The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire 1793-1812, Vol II

The better to divert attention from his real designs, Napoleon took the time appointed for his squadrons' sailing to visit Italy. Leaving Paris April 1, and journeying leisurely, he was in Alessandria on the first of May and in Milan on the 10th. There he remained a month, and was on the 26th crowned king of the late Italian Republic. His stay in Italy was prolonged to July. It is probably to this carefully timed absence that we owe the full and invaluable record of his hopes and fears, of the naval combinations which chased each other through his tireless mind, of the calculations and surmises—true or false, but always ingenious—which are contained in his almost daily letters to the Minister of Marine.

Prominent among his preoccupations were the detention of Ganteaume,—who, "hermetically blockaded and thwarted by constant calms," 183 could not get away,—and the whereabouts of Nelson, who disappeared from his sight as entirely, and from his knowledge far more completely, than Villeneuve did from the British ken. "In God's name! hurry my Brest squadron away, that it may have time to join Villeneuve. Nelson has been again deceived and gone to Egypt. Villeneuve was out of sight on the 10th of April. Send him word that Nelson is seeking him in Egypt; I have sent the same news to Ganteaume by a courier. God grant, however, that he may not find him in Brest." 184 On the 15th of April Ganteaume did make an attempt. The British fleet had been driven off by a gale on the 11th, but reappeared on the 13th. On the afternoon of the 14th word was brought to Admiral Gardner, who had temporarily relieved Cornwallis, that the French were getting under way. The next day they came out; but the enemy now numbered twenty-four sail to their twenty-one, and after a demonstration they retired within the port.

As the advancing season gave less and less hope of the blockade relaxing, Napoleon formed a new combination. Two ships-of-the-line, now nearly ready at Rochefort, should sail under Rear-Admiral Magon, carrying modified instructions to Villeneuve. The latter was now commanded to wait thirty-five days after Magon's arrival, and then, if Ganteaume had not appeared, return direct to Ferrol, discarding the alternative rendezvous of Santiago. At Ferrol he would find fifteen French and Spanish ships, making with his own and Magon's a total of thirty-five. With these he was to appear before Brest, where Ganteaume would join him, and with the combined force of fifty-six of the line at once enter the Channel. Magon sailed with these orders early in May, and on June 4 reached Villeneuve just in time to insure the direction given by the latter to his fleet upon its return. To facilitate the junction at Brest very heavy batteries were thrown up, covering the anchorage outside the Goulet; and there, in May, Ganteaume took up his position, covered by one hundred and fifty guns on shore.

It will be recognized that the emperor's plan, while retaining its essential features, had now undergone a most important modification, due to the closeness of the British blockade of Brest. A combination of his squadrons still remained the key-stone of the fabric; but the tenacity with which the largest of his detachments was held in check had forced him to accept—what he had rejected as least advantageous—a concentration in the Bay of Biscay, the great hive where swarmed the British navy.

It became therefore more than ever desirable to divert as many as possible of the enemy's cruisers from those waters; an object which now continuously occupied Napoleon's mind and curiously tinged his calculations with the color of his hopes. In defiance of statistics, he thought the East Indies, as has before been said, the first of British interests. He sought therefore to raise alarms about India, and persisted in believing that every division sailing from England was bound there. "Cochrane," he writes on April 13, "was before Lisbon on March 4. He must first have gone to the Cape de Verde, thence to Madeira, and if he gets no information he will go to India. That is what any admiral of sense would do in his case." 185 On the 10th of May, when Cochrane had been over a month in the West Indies, he reiterates this opinion, and at the same time conjectures that five thousand troops which sailed from England on the 15th of April with most secret orders were gone to the Cape of Good Hope. "Fears of Villeneuve's meeting this expedition will force them to send more ships to India." 186 On the 31st of May he guesses that eight ships-of-the-line, which sailed ten days before under Collingwood, were bound to India, 187 and a week later repeats the surmise emphatically: "The responsibility of the ministers is so great they cannot but send him to the East Indies." 188 On the 9th of June he writes: "Everything leads me to believe the English sent fifteen ships to the East Indies, when they learned that Cochrane reached Barbadoes a fortnight after Missiessy sailed; and in that case it is quite possible Nelson has been sent to America." 189 This opinion is repeated on the 13th and 14th; and on the 28th, as the veil was about to fall from his eyes, he sums up the acute reasoning which, starting from a false premise, had so misled him: "It is difficult to believe that without any news the English have sent seventeen ships-of-the-line (i. e. Nelson and Collingwood combined) to the West Indies, when Nelson, joining his ten to Cochrane's six, and three at Jamaica, would have nineteen—superior to our squadron; while Collingwood going to the East Indies with eight and finding there nine, in all seventeen, also superior to us—it is difficult, I say, to believe that the enemy, with the chance of being everywhere superior, should blindly abandon the East Indies." 190

Some French writers, 191 as well as some English, have disparaged the insight of Nelson, comparing him unfavorably with Napoleon, and basing their estimate largely upon his error in esteeming Egypt the aim of the French. In view of the foregoing extracts, and of other miscalculations made by the emperor during this remarkable campaign—which will appear farther on—it must be admitted that when in the dark, without good information, both were forced to inferences, more or less acute, but which, resting on no solid data, rose, as Nelson said, little above guesses. So also Collingwood has been credited with completely unravelling Napoleon's plan, and his penetration has been exalted above Nelson's because, after the latter's return from chasing Villeneuve to the West Indies, he wrote that the flight there was to take off the British naval force; overlooking his conjecture, two lines before, that (not England, but) "Ireland is the real mark and butt of all these operations." Rather might each adopt for himself Napoleon's own words, "I have so often in my life been mistaken that I no longer blush for it." 192 When his frigates lost sight of Villeneuve, on the night of March 31, Nelson went neither east nor west; he concentrated his force to cover what he thought the most likely objects of the enemy, and awaited information as to his movements. "I shall neither go to the eastward of Sicily nor to the westward of Sardinia until I know something positive." 193 It can be confidently said that under like conditions Napoleon would have done the same.

The fault of Napoleon's calculations was in over-estimating both the importance and the danger of India, and also in not allowing for the insight and information of the British government. He himself laid down, with his peculiarly sound judgment, the lines it ought to follow: "If I had been in the British Admiralty, I would have sent a light squadron to the East and West Indies, and formed a strong fleet of twenty of the line which I would not have dispatched until I knew Villeneuve's destination." 194 This was just what the Admiralty did. A light squadron was on its way to India, and eight ships were ordered to the West Indies under Collingwood; but that able officer, finding Nelson had started, contented himself with sending two to re-enforce him, and took up his own position with six before Cadiz, thus blocking the junction of the Cartagena ships. The strong body of twenty was kept before Brest, much to Napoleon's annoyance. "If England realizes the serious game she is playing, she ought to raise the blockade of Brest." 195 But here, as with regard to the Indian expeditions, Napoleon's thought was fathered by his wish. To weaken the Brest blockade, as he confessed a little later, was the great point for France. 196

Nothing in fact is more noteworthy, nor more creditable, than the intelligence and steadiness with which the British naval authorities resisted Napoleon's efforts to lead them into ex-centric movements. This was partly due to an accurate judgment of the worth of the enemy's detached squadrons, partly to an intuitive sense of the supreme importance of the Biscay positions, and partly to information much more accurate than Napoleon imagined, or than he himself received in naval transactions. "Those boasted English," jeered he, when he thought them ignorant of Villeneuve's second sailing, "who claim to know of everything, who have agents everywhere, couriers booted and spurred everywhere, knew nothing of it." 197 Yet, by a singular coincidence, on the very day, April 25, that they were supposed thus deceived, the Admiralty were hurrying letters to Nelson and to the West Indies with the important tidings. "You reason," wrote he to Decrès, "as if the enemy were in the secret." 198 This is just what they were,—not as to all details, but as to the main features of his plans. While the emperor was wildly reckoning on imaginary squadrons hastening to India, and guessing where Nelson was, both the latter and his government knew where Villeneuve had gone, and the British admiral was already in the West Indies. About the beginning of May it was known in England not only that the Toulon fleet had sailed, but whither it was bound; 199 and about the first of June, despite the cautions about secrecy imposed by Bonaparte, the British were informed by a prisoner that "the combined fleet, of sixty sail-of-the-line, will fight our fleet (balayer la Manche), while the large frigates will come up channel to convoy the flotilla over. The troops are impatiently awaiting the appearance of the ships to set them free." 200

The Admiralty therefore understood as well as did Napoleon that the crucial necessity in their dispositions was to prevent the combination of the enemy's squadrons, and that the chief scene of operations would be the Bay of Biscay and the approaches to the Channel. They contented themselves, consequently, with strengthening the force there, and keeping before Cadiz alone a detachment under Collingwood, lest a concentration in that port should compel them to weaken the Biscay squadrons. At the time Villeneuve sailed, an expedition of five thousand troops, whose destination was kept profoundly secret, was ready to start for the Mediterranean. This re-enforcement secured the naval bases of Gibraltar and Malta, and the Mediterranean otherwise was abandoned to frigates, supported by two or three ships-of-the-line. Herein also the practice of the Admiralty agreed with the precept of Napoleon. "The Mediterranean," wrote he on June 7 to his Minister of Marine, "is now nothing. I would rather see there two of Villeneuve's ships than forty;" and he added the pregnant counsel, which was exemplified by the British action, "It seems to me your purpose is not exclusive enough for a great operation. You must correct this fault, for that is the art of great successes and of great operations."

The secret expedition was met by Nelson just as he started for the West Indies. During his heavy beat down the Mediterranean he too, as carefully as Napoleon, had been studying the field on which he was to act; but while the one planned with all the freedom and certainty of an offensive, which, disposing of large means, moves upon a known object, the other, though in a restricted sphere, underwent the embarrassments of the defensive, ignorant where the blow was to fall. One clear light, however, shone step by step on his path,—wherever the French fleet was gone there should he go also.

The west wind which delayed his progress brought swiftly to him, on April 19, a vessel 201 from Gibraltar, with word that, two hours after Villeneuve passed the Straits, a frigate had started for England with the news, and that the French and Spaniards had sailed together from Cadiz. From this circumstance he reasoned, accurately, that the destination was the British Islands; 202 but he did not penetrate the deep design of a concentration in the West Indies. He therefore sent the frigate "Amazon" ahead of the fleet to Lisbon, to gather news and rejoin him off Cape St. Vincent; and by her he wrote the Admiralty, and also to the admirals off Brest and in Ireland, that he should take position fifty leagues west of the Scilly Islands, and thence steer slowly toward them. To any person who will plot this position on a map it will be apparent that, with winds prevailing from the westward, he would there be, as he said, equally well situated to reach Brest or Ireland; in short, in an excellent strategic position known to the authorities at home.

Stopping but four hours at Gibraltar on May 6, on the 9th he was off Cape St. Vincent, and there received news that the combined squadrons, to the number of eighteen of the line, had gone to the West Indies. His concern was great, for he fully understood the value of those islands. He had served there, knew them intimately, and had married there. Not a year before he had written, "If our islands should fall, England would be so clamorous for peace that we should humble ourselves." 203 Still, with all his anxiety, he kept his head. The convoy of troops was close at hand, he must provide for its safety. On the 11th of May it arrived, Nelson's fleet being then under way. To the two ships-of-the-line guarding it he added a third, the "Royal Sovereign," whose bad sailing delayed him; and to this circumstance it was owing that that ship, newly coppered, bore Collingwood's flag far in advance of either British column into the fire at Trafalgar. Three hours after the convoy's junction, at 7 P. M.of May 11, Nelson with ten ships was on his way to the West Indies, to seek eighteen which had thirty-one days' start.

On the 4th of June the British fleet, having gained eight days on the allies, anchored at Barbadoes, where it found Cochrane with two sail-of-the-line. The same day Magon with his two joined Villeneuve. In the three weeks the latter had now been in Martinique he had accomplished nothing but the capture of Diamond Rock, a small islet detached from the main island, which the British held and from which they annoyed the coasters. A frigate outstripping Magon had brought pressing orders to make conquests in the British possessions, during the thirty-five days of waiting for Ganteaume. In consequence, when Magon joined, the fleet was under way, standing north to clear the islands before making the stretch to the southward, and to windward, to reach Barbadoes; which Villeneuve had selected as his first point of attack.

On the 4th of June, therefore, the two hostile fleets were but a hundred miles apart, the distance separating Barbadoes from Martinique. Most singularly, at the very moment Villeneuve started north to return upon Barbadoes, false news, too plausible to be slighted, induced Nelson to go south. Positive information was sent by the officer commanding at Santa Lucia that the allies had been seen from there, May 29, steering south. Nelson anchored at Barbadoes at 5 P. M. June 4, embarked two thousand troops during the night, and at 10 A. M. next day made sail for the southward. On the 6th he passed Tobago, which was reported safe, and on the 7th anchored off Trinidad; where to the astonishment of every one nothing had been heard of the enemy. Cursing the news which had forced him to disregard his own judgment, when only a hundred miles of fair wind severed him from his prey, Nelson turned upon his tracks and steered for Martinique, tortured with fears for Jamaica and every exposed British possession.

On the 8th of June, when Nelson left Trinidad, the combined fleets were nearly four hundred miles from him, off the west side of Antigua. Here they captured fourteen merchant ships which had imprudently left port, and by them were informed that Nelson with fourteen ships (instead of ten) had reached Barbadoes. To these fourteen, Villeneuve, whose information was poor, added five as the force of Cochrane, making nineteen to his eighteen. Supposing therefore the enemy to be superior, not only in quality, which he conceded, but in numbers also, he decided, in view of so unexpected an event as the arrival on the scene of the greatest British admiral, to return at once to Europe. In this he doubtless met the wishes of Napoleon. "I think," said the latter, ere he knew the fact, "that the arrival of Nelson may lead Villeneuve to return to Europe;" 204 and he argued, still seeing things as he wished,—certainly not as a seaman would,—"When Nelson learns Villeneuve has left the Windward Islands, he will go to Jamaica," 205 a thousand miles to leeward. "So far from being infallible like the Pope," wrote Nelson at the same moment, "I believe my opinions to be very fallible, and therefore I may be mistaken that the enemy's fleet is gone to Europe; but I cannot bring myself to think otherwise." 206 Then, having given his reasons, he seems to dive into Napoleon's mind and read his thoughts. "The enemy will not give me credit for quitting the West Indies for this month to come." 207

Villeneuve also doubtless hoped to shake off his pursuer by his sudden change of purpose. Transferring troops necessary to garrison the French islands to four frigates, he directed the latter to land them at Guadaloupe and rejoin him off the Azores,—a mistaken rendezvous, which materially lengthened his backward voyage. The combined fleet then made sail on the 9th of June to the northward, to reach the westerly winds that favor the passage to Europe.

Three days later Nelson also was off Antigua, and convinced himself that the allies were bound back to Europe. With the tireless energy that brooked no rest when once resolve was formed, the night was passed transferring the troops which but one week before he had embarked at Barbadoes. But not even a night's delay was allowed in sending news to Europe. At 8 P. M. he hurried off the brig "Curieux" with dispatches to the Admiralty, which the captain, Bettesworth, was to deliver in person; a momentous action, and one fraught with decisive consequences to the campaign, although somewhat marred by an overcautious admiral. On the 13th, at noon, the fleet itself, accompanied by one of Cochrane's two ships, the "Spartiate," sailed for the Straits of Gibraltar; but Nelson, uncertain as to the enemy's destination, also sent word to the officer commanding off Ferrol, 208 lest he might be taken unawares.

Although Villeneuve's decision to return was fortunate and characterized by the extraordinary good luck which upon the whole had so far attended him, it is evident that he ran the chance of crossing Ganteaume on the Atlantic, as he himself had been crossed by Missiessy. Napoleon had taken precautions to insure both his waiting long enough, and also his return in case Ganteaume could not get away by a certain time; but not having foreseen, nor until June 28 209 even known, Nelson's pursuit of Villeneuve, he could not anticipate the course of the latter in such a contingency, nor combine with it the action of the Brest fleet.

Ganteaume, however, was not able to elude Lord Gardner, and on the 8th of May the emperor, having received in Italy the news of Magon's sailing, gave his final decision. If before midnight of May 20 an opportunity offered, the Brest fleet should start; but from daybreak of the 21st, had it every chance in the world, it should stand fast. A frigate was to be kept ready to sail the instant the latter condition took effect, carrying to Villeneuve orders for his action upon reaching Ferrol. This frigate did sail May 21, but of course did not find the admiral in the West Indies. Duplicate instructions were sent to Ferrol.

Villeneuve was by them informed that he would in Ferrol find ready for sea five French and nine Spanish ships, which, with those already under his orders, would make a force of thirty-four sail-of-the-line. In the roads off Rochefort would be five more. At Brest twenty-one ships were lying outside the Goulet, under the protection of one hundred and fifty cannon, ready to get under way at a moment's notice. The great point was to concentrate these three masses, or as much of them as possible, off Boulogne. Three courses were open to him. If the squadron at Ferrol could not leave the port when he appeared, on account of head winds, he should order it to join him at Rochefort and go there at once himself. Thence with forty ships he should proceed off Brest, join Ganteaume, and at once enter the Channel. If, however, the wind was fair for leaving Ferrol, that is, southerly, he would see in that a reason for hastening to Brest, without stopping for the Rochefort squadron; the more so as every delay would increase the British force before Brest. Thirdly, he might possibly, as he drew toward Ushant, find the winds so fair as to give the hope of getting to Boulogne with his thirty-five ships three or four days before the enemy's fleet at Brest could follow. If so, it was left to his discretion to embrace so favorable an opportunity. To these three courses Napoleon added a fourth as a possible alternative. After rallying the Ferrol ships he might pass north of the British Islands, join the Dutch squadron of the Texel with Marmont's corps there embarked, and with these appear off Boulogne. The emperor, however, looked upon this rather as a last resort. A great concentration in the Bay of Biscay was the one aim he now favored.

To facilitate this he busied himself much with the question of diverting the enemy from that great centre of his operations. This it was that made him so ready to believe that each squadron that sailed was gone to the East Indies. If so, it was well removed from the Bay of Biscay. For this he sought to get the Cartagena ships to Toulon or to Cadiz. "If we can draw six English ships before each port," he writes, "that will be a fine diversion for us; and if I can get the Cartagena ships in Toulon I will threaten Egypt in so many ways that they will be obliged to keep there an imposing force. They will believe Villeneuve gone to the East Indies in concerted operation with the Toulon squadron." 210 For this he purposes to send Missiessy to Cadiz. In Rochefort that admiral will occupy a British detachment, but on the spot where the emperor does not wish it; at Cadiz it will be remote from the scene. But later on he says, "Perhaps the enemy, who are now thoroughly frightened, will not be led away; in that case I shall have dispersed my force uselessly." 211 Therefore he concludes to keep him at Rochefort, where, if blockaded, he reduces the force either off Ferrol or off Brest. If not blockaded, he is to go to sea, take a wide sweep in the Atlantic, and appear off Ireland. The English will then doubtless detach ships to seek him; but he will again disappear and take position near Cape Finisterre, where he will be likely to meet Villeneuve returning. 212 Finally, for the same reason, toward the end of June he tries to create alarm about the Texel. Marmont is directed to make demonstrations and even to embark his troops, while part of the emperor's guard is moved to Utrecht. "This will lead the enemy to weaken his fleet before Brest, which is the great point." 213

All these movements were sound and wise; but the emperor made the mistake of underestimating his enemy. "We have not to do," he said, "with a far-sighted, but with a very proud government. What we are doing is so simple that a government the least foresighted would not have made war. For an instant they have feared for London; soon they will be sending squadrons to the two Indies." 214

The British government and the British Admiralty doubtless made blunders; but barring the one great mistake, for which the previous administration of St. Vincent was responsible, of allowing the material of the navy to fall below the necessities of the moment, the Trafalgar campaign was in its leading outlines well and adequately conceived, and in its execution, as event succeeded event, ably and even brilliantly directed. Adequate detachments were placed before each of the enemy's minor arsenals, while the fleet before Brest constituted the great central body upon which the several divisions might, and when necessity arose, actually did fall back. Sudden disaster, or being beaten in detail, thus became almost impossible. In the home ports was maintained a well-proportioned reserve, large enough to replace ships disabled or repairing, but not so large as seriously to weaken the force at sea. As a rule the Admiralty successfully shunned the ex-centric movements to which Napoleon would divert them, and clung steadfastly to that close watch which St. Vincent had perfected, and which unquestionably embodied the soundest strategic principles. Missiessy returned to Rochefort on the 26th of May and was promptly blocked by a body of five or six ships. As the force in Ferrol increased, by the preparation of ships for sea, the opposing squadron of six or seven was raised to ten, under Rear-Admiral Calder. Before Brest were from twenty to twenty-five, to whose command Admiral Cornwallis returned early in July, after a three months' sick leave. Collingwood with half a dozen was before Cadiz, where he effectually prevented a concentration, which, by its distance from the scene of action, would have seriously embarrassed the British navy. Such was the situation when Villeneuve and Nelson, in June and July, were re-crossing the Atlantic, heading, the one for Ferrol, the other for the Straits; and when the crisis, to which all the previous movements had been leading, was approaching its culmination.