Protestantism and Catholicity

"To these causes may be attributed, in great part, the esteem which the artisans have acquired. Nothing could be more salutary than this obligation they were always under of comporting themselves with dignity and distinction in public employments, whether in the corporation or the municipal government. Moreover the constant example of the master of the house, who, up to the present time, has always lived in common with his apprentices in a praiseworthy manner, has confirmed the children in ideas of order and dignity; for the manners and habits of a people, which are as powerful as law, must be inculcated from the tenderest age. Thus, in Barcelona, the operative has never been confounded by the slovenliness of his dress with the mendicant, whose idle and dissipated habits, says an illustrious writer, are easily contracted when the dress of the man of respectability is in no way distinguished from that of the rabble. Nor are the laboring population ever seen wearing those cumbersome garments which, serving as a cover for rags and a cloak for idleness, cramp the movements and activity of the body, and invite to a life of indolent ease. The people have not contracted a habit of frequenting taverns, where example leads to drunkenness and moral disorders. Their amusements, so necessary for working people to render their daily toils supportable, have always been innocent recreations, which either afforded them repose from their fatigues or varied them. The games formerly permitted were either the ring (la bague), nine pins, bowls, ball, shooting at a mark, fencing, and public dancing, authorized and watched over by the authorities; an amusement which from time immemorial has been general amongst the Catalans, in certain seasons and on certain festivals of the year.

"The respect for the artisan of Barcelona has never been diminished on account of the material on which his art was exercised, whether it was silver, steel, iron, copper, wood, or wool. We have seen that all the trades were equally eligible to the municipal offices of the state; none were excluded – not even butchers. Ancient Barcelona did not commit the political error of establishing preferences that might have produced some odious distinctions of trades. The inhabitants considered that all the citizens were in themselves worthy of esteem, since all contributed to the growth and maintenance of the property of a capital whose opulence and power were founded upon the industry of the artisan and the merchant. In fact, Barcelona has ever been free from that idea, so generally entertained, that every mechanical profession is low and vulgar – a mischievous and very common prejudice, which, in the provinces of Spain, has made an irreparable breach in the progress of the arts. At Barcelona, admission into certain trades-corporations has never been refused to the members of other trades: in this city all the trades are held in the same estimation. In a word, neither Barcelona nor any other town in Catalonia has ever entertained those vulgar prejudices that are enough to prevent honorable men from devoting themselves to the arts, or to cause the son to forsake the art practised by the father."14

Note 36, p. 361

I have spoken of the numerous Councils held by the Church at different epochs; why, it will be asked, does she not hold them more frequently now? I will answer this question by quoting a judicious passage from Count de Maistre, in his work On the Pope, book i. chap. 2: —

"In the first ages of Christianity," says he, "it was more easy to assemble Councils, because the Church was not so numerous as now, and because the emperors possessed powers that enabled a sufficient number of Bishops to assemble, so that their decisions needed only the assent of other Bishops. Yet these Councils were not assembled without much difficulty and embarrassment. But in modern times, since the civilized world has been divided into so many sovereignties, and immeasurably increased by our intrepid navigators, an Œcumenical Council has become a chimera.15 Simply to convoke all the Bishops, and to bring legally together such a convocation, five or six years would not suffice."

Note 37, p. 369

That my readers may be convinced of the truth and accuracy of what I here affirm, I invite them to read the history of the heresies that have afflicted the Church since the first ages, but particularly from the tenth century down to our own days.

Note 38, p. 373

It was not, I have said, without prejudice to the liberty of the people that the influence of the clergy was withdrawn from the working of the political machine. In order to ascertain how far this is true, it may be well to remark, that a great number of theologians were favorable to tolerably liberal doctrines in political matters, and that it was the clergy who exercised the greatest freedom in speaking to kings, even after the people had almost entirely lost the right of intervention in political affairs. Observe what opinions St. Thomas held on forms of government.

(Quest. cv. 1a 2æ.)

De ratione judicialium præceptorum art. 1. Respondeo dicendum, quod circa bonam ordinationem principum in aliqua civitate, vel gente, duo sunt attendenda, quorum unum est, ut omnes aliquam partem habeant in principatu; per hoc enim conservatur pax populi et omnes talem ordinationem amant et custodiunt ut dicitur (II. Polit., cap. i.); aliud est quod attenditur secundum speciem regiminis vel ordinationis principatum, cujus cum sint diversæ species, ut philosophus tradit in III. Polit. cap. v., præcipue tamen unum regimen est, in quo unus principatur secundum virtutem: et aristocratia, id est potestas optimorum, in qua aliqui pauci principantur secundum virtutem. Unde optima ordinatio principum est in aliqua civitate vel regno, in quo unus præficitur secundum virtutem qui omnibus præsit et sub ipso sunt aliqui principantes secundum virtutem, et tamen talis principatus ad omnes pertinet, tum quia ex omnibus eligi possunt, tum quia etiam ab omnibus eliguntur. Talis vero est omnis politia bene commixta ex regno in quantam unus præest, et aristocratia in quantum multi principantur secundum virtutem, et ex democratia, id est potestate populi in quantum ex popularibus possunt eligi principes, et ad populum pertinet electio principum, et hoc fuit institutum secundum legem divinam.

Divus Thomas. (1a 2æ Q. 90, art. 4o.)

Et sic ex quatuor prædictis potest colligi definitio legis quæ nihil est aliud quam quædam rationis ordinatio ad bonum commune ab eo qui curam communitatis habet promulgata. Q. 95, art. 4.

Tertio est de ratione legis humanæ ut instituatur a gubernante communitatem civitatis: sicut supra dictum est. (Quest. 90, art. 3.) Et secundum hoc distinguuntur leges humanæ secundum diversa regimina civitatum, quorum unum, secundum philosophum in III. Polit., cap. xi., est regnum, quando scilicet civitas gubernatur ab uno, et secundum hoc accipiuntur constitutiones principum; aliud vero regimen est aristocratia, id est principatus optimorum vel optimatum, et secundum hoc sumuntur responsa prudentum et etiam senatusconsulta. Aliud regimen est oligarchia, id est principatus paucorum divitum et potentum; et secundum hoc sumitur jus prætorium, quod etiam honorarium dicitur. Aliud autem regimen est populi, quod nominatur democratia; et secundum hoc sumuntur plebiscita. Aliud autem est tyrannicum, quod est omnino corruptum unde ex hoc non sumitur aliqua lex. Est etiam et aliquod regimen ex istis commixtum, quod est optimum, et secundum hoc sumitur lex quam majores natu simul cum plebibus sanxerunt, ut Isidorus dicit lib. 5, Etym. O. cap. x.

If certain declaimers are to be believed, it would seem that the principle, that it is the law which governs, and not the will of man, is quite a recent discovery. But observe with what solidity and perspicuity the angelic doctor expounds this doctrine.

(1a 2æ Q. 93, art. 1.)

Utrum fuerit utile aliquas leges poni ab hominibus.

Ad 2m dicendum, quod sicut Philosophus dicit. 1. Rhetor. Melius est omnia ordinari lege, quam dimittere judicum arbitrio, et hoc propter tria. Primo quidem, quia facilius est invenire paucos sapientes, qui sufficiant ad rectas leges ponendas, quam multos; qui requirerentur ad recte judicandum de singulis. Secundo, quia illi qui leges ponunt, ex multo tempore considerant quid lege ferendum sit: sed judicia de singularibus factis fiunt ex casibus subito exortis. Facilius autem ex multis consideratis potest homo videre quid rectum sit, quam solum ex aliquo uno facto. Tertio, quia legislatores judicant in universali, et de futuris: sed homines judiciis præsidentes judicant de præsentibus; ad quæ afficientur amore vel odio, aut aliqua cupiditate; et sic eorum depravatur judicium. Quia ergo justitia animata judicis non invenitur in multis, et quia flexibilis est: ideo necessarium fuit in quibuscumque est possibile, legem determinare quid judicandum sit, et paucissima arbitrio hominum committere.

In Spain, the Procuradores of the Cortes dared not raise their voices against the excesses of power; and their timidity drew down the keen reproaches of P. Mariana. In the examination to which he was subjected in the celebrated suit commenced against him on the subject of the seven treatises, he confesses having applied to the Procuradores the epithets of vile, superficial, and utterly venal, only striving to obtain the favor of the prince, and their own particular interests, without solicitude for the public good. He added, that such was the public cry, the general complaint, at least at Toledo, where he was residing.

I will leave unnoticed his work intituled De Rege et Regis institutione, of which I have spoken elsewhere. Confining myself to his History of Spain, I will observe with what liberty he expresses himself on the most delicate points, without meeting with any opposition, either from the civil or from the ecclesiastical authority. In his 1st book, chap. 4, speaking of the Aragonese, in his usual grave and severe tone, he says: "The Aragonese possess and enjoy laws and fueros very different from those of the other people of Spain; they possess every thing most adapted for preserving liberty against the excessive power of kings, for preventing this power from degenerating and changing, by its natural tendency, into tyranny; for they are not ignorant of this truth, that the right of liberty is generally lost by degrees."

It was precisely at this epoch that the clergy expressed themselves with the greatest freedom on the most delicate of all subjects, that of contributions. The venerable Palafox, in his memorial or petition to the king for ecclesiastical immunity, said: "According to St. Augustine, to the great Tostat, and other weighty authors, the Son of God appointed that the children of God – that is the ministers of the Church, his priests – should not pay tribute to the pagan princes. In fact, he addressed to St. Peter the following question, already resolved by the eternal wisdom of the Father: Reges gentium a quibus accipiunt tributum, a filiis, an ab alienis? St. Peter answered, Ab alienis; and our Lord concluded with these words: Ergo liberi sunt filii. I may be allowed, sire, to make this delicate observation, that the Divine Majesty does not say, Reges gentium a quibus capiunt tributum, but a quibus accipiunt. By this word accipiunt, we understand the mildness and mansuetude with which the payment of a tribute should always be exacted, in order to diminish the bitterness and repugnance accompanying a tribute.

"46. It is doubtless useful for the preservation of the state, that, in the first place, subjects should give, in order that princes may then receive. It is proper that kings should receive, and employ the tribute paid them, for on this depends the safety of crowns; but it is well that subjects should first give it voluntarily. It is doubtless from this passage of Scripture, from this expression of the Eternal Word, that the Catholic Crown, always so pious, has received the holy doctrine, by virtue of which neither your majesty nor your illustrious predecessors have ever permitted a tribute to be levied without its having first received the consent of the kingdoms themselves, and been offered by them; and your majesty is incomparably more exalted by limiting and moderating your power, than by exercising it to its utmost extent.

"47. Sire, if laymen, who have no exemption in matters of tribute, enjoy that which the kindness of your majesty and of the most Catholic kings grant them; if they do not pay till they choose to make a voluntary offering; if nothing is received from them except on this condition, will religion, your majesty's renowned piety, and the devoted zeal of the Council, allow the clergy – the sons, the ministers of God, the privileged, those who are exempt by divine and human law in all the nations of the world, and among the very pagans – to enjoy less favor than strangers, who are not, like them, either ministers of the Church or priests of God? Is the word capiunt, sire, to be applied exclusively to the ministers of God, and the word accipiunt to men of the world?"

In his work intituled Historia Real Sagrada, the same writer raises his voice against tyranny with extreme severity:

"12. Such," says he, "is the law which the king whom you wish for will maintain in your regard. The word law is here employed ironically, as if God should say: 'You imagine, without doubt, that this king of yours would govern according to law; on this supposition you asked for him, since you complained that my tribunal did not govern you. Now, the law which this king will exercise towards you will be, to disregard all law; and his law will eventually be tyranny respected.' The politician who, relying upon this passage, should attribute as a right to the monarch a power which is merely pointed out by God to the people as a chastisement, would be an uncivilized being, unworthy of being treated as a rational creature. The Lord, in this instance, does not define what is the best; he does not say what he is giving them; these words are no appreciation of power; he merely declares what would be the case, and what he condemns. Who shall dare to found the origin of tyranny on justice itself? God says, that he whom they desire for a king will be a tyrant – not a tyrant approved of by him, but a tyrant that he reprobates and chastises. And subsequent events clearly shewed it, since there were in Israel wicked kings, by whom the prophecy was fulfilled, and Saints who obtained on the throne the mercy of God. The wicked kings literally accomplished the divine threat, by doing what they were forbidden; the good ones established their dignity upon propriety and justice within prescribed limits."

Father Marquez, in his Christian Prince or Magistrate (Gobernador Cristiano), also enlarges on the same question; he expounds his opinion both theoretically and practically.

(Chapter xvi. 53.)

"Thus far we have heard the words of Philo, writing on this event. As these words afforded me an opportunity of reasoning on the obligations of Christian kings, I have taken care to quote them at length. I will not expect these kings to act like Moses; for they have not the miraculous aid which the Hebrew legislator received for the relief of the people, nor the rod which God gave him to make water flow from the rock at need. But I will recommend them to reflect maturely on the additional services they shall attempt to exact from their subjects, and the burdens they shall impose on them. Let them reflect that they are bound to justify the motive of their request in all truth, and without any false coloring; always and constantly aware that they are in the presence of God, that the eyes of God are fixed on their hands, that He will require from them a strict account of their actions. For, as the holy doctor of Nazianzen says, the Son of God came designedly into the world at the taking of a census and a resettlement of the imposts, in order to confound kings who would have appointed them through caprice; so that kings may now know that the Son of God takes account of every item, and weighs in the balance of his strict justice things which we should account of little moment.

"The above reflection will serve to dispel the false ideas of certain flatterers, who, to obtain the favor of princes, persuade them that they are perfectly independent and the masters of the lives and property of their subjects, free to dispose of them as they may think proper. In support of this pretended maxim, they allege, as we have seen, the history of Samuel, who answered the people on the part of God, when they were demanding a king, 'You shall have one, but on terrible conditions.' This king was to take from them their fields, their vineyards, their olive-yards, to give them to his servants; he was to take their daughters for slaves, 'to make him ointments, and to be his cooks and bakers.' And they have not observed that, as John Bodin says, this is the interpretation of Philip Melancthon, which alone is sufficient to render it suspicious. Moreover, as St. Gregory, and after him other doctors, have observed, this passage of Scripture does not establish the just right of kings, but rather announces beforehand the tyranny of a great number of princes; in fine, these words do not explain what good princes might do, but merely what bad ones would usually do. Hence, when Achab seized upon the vineyard of Naboth, God was angry with him, and we know how He treated him. When David, the elect of God, demanded a spot whereon to set up the altar of Jebusee, he only asked it on condition of paying the value of the land.

"For this reason princes should examine with scrupulous attention whether contributions are just; for if they are not, doctors decide that they cannot, without manifest injustice, thus more or less infringe on the rights of their subjects. This doctrine is so Catholic and certain, that men holding sound doctrine affirm that, in this case, princes cannot impose fresh tributes, even though necessary, without the consent of the nation. For, say they, the prince not being (which he certainly is not) the master of his subjects' property, cannot make use of it without the consent of those from whom he is to receive it. This custom has been long in practice in the kingdom of Castile, where the laws of royalty prohibit the levying of any new impost without the intervention of the Cortes: after having received the sanction of the Cortes, the impost is submitted to the vote of the towns; and the prince does not consider his demand granted till it has received the sanction of the majority of the towns. Edward I. of England made a similar law, according to many authors of weight; and Philip of Commines says, that it was the same in France till the time of Charles VII., who, urged by an extreme necessity, suppressed these formalities, and levied a tax without waiting for the consent of the States, and this inflicted on the kingdom so deep a wound, that it will long continue unhealed. If we may credit certain affirmations, this author reports, that it was then asserted that the king had escaped from the guardianship exercised by the kingdom; but that his own opinion is, that kings cannot, without the consent of their people, exact a single farthing; princes acting otherwise, says he, fall under the Pope's excommunication; no doubt that of the bull In Cœna Domini. For my own part, I ought to confess that I do not find this in Philip de Commines… With respect to this second point, it is evident, that the prince cannot, on his own authority, impose new tributes without the consent of the nation, whenever this nation shall have acquired by any of the reasons mentioned a contrary right, which I consider to be the case in Castile. No one, in fact, will deny that kingdoms at their commencement have a right to choose their kings on this condition, or render them such services as to obtain in return that no new imposts shall be laid on them without their consent. Now, in either case, there will be a compact made, from which kings cannot depart; and it is of no consequence, as some imagine it to be, whether they have obtained their kingdoms through the election of their subjects, or by mere force of arms. Although it is probable, indeed, that a State yielding itself of its own accord, will obtain greater privileges and better conditions than those acquired by a just war, it would not, however, be impossible for a State, in choosing a king, to confer upon him all its power in an absolute manner, and without this restriction, with a view to lay him under greater obligations, and to testify to him a greater degree of devotedness; and, on the other hand, a king, who had subjected a kingdom by force of arms, might nevertheless voluntarily grant it this privilege, with a view to obtain its gratitude, and more affectionate obedience on its part. The positive rule, therefore, for this particular right, will be the contract made, whether virtually or expressly, between the State and the prince; a contract which should be inviolable, especially if it is sealed by an oath."

The Prince, or Christian Magistrate(Liv. ii. ch. xxxix. § 2.)

"Princes, it is said, may compel their subjects to sell at half-price, or to give gratuitously, a part of their property. This opinion is generally founded on the law which ordains that, when a ship in a tempest has been saved by throwing overboard a part of the cargo, the proprietors of the remaining part are obliged to make a proportionate contribution to indemnify the sufferers for the loss they have sustained. Bartholus and other authors have inferred from this, that in a time of necessity and famine the monarch may require his subjects to give gratuitously, and a fortiori to sell at a lower price, a portion of their property to those in need. The monarch, say they, might, without any doubt, render property common, as it was before the establishment of social rights; he may consequently take it from one of his subjects and give it to another.

"It is certainly said in the laws of the kings of Israel, that he who should be chosen by God might seize upon the vineyards and property of his subjects, to confer them on his own servants; but the doctors do not support their arguments on this text. In fact, as we have said in chapter 16th, book i., the question does not concern the rights of a good prince, but the tyrannical acts of a bad one. Now, a careful study of the Scriptures will shew, that this passage must be favourable to one or other of the two opinions; for, if it were intended to establish that kings would possess in conscience the authority set forth in this passage, they would certainly have the right of seizing the property of one of their subjects to give it to another. If this passage is merely meant as a declaration of the injustices, of the extortions, and the tyrannies of wicked monarchs, it is no less certain that in Scripture the deed is considered unjust; for this deed is alleged as an example of what tyrants would do; now if it had been permitted to a good king, it would not have been quoted as an example of tyranny, as the Scriptures suppose it.

"Thus, this text alone, even were there no other in support of this doctrine, would satisfy me, that kings cannot lawfully compel their subjects to relinquish their property for less than its value, not even under pretext of the public good. In fact, were this pretext valid, it would not have been difficult for the kings of Israel to find an excuse for their tyranny; they might have alleged, that it was important to the public good to reward servants whose fidelity was so advantageous to the interests of the kingdom. Further, King Achab might have urged, that the amusements of the prince formed a part of the public good, since the people are so much interested in the health of the prince; and under this pretext might have deprived Naboth of his vineyard in order to enlarge his gardens. We find, however, that this pretext did not justify him in compelling Naboth even to sell his vineyard; the king, although grieved, was not offended by this man's refusal, neither was it his intention to seize the vineyard, had not the impious Jezabel furnished him with the means of doing so.

"Reason is evidently in favour of this opinion. Kings are the ministers of justice, and have been appointed to administer and uphold justice among the people. As St. Thomas teaches, the contract in buying and selling is only just in proportion as the price is equivalent to the thing purchased. Public, it is true, should be preferred to individual interest; in case, therefore, that a State is in danger of dissolution, the monarch might demand property at a less price, or even for nothing, just as he might compel the citizen to expose his life, which is of still greater value, in defending the common cause in a just war. This case, however, as P. Molina observes, is impossible, since the monarch would always be able to indemnify the individual for the loss he sustained, by levying for this purpose a general tax, a just tribute, and one that the State would be bound to pay. To prove this still more clearly, let us imagine the most urgent case possible; let us suppose that the king is besieged in his capital by a tyrant; the tyrant is about to enter sword and torch in hand; he offers to raise the siege on condition of receiving a statue of gold of great value, formerly the property of his ancestors, which a subject of the besieged king, the commander-in-chief of his armies, had taken in the plunder of a town, and made the inalienable property of the eldest son of his family. To render the case still more pressing, let us suppose that the tyrant has a dearly-cherished relation in the service of the besieged king, and that he will be satisfied if a rich lord of the kingdom, possessing a great number of estates, be despoiled, and his property conferred on his relation. It cannot be doubted that, in order to purchase the lives of all, this arrangement might be entered into; and that the king would be justified in acceding to the demand, in taking the statue, or even the whole of this property, to confer it on the tyrant's relation. But no one will assert that the lord should suffer the whole loss. The State would be under the obligation of indemnifying him for the loss, by taking upon itself the indemnification, the lord merely contributing his quota; for this reason, that it would be opposed to natural justice for the burdens of the whole body to fall upon a single member, which would be the case according to the law proposed by the opponents. If, in a case of shipwreck, all the cargo were thrown overboard to save the ship and the lives and fortunes of all, the obligation being common to all, it would not be just that it should fall exclusively upon the owners; because the cargo could best be thrown overboard and most endangered the ship's safety: the loss should be borne by all, even by those who had with them things only of little weight, as jewels or diamonds, for instance; since neither these latter proprietors nor the vessel herself could be saved without lightening her by throwing overboard the heavier portion of the cargo.