The Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and Course of Nature

– If we had them in full, at birth, we should at first be distracted and bewildered, and our faculties would be of no use previous to experience. Ignorant of any employment, we could not provide for ourselves.

– So that man is an unformed, unfinished creature, even as to this world, till he acquire knowledge, experience, and habits.

2.) Provision is made for our acquiring, in youth, the requisite qualities for manhood.

– Children learn, from their very birth,

· The nature and use of objects.

· The subordinations of domestic life.

· The rules of life.

– Some of this learning is acquired so insensibly, as to seem like instinct, but some requires great care and labor, and the doing of things we are averse to.

– According as we act during this formative period, is our character formed; and our capacity for various stations in society determined.

– Early opportunities lost, cannot be recovered.

3.) Our state of discipline throughout this life, for another, is exactly of the same kind: and comprehended under one general law.

– If we could not see how the present discipline fitted us for a higher life, it would be no objection.

· We do not know how food, sleep, &c. enlarges the child’s body; nor would we expect such a result, prior to experience.

· Nor do children understand the need of exercise, temperance, restraint, &c.

– We thus see a general analogy of Providence indicating that the present life is preparatory.

4. If virtue is a necessary qualification for future happiness, then we see our need of the moral culture of our present state.

1.) Analogy indicates that our future state will be social.

– Nature furnishes no shadow of unreasonableness in the Scripture doctrine that this future community will be under the more immediate government of God.

– Nor the least proof that its members will not require the exercise of veracity, justice, &c. towards each other; and that character which results from the practice of such virtues.

– Certainly the universe is under moral government; and a virtuous character must, in some way, be a condition of happiness in that state.

2.) We are deficient, and in danger of deviating from what is right.

– We have desires for outward objects.

– The times, degrees, &c. of gratifying these desires, are, of right, subject to the control of the moral principle.

– But that principle neither excites them, nor prevents their being excited.

– They may exist, when they cannot be lawfully gratified, or gratified at all.

– When the desire exists, and the gratification is unlawful, we are tempted.

3.) The only security is the principle within.

– The strengthening of this lessens the danger.

– It may be strengthened, by discipline and exercise.

· Noting examples.

· Attending to the right, and not to preference.

· Considering our true interests.

– When improved, it becomes, in proportion to its strength, our security from the dangers of natural propensions.

– Virtue, become habitual by discipline, is improved virtue; and improved virtue must produce increased happiness, if the government of the world is moral.

4.) Even creatures made upright may fall.

– The fall of an upright being, is not accounted for by the nature of liberty; for that would only be saying that an event happened because it might happen.

– But from the very nature of propensions.

– A finitely perfect being would have propensions corresponding to its surroundings; its understanding; and its moral sense; and all these in due proportions.

– Such a being would have propensions, though the object might not be present, or the indulgence might be contrary to its moral sense; and this would have some tendency, however small, to induce gratification.

– The tendency would be increased by the frequency of occasions; and yet more by the least indulgence, even in thought; till, under peculiar conjunctures, it would become effect.

– The first transgression might so utterly disorder the constitution, and change the proportions of forces, as to lead to a repetition of irregularities; and hence to the construction of bad habits, and a depraved character.

5.) On the contrary, a finitely perfect being may attain higher virtue, and more security, by obeying the moral principle.

– For the danger would lessen, by the increased submissiveness of propensions.

– The moral principle would gain force by exercise.

6.) Thus vice is not only criminal, but degrading; and virtue is not only right, but improving.

– The degree of improvement may be such that the danger of sinning may be almost infinitely lessened.

– Yet the security may always be the habits formed in a state of discipline; making such a state altogether fit and necessary.

7.) This course of reasoning is vastly stronger when applied to fallen and corrupt creatures.

– The upright need improvement; the fallen must be renewed.

– Discipline is expedient for the one; necessary for the other; and of a severer sort.

II. The present world is peculiarly fit for such discipline as we need

1. Surrounding evils tend to produce moderation, practical knowledge, &c. very different from a mere speculative knowledge of our liability to vice and misery.

2. Our experience in this world, with right views and practice, may leave eternal impressions for good.

3. Every act of self-government in the exercise of virtue, must, from the very make of our nature, form habits of virtue, and a more intense virtuous principle.

4. Resolute and persevering resistance to particular and violent temptations, is a continued act of virtue, and that in a higher degree than if the seduction were transient and weak.

5. Self-denial is not essential to virtue, but is almost essential to discipline and improvement.

1.) Because actions materially virtuous, which have no difficulty, but agree with our inclinations, may be done merely from inclination, and so not be really virtuous.

2.) But when they are done in face of danger and difficulty, virtuousness is increased, and confirmed into a habit.

Objec. 1. As our intellectual or physical powers may be overtasked, so may our moral.

Ans. This may be so in exceptional cases, but it does not confute the argument. In general, it holds good. All that is intended to be proved is, that this world is intended to be a state of improvement, and is fitted for it.

1.) Some sciences which of themselves are highly improving, require a trying measure of attention, which some will not submit to.

2.) It is admitted that this world disciplines many to vice: but this viciousness of many is the very thing which makes the world a virtuous discipline to good men. The whole end in placing mankind as they are we know not; but these things are evident – the virtues of some are exercised: – and so exercised as to be improved: and improved beyond what they would be in a perfectly virtuous community.

3.) That all, or even the generality, do not improve, is no proof that their improvement was not intended. Of seeds and animals not one in a million comes to perfection; yet such as do, evidently answer an end for which they were designed. The appearance of waste in regard to seeds, &c. is just as unaccountable, as the ruin of moral agents.

Objec. 2. Rectitude arising from hope and fear, is only the discipline of self-love.

Ans. Obedience is obedience, though prompted by hope or fear: and a course of such obedience, forms a habit of it: and distinct habits of various virtues, by repressing inclination whenever justice, veracity, &c. require.

Beside, veracity, justice, regard to God’s authority, and self-interest, are coincident; and each, separately, a just principle. To begin a good life from either of them, and persist, produces that very character which corresponds to our relations to God, and secures happiness.

Objec. 3. The virtues requisite for a state of afflictions, and produced by it, are not wanted to qualify us for a state of happiness.

Ans. Such is not the verdict of experience. Passive submission is essential to right character. Prosperity itself begets extravagant desires; and imagination may produce as much discontent as actual condition. Hence, though we may not need patience in heaven, we shall need that temper which is formed by patience.

Self-love would always coincide with God’s commands, when our interest was rightly understood; but it is liable to error. Therefore, HABITS of resignation are necessary, for all creatures; and the proper discipline for resignation is affliction.

Objec. 4. The trouble and danger of such discipline, might have been avoided by making us at once, what we are intended to become.

Ans. What we are to be, is the effect of what we are to do. God’s natural government is arranged not to save us from trouble or danger, but to enable and incline us to go through them. It is as natural for us to seek means to obtain things, as it is to seek the things; and in worldly things we are left to our choice, whether to improve our powers and so better our condition, or to neglect improvement and so go without the advantage.

Analogy, therefore, makes the same arrangement credible, as to a future state.

III. This state of discipline may be necessary for the display of character

1. Not to the all-knowing Being, but to his creation, or part of it, and in many ways which we know not.

2. It may be a means in disposing of men according to character.

3. And of showing creation that they are so disposed of.

4. Such display of character certainly contributes, largely, to the general course of things considered in this chapter.

CHAPTER VIOF NECESSITY AS INFLUENCING CONDUCT

Fatalists have no right to object to Christianity, for they of course hold the doctrine to be compatible with what they see in nature.

The question is, whether it be not equally compatible with what Christianity teaches.

To argue on the supposition of so great an absurdity as necessity, is puzzling; and the obscurity and puzzle of the argument must therefore be excused.

I. Necessity does not destroy the proof of an intelligent Author and Governor of the world

1. It does not exclude design and deliberation.

1.) This is matter of actual experience and consciousness.

– Necessity does not account for the existence of any thing, but is only a circumstance relating to its origin. Instance the case of a house: the fatalist admits that it had a builder, and the only question would be, was he obliged to build it as he did?

2.) It is the same as to the construction of the world. To say it exists by necessity must mean it had a maker, who acted by necessity: for necessity is only an abstract notion, and can do nothing.

3.) We say God exists by necessity, because we intuitively discern that there must be an infinite Being, prior to all causes; but we cannot say that every thing so exists. The fact that many changes in nature are produced by man’s contrivance is a proof of this.

4.) Thus though the fatalist does not choose to mean by necessity an agent acting necessarily, he is obliged to mean this.

5.) And it also follows that a thing’s being done by necessity does not exclude design.

2. It does not exclude a belief that we are in a state of religion.

1.) Suppose a fatalist to educate a child on his own principles, – viz.: that he cannot do otherwise than he does; and is not subject to praise or blame. (It might be asked, would he, if possessed of common sense, so educate his child?)

– The child would be delighted with his freedom; but would soon prove a pest, and go to destruction.

– He would meet with checks and rebuffs, which would teach him that he was accountable.

– He would, in the end, be convinced either that his doctrine was wrong, or that he had reasoned inconclusively upon it, and misapplied it.

2.) To apply fatalism to practice, in any other way, would be found equally fallacious: e. g. that he need not take care of his life.

3.) No such absurdity follows the doctrine of freedom.

– Reasoning on this ground is justified by all experience.

– The constitution of things is as if we were free.

4.) If the doctrine of necessity be true, and yet, when we apply it to life, always misleads us; how, then, can we be sure it would not mislead us with respect to future interests?

5.) It follows that if there are proofs of religion on the supposition of freedom, they are just as conclusive on the supposition of necessity.

3. It does not refute the notion that God has a will and a character.

1.) It does not hinder us from having a will and a character; from being cruel, or benevolent, or just, &c.

2.) If necessity be plead as the excuse for crime, it equally excuses the punishment of crime; for if it destroys the sin of the one, it destroys the sin of the other.

3.) The very assumption of injustice in punishing crime, shows that we cannot rid ourselves of the notion of justice and injustice.

Objec. If necessity be reconcilable with the character of God, as portrayed in Christianity, does it not destroy the proof that he has that character; and so destroy the proofs of religion?

Ans. No. Happiness and misery are not our fate, but the results of our conduct. God’s government is that of a father and a magistrate; and his natural rule of government must be veracity and justice. We shall proceed to show that,

II. Necessity does not destroy the proofs of religion

1. It is a plain fact that God rewards and punishes.

1.) He has given us a moral faculty, by which we discern between actions, and approve or disapprove, &c.

2.) This implies a rule, a peculiar kind of rule; i. e. one from which we cannot depart without being self-condemned.

3.) The dictates of our moral faculty are God’s laws, with sanctions. It not only raises a sense of duty, but a sense of security in obeying, and danger in disobeying; and this is an explicit sanction.

4.) God’s government must conform to the nature he has given us; and we must infer that in the upshot happiness will follow virtue, and misery vice.

5.) Hence religious worship is a duty, if only as a means of keeping up the sense of this government.

6.) No objection from necessity can lie against this course of proof.

– The conclusion is wholly and directly from facts; not from what might appear to us to be fit, but from what his actions tell us he wills.

2. Natural religion has external evidence which necessity, if true, does not affect.

1.) Suppose a person convinced of the truths of natural religion, but ignorant of history, and of the present state of mankind, he would inquire:

– How this religion came?

– How far the belief of it extended?

– If he found that some one had totally propounded it, as a deduction of reason, then, though its evidences from reason would not be impaired, its history would furnish no further proof.

2.) But such an one would find, on the contrary,

– That essentially it had been professed in all countries.

– And can be traced up through all ages.

– And was not reasoned out, but revealed.

3.) These things are of great weight.

– Showing natural religion to be conformed to the common sense of mankind.

– And either that it was revealed, or forces itself upon the mind.

– The rude state of the early ages leads to the belief of its being revealed, and such is the opinion of the learned.

3. Early pretences to revelation indicate some original real one from which they were copied.

– The history of revelation is as old as history itself.

– Such a fact is a proof of religion, against which there is no presumption.

– And indicates a revelation prior to the examination of the book said to contain it; and independent of all considerations of its being corrupted, or darkened by fables.

4. It is thus apparent that the external evidence of religion is considerable; and is not affected by the doctrine of necessity.

REMARKS

1. The danger of taking custom, &c. for our moral rule.

1.) We are all liable to prejudice.

2.) Reason may be impaired, perverted, or disregarded.

3.) The matter in hand is of infinite moment.

2. The foregoing observations amount to practical proof.

Objec. Probabilities which cannot be confuted, may be overbalanced by greater probabilities: much more by demonstration. Now, as the doctrine of necessity must be true, it cannot be that God governs us as if we were free when he knows we are not.

Ans. This brings the matter to a point, and the answer is not to be evaded, – viz.: that the whole constitution and course of things shows this reasoning to be false, be the fallacy where it may.

The doctrine of freedom shows where, – viz.: in supposing ourselves necessary agents when in fact we are free.

Admitting the doctrine of necessity, the fallacy evidently lies in denying that necessary agents are accountable; for that they are rewarded and punished is undeniable.

Conclusion. – It follows that necessity, if true, neither proves that God will not make his creatures happy or miserable according to their conduct, nor destroys the proofs that he will do so. That is, necessity, practically, is false.

CHAPTER VIIDIVINE GOVERNMENT A SCHEME IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED

Moral government, as a fact, has now been considered; it remains for us to remove objections against its wisdom and goodness. A thing being true does not prove it to be good.

In arguing as to its truth, analogy could only show it to be credible. But, if a moral government be admitted as a fact, analogy makes it credible that it is a scheme or system, and that man’s comprehension of it is necessarily so limited, as to be inadequate to determine its injustice.

This we shall find to be the case.

Doctrine. On the supposition that God exercises moral government, the analogy of nature teaches that it must be a scheme, and one quite beyond our comprehension.

I. The ordering of nature is a scheme; and makes it credible by analogy, that moral government is a scheme

1. The parts curiously correspond to each other; individuals to individuals, species to species, events to events; and all these both immediate and remote.

2. This correspondence embraces all the past, and all the future; including all creatures, actions, and events.

1.) There is no event, which does not depend for its occurrence on some further thing, unknown to us; we cannot give the whole account of any one thing.

2.) Things apparently the most insignificant, seem to be necessary to others, of the greatest importance.

3. If such is God’s natural government, it is credible that such is his moral government.

1.) In fact they are so blended as to make one scheme.

– One is subservient to the other, just as the vegetable kingdom subserves the animal, and our animal organization subserves our mental.

– Every act of God seems to look beyond the occasion, and to have reference to a general plan.

– There is evidently a previous adjustment.

· The periods, &c. for trying men.

· The instruments of justice.

· The kinds of retribution.

2.) The whole comprises a system, a very small part of which is known to us: therefore no objections against any part can be insisted on.

3.) This ignorance is universally acknowledged, except in arguing against religion. That it ought to be a valid answer to objections against religion, we proceed to show.

– Suppose it to be asserted that all evils might have been prevented by repeated interpositions; or that more good might have been so produced; which would be the utmost that could be said: still,

– Our ignorance would vindicate religion from any objections arising from apparent disorders in the world.

– The government of the world might be good, even on those suppositions; for at most they could but suggest that it might be better.

– At any rate, they are mere assertions.

– Instances may be alleged, in things much less out of reach, of suppositions palpably impossible, which all do not see to be so: nor any, at first sight.

4.) It follows that our ignorance is a satisfactory answer to all objections against the divine government.

– An objection against an act of Providence, no way connected with any other thing, as being unjust, could not be answered by our ignorance.

– But when the objection is made against an act related to other and unknown acts, then our ignorance is a full answer.

– Some unknown relation, or unknown impossibility, may render the act not only good, but good in the highest degree.

II. Consider some particular things, in the natural government of God, the like of which we may infer, by analogy, to be contained in his moral government

1. No ends are accomplished without means.

1.) Often, means very disagreeable bring the most desirable results.

2.) How means produce ends, is not learned by reason, but experience.

3.) In many cases, before experience, we should have expected contrary results.

4.) Hence we may infer that those things which are objected against God’s moral government, produce good.

5.) It is evident that our not seeing how the means work good, or their seeming to have an opposite effect, offers no presumption against their fitness to work good.

6.) They may not only be fit, but the only means of ultimate good.

Objec. Though our capacity of vice and misery may promote virtue, and our suffering for sin be better than if we were restrained by force, yet it would have been better if evil had not entered the world.

Ans. It is granted that though sinful acts may produce benefits, to refrain from them would produce more. We have curative pains, yet pain is not better than health.

2. Natural government is carried on by general laws.

1.) Nature shows that this is best: all the good we enjoy is because there are general laws. They enable us to forecast for the procurement of good.

2.) It may not be possible, by general laws, to prevent all irregularities, or remedy them.

3.) Direct interpositions might perhaps remedy many disorders arising under them, but this would have bad effects.

– Encouraging improvidence.

– Leaving us no rule of life.

– Every interposition would have distant effects: so that we could not guess what would be the whole result.

· If it be replied that those distant effects might also be corrected by direct interpositions – this is only talking at random.

Objec. If we are so ignorant as this whole argument supposes, we are too ignorant to understand the proofs of religion.

Ans. 1. Total ignorance of a subject precludes argument, but partial ignorance does not. We may, in various degrees, know a man’s character, and the way he is likely to pursue certain ends; and yet not know how he ought to act to gain those ends. In this case objections to his mode of pursuing ends may be answered by our ignorance, though that he does act in a certain manner is capable of proof. So we may have evidence of God’s character and aims, and yet not be competent judges as to his measures. Our ignorance is a good answer to the difficulties of religion, but no objection to religion itself.

Ans. 2. If our ignorance did invalidate the proofs of religion, as well as the objections, yet is it undeniable that moral obligations remain unaffected by our ignorance of the consequences of obedience or violation. The consequences of vice and virtue may not be fully known, yet it is credible that they may be such as religion declares: and this credibility is an obligation, in point of prudence, to abstain from sin.