Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. I (of 2)

Let us then leave nature its secrets; and let us not limit omnipotence by saying, that the order of the world is so intrinsically necessary that its present relations cannot be changed without contradiction. When we examine the possibility of a new order of relations between the beings which we call bodies, let us not settle the question too quickly, taking for our only type of the possible the vain impotence of our faculties. What should we think of a blind man who should laugh at those who see, if he heard them speak of the relations of objects as seen? Yet we present the same spectacle to a pure spirit when we talk of the impossibility of an order different from what our senses perceive.

205. The principles of physical science are in great part conditional; for they are true only on the supposition of the reality of the data furnished by experience. If position and relation to place are not essential to bodies, distance and motion are conditional facts true only under certain suppositions. All the natural sciences, as we have seen, are reduced to the calculation of extension and motion; they do not reach the essence of things, but are limited to one aspect, that presented by experience. In these sciences there is consequently nothing strictly absolute; in this respect, they are far below metaphysics, which knows things that are absolutely necessary. A further explanation of this doctrine is required, and will be given in the following chapters.

CHAPTER XXIX.

SOLUTION OF TWO DIFFICULTIES

206. Must not the theory which supposes the relations of bodies to be variable, put an end to all the natural sciences? Can there be science without a necessary object? and can there be a necessity which is compatible with variability?

The natural sciences have two parts: one physical, and the other geometrical. The first supposes the data furnished by experience; the second forms its calculations relative to these data. Change the relations of external beings, and the data will be different, you will have a new experience producing a new physical science: the calculation will be the same, only new results will be obtained from the new data. The difficulty thus disappears. All the physical sciences are based on observation, all their combinations are made from data furnished by experience; therefore the physical sciences are not wholly absolute, but they have a part which is conditional. The theory of universal gravitation is developed as a body of geometrical science, but it starts from the data furnished by experience. Destroy these data and from a body of physical science it becomes a body of pure geometry. In mechanics, the problems of the composition and decomposition of forces have a physical signification, inasmuch as they presuppose the data of experience; suppress these data and there remains only a composition of lines which mean nothing when we call them forces. Therefore mechanics is only a system of geometrical applications.

207. Here another difficulty arises which is apparently more serious than the other. If the relations of bodies are not essential, but are subject to variation; if our calculations upon them are not founded upon data which are intrinsically necessary, it seems that geometry is destroyed, or limited in such a way to the ideal order, that it cannot be sure that on descending to the field of experience it will not find that false which it regarded as true, and that true which it reputed false. For example, the distances of bodies are calculated by considerations of geometry: if the relation of distance is variable, and a body may be in many places at the same time, geometry turns out false. Such a supposition is no more than the application of the foregoing theory; for, if the relations are variable, this variation may affect distance, which is only a relation. I said this difficulty was more serious than the other, because it leaves the field of experience, and attacks the order of our ideas, an order which we must hold to be indestructible, unless we wish to give up our reason. What would become of our reason if geometry were contradicted by the reality? what would become of an order of ideas in contradiction to facts? Still I repeat that the force of this difficulty is only apparent, and if analyzed will be found of no more weight than the objection which we have already answered.

A body which is a hundred yards distant from another, cannot be only one yard distant; geometry would be opposed to it. But if the relations of bodies are variable this proposition can mean nothing with respect to the reality. Therefore geometry is false. I admit the consequence; but the principle on which it is based involves a supposition contrary to my theory. If you alter or destroy the relations of bodies, you destroy distance, which is a relation, consequently you cannot have a distance of one hundred yards, nor of one yard, nor any distance at all, and if there is no distance there is no contradiction. If, then, you ask how great is the distance between them, your question is absurd; for it supposes a distance, whereas there is no distance at all.

208. This solution rests on a fundamental principle which we ought never to lose sight of. Geometrical truth is true in reality when the conditions of geometry exist in reality; if these conditions do not exist, there is no real geometry. There is nothing strange in this: in fact, the same occurs in the purely ideal order; even there, geometry rests on certain postulates, without which it is impossible. Two triangles with the same base and altitude are equivalent to each other. This is a true proposition, but only on the supposition that there are those orders of points which are called lines, and that the lines form angles, and are united at three points. If these relations are not presupposed, the geometrical theorem has no meaning.

209. Geometry in itself, or in the purely ideal order, is founded on the principle of contradiction. The truth of this principle being absolutely necessary, that of geometry is equally so. But the principle of contradiction, like all purely ideal principles, abstracts existence, and is applied to nothing in practice, unless we suppose some fact to support it. Yes and no at the same time are impossible; but the principle determines nothing for or against either of the extremes. It only affirms that one excludes the other; if we suppose yes, it excludes no, and if we suppose no, it excludes yes; that is to say, it always needs a condition, a datum which only experience can furnish.

It is the same with geometry. All its theorems and problems refer to the ideal field within us, where there are certain conditions which lead to certain results, by virtue of the principle of contradiction: whenever the conditions exist, the results are true; but if the former fail the latter are false. Ideal sciences consider the connection of conclusions with principles in the order of possibility, but take no note of facts. If the connection is admitted the science is true.

CHAPTER XXX.

PASSIVE SENSIBILITY

210. Active sensibility, or the faculty of perceiving by the senses, has been a subject of great dispute among philosophers. Passive sensibility, or the capacity of an object to be perceived, is a question of not less interest.

Can every thing which exists be perceived by the senses?

Before answering this question, let us remember that to be perceived by the senses may be understood in two ways: First, it may mean, to cause an impression in a sensitive being; and secondly, to be the immediate object of sensible intuition. The first is true of every being capable of producing the impression; the second is true only of those beings which unite the conditions which the intuition supposes.

211. To produce an impression is simply to cause; and causality is not repugnant to simple beings. There is, therefore, no absurdity in supposing that pure spirits can produce sensible impressions: were it otherwise God could not act upon our soul, causing an impression in it, without the mediation of bodies. This causality cannot be called passive sensibility; the being which has it is not perceived by the senses. The relation of the sensation to the being which produces it would be only that of an effect to its cause.

212. To be the immediate object of sensible intuition, is to be presented to this intuition as an original to the copy. Under this view, only the extended can be perceived by the senses; that is to say, multiplicity combined with continuity is an absolutely necessary condition of our sensitive faculties in relation to external objects.

213. In this manner, it is a manifest contradiction to say that the simple can be sensible. Instinct and reason force us to suppose a real object of sensible intuition. This intuition is referred to the object as to something essentially composite, belonging to the order which we call continuity. If we make this object simple, it ceases to be sensible; and we both affirm and deny its sensible objectiveness. It is a contradiction to suppose a faculty in act, and at the same time to deprive it of the conditions to which its action is necessarily subject.

214. It may be said, that there is no necessity of transferring to the object the conditions of the subject, and therefore a simple object may be presented to the senses. But this is to elude the question at issue. For, either the sensible intuition is referred to the object, or it is not; if it is, the object cannot be simple; if it is not, we fall into idealism, which we have so often combated in the course of this work.

215. If you answer, that our soul, which is simple, has the representation of the composite, I reply, that the objective representation is not the same thing as the subjective perception of the composite; nor the presentation of the object as multiple the same thing as the perception of the multiple. Our soul perceives the multiple, and for this reason must itself be one, or it could not perceive that which is multiple. So much for the subjective; as to the objective, we must remark, that our sensible representations do not always proceed from real objects; but they always refer to objects which are at least possible; that is to say, the intuition is never entirely void; and when it has no object in reality, it finds one in possibility.

216. The external world, as involving multiplicity, or a collection of many beings, and as susceptible of this order which we call continuity, may be the object of sensible intuition, as we experience in reality. But this passive sensibility is not intrinsically necessary to it: I mean that God could so have disposed the collection of beings constituting the universe as not to be sensible. This is based on the variability of the relations of bodies; for, it is evident that if these relations did not exist, or were not subject to the conditions required by sensible representation, this representation would be impossible, and the world not sensible.

217. Experience confirms this conclusion which is obtained from transcendental philosophy. We find a slight alteration continually changing sensible bodies into insensible, and making sensible those that were insensible. The condensation of the air makes it visible; and its rarefaction invisible. A liquid body is tangible, but it ceases to be so when converted into vapor. The same variety which is caused by the alteration of the object may also proceed from a modification of the organ. A proof of this is found in what happens to the sight when aided by certain instruments. If, then, these transitions from sensible to insensible are now possible, without infringement of the fundamental laws of the relations of bodies, why could there not be a radical change in these relations which should make bodies wholly insensible?

218. By the variation of the relations of the beings which compose the corporeal universe, the sensible might become insensible; and, on the other hand, there are many insensible beings which by a different arrangement might be made sensible. To a certain extent we have something besides idle conjectures on this matter: facts speak; in proportion as the field of experience is expanded, new phenomena are discovered; thus magnetic attraction, electricity, and galvanism, have been added to experimental science.

In these phenomena there are agents at work which are not perceptible to the senses; why may they not be disposed in such way as to be perceived like other bodies? Where is the limit of these agents? We know not; but reasoning from analogy we may believe that there are many others whose existence is not known to us.

The perfection of a sensitive organ by means of instruments, is an arrangement by which we vary the ordinary system of the relations of our body to those around us. This perfectibility is indefinite, and the farther we advance, the greater do we find its extension. It is therefore probable, that in the universe there are many beings which are imperceptible to our senses, but which a modification of our organs, or a change of some of the laws of nature would render sensible. What a vast field of bold conjectures and sublime meditations!

CHAPTER XXXI.

POSSIBILITY OF A GREATER SPHERE IN ACTIVE SENSIBILITY

219. Having treated of passive sensibility in the order of possibles, a similar question naturally arises with respect to the active sensibility of beings subject to different conditions from those of our soul while united to the body.

I speak only of possibility, for, limited to what experience teaches us, we know not what may be in the sphere of beings with which we have no communication. Whatever we know of them is by divine revelation; and the object of revelation is not to teach us philosophy, but virtue.

220. To examine how far active sensibility is possible in an order different from that of our experience, not only raises curious and interesting questions, but it also gives an opportunity to explain by new reflections, the nature of this phenomenon in its relations to bodily organization. There is a special reason why we should seek to investigate this question. It consists in the interest inspired by every thing which relates to a state of existence into which we must soon enter. Short are the moments allotted to man to dwell in this world. We all hasten with astonishing rapidity to the final instant when the fragile organization which envelops our mortal spirit shall dissolve, and crumble into dust, – when the being which feels, thinks, and wills within us, shall pass to a new state, and be separated from the bodily organization. What will then be its faculties? This is a question which we cannot be indifferent to; for it concerns us, and the state of our future existence.

221. If we are asked whether a pure spirit is capable of sensible perception, we must answer negatively; because we are treating of active sensibility, which is not possible without the mediation of a body. I believe that some explanation of the question may be given. But we must first of all determine the meaning of the words. Sometimes we understand by a pure spirit, one which is not united to a body; but, more strictly speaking, the term is confined to a spirit which neither is united to a body, nor destined to this union. Thus the human soul is a spirit, but not a pure spirit; for it is either actually united to a body or is destined to this union.

It might appear at first sight that as we are limiting ourselves to the sphere of possibility, there is no difference between the two acceptations of the term; for, if it is not essentially repugnant to the soul when separated from the body, to have sensible intuition, it will not be so to other spirits. The parity is not certain; still, for the present, when speaking of pure spirits in general, I shall include souls separated from bodies.

222. What do we understand by sensing? This word may mean two things. It may mean the receiving of an impression by means of bodily organs; or it may mean simply the experiencing of the impression, independently of the bodily organ. For example: I see an object. Here is the affection called seeing, and the mechanism by which the object transmits light to the retina, and a certain impression to the brain. These are two very different things; the first is a fact of my mind; the second a modification of my body.

223. If by sensing is meant the receiving of the impression of a bodily organ, it is clear that a spirit which has no body cannot sense; but if by it is meant only the subjective affection abstracted from the medium by which it is produced or communicated, then the question is different, and the existence or non-existence of bodies cannot affect its answer either affirmatively or negatively.

224. The question then becomes this: Can a pure spirit have the various affections and representations which we call sensible?

Simplicity is not opposed to the sensitive faculty. Our soul senses, and still it is simple. The body aids it in the exercise of the sensitive faculties; but this aid is instrumental, not, however, in such a manner that the soul senses by the body, as an action is performed by means of the instrument. That which senses is the soul itself, and the instrumental action of the body consists in providing certain conditions from which sensation follows, by a physical or occasional influx. Therefore, the simplicity of a pure spirit is no argument against the sensitive faculties. Such an argument would prove too much; consequently, it proves nothing.

225. Hence there would be no intrinsical repugnance in God communicating to a pure spirit sensitive faculties; whether representative like those which place us in relation with the corporeal world, or purely subjective, like those of pleasure or pain.

226. Although in the present order these functions depend on certain conditions to which bodies are subject, considered in themselves, inasmuch as they are a modification of the soul, they have no essential relation to the corporeal world. It would therefore seem contrary to the principles of sound philosophy to say, that the soul separated from the body could not experience affections similar to those it has in this life. If this is not repugnant to the soul in its separate existence, why should it be so to other spirits?

The sensitive faculties are a sort of inferior order of perception. We see them in beings united to bodies, but they are not exercised immediately by a bodily organ. So far from contradicting simplicity, they require it; and therefore we have seen58 that matter is incapable of sensation. Many grave philosophers are of opinion that the causality of bodies with respect to sensations, is only occasional. This opinion is founded on the difficulty of explaining how a composite being can produce affections of any kind in a simple being. Instead of a repugnance between simplicity and the sensitive faculties, there is, on the contrary, a necessary connection. No composite being can be sensitive.

227. Perhaps it may now be thought that there is no longer any doubt of the possibility of sensation independently of the bodily organs; and that to hold the contrary, it would be necessary to maintain that God can not produce immediately that which he produces by means of second causes. The observations which we have made may seem to have exhausted the matter, but if we reflect on it, we shall find that we have scarce entered on it.

It must not be forgotten that we are examining the possibility of sensitive faculties, in relation to one attribute only, that of simplicity. This greatly limits the question, as it leaves it to be solved under one aspect only. Simplicity is a negative property. When we say that any thing is simple, we deny that it has parts, but we affirm none of its properties; we say what it is not, not what it is. Therefore, in maintaining that sensitive faculties are not repugnant to a pure spirit, we ought to restrict the proposition; we should express our meaning more exactly, if instead of saying "sensitive faculties are not repugnant to a pure spirit," we should say, "sensitive faculties are not repugnant to the simplicity of a pure spirit."

228. This last observation seems to me to present the question in its true point of view. Any other expression of it seems only to confuse ideas and raise problems which we have not sufficient data to solve. In fact, how do we know but what the repugnance which does not exist between sensibility and simplicity, may exist between sensibility and some attribute which we know nothing about? This argument is not valid for the human soul, because we already know that the soul is capable of sensing; but it is valid for other spirits, whose essence is unknown to us, and the character of whose perceptive faculties experience has not discovered to us.

229. One of the distinctive marks of sensitive perception is the reference to individual objects, not in what concerns their essence, but inasmuch as they are arranged in a certain order, the variations of which do not affect their internal nature. Extension itself, which both instinct and reflection teach us to regard as objective, is rather a result of the relations of the beings which form the composite extended object, than those beings themselves. The sensitive faculties are the lowest grade in the order of perception. Their sole function is to make known to their possessor a certain arrangement of external objects, but they teach him nothing concerning the nature of those objects. Pure spirits are a grade higher in the scale of perceptive beings, and one of the characteristics of intelligence is, that it penetrates to the inward nature of things. Therefore it might easily happen that the sensible faculties are repugnant to intelligences of a higher order than ours, not by reason of their simplicity, but on account of the different manner of their perception.

230. Reasoning by analogy from what takes place within ourselves, we are confirmed in this opinion. Sensible representations are often powerful auxiliaries to purely intellectual perception; but they just as often embarrass and confuse it. In meditating on very abstract matters sensible representations are a hinderance to the understanding, from which we should be glad to free ourselves. Every one has experienced this to be so. They are like shadows which come between the eye of the intellect and the object: the necessity of continually removing them delays and weakens our perception. Thus, we propose, for example, to think of causality. No sensible representation should find place in this idea in the abstract, yet in spite of all our efforts the representation haunts us. At one time it is the word causality, written or spoken; at another, the image of a man doing something, or of any other agent. The sensible representation is always in our way, and we cannot free ourselves from its presence. The understanding is forced to repeat continually to itself, "This is not the idea of causality; it is only an image, a comparison, an expression;" in order to defend itself against illusions, which would make it confound the particular with the universal, the contingent with the necessary, the phenomenal with the real.

231. We must conclude from this that a repugnance of sensitive faculties to the nature of a pure spirit, might proceed from the character of its intelligence, which by reason of its perfection rejects the duality of perception which exists in us. The object of the understanding is the essence of the thing understood, quidditas, as the scholastics called it. Sensible representations tell us nothing of this essence. They offer only one aspect of things, and even this is limited to the perception of extension; for as regards the other sensations, they are a subjective fact which instinct and reason teach us to attribute to external causes, rather than a perception of the real disposition of things.

232. This suggests another observation which supports the conjecture that the elevation of intelligence above a certain degree makes it incompatible with sensitive faculties. Sensations would tell us nothing even of this aspect and disposition of things if they did not have extension for their basis. To what should we reduce the corporeal world if we supposed it unextended? Since extension, as we have shown,59 although the basis of some sensations, is not the direct and immediate object of sensation; that which in the sensitive faculties makes us perceive something of the reality of objects, is not strictly sensible. Therefore, if it is the character of intellectual perception to know the reality of the object, the more elevated an intelligence is the farther it will be from sensation, and there may be a subject in which intellectual faculties are incompatible with sensitive faculties.