Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. I (of 2)

CHAPTER XXXIV.

CONCLUSION AND SUMMING UP

262. Before passing to another subject, let us fix our attention for a few moments on the nature and origin of the idea of extension. We shall thus collect the fruit of the preceding investigations, and prepare the way for those which follow.

The scientific fruitfulness of this idea to our mind proves how distant sensible impressions are from intellectual perception. We cannot know whether this idea existed in our mind before the sensible impression; if it did exist we were not conscious of it, and in this respect it is affirming a gratuitous proposition to say that it is an innate idea. What we can safely say, is, that there are two distinct orders of internal phenomena, that sensation could not have produced the idea, that this idea is immeasurably superior to the external impression, or even the internal sensitive intuition, and that if it did not already exist in the mind, it was not produced by sensation as an effect is produced by its cause.

263. Here we make an important transition from the order of sensations, to the order of ideas, and discover in our mind a new class of facts. It matters little whether these facts exist before the impression, or result from its presence. In the first case, we see in the mind a deposit of germs which need only the warmth of life in order to be developed; in the second, we find in the mind a fertility which produces these germs. In either case we find a being of a privileged nature, a sublime being which by a single leap rises above the region of matter, and awakened by the external impression, arises to a new life which this world cannot contain.

264. In this sense there are innate ideas; ideas which sensation could not have produced. In this sense all general and necessary ideas are innate; for sensation could not produce them. Sensation is never any thing more than a phenomenon, a particular and contingent fact, and consequently incapable of producing general ideas, or the ideas of the necessary relations of being. Sight, or the imaginary representation of a triangle, is a contingent phenomenon which tells us nothing of the necessary relations of the sides and angles to each other. In order to perceive these relations, this necessity, something else is required. This something else, call it innate ideas, force, fecundity, or activity of the mind, or any thing you please, exists, and could not have been produced by sensation, but belongs to a higher order distinct from sensible phenomena.

265. After such long investigations of the phenomena of sensation, we at last find an idea; it is the idea of extension, the foundation of all the mathematical sciences and of their application to the laws of nature.

The human mind, in all its relations with the material world, seems to have one great idea, that of extension, which, modified in infinite ways, is the origin of all the sciences which relate to matter. The whole material world rests on this idea, and all knowledge of material objects proceeds from it. It is a pure idea in its necessary relations and in its necessary branches. It is a light given to the lord of creation that he may know and admire the prodigies of nature.

266. We find the same wonderful simplicity amidst so complicated a multiplicity in another order of ideas. Hence we infer that the whole edifice of the sciences and all human knowledge are founded on a small number of ideas, perhaps on two alone. These ideas are not sensible representations, they are the objects of pure intuitions; they cannot be decomposed, but they may be applied to an infinite variety of things; they are not explained by words, as a union including various conceptions; by them a mind acts on another mind, not to teach it any thing, but to make it concentrate its activity in order to note what it contains within itself, and learn, in a certain measure, what it already knows.

Try to explain extension, the idea by which we perceive this order which we cannot express in words, but on which we found sensible experience and geometrical science, and you can find no expression. Will you define it to be "parts outside of parts?" But what are parts, and what does outside mean, if you have not the idea of extension? Take any extended thing, make your mind concentrate itself and exercise its activity in generalization. Is this triangle a quadrilateral? No. Are they both extended? Yes. Is this surface a solid? No. Are they both extended? Yes. Are all triangles different from quadrilaterals? Yes. Have all surfaces and solids extension? Yes. How do you pass from one fact to all the facts of the same kind, from the contingent to the necessary? Have you explained what extension is? No. Have you shown what there is common to all these different things? No. All that you have done then is to arouse the activity of your mind, and to make it direct its attention to the general idea of extension, and the mind applies this idea to various things which are different, yet have something in common, it applies the different modifications of this idea to various things which have something in common, and finds them different. You have not taught the truths of geometry to the mind, but have awakened them in it, whether they already existed in it, or the mind had the faculty of producing them.

267. Let us now collect the result of the investigations we have made. I do not give an equal value to all the propositions which follow. I have explained my opinion of each in its proper place, but I consider it well to sum them all up here in order to assist the understanding and help the memory.

I. There is immediate certainty of our relations with beings distinct from us.

II. There is certainty of the existence of an external world.

III. The external world in relation to us, is only an extended being which affects us, and is subject to constant laws which we may determine.

IV. We have the idea of extension.

V. The idea of extension is excited by sensations, but it is not confounded with them.

VI. The idea of extension is the basis of all our cognitions of bodies.

VII. The idea of extension should not be confounded with the imaginary representation of extension.

VIII. An extended space which is nothing real, is an absurdity.

IX. Space is nothing real distinguished from the extension of bodies.

X. Where there are no bodies, there are no distances.

XI. Motion is the change of the positions of bodies among themselves.

XII. There is not and cannot be vacuum of any kind.

XIII. The idea of space is the idea of extension in the abstract.

XIV. The imagination of an unlimited space is only an attempt of the imagination to follow the understanding in the abstraction of extension. It also arises from our habit of seeing through transparent mediums, and moving in fluids whose resistance is not perceptible.

XV. As all that we know of bodies is, that they are extended and affect us, whatever has these two conditions is to us a body.

XVI. But as we do not know the essence of bodies, we do not know whether a body can exist without extension.

XVII. Neither do we know what modifications the extension of one body may be subject to, with respect to others.

XVIII. The elements of which bodies are composed are unknown to us.

XIX. The approximation of some bodies to others, and the gravitation which results from it, seem to be the necessary effect of their present relations.

XX. The necessity of approximation does not suffice to explain the laws of motion, or their beginning, or their continuation.

XXI. The idea of space is not an absolutely necessary condition of sensation.

XXII. The idea of extension has a real objectiveness.

XXIII. The transition from the subjective to the objective in relation to extension is a primitive fact of our nature.

XXIV. Therefore bodily phenomena have a real existence outside of us.

XXV. Therefore a real certainty, scientific as well as phenomenal, arises from the testimony of the senses.

XXVI. Reason justifies the instinct of nature when it examines the relation of subjectiveness with objectiveness in sensations.

XXVII. Geometry considers extension in the abstract; but with the certainty that when the principle exists in the real order, the consequences cannot fail to be produced, and that the consequences will be more or less exact in proportion as the principle is more or less exactly realized.

XXVIII. Notwithstanding our certainty of the existence of the external world we do not know its essence.

XXIX. We do not know what this world is when seen by a pure spirit.

XXX. Sensible intuition, to which our geometry relates, does not constitute the essence of scientific knowledge, and may be separated from it.

XXXI. A change in the relations of corporeal beings among themselves, and with our sensitive faculties, is not intrinsically impossible.

NOTES TO BOOK FIRST

ON CHAPTER I

(1) We must distinguish between certainty and truth: there are intimate relations between them, yet they are very different things. Truth is the conformity of the intellect with the object. Certainty is a firm assent to a real or apparent truth.

Certainty is not truth, but it must at least have the illusion of truth. We may be certain of what is false, but not unless we believe it to be true.

There is no truth so long as there is no judgment; for without judgment there is only perception, but no comparison of the idea with the thing; and without comparison there can be neither conformity nor discrepancy. If we conceive a mountain a thousand miles high, we conceive a thing that does not exist; but we do not err so long as we do not assert the existence of the mountain. If we affirm it, there is opposition between our judgment and the reality: this constitutes error. The object of the intellect is truth; therefore, we at least require the illusion of truth in order to be certain: our intellect is weak; hence its certainty is liable to error. The first is a law of the intellect, the second a proof of its frailty.

Philosophy, or, rather, man, cannot rest content with appearances, but demands reality; if any one be convinced that he has only the appearance, or if he even doubt of it, he loses his certainty, for it admits appearances only on condition of their being disguised.

ON CHAPTER II

(2) Even Pyrrho did not doubt of every thing as some pretend; he admitted sensations so far as passive, and resigned himself to the consequences of these impressions, and yielded to the necessity of conforming in practice to what they indicated. No one ever yet denied appearances: it is reality that is disputed; some hold that man must be content with saying it appears; others that he can go so far as to say it is. It is useful to preserve this distinction, as it prevents confusion of ideas in the history of philosophy, and conduces to render clear the question of certainty. Thus of the three questions: is there certainty? on what is it founded? how is it acquired? the first is resolved alike by all the schools, so far as it relates to a fact of our soul: by only admitting appearances, they admit the certainty of them.

ON CHAPTER III

(3) In order to form clear ideas of the development of the understanding, and the other faculties of our soul, the reader may refer to what we advanced in our work, entitled The Criterion, and particularly to the chapters I., II., III., XII., XIII., XIV., XVIII., and XXII.

ON CHAPTER IV

(4) We subjoin the passages from St. Thomas on the unity and multiplicity of ideas, to which we referred in the text. We believe the friends of solid and profound metaphysics will read them with great pleasure.

"In omnibus enim substantiis intellectualibus, invenitur virtus intellectiva per influentiam divini luminis. Quod quidem in primo principio est unum et simplex, et quanto magis creaturæ intellectuales distant a primo principio, tanto magis dividitur illud lumen, et diversificatur, sicut accidit in lineis a centro egredientibus. Et inde est quod Deus per suam essentiam omnia intelligit: superiores autem intellectualium substantiarum, etsi per plures formas intelligant, tamen intelligunt per pauciores et magis universales et virtuosiores ad comprehensionem rerum propter efficaciam virtutis intellectivæ, quæ est in eis. In inferioribus autem sunt formæ plures et minus universales, et minus efficaces ad comprehensionem rerum, in quantum deficiunt a virtute intellectiva superiorum. Si ergo inferiores substantiæ haberent formas in illa universalitate, in qua habent superiores, quia non sunt tantæ efficaciæ in intelligendo, non acciperent per eas perfectam cognitionem de rebus, sed in quadam communitate, et confusione, quod aliqualiter apparet in hominibus. Nam qui sunt debilioris intellectus, per universales conceptiones magis intelligentium, non accipiunt perfectam cognitionem, nisi eis singula in speciali explicentur. (P. 1n, Q. 892, A. 1°.)

"Intellectus quanto est altior et perspicacior tanto ex uno potest plura cognoscere. Et quia intellectus divinus est altissimus, per unam simplicem essentiam suam omnia cognoscit; nec est ibi aliqua pluralitas formarum idealium, nisi secundum diversos respectus divinæ essentiæ ad res cognitas; sed in intellectu creato multiplicatur secundum rem quod est unum secundum rem in mente divina, ut non possit omnia per unum cognoscere; ita tamen quod quanto intellectus creatus est altior, tanto pauciores habet formas ad plura cognoscenda efficaces. Et hoc est quod Dio. dicit, 12, cœ. hier. quod superiores ordines habent scientiam magis universalem in inferioribus. Et in lib. de causis dicitur, quod intelligentiæ superiores habent formas magis universales; hoc tamen observato, quod in infimis angelis sunt formæ adhuc universales in tantum, quod per unam formam possunt cognoscere omnia individua unius speciei: ita quod illa species sit propria, uniuscujusque particularium secundum diversos respectus ejus ad particularia, sicut essentia divina efficitur propria similitudo singulorum secundum diversos respectus; sed intellectus humanus qui est ultimus in ordine substantiarum intellectualium habet formas in tantum particulatas quod non potest per unam speciem nisi unum quid cognoscere. Et ideo similitudo speciei existens in intellectu humano non sufficit ad cognoscenda plura singularia; et propter hoc intellectui adjuncti sunt sensus quibus singularia accipiat. (Quodlib. 7, A. 3.)

"Respondeo dicendum, quod ex hoc sunt in rebus aliqua superiora, quod sunt uni primo, quod est Deus, propinquiora et similiora. In Deo autem tota plenitudo intellectualis cognitionis continetur in uno, scilicet in essentia divina, per quam Deus omnia cognoscit. Quæ quidem intelligibilis plentitudo, in intelligibilibus creaturis inferiori modo et minus simpliciter invenitur. Unde oportet, quod ea quæ Deus cognoscit per unam, inferiores intellectus cognoscant per multa; et tanto amplius per plura, quanto amplius intellectus inferior fuit. Sic igitur quanto angelus fuerit superior, tanto per pauciores species universitatem intelligibilium apprehendere poterit, et ideo oportet quod ejus formæ sint universaliores, quasi ad plura se extendentes unaquæque eorum. Et de hoc, exemplum aliqualiter in nobis perspici potest: sunt enim quidam, qui veritatem intelligibilem capere non possunt; nisi eis particulatim per singula explicatur. Et hoc quidem ex debilitate intellectus eorum contingit. Alii vero qui sunt fortioris intellectus, ex paucis multo capere possunt." (P.1a, Q. 55a A. 3°.)

ON CHAPTER V

(5) Here is the idea of Condillac's man-statue explained by himself: "To gain this object we imagined a statue internally organized like ourselves, and animated with a mind deprived of every sort of ideas. We also supposed its exterior composed wholly of marble, to allow it the use of none of its senses, and we reserved to ourselves the liberty to open them at our pleasure to the different impressions of which they are susceptible.

"We thought we ought to commence with smell, because of all the senses this is the one which least contributes to cognitions of the mind. Next we had to examine the others, and after having considered them apart and together, we saw the statue become an animal able to attend to its own preservation.

"The principle that determines the development of its faculties is simple; even sensations contain it; for, all being of necessity either agreeable or the contrary, the statue is interested in enjoying some and shunning others. The reader will now be convinced that this interest suffices to give occasion to the gradations of the will and the understanding. Judgments, reflection, desires, passions, are only sensations variously transformed. This is why it seemed to us useless to suppose the soul to have received immediately from nature all the sensations with which it is endowed. Nature has given us organs which show us by pleasure or pain what we ought to seek or to avoid; but here she stops, and leaves to experience the task of leading us to contract habits, and finish the work she has commenced.

"This object is new, and shows all the simplicity of the ways of the Author of nature. Is it not a thing worthy of our admiration thus to see, from man's sensibility to pleasure or pain, spring up in him ideas, desires, habits, and talents of various kinds?" —Traite des Sensations. Dessein de l'ouvrage.

What we admire in Condillac is not his system, but his candor; and we wonder yet more that, for a time, he should have had numerous followers of his so poor and superficial system. The author proposes the difficulty, that as there is in our soul nothing but transformed sensations, it is strange that brutes, which also have sensations, should not be endowed with the same faculties as man. Can the reader imagine what profound reason the French philosopher assigned? We doubt it very much. It is a curious thought: "the organ of touch is less perfect in brutes, and consequently it cannot be to them an occasional cause of all the operations which we observe in ourselves." He did well to adopt the motto: nec tamen quasi Pythius Apollo!

ON CHAPTER VI

(6) The works of the scholastics are worth reading on these points. Treating of the object of science, they are at once exact and profound. It is not easy to think of any thing concerning the classification of truths not explained or indicated by them.

ON CHAPTER VII

(7) Let us not be thought to judge too severely of the forms adopted by the German philosophers. It is well known how Madame de Staël speaks of them; but happily we can cite in our favor a more competent judge. Schelling, one of the chiefs of German philosophy, says: "The Germans have so long philosophized among themselves, as to gradually depart more and more, in their thoughts and their words, from what is universally intelligible; and the degree of departure therefrom has almost come at last to be the measure of philosophical ability. Examples are not wanting to us. As families which separate from general society, and live wholly among themselves, among other repulsive singularities, come to use expressions intelligible only to themselves, so is it with the Germans in philosophy; and after vain efforts to spread the Kantian philosophy out of Germany, they renounced the attempt to make themselves intelligible to other nations; they became accustomed to regard themselves as the chosen people of philosophy, forgetting that the primary end of philosophy, – an end often neglected, but not the less to be sought for on that account, – is to gain universal consent, by making themselves universally intelligible. This is not to say that we must judge works of thought like exercises in style; but all philosophy not intelligible to all civilized nations, and accessible in every language, cannot, for this reason alone, be the universal and true philosophy." —Schelling's Judgment of V. Cousin, and the state of French and German Philosophy in general. 1834. p. 4.

Schelling flatters himself that German philosophy is about to take a better course with respect to clearness, and adds: "The philosophical writer who, for tens of years past, was unable to depart from the terms and forms of the school, without loss of his scientific reputation, may hereafter emancipate himself from this restraint. He will seek depth of thought; and an absolute incapacity to express himself with clearness, will no longer be regarded as the mark of talent and philosophical inspiration." We have nothing to add to this passage; we would only remind its author that: mutato nomine, de te fabula narratur.

ON CHAPTER VIII

(8) The perusal of Schelling's work on Ideal Transcendentalism leaves no doubt as to his view of this identity, which at bottom neither is nor can be any thing else than pantheism; yet, for the sake of truth, we will allow that Schelling seems to have modified his doctrine, or to have feared its consequences, if we are to consider the indications found in his discourse at the opening of his course of philosophy, at Berlin, the 13th of November, 1841. We there find the following passage, worthy of the attention of all thinking men: "The difficulties and obstacles of all kinds, against which philosophy contends are visible, and in vain would we attempt to dissemble them. Never was there a more powerful reaction against philosophy on the part of real and active life than at this present epoch; and this proves philosophy to have penetrated even to the vital questions of society, those concerning which no one can rest indifferent. So long as a philosophy is only in the first stages of formation, taking the first steps in its march, no one cares for it, except philosophers themselves; other men await the last word of philosophy, since it is important to the general public only in its results.

"We confess that we ought not to take as the practical result of a solid and profoundly meditated philosophy whatever it may please any body to designate as such: were it so, the world would be subjected to doctrines the most repugnant to sound morality, even such as sap its foundation. No! No one judges of philosophy by the practical conclusions drawn by ignorance or presumption. Moreover, lest deception on this point be possible, the public should reject a philosophy which has such results, without examining or even judging it in its principles; it should say that it cannot understand the depth of these questions, or the artificial and intricate march of the arguments; but without pausing here it should promptly decide that a philosophy leading to such conclusions cannot be true in its principles. What the Roman moralist said of the useful: nihil utile nisi quod honestum, is equally applicable to the investigation of truth: no philosophy that respects itself will allow that it leads to irreligion. Yet actual philosophy is in such a state, that, however much it promises a religious result, no one admits it; for deductions drawn from it convert the dogmas of the Christian religion into a vain phantasmagory.

"As to this, some of its most faithful disciples are openly agreed; be the suspicion well founded or not, its existence suffices, and this opinion is established.

"But active life in the last result is always right; and so philosophy is exposed to great risks. They who war on one philosophy are not far from condemning all philosophy; they say in their heart, there is no longer philosophy in the world. I myself am not exempt from these condemnations, since it is pretended that it is I, who first gave impulse to this philosophy which is at present so badly judged of, because of its religious results.

"How shall I defend myself? Certainly I would never attack a philosophy for its last results; but I would judge it in its first principles, as every philosophical mind should. It is moreover well enough known that I have shown myself little satisfied with the philosophy of which I speak.

"The moral and spiritual worlds are so divided that any point of union for an instant should be a motive of satisfaction. Besides to destroy, is a very sad thing when there is nothing wherewith to replace the thing destroyed. 'Do it better yourself,' we say to one who can do nothing but criticize.