proceed from such principles; all these rely upon our having observed the like to what we hope, fear, expect, judge; I say, upon our having observed the like, either with respect to others or ourselves. Thus, the prince8 who had always lived in a warm climate, naturally concluded in the way of analogy, that there was no such thing as water’s becoming hard, because he had always observed it to be fluid and yielding. We, on the contrary, from analogy conclude, that there is no presumption at all against this: that it is supposable there may be frost in England any given day in January next; probable that there will on some day of the month; and that there is a moral certainty, i. e. ground for an expectation without any doubt of it, in some part or other of the winter.

Probable evidence, in its very nature, affords but an imperfect kind of information; and is to be considered as relative only to beings of limited capacities. For nothing which is the possible object of knowledge, whether past, present, or future, can be probable to an infinite intelligence; since it cannot but be discerned absolutely as it is in itself, certainly true, or certainly false. But to us, probability is the very guide of life.

From these things it follows, that in questions of difficulty, or such as are thought so, where more satisfactory evidence cannot be had, or is not seen; if the result of examination be, that there appears upon the whole, any even the lowest presumption on one side, and none on the other, or a greater presumption on one side, though in the lowest degree greater; this determines the question, even in matters of speculation. In matters of practice, it will lay us under an absolute and formal obligation, in point of prudence and of interest, to act upon that presumption or low probability, though it be so low as to leave the mind in very great doubt which is the truth. For surely a man is as really bound in prudence to do what upon the whole, according to the best of his judgment, appears to be for his happiness,9 as what he certainly knows to be so.

Further, in questions of great consequence, a reasonable man will think it concerns him to remark lower probabilities and presumptions than these; such as amount to no more than showing one side of a question to be as supposable and credible as the other: nay, such even as but amount to much less than this. For numberless instances might be mentioned respecting the common pursuits of life, where a man would be thought, in a literal sense, distracted, who would not act, and with great application too, not only upon an even chance, but upon much less, and where the probability or chance was greatly against his succeeding.10

It is not my design to inquire further into the nature, the foundation, and measure of probability; or whence it proceeds that likeness should beget that presumption, opinion, and full conviction, which the human mind is formed to receive from it, and which it does necessarily produce in every one; or to guard against the errors, to which reasoning from analogy is liable. This belongs to the subject of Logic; and is a part of that subject which has not yet been thoroughly considered. Indeed I shall not take upon me to say, how far the extent, compass, and force, of analogical reasoning, can be reduced to general heads and rules; and the whole be formed into a system. But though so little in this way has been attempted by those who have treated of our intellectual powers, and the exercise of them; this does not hinder but that we may be, as we unquestionably are, assured, that analogy is of weight, in various degrees, towards determining our judgment and our practice. Nor does it in any wise cease to be of weight in those cases, because persons, either given to dispute, or who require things to be stated with greater exactness than our faculties appear to admit of in practical matters, may find other cases in which it is not easy to say, whether it be, or be not, of any weight; or instances of seeming analogies, which are really of none. It is enough to the present purpose to observe, that this general way of arguing is evidently natural, just, and conclusive. For there is no man can make a question but that the sun will rise to-morrow, and be seen, where it is seen at all, in the figure of a circle, and not in that of a square.

Hence, namely from analogical reasoning, Origen11 has with singular sagacity observed, that “he who believes the Scripture to have proceeded from him who is the Author of nature, may well expect to find the same sort of difficulties in it, as are found in the constitution of nature.” And in a like way of reflection it may be added, that he who denies the Scripture to have been from God upon account of these difficulties, may, for the very same reason, deny the world to have been formed by him. On the other hand, if there be an analogy or likeness between that system of things and dispensation of Providence, which revelation informs us of, and that system of things and dispensation of Providence, which experience together with reason informs us of, i. e. the known course of nature; this is a presumption, that they have both the same author and cause; at least so far as to answer objections against the former’s being from God, drawn from any thing which is analogical or similar to what is in the latter, which is acknowledged to be from him; for an Author of nature is here supposed.

Forming our notions of the constitution and government of the world upon reasoning, without foundation for the principles which we assume, whether from the attributes of God, or any thing else, is building a world upon hypothesis, like Des Cartes. Forming our notions upon reasoning from principles which are certain, but applied to cases to which we have no ground to apply them, (like those who explain the structure of the human body, and the nature of diseases and medicines, from mere mathematics,) is an error much akin to the former: since what is assumed in order to make the reasoning applicable, is Hypothesis. But it must be allowed just, to join abstract reasonings with the observation of facts, and argue from such facts as are known, to others that are like them; from that part of the divine government over intelligent creatures which comes under our view, to that larger and more general government over them which is beyond it; and from what is present, to collect what is likely, credible, or not incredible, will be hereafter.

This method then of concluding and determining being practical, and what, if we will act at all, we cannot but act upon in the common pursuits of life; being evidently conclusive, in various degrees, proportionable to the degree and exactness of the whole analogy or likeness; and having so great authority for its introduction into the subject of religion, even revealed religion; my design is to apply it to that subject in general, both natural and revealed: taking for proved, that there is an intelligent Author of nature, and natural Governor of the world. For as there is no presumption against this prior to the proof of it: so it has been often proved with accumulated evidence; from this argument of analogy and final causes; from abstract reasonings; from the most ancient tradition and testimony; and from the general consent of mankind. Nor does it appear, so far as I can find, to be denied by the generality of those who profess themselves dissatisfied with the evidence of religion.

As there are some, who, instead of thus attending to what is in fact the constitution of nature, form their notions of God’s government upon hypothesis: so there are others, who indulge themselves in vain and idle speculations, how the world might possibly have been framed otherwise than it is; and upon supposition that things might, in imagining that they should, have been disposed and carried on after a better model, than what appears in the present disposition and conduct of them.12 Suppose now a person of such a turn of mind, to go on with his reveries, till he had at length fixed upon some particular plan of nature, as appearing to him the best. – One shall scarce be thought guilty of detraction against human understanding, if one should say, even beforehand, that the plan which this speculative person would fix upon, though he were the wisest of the sons of men, probably would not be the very best, even according to his own notions of best; whether he thought that to be so, which afforded occasions and motives for the exercise of the greatest virtue, or which was productive of the greatest happiness, or that these two were necessarily connected, and run up into one and the same plan.

It may not be amiss, once for all, to see what would be the amount of these emendations and imaginary improvements upon the system of nature, or how far they would mislead us. It seems there could be no stopping, till we came to some such conclusions as these: that all creatures should at first be made as perfect and as happy as they were capable of ever being: that nothing, surely, of hazard or danger should be put upon them to do; some indolent persons would perhaps think nothing at all: or certainly, that effectual care should be taken, that they should, whether necessarily or not, yet eventually and in fact, always do what was right and most conducive to happiness; which would be thought easy for infinite power to effect, either by not giving them any principles which would endanger their going wrong, or by laying the right motive of action in every instance before their minds in so strong a manner, as would never fail of inducing them to act conformably to it: and that the whole method of government by punishments should be rejected as absurd; as an awkward roundabout method of carrying things on; nay, as contrary to a principal purpose, for which it would be supposed creatures were made, namely, happiness.

Now, without considering what is to be said in particular to the several parts of this train of folly and extravagance, what has been above intimated, is a full direct general answer to it; namely, that we may see beforehand that we have not faculties for this kind of speculation. For though it be admitted that, from the first principles of our nature, we unavoidably judge or determine some ends to be absolutely in themselves preferable to others, and that the ends now mentioned, or if they run up into one, that this one is absolutely the best; and consequently that we must conclude the ultimate end designed, in the constitution of nature and conduct of Providence, is the most virtue and happiness possible; yet we are far from being able to judge what particular disposition of things would be most friendly and assistant to virtue; or what means might be absolutely necessary to produce the most happiness in a system of such extent as our own world may be, taking in all that is past and to come, though we should suppose it detached from the whole things. Indeed we are so far from being able to judge of this, that we are not judges what may be the necessary means of raising and conducting one person to the highest perfection and happiness of his nature. Nay, even in the little affairs of the present life, we find men of different educations and ranks are not competent judges of the conduct of each other. Our whole nature leads us to ascribe all moral perfection to God, and to deny all imperfection of him. And this will forever be a practical proof of his moral character, to such as will consider what a practical proof is; because it is the voice of God speaking in us. Hence we conclude, that virtue must be the happiness, and vice the misery, of every creature; and that regularity and order and right cannot but prevail finally in a universe under his government. But we are in no sort judges, what are the necessary means of accomplishing this end.