The Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and Course of Nature

But it is said, these observations are equally applicable to brutes:37 and it is thought an insuperable difficulty, that they should be immortal, and by consequence capable of everlasting happiness. Now this manner of expression is both invidious and weak: but the thing intended by it, is really no difficulty at all, either in the way of natural or moral consideration. For 1, Suppose the invidious thing, designed in such a manner of expression, were really implied, as it is not in the least, in the natural immortality of brutes, namely, that they must arrive at great attainments, and become rational and moral agents; even this would be no difficulty, since we know not what latent powers and capacities they may be endued with. There was once, prior to experience, as great presumption against human creatures, as there is against the brute creatures, arriving at that degree of understanding, which we have in mature age. For we can trace up our own existence to the same original with theirs. We find it to be a general law of nature, that creatures endued with capacities of virtue and religion should be placed in a condition of being, in which they are altogether without the use of them, for a considerable length of their duration; as in infancy and childhood. And great part of the human species, go out of the present world, before they come to the exercise of these capacities in any degree.

2. The natural immortality of brutes does not in the least imply, that they are endued with any latent capacities of a rational or moral nature. The economy of the universe might require, that there should be living creatures without any capacities of this kind. And all difficulties as to the manner how they are to be disposed of, are so apparently and wholly founded in our ignorance, that it is wonderful they should be insisted upon by any, but such as are weak enough to think they are acquainted with the whole system of things. There is then absolutely nothing at all in this objection, which is so rhetorically urged, against the greatest part of the natural proofs or presumptions of the immortality of human minds; I say the greatest part, for it is less applicable to the following observation, which is more peculiar to mankind.

III. As it is evident our present powers and capacities of reason, memory, and affection, do not depend upon our gross body in the manner in which perception by our organs of sense does; so they do not appear to depend upon it at all, in any such manner as to give ground to think, that the dissolution of this body will be the destruction of these our present powers of reflection, as it will of our powers of sensation; or to give ground to conclude, even that it will be so much as a suspension of the former.

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1

Among these were Jones, author of the admirable Treatise on the Canon of the New Testament: Lardner, Maddox, Chandler, Archbishop Secker, &c.

2

Sermon at Spittle, on Abraham’s trial.

3

Among them were Cudworth, born 1617; “Intel. Syst. of the Universe:” Boyle, 1626; “Things above Reason:” Stillingfleet, 1635; “Letters to a Deist:” Sir I. Newton, 1642; “Observations on Prophecy:” Leslie, 1650; “Short Method with Deists:” Lowth, 1661, Vindic. of the Divine Author of the Bible: King, 1669; “Origin of Evil:” Sam. Clark, 1675; “Evidences of Nat. and Rev. Religion:” Waterland, 1683; “Scripture Vindicated:” Lardner, 1684; “Credibility of Gospel History:” Leland, 1691; “View of Deistical Writers,” and “Advantage and Necessity of Rev.:” Chandler, 1693; “Definition of Christianity,” on “Prophecy,” &c.: Warburton, 1698; “Divine Leg. of Moses;” Bishop Newton, 1704; “On the Prophecies:” Watson, 1737; “Apology for Christianity,” (against Gibbon,) and also “Apology for the Bible,” (against Paine.)

4

McIntosh: “Progress of Ethical Philosophy.”

5

Brougham: “Disc. on Nat. Theology.”

6

Verisimile.

7

[These three ways of being “like,” are very distinct from each other. The first is equivalent to a logical induction. The second produces belief, because the same evidence made us believe in a similar case. The third is just an analogy, in the popular sense of the term.]

8

The story is told by Mr. Locke in the Chapter of Probability.

9

[This is good common sense, and men always act thus if prudent. But it is not enough thus to act in the matter of salvation. “He that believeth not shall be damned:” Mark xvi. 16. “He that believeth hath everlasting life:” John iii. 36. “With the heart man believeth unto righteousness:” Rom. x. 10. Belief is part of the sinner’s duty in submitting himself to God; and not merely a question of prudence.]

10

See Part II. chap. vi.

11

Philocal. p. 23, Ed. Cant.

12

[Some of these speculations, carried to the full measure of absurdity and impiety, may be found in Bayle’s great “Historical and Critical Dictionary.” See as instances, the articles Origen, Manichæus, Paulicians.]

13

Ch. i.

14

Ch. ii.

15

Ch. iii.

16

Ch. iv.

17

Ch. v.

18

Ch. vi.

19

Ch. vii.

20

Part II. Ch. i.

21

Ch. ii.

22

Ch. iii.

23

Ch. iv.

24

Ch. v.

25

Ch. vi. vii.

26

Ch. viii.

27

[This chapter Dr. Chalmers regards as the least satisfactory in the book: not because lacking in just analogies, but because infected with the obscure metaphysics of that age. His reasoning, however, only serves to show that B. has perhaps made too much of the argument from the indivisibility of consciousness; and by no means that he does not fairly use it.

28

I say kind of presumption or probability; for I do not mean to affirm that there is the same degree of conviction, that our living powers will continue after death, as there is, that our substances will.

29

Destruction of living powers, is a manner of expression unavoidably ambiguous; and may signify either the destruction of a living being, so as that the same living being shall be incapable of ever perceiving or acting again at all; or the destruction of those means and instruments by which it is capable of its present life, of its present state of perception and of action. It is here used in the former sense. When it is used in the latter, the epithet present is added. The loss of a man’s eye is a destruction of living powers in the latter sense. But we have no reason to think the destruction of living powers, in the former sense, to be possible. We have no more reason to think a being endued with living powers, ever loses them during its whole existence, than to believe that a stone ever acquires them.

30

[The next paragraph indicates that Butler does not, as Chalmers thinks, consider this argument as “handing us over to an absolute demonstration.” It just places all arguments for and against the soul’s future life, in that balanced condition, which leaves us to learn the fact from revelation, free from presumptions against its truth. This view of the case entirely relieves the objection as to the future life of brutes; and shows how entirely we must rely on revelation, as to the future, both of man and beast.]

31

[Dodwell had published a book, in which he argues that human souls are not naturally immortal, but become so, by the power of the Holy Ghost, in regeneration. Dr. Clarke replied. The controversy was continued by Collins. Dr. C. wrote four tracts on the subject.These “presumptions” form the base of materialism, and hence the denial of a future state. Surely, thoughts and feelings, if material, have extension. But can any one conceive of love a foot long, or anger an inch thick? How superior to the gloomy mists of modern infidels have even pagans been! Cicero makes Cato say, “The soul is a simple, uncompounded substance, without parts or mixture: it cannot be divided, and so cannot perish.” And in another place, “I never could believe that the soul lost its senses by escaping from senseless matter; or that such a release will not enlarge and improve its powers;” and again, “I am persuaded that I shall only begin truly to live, when I cease to live in this world,” Xenophon reports Cyrus as saying, in his last moments, “O my sons! do not imagine that when death has taken me from you, I shall cease to exist.”]

32

See Dr. Clarke’s Letter to Mr. Dodwell, and the defences of it.

33

[As every particle of our bodies is changed within seven years, an average life would take us through many such changes. If the mind changes with the body, it would be unjust for an old man to be made to suffer for the sins of his youth. To escape this, the materialist is driven to affirm that the whole is not altered, though every particle be changed.This argument from the constant flux is irresistible. It proves our identity, and that matter and mind are not the same. Does it not also destroy all presumption that the Ego cannot exist without this particular body?]

34

See Dissertation I.

35

[The mind affects the body, as much as the body does the mind. Love, anger, &c. quicken the circulation; fear checks it; terror may stop it altogether. Mania is as often produced by moral, as by physical causes, and hence of late moral means are resorted to for cure. The brain of a maniac, seldom shows, on dissection, any derangement. But this does not prove that there was no functional derangement.]

36

[“S. What shall we say, then, of the shoemaker? That he cuts with his instrument only, or with his hands also? A. With his hands also. S. Does he use his eyes also, in making shoes? A. Yes. S. But are we agreed that he who uses, and what he uses, are different? A. Yes. S. The shoemaker, then, and harper, are different from the hands and eyes they use? A. It appears so. S. Does a man then use his whole body? A. Certainly. S. But he who uses, and that which he uses are different. A. Yes. S. A man then is something different from his own body.” Plat. Alcibi. Prim. p. 129, D. Stallb. Ed.“It may easily be perceived that the mind both sees and hears, and not those parts which are, so to speak, windows of the mind.” “Neither are we bodies; nor do I, while speaking this to thee, speak to thy body.” “Whatever is done by thy mind, is done by thee.” Cicero, Tusc. Disput. I. 20, 46 and 22, 52.“The mind of each man is the man; not that figure which may be pointed out with the finger.” Cic., de Rep. b. 6, s. 24.]

37

[Butler’s argument, if advanced for proof would prove too much, not only as to brutes but as to man; for it would prove pre-existence. And this is really the tenet, (i. e. transmigration,) of those who arrive at the doctrine of immortality only by philosophy. Philosophy cannot establish the doctrine of a future state, nor can it afford any presumptions against either a future or a pre-existent state.Nothing is gained by insisting that reason teaches the true doctrine of the soul; any more than there would be by insisting that by it we learned the doctrine of a trinity, or atonement. Philosophy does teach that He who can create, under infinite diversity of forms, can sustain existence, in any mode he pleases.The reader who chooses to look further into the discussion as to the immortality of brutes, will find it spread out in Polignac’s Anti-Lucretius, and still more in Bayle’s Dictionary, under the articles Pereira, and Rorarius. The topic is also discussed in Des Cartes on the Passions: Baxter on The Nature of the Soul: Hume’s Essays, Essay 9: Search’s Light of Nature: Cheyne’s Philosophical Principles: Wagstaff on the Immortality of Brutes: Edwards’ Critical and Philosophical Exercitations: Watt’s Essays, Essay 9: Colliber’s Enquiry: Locke on the Understanding, b. 2, ch. ix.: Ditton on the Resurrection: Willis De Anima Brutæ.]