The Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and Course of Nature

285

P. 267, &c.

286

P. 270, &c.

287

Deut. xxviii. 37.

288

All the particular things mentioned in this chapter, not reducible to the head of certain miracles, or determinate completions of prophecy. See p. 263.

289

[Butler states this argument with more than his usual brevity, and its force is not seen without reflection. “If contrivance or accident could have given to Christianity any of its apparent testimonies, its miracles, its prophecies, its morals, its propagation, or [the character of] its founder, there could be no room to believe, or even imagine, that all these appearances of great credibility, could be united together, by any such means. If successful craft could have contrived its public miracles, or the pretence of them, it requires another reach of craft, to adopt its prophecies to the same object. Further, it required not only a different, but a totally opposite art to conceive and promulgate its admirable morals. Again, its propagation, in defiance of the powers and terrors of the world, implied still other qualities of action. Lastly, the model of the life of its founder, is a work of such originality and wisdom, as could be the offspring only of consummate powers of invention, or rather never could have been devised, but must have come from real life. The hypothesis sinks under its incredibility. Each of these suppositions of contrivance, being arbitrary and unsupported, the climax of them is an extravagance.” – Davison, on Prophecy.]

290

1 John iv. 18. – [“There is no fear in love,” &c.]

291

[Obedience from dread, if it continue to be the only motive, precludes advance toward perfection; for “He that feareth is not made perfect in love.” But obedience from a discernment of the reasonableness and beneficence of religion, and of the perfections of its Author, increases love till it “casteth out fear.”]

292

[See a discussion of this subject, in Bayle’s Historical and Biographical Dictionary: art. Xenophanes: notes D, E, F, G.]

293

See Dissertation II.

294

[It is remarked by Dean Fitzgerald, that “It is not inconceivable that the Almighty should apply such a test of men’s candor and fidelity, as should require them first to act upon a thing as true, before they were so fully satisfied of its truth as to leave no doubt remaining. Such a course of action might be the appointed, and for all we know, the only possible way of overcoming habits of thought and feeling, repugnant to the belief demanded, so that a fixed religious faith might be the reward, as it were, of a sincere course of prudent behavior.”]

295

By arguing upon the principles of others, the reader will observe is meant, not proving any thing from those principles, but notwithstanding them. Thus religion is proved, not from the opinion of necessity; which is absurd: but, notwithstanding or even though that opinion were admitted to be true.

296

P. 141, &c.

297

Prov. xx. 27.

298

Serm. at the Rolls, p. 106.

299

John iii. 16: Heb. v. 9.

300

P. 258, &c.

301

Locke’s Works, vol. i. p. 146.

302

Locke, pp. 146, 147.

303

Locke, p. 152.

304

See an answer to Dr. Clarke’s Third Defence of his Letter to Mr. Podwell, 2d edit. p. 44, 56, &c.

305

[“One is continually reminded throughout this dissertation, of what is called The common-sense school of Scotch metaphysicians. Nor can there be any doubt that Reid, in particular, was largely indebted to Butler, of whose writings he was a diligent student, for forming that sober and manly character of understanding which is, I think, his great merit.” – Fitzgerald.]

306

This way of speaking is taken from Epictetus, and is made use of as seeming the most full, and least liable to cavil. And the moral faculty may be understood to have these two epithets, δοκιμαστικὴ and ἀποδοκιμαστικὴ [applauding and condemning] upon a double account; because, upon a survey of actions, whether before or after they are done, it determines them to be good or evil; and also because it determines itself to be the guide of action and of life, in contradistinction from all other faculties, or natural principles of action; in the very same manner as speculative reason directly and naturally judges of speculative truth and falsehood: and at the same time is attended with a consciousness upon reflection, that the natural right to judge of them belongs to it.

307

Οὐδὲ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ κακία – ἐν πείσει ἀλλὰ ἐνεργείᾳ, [Virtue and vice are not in feeling, but in action,] M. Anton, lib. ix. 16. Virtutis laus omnis in actione consistit. [The whole praise of virtue, depends on action.] Cic. Off. lib. i. cap. 6.

308

P. 145.