Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. I (of 2)

37

See Book 1, § 56.

38

Essai sur l'Indifference, Tome II., Part III., Ch. I.

39

Book II. Ch. ix.

40

See Ch. I.

41

Descartes, Principes de la Philosophie. P. 2, § 18.

42

Descartes, Ibid., § II, p. 21.

43

Leibnitz, Nouveaux Essais. L. II., C. XIII., § 17.

44

Leibnitz, Ibid., § 21.

45

Fragment of a Letter. – (I do not know what letter the author here refers to, but the same opinion in almost the same words may be found in Clarke's fourth and fifth letters to Leibnitz, Tr.)

46

I take no notice in this place of the different manner in which the idea of being is applicable to God and to creatures.

47

See Book II., Chap. xv.

48

Kant, Transc. Æsth. I. Absch. § 2, 1.

49

Bk. II., Chs. VII., VIII., and IX., and Bk. III., Ch. IV.

50

Bk. II., Ch. VIII., and Bk. III., Ch. VI.

51

Bk. II. Chap. VIII.

52

Chap. v.

53

XII., XIII., XIV., and XV.

54

Sum. Theol. P. I., Q. viii., Art. 1.

55

Sum. Theol. Q. LII., Art. I.

56

Dialecticians understand by an equivocal term one which in different things has an entirely different meaning. They give as an example the term lion which is applied equivocally to an animal, or a constellation. Æquivoca sunt quorum nomen commune est, et ratio per nomen significata, simpliciter diversa, is the scholastic definition.

57

Sum. Theol. Q. lxxvi., Art. 8.

58

B. II., Ch. II.

59

Ch. II.

60

In this proposition Clarke is either inexact and obscure, or else he falls into a serious error. The immensity of God is God himself. Every attribute of God is God.

61

Here Clarke confounds divisibility with separability. See chapters X. and XI. of this book.

62

Goclenius is the author of a philosophical dictionary quoted by Leibnitz.

63

Here Clarke falls again into the confusion we have spoken of, and making divisibility the same thing as separability, he asserts contradictory propositions.

64

Kant defines phenomenon, "the indeterminate object of an empirical intuition." He calls empirical intuition, "that which relates to an object by means of sensation." He understands by sensation, "the effect of an object on the representative faculty, in so far as we are affected by it." —Transcend. Æsthet. I.