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The Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and Course of Nature
Ans. 3. Our answers to the objections against religion, are not equally valid against the proofs of it.
[Answers rehearsed.]
Ans. 4. Our answers, though they may be said to be based on our ignorance, are really not so, but on what analogy teaches concerning our ignorance, – viz.: that it renders us incompetent judges. They are based on experience, and what we do know; so that to credit religion is to trust to experience, and to disregard it is the contrary.
CONCLUSION1. The reasoning of the last chapter leads us to regard this life as part of a larger plan of things.
1.) Whether we are connected with the distant parts of the universe, is uncertain; but it is very clear we are connected, more or less, with present, past, and future.
2.) We are evidently in the midst of a scheme, not fixed but progressive; and one equally incomprehensible, whether we regard the present, past, or future.
2. This scheme contains as much that is wonderful as religion does: for it certainly would be as wonderful that all nature came into existence without a Creator, as that there should be a Creator: and as wonderful that the Creator should act without any rule or scheme, as that he should act with one; or that he should act by a bad rule, rather than a righteous one.
3. Our very nature compels us to believe that the will and character of the Author of nature, is just and good.
4. Whatever be his character, he formed the world as it is, and controls it as he does, and has assigned us our part and lot.
5. Irrational creatures act their part, and receive their lot, without reflection, but creatures endued with reason, can hardly avoid reflecting whither we go, and what is the scheme, in the midst of which we find ourselves.
[Here follows a recapitulation of the book.]
PART II
CHAPTER IIMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITYEvery one must admit that we need a revelation. Few, if any, could reason out a system, even of natural religion. If they could, there is no probability that they would. Such as might, would still feel the want of revelation. To say that Christianity is superfluous, is as wild as to say all are happy.
No exactness in attending to natural religion can make Christianity of small importance.
If Christianity be from God, we must obey, unless we know all his reasons for giving it: and also that those reasons no longer exist; at least in our case. This we cannot know.
The importance of Christianity appears if we regard it
I. As a republication of natural religion1. It gives the moral system of the universe.
1.) Free from corruptions; teaching that
– Jehovah created all things.
– ” governs all things.
– Virtue is his law.
– Mankind will be judged according to character.
2.) It publishes its facts authoritatively.
3.) With vastly more clearness; e.g. the doctrines of a future state: danger of sin: efficacy of repentance.
4.) With the advantage of a visible church, distinguished from the world by peculiar institutions.
Objec. The perversions of Christianity, and the little good it has done.
Ans. 1. Natural religion is no less perverted, and has done less good.
2. The benefits of Christianity are not small.
3. The evils ascribed to it, are not its effects. Things are to be judged by their genuine tendencies.
4. The light of reason, no more than revelation forces acquiescence.
5.) With the additional advantage that every Christian, is bound to instruct and persuade others.
II. As containing truths not discoverable by natural reason1. A mode of salvation for the ruined.
2. Duties unknown before.
3. Our relations to the Son and Holy Ghost.
1.) Hence the form of baptism.
2.) Pious regards to Christ, and the Holy Ghost, based on our relations to them.
4. The manner of external worship.
III. The fearful hazard of neglecting Christianity1. Those who think natural religion sufficient, must admit that Christianity is highly important.
2. Our relations to Christ being made known, our religious regard to him is an evident obligation.
3. These relations being real, there is no reason to think that our neglect of behaving suitably to them, will not be attended with the same kind of consequences as follow the neglect of duties made known by reason.
4. If we are corrupt and depraved, and so unfit for heaven, and if we need God’s Holy Spirit to renew our nature, how can it be a slight thing whether we make use of the means for obtaining such assistance?
5. Thus, if Christianity be either true, or merely credible, it is most rash and presumptuous to treat it lightly.
REMARKS1. The distinction between positive and moral obligations.
1.) For moral precepts we can see the reason: for positive we cannot.
2.) Moral duties are such prior to command; positive duties are such because commanded.
3.) The manner in which a duty is made known, does not make it moral or positive.
2. The ground of regarding moral duties as superior to positive.
1.) Both have the nature of moral commands.
2.) If the two conflict, we must obey the moral.
– Positive institutions are means to moral ends.
– Ends are more excellent than means.
– Obedience to positive institutions, has no value but as proceeding from moral principle.
3.) Both moral and positive duties are revealed, and so are on a level; but the moral law is also interwoven with our very nature, and so its precepts must prevail when the two interfere.
3. There is less necessity for determining their relative authority, than some suppose.
1.) Though man is disposed to outward and ritual religion, nothing can give us acceptance with God, without moral virtue.
2.) Scripture always lays stress on moral duties.
3.) It is a great weakness, though very common, to make light of positive institutions, because less important than moral.
– We are bound to obey all God’s commands.
– A precept, merely positive, admitted to be from God, creates moral obligation, in the strictest sense.
CONCLUSIONThis account of Christianity shows our great obligation to study the Scriptures.
CHAPTER IIPRESUMPTIONS AGAINST A REVELATION, CONSIDERED AS MIRACULOUSHaving shown the need of revelation, we now examine the presumptions against it.
The analogy of nature is generally supposed to afford presumptions against miracles.
They are deemed to require stronger evidence than other events.
I. Analogy furnishes no presumptions against the general scheme of Christianity1. It is no presumption against Christianity, that it is not the discovery of reason, or of experience.
2. Nor is it a presumption against Christianity, that it contains things unlike the apparent course of nature.
1.) We cannot suppose every thing, in the vast universe, to be just like what is the course of nature in this little world.
2.) Even within the present compass of our knowledge, we see many things greatly unlike.
3. If we choose to call what is unlike our known course of things, miraculous, still that does not make it improbable.
II. There is no presumption against such a revelation, as we should now call miraculous, being made, at the beginning of the world1. There was then no course of nature, as to this world.
2. Whether man then received a revelation involves a question not of miracles, but of fact.
3. Creation was a very different exertion of power from that which rules the world, now it is made.
4. Whether the power of forming stopped when man was made; or went on, and formed a religion for him, is merely a question as to the degree or extent, to which a power was exerted.
5. There is then no presumption from analogy against supposing man had a revelation when created.
6. All tradition and history teaches that he had, which amounts to a real and material proof.
III. There is no presumption against miracles, or a miraculous revelation, after the course of nature was settled1. Such a presumption, requires the adduction of some parallel case.
2. This would require us to know the history of some other world.
3. Even then, if drawn from only one other world, the presumption would be very precarious.
To be more particular,
1. There is a strong presumption against any truth till it is proved – which yet is overcome by almost any proof.
– Hence the question of a presumption against miracles, involves only the degree of presumption, (not whether the presumption is peculiar to miracles,) and whether that degree is such as to render them incredible.
2. If we leave out religion, we are in total darkness as to the cause or circumstances on which the course of nature depends.
– Five or six thousand years may have given occasion and reasons for miraculous interpositions of Providence.
3. Taking in religion, there are distinct reasons for miracles; to afford additional instruction; to attest the truth of instruction.
4. Miracles must not be compared with common events, but with uncommon; earthquakes, pestilence, &c.
CONCLUSION1. There are no analogies to render miracles incredible.
2. On the contrary, we see good reasons for them.
3. There are no presumptions against them, peculiar to them, as distinguished from other unusual phenomena.
CHAPTER IIIOUR INCAPACITY OF JUDGING WHAT SHOULD BE EXPECTED IN A REVELATION FROM GODBeside the objectors to the evidences of Christianity, there are many who object to its nature. They say it is not full enough: has in it foolish things: gives rise to superstition: subserves tyranny: is not universally known: not well arranged: figurative language, &c.
It is granted that if it contained immoralities or contradictions they would show it to be false. But other objections against religion, aside from objections against its evidences, are frivolous: as will now be shown.
Let the student look to the force of the proofs, rather than any consequences which may be drawn from them.
I. The Scripture informs us of a scheme of government, in addition to the material laws of the world1. If both these schemes, the physical and the moral, coincide and form one whole, then our inability to criticise the system of nature, renders it credible that we are incompetent to criticise the system of grace.
2. Nature shows many things we should not have expected, prior to experience.
3. Hence it is altogether likely it would be so in religion.
4. If a citizen is incompetent to judge of the propriety of the general laws of his government, he is equally incompetent to judge when and how far those laws should be suspended, or deviated from.
II. We are no better judges of how revelation should be impartedWhether to every man, or to some for others; or what mode or degree of proof should be given; or whether the knowledge should be given gradually or suddenly.
1. We are not able to judge how much new knowledge ought to be given by revelation.
2. Nor how far, nor in what way, God should qualify men to transmit any revelation he might make.
3. Nor whether the evidence should be certain, probable, or doubtful.
4. Nor whether all should have the same benefit from it.
5. Nor whether it should be in writing, or verbal. If it be said that if not in writing it would not have answered its purpose: I ask, what purpose? Who knows what purposes would best suit God’s general government?
6. All which shows it to be absurd to object to particular things in revelation as unsuitable.
III. Hence the only question, concerning the truth of revelation is, whether it is a revelation1. No obscurities, &c. could overthrow the authority of a revelation.
2. It can only be overthrown by nullifying the proofs.
3. Though the proofs could be shown to be less strong than is affirmed, it still should control our conduct.
IV. Modes of arguing, which are perfectly just, in relation to other books, are not so as to the Bible1. We are competent judges of common books, but not of Scripture.
2. Our only inquiry should be to find out the sense.
3. In other books, internal improbabilities weaken external proof; but in regard to revelation, we scarcely know what are improbabilities.
1.) Those who judge the Scripture by preconceived expectations, will imagine they find improbabilities.
2.) And so they would by thus judging in natural things.
– It would seem very improbable, prior to experience, that man should be better able to determine the magnitudes and motions of heavenly bodies, than he is to determine the causes and cures of disease, which much more nearly concerns him.
– Or that we should sometimes hit upon a thing in an instant, even when thinking of something else, which we had been vainly trying to discover for years.
– Or that language should be so liable to abuse, that every man may be a deceiver.
– Or that brute instinct should ever be superior to reason.
V. Such observations apply to almost all objections to Christianity, as distinguished from objections against its evidenceFor instance, the disorderly manner in which some, in the apostolic age used their miraculous gifts.
1. This does not prove the acts not miraculous.
2. The person having any such gift, would have the same power over it which he would have over any other ability, and might pervert it.
3. To say why was he not also endued with prudence, to restrain its use, is but saying why did not God give a higher degree of miraculous endowment? As to which we are not competent judges.
4. God does not confer his natural gifts, (memory, eloquence, knowledge, &c.) only on those who are prudent and make the best use of them.
5. Nor is worldly instruction, by educators, commonly given in the happiest manner.
VI. There is a resemblance between religion and nature in several other respects1. In both, common and necessary things, are plain; but to “go on to perfection” in either, requires exact and laborious study.
2. The hinderances to both religious and physical knowledge, are the same in kind. A more perfect knowledge may be brought about,
1.) By the progress of learning and liberty.
2.) By students attending to intimations overlooked by the generality.
3. It is not wonderful that our knowledge of Bible truth should be small; for the natural world has laid open to inspection, for thousands of years, and yet only lately are any great discoveries made.
4. Perhaps these scientific discoveries, are to be the means of opening and ascertaining Bible truth.
Objec. The cases are not parallel; for natural knowledge is of no consequence, compared to spiritual.
Ans. 1. The cases are parallel; for natural knowledge is as important to our natural well-being, as spiritual knowledge is to our spiritual well-being.
Ans. 2. If the cases were not parallel, there are plenty of other analogies, which show that God does not dispense his gifts according to our notions of their value.
Objec. 2. If Christianity be intended for the recovery of men, why not sooner introduced, and more widely diffused?
Ans. The objection is just as strong against the natural sciences. Nay, if the light of nature and of revelation are both from the same source, we might expect that revelation would have been introduced and diffused just as it is.
1.) Remedies for disease are known but to a few, or not known at all, nor to any without care and study.
2.) When proposed by discoverers, they have been treated with derision, and the use rejected by thousands whom they might have cured.
3.) The best remedies have been used unskilfully, and so made to produce more disease.
4.) Their benefit may come very slowly.
5.) In some cases they may be wholly ineffectual.
6.) They maybe so disagreeable that many will not submit to use them, even with the prospect of a cure.
7.) Sometimes the remedy may be entirely out of reach if we were ready to take it.
All this reasoning may be applied to Christianity.
VII. Having obviated all objections to Christianity, from its containing things we should not have expected, we will now consider the objections against its morality1. Reason may judge, as to whether revelation contains things contrary to justice, and wisdom, &c. as those attributes are taught by natural religion. But no such objections are advanced, except such as would equally condemn the constitution of nature.
2. There are indeed particular precepts, to particular persons, which would be immoral, but for the precept. The precept changes the nature of the action.
3. None are contrary to immutable morality. We are never commanded to cultivate the principles of ingratitude, treachery, &c.
4. God may command the taking of life or property because these are his.
5. The only real difficulty is, that such commands are liable to be perverted by the wicked to their own horrid purposes; and to mislead the weak. But such objections do not lie against revelation, as such, but against the very notion of religion as a trial.
6. The sum of the whole is, objections against the scheme of Christianity do not affect its truth; since there are no objections against its morality. Hence objections against it, aside from its evidences, are frivolous. Objections against the evidence, will be considered in a subsequent chapter, [i. e. ch. vii.]
CHAPTER IVCHRISTIANITY A SCHEME IMPERFECTLY UNDERSTOODIn the last chapter it was shown that we might expect, beforehand, that a revelation would contain strange things, and things liable to great objections.
This abates the force of such objections, or rather precludes them.
But it may be said this does not show such objectionable things to be good, or credible.
It was a sufficient answer [ch. vii. part i.] to objections against the course of nature, that it was a scheme, imperfectly comprehended.
If Christianity be a scheme, the like objections admit of a like answer.
[In studying this chapter, let chap. vii. part i. be kept in view.]
I. Christianity is a scheme, beyond our comprehension1. God’s general plan is to conduct things gradually, so that, finally, every one shall receive what he deserves.
2. Christianity is a particular arrangement, under this general plan: is a part of it, and conduces to its completion.
3. It is itself a complicated and mysterious economy.
1.) Its arrangements began from the fall of man.
2.) Various dispensations, patriarchal, prophetic, &c. were preparatory to it.
3.) At a certain juncture in the condition of the world Jesus Christ came.
4.) The mission of the Holy Ghost was part of this economy.
5.) Christ now presides over it, and will establish the church, judge the world, give up the kingdom, &c. &c.
4. Of course, we can comprehend but little of such a scheme.
5. We plainly see, from what is revealed, that there is very much unrevealed.
6. Thus it is evident that we are as little capable of judging as to the whole system of religion, as we are as to the whole system of nature.
II. In both material and spiritual things, means are used to accomplish ends1. Hence a thing may seem foolish to us, because we do not know its object and end.
2. Its seeming foolish to us, is no proof that it is so.
III. Christianity is carried on by general laws, no less than nature1. Why do we say there are laws of nature?
1.) We indeed know some such. But nothing of the laws of many things, e. g.
· Pestilence.
· Storms.
· Earthquakes.
· Diversities of human powers.
· Association of ideas.
2.) Hence we call many things accidental, which we know are not matters of chance, but are subject to general laws.
3.) It is a very little way that we can trace things to their general laws.
4.) We attribute many things to such laws, only by analogy.
2. Just for the same reasons, we say that miracles comport with God’s general laws of wisdom. These laws may be unknown to us; but no more so than those by which some die as soon as born, or live to old age, or have superior understandings, &c.
3. We see no more reason to regard the frame and course of nature as a scheme, than we have to regard Christianity as such.
1.) If the first is a scheme, then Christianity, if true, would be likely to be a scheme.
2.) As Christianity is revealed but in part, and is an arrangement to accomplish ends, there would of course seem to us, in it, irregularities; just as we see in nature.
3.) Therefore objections against the one, are answered in the same manner as objections against the other.
Having, in a previous chapter, [ch. iii.,] answered objections to Christianity as a matter of fact, and in this, as a general question of wisdom and goodness, the next thing is to discuss objections in particular.
As one of these is directed against the scheme, as just now described, it will be considered here.
Objec. Christianity is a roundabout, and perplexed contrivance; just such as men, for want of understanding or power, are obliged to adopt, in their designs.
Ans. 1.) God uses just such complex arrangements in the natural world. The mystery is quite as great in nature as in grace.
2.) We do not know what are means, and what are ends.
3.) The natural world, and its government, are not fixed, but progressive.
4.) Great length of time is required in some changes; e. g. animals, vegetables, geological periods, &c.
5.) One state of life is a preparation and means for attaining another.
6.) Man is impatient, but Jehovah deliberate.
CHAPTER VOF A MEDIATOR, AND REDEMPTION BY HIMNothing in Christianity is so much objected to as the position assigned to Christ; yet nothing is more unjust. The whole world exhibits mediation.
I. Our existence, and all its satisfactions, are by the medium of others1. If so in the natural world, why not in the spiritual?
2. The objection therefore is not only against Christ’s mediation, but all mediation.
II. We cannot know all the ends for which God punishes, nor by whom he should punish1. Future punishment may be as natural a sequence of sin, as a broken limb is of falling from a precipice.
2. This is not taking punishment out of the hands of God, and giving it to nature; it is only distinguishing ordinary events from miraculous.