Protestantism and Catholicity

Note 32, p. 336

I have noticed the opinion of D. Felix Amat, Archbishop of Palmyra, with respect to the obedience due to de facto governments. I have remarked, that this writer's principles, besides being false, are opposed to the rights of the people. The Archbishop of Palmyra appears to have been at a loss to discover a maxim to which it is possible to conform under all circumstances that may occur, and which do occur but too often. He dreaded the obscurity and confusion of ideas when the legitimacy of a given case was to be defined; he wished to remedy an evil, but he appears to have aggravated it to an extraordinary degree. Observe how he sets forth his opinion in his work entitled Idea of the Church Militant, chap. iii. art. 2:

"The more I reflect," says he, "on the difficulties I have just pointed out, the more I am convinced that it is impossible to resolve them, even those which are ancient, with any degree of certainty; and it is equally impossible to derive any light from them to aid us in resolving those which are formed at the present day by the struggle between the prevailing spirit of insubordination in opposition to the judgment and will of the governor, and the contrary effort made to limit more and more the liberty of those who obey. Starting from the divers points and notions that I have laid down relative to the supreme power in all really civil societies, it appears to me, that, instead of losing time in mere speculative discussions, it will be more useful to propose a practical, just, and opportune maxim for the preservation of public tranquillity, especially in Christian kingdoms and states, and for affording the means of re-establishing it when it has been troubled or destroyed.

"The Maxim. – No one can doubt the legitimacy of the obligation of every member of any civil society whatever to obey the government which is de facto and unquestionably established. I say 'unquestionably established,' because there is here no question of a mere invasion or temporary occupation in time of war. From this maxim follow two consequences: 1st, to take part in insurrections, or assemblages of people, addressing themselves to the constituted authorities with a view to compel them to grant what they consider unjust, is always an act contrary to right reason; always unlawful, condemned by the natural law and by the Gospel. 2dly, individual members of society, who combine together and take up arms, in small or large numbers, for the purpose of attacking the established government by physical force, are always guilty of rebellion, a crime strongly opposed to the spirit of our divine religion."

I will not here repeat what I have already said on the unsoundness, the inconveniences, and the dangers of such a doctrine, but merely add, that with respect to governments only established de facto, to grant them the right of commanding and exacting obedience involves a contradiction. To say that a de facto government is bound, whilst it does exist, to protect justice, to avoid crimes, to prevent the dissolution of society, is merely to maintain truths universally admitted, and denied by no one; but to add, that it is unlawful, and contrary to our holy religion, to combine together and raise forces for the overthrow of a de facto government, is a doctrine which Catholic theologians have never professed, which true philosophy has never admitted, and which no nation has ever observed.

Note 33, p. 343

I insert here certain remarkable passages from St. Thomas and Suarez, in which these authors explain the opinions to which I have alluded in the text, respecting the differences which may arise between governors and the governed. I refer to what I have already pointed out in another place; we are not about to examine so much whether such or such doctrines are true, as to discover what were the doctrines at the time we are speaking of, and what opinion the most distinguished doctors formed on the delicate questions of which we are treating.

D. THOMAS(2. 2. Q. 42. art. 2o ad tertium. – Utrum seditio sit semper peccatum mortale?)

3. Arg. Laudantur qui multitudinem a potestate tyrannica liberant, sed hoc non de facili potest fieri sine aliqua dissensione multitudinis, dum una pars multitudinis nititur retinere tyrannum, alia vero nititur eum abjicere, ergo seditio potest fieri sine peccato.

Ad tertium dicendum; quod regimen tyrannicum non est justum quia non ordinatur ad bonum commune, sed ad bonum privatum regentis ut patet per Philosophum; et ideo perturbatio hujus regiminis non habet rationem seditionis, nisi forte quando sic inordinate perturbatur tyranni regimen, quod multitudo subjecta majus detrimentum patitur ex perturbatione consequenti quam ex tyranni regimine; magis autem tyrannus seditiosus est, qui in populo sibi subjecto discordias et seditiones nutrit, ut tutius dominari possit; hoc enim tyrannicum est, cum sit ordinatum ad bonum proprium præsidentis cum multitudinis nocumento.

Cardinalis Cayetanus in hunc textum. "Quis sit autem modus ordinatus perturbandi tyrannum et qualem tyrannum, puta secundum regimen tantum, vel secundum regimen et titulum, non est præsentis intentionis: sat est nunc, quod utrumque tyrannum licet ordinate perturbare absque seditione quandoque; illum ut bono reipublicæ vacet, istum ut expellatur."

LIB. I De Regimine Principum. (Cap. x.)

Quod rex et princeps studere debet ad bonum regimen propter bonum sui ipsius, et utile quod inde sequitur, cujus contrarium sequitur regimen tyrannicum.

Tyrannorum vero dominium diuturnum esse non potest, cum sit multitudini odiosum. Non potest enim diu conservari, quod votis multorum repugnat. Vix enim a quoquam præsens vita transigitur quin aliquas adversitates patiatur. Adversitatis autem tempore occasio deesse non potest contra tyrannum insurgendi; et ubi adsit occasio, non deerit ex multis vel unus qui occasione non utatur. Insurgentem autem populus votive prosequitur: nec de facili carebit effectu, quod cum favore multitudinis attentatur. Vix ergo potest contingere, quod tyranni dominium protendatur in longum. Hoc etiam manifeste patet, si quis consideret unde tyranni dominium conservatur. Non n. conservatur amore, cum parva, vel nulla sit amicitia subjectæ multitudinis ad tyrannum ut ex præhabitis patet: de subditorum autem fide tyrannis confidendum non est. Non n. invenitur tanta virtus in multis, ut fidelitatis virtute reprimantur, ne indebitæ servitutis jugum, si possint, excutiant. Fortassis autem nec fidelitati contrarium reputabitur secundum opinionem multorum, si tyrannicæ nequitiæ qualitercumque obvietur. Restat ergo ut solo timore tyranni regimen sustentetur; unde et timeri se a subditis tota intentione procurant. Timor autem est debile fundamentum. Nam qui timore subduntur, si occurrat occasio qua possint impunitatem sperare, contra præsidentes insurgunt eo ardentius, quo magis contra voluntatem ex solo timore cohibebantur. Sicut si aqua per violentiam includatur, cum aditum invenerit, impetuosius fluit. Sed nec ipse timor caret periculo, cum ex nimio timore plerique in desperationem inciderint. Salutis autem desperatio audacter ad quælibet attentanda præcipitat. Non potest igitur tyranni dominium esse diuturnum. Hoc etiam non minus exemplis, quam rationibus apparet.

LIB. I. CAP. VI

Conclusio; quod regimen unius simpliciter sit optimum; ostendit qualiter multitudo se debet habere circa ipsum, quia auferenda est ei occasio ne tyrannizet, ei quod etiam in hoc est tolerandus propter majus malum vitandum.

Quia ergo unius regimen præ eligendum est, quod est optimum, et contingit ipsum in tyrannidem converti, quod est pessimum, ut ex dictis patet, laborandum est diligenti studio, ut sic multitudini provideatur de rege, ut non incidat in tyrannum. Primum autem est necessarium, ut talis conditionis homo ab illis ad quos hoc spectat officium, promoveatur in regem, quod non sit probabile in tyrannidem declinare. Unde Samuel Dei providentiam erga institutionem regis commendans, ait, 1 Regum xiii.: Quæsivit sibi Dominus, virum secundum cor suum: deinde sic disponenda est regni gubernatio, ut regi jam instituto tyrannidis subtrahatur occasio. Simul etiam sic ejus temperetur potestas, ut in tyrannidem de facili declinare non possit. Quæ quidem ut fiant, insequentibus considerandum erit. Demum vero curandum est, si rex in tyrannidem diverteret, qualiter posset occuri. Et quidem si non fuerit excessus tyrannidis, utilius est remissam tyrannidem tolerare ad tempus, quam tyrannum agendo multis implicari periculis, quæ sunt graviora ipsa tyrannide. Potest, n. contingere ut qui contra tyrannum agunt prævalere non possint, et sic provocatus tyrannus magis desæviat. Quod si prævalere quis possit adversus tyrannum, ex hoc ipso proveniunt multoties gravissimæ dissensiones in populo, sive dum in tyrannum insurgitur, sive post dejectionem tyranni erga ordinationem regiminis multitudo separatur in partes. Contingit etiam ut interdum dum alicujus auxilio multitudo expellit tyrannum, ille potestate accepta tyrannidem arripiat, et timens pati ab alio quod ipse in alium fecit, graviori servitute subditos opprimat. Sic enim in tyrannide solet contingere, ut posterior gravior fiat quam præcedens, dum præcedentia gravamina non deserit, et ipse ex sui cordis malitia nova excogitat: unde Syracusis quondam Dyonisii mortem omnibus desiderantibus, anus quædem ut incolumnis et sibi superstes esset, continue orabat: quod ut tyrannus cognovit, cur hoc faceret interrogavit. Tum illa, puella, inquit, existens cum gravem tyrannum haberemus, mortem ejus cupiebam, quo interfecto, aliquantulum durior successit; ejus quoque dominationem finiri magnum existimabam, tertium te importuniorem habere cœpimus rectorem; itaque si tu fueris absumptus, deterior in locum tuum succedet. Et si sit intolerabilis excessus tyrannidis, quibusdam visum fuit, ut ad fortium virorum virtutem pertineat tyrannum interimere, seque pro liberatione multitudinis exponere periculis mortis: cujus rei exemplum etiam in veteri Testamento habetur. Nam Ajoth quidam Eglon regem Moab, qui gravi servitute populum Dei premebat, sica infixa in ejus femore interemit, et factus est populi judex. Sed hoc Apostolicæ doctrinæ non congruit. Docet n. nos Petrus, non bonis tantum et modestis, verum etiam discolis Dominis reverenter subditos esse. 2 Petr. ii. Hæc est enim gratia, si propter conscientiam Dei sustineat quis tristitias patiens injuste: unde cum multi Romani Imperatores fidem Christi persequerentur tyrannice, magnaque multitudo tam nobilium, quam populi esset ad fidem conversa, non resistendo, sed mortem patienter et armati sustinentes pro Christo laudantur, ut in sacra Thebæorum legione manifeste apparet; magisque Ajoth judicandus est hostem interemisse, quam populi rectorem, licet tyrannum; unde et in veteri Testamento leguntur occisi fuisse hi qui occiderunt Joas regem Juda, quamvis a cultu Dei recedentem, eorumque filiis reservatis secundum legis præceptum. Esset autem hoc multitudini periculosum et ejus rectoribus, si privata præsumptione aliqui attentarent præsidentium necem etiam tyrannorum. Plerumque enim hujusmodi periculis magis exponunt se mali quam boni. Malis autem solet esse grave dominium non minus regum quam tyrannorum, quia secundum sententiam Salomonis: Dissipat impios rex sapiens. Magis igitur ex hujus præsumptione immineret periculum multitudini de amissione regis, quam remedium de subtractione tyranni. Videtur autem magis contra tyrannorum sævitiam non privata præsumptione aliquorum, sed auctoritate publica procedendum. Primo quidem, si ad jus multitudinis alicujus pertineat sibi providere de rege, non injuste ab eadem rex institutus potest destitui, vel refrænari ejus potestas, si potestate regia tyrannice abutatur. Nec putanda est talis multitudo infideliter agere tyrannum destituens, etiamsi eidem in perpetuo se ante subjecerat: quia hoc ipse meruit in multitudinis regimine se non fideliter gerens, ut exigit regis officium, quod ei pactum a subditis non reservetur. Sic Romani Tarquinium superbum quem in regem susceperant, propter ejus et filiorum tyrannidem a regno ejecerunt substituta minori, scilicet consularia potestate. Sic etiam Domitianus, qui modestissimis Imperatoribus Vespasiano patri, et Tito fratri ejus successerat, dum tyrannidem exercet, a senatu Romano interemptus est, omnibus quæ perverse Romanis fecerat per Senatusconsultum juste et salubriter in irritum revocatis. Quo factum est, ut beatus Joannes Evangelista dilectus Dei discipulus, qui per ipsum Domitianum in Pathmos insulam fuerat exilio relegatus, ad Ephesum per Senatusconsultum remitteretur. Si vero ad jus alicujus superioris pertineat multitudini providere de rege, spectandum est ab eo remedium contra tyranni nequitiam. Sic Archelai, qui in Judæa pro Herode patre suo regnare jam cœperat, paternam malitiam imitantis, Judæis contra eum querimoniam ad Cesarem Augustum deferentibus, primo quidem potestas diminuitur, ablato sibi regio nomine, et medietate regni sui inter duos fratres suos divisa: deinde cum nec sic a tyrannide compesceretur a Tiberio Cesare relegatus est in exilium apud Lugdunum Galliæ civitatem. Quod si omnino contra tyrannum auxilium humanum haberi non potest, recurrendum est ad regem omnium Deum, quid est adjutor in opportunitatibus in tribulatione. Ejus enim potentiæ subest, ut cor tyranni crudele convertat in mansuetudinem, secundum Salomonis sententiam. Proverb. xii. Cor regis in manu Dei quocumque voluerit inclinavit illud. Ipse enim regis Assueri crudelitatem, qui Judæis mortem parabat, in mansuetudinem vertit. Ipse est qui ita Nabuchodonosor, crudelem regem convertit, quod factus est divinæ potentiæ prædicator. Nunc igitur, inquit, ego Nabuchodonosor laudo, et magnifico, et glorifico regem cœli, quia opera ejus vera et viæ ejus judicia, et gradientes in superbia potest humiliare. Dan. iv. Tyrannos vero quos reputat conversione indignos, potest auferre de medio vel ad infimum statum reducere, secundum illud Sapientes Eccles. x. Sedem ducum superborum destruxit Deus, et sedere fecit mites pro eis. Ipse enim qui videns afflictionem populi sui in Ægypto, et audiens eorum clamorem Pharaonem tyrannum dejecit cum exercitu suo in mare; ipse est qui memoratum Nabuchodonosor prius superbientem non solum ejectum de regni solio, sed etiam de hominum consortio, in similitudinem bestiæ commutavit. Nec enim abreviata manus ejus est, ut populum suum a tyrannis liberare non possit. Promittit enim populo suo per Isaiam, requiem se daturum a labore et confusione, ac servitute dura, qua ante servierat, et per Ezech. xxxiv. dicit: Liberabo meum gregem de ore eorum pastorum, qui pascunt seipsos. Sed ut, hoc beneficium populus a Deo consequi mereatur, debet a peccatis cessare, quia in ultionem peccati divina permissione impii accipiunt principatum, dicente Domino per Osee xiii.: Dabo tibi regem in furore meo, et in Job. xxxiv. dicitur, quod regnare facit hominem hypocritam propter peccata populi. Tollenda est igitur culpa, ut cesset a tyrannorum plaga.

SUAREZ(Disp. 13. De Bello. sect. 8. – Utrum seditio sit intrinsece mala?)

Seditio dicitur bellum commune intra eamdem Rempublicam, quod geri potest, vel inter duas partes ejus, vel inter Principem et Rempublicam. Dico primo: Seditio inter duas partes Reipublicæ semper est mala ex parte aggressoris: ex parte vero defendentis se justa est. Hoc secundum per se est notum. Primum ostenditur: quia nulla cernitur ibi legitima auctoritas ad indicendum bellum; hæc enim residet in supremo Principe, ut vidimus sect. 2. Dices, interdum poterit Princeps eam auctoritatem concedere, si magna necessitas publica urgeat. At tunc jam non censetur aggredi pars Reipublicæ, sed Princeps ipse; sicque nulla erit seditio de qua loquimur. Sed, quid si illa Reipublicæ pars sit vere offensa ab alia neque possit per Principem jus suum obtinere? Respondeo, non posse plus efficere, quam possit persona privata, ut ex superioribus constare facile potest.

Dico secundo: Bellum Reipublicæ contra Principem, etiamsi aggressivum, non est intrinsece malum; habere tamen debet conditiones justi alias belli, ut honestetur. Conclusio solum habet locum, quando Princeps est tyrannus; quod duobus modis contingit, ut Cajet. not. 2. 2. q. 64 articulo primo ad tertium: primo si tyrannus sit quoad dominium, et potestatem: secundo solum quoad regimen. Quando priori modo accidit tyrannus, tota Respublica, et quodlibet ejus membrum jus habet contra illum; unde quilibet potest se ac Rempublicam a tyrannide vindicare. Ratio est; quia tyrannus ille aggressor est, et inique bellum movet contra Rempublicam, et singula membra; unde omnibus competit jus defensionis. Ita Cajetanus eo loco, sumique potest ex D. Thom. in secundo, distinctione 44, quæstione secunda, articulo secundo. De posteriori tyranno idem docuit Joann. Hus, imo de omni iniquo superiore; quod damnatum est in Concilio Constant. Sessione 8 et 15. Unde certa veritas est, contra hujusmodi tyrannum nullam privatam personam, aut potestatem imperfectam posse juste movere bellum aggressivum, atque illud esset propie seditio. Probatur, quoniam ille, ut supponitur, verus est Dominus: inferiores autem jus non habent indicendi bellum, sed defendendi se tantum; quod non habet locum in hoc tyranno: namque ille non semper singulis facit injuriam, atque si invaderent, id solum possent efficere, quod ad suam defensionem sufficeret. At vero tota Respublica posset bello insurgere contra ejusmodi tyrannum, neque tunc excitaretur propia seditio (hoc siquidem nomen in malam partem sumi consuevit). Ratio est: quia tunc tota Respublica superior est Rege: nam, cum ipsa dederit illi potestatem, ea conditione dedisse censetur, ut politice, non tyrannice regeret, alias ab ipsa posset deponi. Est tamen observandum, ut ille vere, et manifeste tyrannice agat; concurrantque aliæ conditiones ad honestatem belli positas. Lege Divum Thomum 1 de regimine Principum, cap. 6.

Dico tertio: Bellum Reipublicæ contra Regem neutro modo tyrannum, est propiissime seditio, et intrinsece malum. Est certa, et inde constat: quia deest tunc et causa justa, et potestas. Ex quo etiam e contrario constat, bellum Principis contra Rempublicam sibi subditam, ex parte potestatis posse esse justum, si adsint aliæ conditiones; si vero desint, injustum omnino esse.5

Listen to the language of P. Marquez in Spain, in the so-called despotic times: it is well known that his work intituled El Gobernador Cristiano was not one of those obscure books which are never widely circulated; it met with such success that it went through several editions, as well in Spain as in foreign countries. I will give the title at length, and I will add, at the same time, a note of the editions published at different epochs, in different countries, in different languages, – a note which is to be found in the edition of Madrid in 1773.

"The Christian Magistrate (El Gobernador Cristiano), according to the Life of Moses, the Ruler of the People of God, by the R. P. M. J. R. John Marquez, O. S. A., preacher to his Majesty King Philip III., Examiner of the Holy Office of the Inquisition, and Evening Professor of Theology at the University of Salamanca. New and sixth edition, with permission. Madrid, 1773."

"The Christian Magistrate, composed at the request and in honor of His Excellency the Duke of Feria, first published at Salamanca, in the year 1612; a second edition in the same town in 1619; a third edition at Alcala in 1634, and a fourth at Madrid in 1640; the fifth edition was published out of Spain, at Brussels, in 1664. This is the masterpiece among works of this nature which have been written among us.

"Father Martin of St. Bernard, of the Order of Cîteaux, translated this work into Italian, and had it printed at Naples, in 1646. It was also translated into French by M. de Virion, counsellor to the Duke of Lorraine, and it was printed at Nancy in 1621."

BOOK I. CHAP. 8

"We have now to answer the contrary objections. We maintain that neither the divine nor the natural law has given to states the power of arresting the progress of tyranny by means so violent as that of shedding the blood of princes, they being the vicars of God, divinely invested with the right of life and death over other men. But so far as resisting their cruelty is concerned, it is incontestable that it may and ought to be done. They are not to be obeyed in any thing opposed to the law of God; we must, therefore, escape from their wicked commands, and prevent their blows, as Jonathan did with regard to Saul, his father, when he saw him take his spear to smite David, and when, rising from the table, he went in search of the latter, and warned him of his danger. It is also sometimes allowable to resist princes by force of arms, in order to prevent them from executing notoriously rash and cruel determinations; for, according to the words of St. Thomas, this is not to excite sedition, but to stop and prevent it. Tertullian affirms the same thing when he says: 'Illis nomen factionis accommodandum est, qui in odium bonorum et proborum conspirant, cum boni, cum pii congregantur, non est factio dicenda, sed curia.'

"This is the reason why the blessed St. Hermenegildus, a glorious Spanish martyr, took up arms and entered the field against King Leovigildus, an Arian, to resist the great persecution directed by this prince against the Catholics. This fact is related by the contemporary historians. True, St. Gregory of Tours condemns this act of our king-martyr, not for having resisted his sovereign, but because the former was both his king and his father: and he maintains that although he was a heretic, his son ought not to have resisted him. This reply, however, is not well founded, as Baronius observes. Moreover, the authority of this Gregory was combated by another Gregory, greater than he, St. Gregory the Great, who, in the preface to his book of Morales, approves of the embassy of Leander, sent to Constantinople by St. Hermenegildus, to solicit the aid of Tiberius against Leovigildus, his father. It is indubitable that however strong may be the obligation of filial piety, that of religion is still stronger. The latter obliges us to sacrifice every thing if it be necessary; and it is on account of cases of this nature, that it is written of the tribe of Levi: 'Qui dixerunt patri suo et matri suæ, nescio vos, et fratribus suis ignoro vos, nescierunt filios suos.' Such was the conduct of the Levites when they took up arms, by the command of Moses, to punish their relations for the sin of idolatry.

"If the prince should go so far as personally to make an attempt upon the life of the subject who has no other means of defending himself than killing him, – as when Nero, parading the streets of Rome, followed by a troop of armed men, attacked the quiet and unsuspecting citizens; I say, that in such a case it would be allowable to kill him; for if it is true, as Fr. Dominic de Soto observes, that the subject in this extremity is to suffer himself to be killed, and so prefer the monarch's life to his own, it is solely in the case when the death of the monarch would give rise to great troubles and civil wars in the state; in any other case it would be monstrously inhuman to force men to a thing so insupportable. But when the subject's property is merely to be defended against the cupidity of the monarch, it should not be allowable to lay hands on him; for it is a privilege granted to princes by divine and human laws, that their blood shall not be spilt for any outrage which, committed by any other violator of private property, would be a sufficient motive for taking away his life. The reason of this is, that the life of the king is the soul and bond of the state; that it is of more importance than the property of individuals; that it is better to tolerate grievances of this nature, than to destroy the head of the state."

Note 34, p. 348

In order to give an idea of the means employed at this epoch to limit the power of the monarch, by forming associations, whether among the people themselves, or between the people, the grandees, and the clergy, I insert here the letter, or Charter of Fraternity (Hermandad), which the kingdoms of Leon and Galicia made with Castile. I have extracted this piece literally from the collection intituled Bullarium ordinis militiæ sancti Jacobi Gloriosissimi Hispaniarum patroni, p. 223. It will prove to us the existence already, at a remote epoch of our history, of a lively instinct for liberty, although ideas were still limited to a secondary order.

"1. In the name of God and of the blessed Virgin. Amen.

"Be it known to all those who shall read this letter, that on account of the innumerable acts of injustice, injuries, deeds of violence, murders, imprisonments, insolent refusals of audience, opprobriums, and other outrages without measure, committed against us by the king D. Alphonso, to the contempt of God, of justice, of right, and to the great detriment of all these kingdoms; we, the infantes, the prelates, the rich men, the councils, the orders, the knights of the kingdoms of Leon and Galicia, seeing ourselves overwhelmed with injustice and ill-treatment, as we have stated above, and finding it insupportable; our lord the infante Don Sancho has thought good and appointed that we should be of one mind and of one heart, he with us and we with him, to maintain our laws, our privileges, and our charters, in our usages, our manners, our liberties, and franchises, which we enjoyed under king Don Alphonso, his great-grandfather, the conqueror at the battle of Merida, and under king Don Ferdinand, his grandfather; under the emperor and all the other kings of Spain, their predecessors; and under the king Don Alphonso, his father, – all princes who have best merited our gratitude; and our said lord the infante Don Sancho has bound us to this effect by oath and promise, as it is certain by letters between him and us. Considering that it is agreeable to the service of God, of the blessed Virgin, of the court of Heaven, to the defence and honor of the holy Church, of the infante Don Sancho, and of the kings who shall succeed him, in fine, to the advantage of the whole country, we ordain and establish fraternity (hermandad), now and for ever, we the whole of the kingdoms above named, with the councils of the kingdom of Castile, with the infantes, the rich men, the hidalgos, the prelates, the orders, the knights, and all others who are in this kingdom, and who are willing to be with us, as it has just been said.