History of Julius Caesar Vol. 2 of 2

It was the end of June. The wind from the north-west, which on this coast blows habitually at this period of the year, retarded the departure of the fleet twenty-five days; at length a favourable wind rose, and the army received orders to embark. In the middle of the bustle and confusion of starting, Dumnorix left the camp secretly with the Æduan cavalry, and took the road for his own country. When this was known, the embarkment was suspended, and a great part of the cavalry went in pursuit of the fugitive, with orders to bring him back dead or alive. Dumnorix, soon overtaken, resists, and is surrounded and slain. The Æduan cavalry all returned to the camp.

On the 20th of July, we believe, the fleet raised anchor at sunset, with a light breeze from the south-west. This wind having ceased towards midnight, the fleet was carried rather far out of its route by the current of the rising tide. At daybreak, Cæsar perceived that he had left Britain to his left. (See Plate 16.) But then came on the shifting of the current, of which he took advantage, and, aided by the reflux (jusant), laboured with all oars to gain the part of the isle found, in the preceding year, to offer an easy landing. Under these circumstances, the soldiers, with a persevering energy, succeeded, by means of their oars, in giving to the transport ships, in spite of their heaviness, the speed of galleys. The army landed, towards noon, on several points at once,391 without any appearance of the enemy. Prisoners reported subsequently that the barbarians, terrified at the view of so great a number of ships, had withdrawn to the heights.392

March into the interior of the Country.

III. Having effected the landing, Cæsar established his camp in a good position, near the sea.393 The fleet, left at anchor near the shore, on a level beach without shoals, under the command of Atrius, inspired him with no uneasiness.394 As soon as he knew where the enemy was posted, he began his march at the third watch (midnight), leaving ten cohorts395 and 300 cavalry to guard the fleet. After having proceeded during the night about twelve miles, the Romans at daybreak came in sight of the barbarians, posted on the heights of Kingston, beyond a stream of water now called the Little Stour.396 These caused their cavalry and chariots to advance as far as the bank of the stream, seeking, from their commanding position, to dispute the passage; but, repulsed by the cavalry, they withdrew into a forest where there was a place singularly fortified by nature and art, a refuge constructed in former times in their intestine wars.397 Numerous abatis of felled trees closed all the avenues. The Romans pushed the enemy up to the border of the wood, and made an attempt to carry the position. The Britons issued forth in small groups to defend the approaches of their oppidum; but the soldiers of the 7th legion, having formed the tortoise and pushed a terrace up to the inclosure, obtained possession of the retrenchment, and drove them out of the wood without sensible loss. Cæsar prevented the pursuit; he was unacquainted with the country, and wished to employ the rest of the day in fortifying his camp.398

Destruction of a part of the Fleet.

IV. Next morning, he divided the infantry and cavalry into three bodies, and sent them separately in pursuit of the enemy. The troops had advanced a considerable distance, and already the hindmost of the fugitives were in view, when a party of cavalry, despatched by Q. Atrius, came to announce that, in the preceding night, a violent tempest had damaged and thrown on shore nearly all the vessels. Neither anchors nor cordage had been strong enough to resist; the efforts of pilots and sailors had been powerless, and the shocks of the vessels against one another had caused serious loss. At this news, Cæsar called in his troops, ordered them to limit their efforts to repulsing the enemy as they retired, and hurried on before them to his fleet. He verified the correctness of the losses which were announced: about forty ships were destroyed, and the repair of the others required a long labour. He took the workmen attached to the legions, and brought others from the continent; wrote to Labienus to build, with his troops, the greatest number of ships possible; and lastly, in order to place his fleet in safety from all danger, he resolved, in spite of the labour it must entail upon him, to haul all the vessels on land, and inclose them in the camp by a new retrenchment.399 The soldiers employed ten entire days in this work, without interruption, even during the night.400

Cæsar resumes the offensive.

V. The vessels once placed on dry ground and surrounded with substantial defences, Cæsar left in the camp the same troops as before, and returned towards the localities where he had been obliged to abandon the pursuit of the Britons. He found them collected in great number. The general direction of the war had been entrusted to Cassivellaunus, whose states were separated from the maritime districts by the Thames, a river which was about eighty miles distant from the coast.401 This chief had heretofore had to sustain continual wars against the other peoples of the island; but, in face of the danger, all, with unanimous accord, agreed in giving him the command.

The enemy’s cavalry, with the war-chariots, attacked vigorously the cavalry in its march; they were everywhere beaten and driven back into the woods or to the heights. A short time after, while the Romans were labouring without distrust at their retrenchments, the Britons suddenly issued from the woods and attacked their advanced posts. The struggle becoming obstinate, Cæsar sent forward two picked cohorts, the first of two legions. They had hardly taken their position, leaving a slight interval between them, when the barbarians, manœuvring with their chariots according to custom, so intimidated the Romans by this mode of fighting, that they passed and repassed with impunity across the interval between the cohorts. The enemy was only repulsed on the arrival of re-enforcements. Q. Laberius Durus, a military tribune, perished in this action.

The description of this battle, as given in the “Commentaries,” has been differently understood. According to Dio Cassius, the Britons had at first thrown the ranks of the Romans into disorder by means of their chariots; but Cæsar, to baffle this manœuvre, had opened for them a free passage by placing his cohorts at greater intervals. He would thus have repeated the dispositions taken by Scipio at the battle of Zama, to protect him against the Carthaginian elephants.

This engagement, which took place before the camp and under the eyes of the army, showed how little the Roman tactics were fitted for this kind of warfare. The legionary, heavily armed, and accustomed to combat in line, could neither pursue the enemy in his retreat, nor move too far from his ensigns. There existed a still greater disadvantage for the cavalry. The Britons, by a simulated flight, drew them away from the legionaries, and then, jumping down from their chariots, engaged on foot in an unequal struggle; for, always supported by their cavalry, they were as dangerous in the attack as in the defence.402

The following day, the enemies took a position far from the camp, on the heights; they only showed themselves in small parties, isolated, harassing the cavalry with less ardour than before. But, towards the middle of the day, Cæsar having sent three legions and the cavalry, under the orders of the lieutenant C. Trebonius, to forage, they rushed from all sides upon the foragers with such impetuosity, that they approached the eagles and legions which had remained under arms. The infantry repulsed them vigorously, and, though they usually left to the cavalry the care of the pursuit, this time they did not cease to drive them before them till the cavalry, feeling themselves supported, came themselves to complete the rout. These left them time neither to rally nor to halt, nor to descend from their chariots, but made a great carnage of them. After this defeat, the Britons resolved to combat no more with their forces united, but to confine themselves to harassing the Roman army, so as to drag on the war in length.403

March towards the Thames.

VI. Cæsar, penetrating their design, hesitated no longer, in order to terminate the campaign promptly, to advance to the very centre of their strength: he directed his march towards the territory of Cassivellaunus, passing, no doubt, by Maidstone and Westerham. (See Plate 16.) Arriving at the banks of the Thames, which was then fordable only at one place, perhaps at Sunbury, he perceived a multitude of enemies drawn up on the opposite bank.404 It was defended by a palisade of sharp pointed stakes, before which other stakes driven into the bed of the river remained hidden under the water. Cæsar was informed of this by prisoners and deserters, and he sent the cavalry forward (probably a certain distance above or below), in order to turn the enemy’s position and occupy his attention, while the infantry destroyed the obstacles and crossed the ford. The soldiers entered the river resolutely, and, although they were in the water up to their shoulders, such was their ardour that the enemy could not sustain the shock, but abandoned the bank and fled. Polyænus relates that on this occasion Cæsar made use of an elephant to facilitate the passage; but, as the “Commentaries” do not mention such a fact, it is difficult to believe.405

Submission of a part of Britain.

VII. This check deprived Cassivellaunus of all hope of resistance; he sent away the greatest part of his troops, and only kept with him about 4,000 men, mounted in chariots. (Supposing six essedarii to the chariot, this would still amount to the considerable number of 660 carriages.) Sometimes confining himself to watching the march of the army, at others hiding in places of difficult access, or making a void before the march of the Roman columns; often, also, profiting by his knowledge of the localities, he fell unexpectedly with his chariots on the cavalry when it ventured far plundering and sacking, which obliged the latter to keep near the legions. Thus the damage inflicted on the enemy could not extend beyond the march of the infantry.

Meanwhile the Trinobantes, one of the most powerful peoples of Britain, sent deputies to offer their submission and demand Mandubratius for their king. This young man, flying from the anger of Cassivellaunus, who had put his father to death, had come to the continent to implore the protection of Cæsar, and had accompanied him into Britain. The Roman general listened favourably to the demand of the Trinobantes, and exacted from them forty hostages and wheat for the army.

The protection obtained by the Trinobantes engaged the Cenimagni, the Segontiaci, the Ancalites, the Bibroci, and the Cassi (see p. 168

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1

Justin, XXIV. 4. – Titus Livius, V. 48.

2

Polybius, II. 17-19. – Titus Livius, V. 35.

3

Pausanias, X. 19-23. – Diodorus Siculus, Eclog., XXII. 13.

4

Strabo, IV. p. 156, edit. Dübner and Müller. – Justin, XXXII. 3.

5

Polybius, IV. 46.

6

Justin, XXV. 2. – Titus Livius, XXXVIII. 16. – Pausanias, VII. 6, § 5.

7

Polybius, XXXIII. 7, 8. – Titus Livius, Epitome, XLVII.

8

Strabo, IV., p. 169.

9

Titus Livius, Epitome, LX.

10

Titus Livius, Epitome, LXI.

11

Strabo, IV., pp. 154, 159. – Titus Livius, Epitome, LXI. – Florus, III. 2. – Velleius Paterculus, II. 10.

12

Lucan, I. 424.

13

Cæsar, De Bello Gallico, I. 45. – Strabo, IV., p. 158.

14

Titus Livius, Epitome, LXII. – Eutropius, IV. 10. – Velleius Paterculus, I. 15.

15

Strabo, VII., p. 243.

16

This victory was gained by the Tigurini, a people of Helvetia, on the territory of the Allobroges. According to the Epitome of Titus Livius (LXV.), the battle took place in the district of the Nitiobriges, a people inhabiting the banks of the Garonne, which is not very probable.

17

After pillaging the temple of Toulouse.

18

Titus Livius, Epitome, LXVII. – Tacitus, Germania, 37.

19

Jugurtha, 114.

20

Orat. de Provinciis Consularibus, 13.

21

Orat. de Provinciis Consularibus, 13.

22

The fugitives from Vienne founded the town which subsequently took the name of Lugdunum, in a place called Condate, which is synonymous with confluence. (Dio Cassius, XLVI. 50.)

23

Orat. de Provinciis Consularibus, 13.

24

Jugurtha, 114.

25

Cicero, Orat. de Provinciis Consularibus, 13.

26

Cicero, Epist. ad Atticum, I. 19.

27

Plutarch, Cæsar, 41. – Appian, Civil Wars, II. 41.

28

Appian, Civil Wars, II. 41.

29

Plutarch, Cæsar, 41. – Appian, Civil Wars, II. 41.

30

Appian, Civil Wars, II. 41.

31

Cicero, Orat. de Provinciis Consularibus, 11. – Dio Cassius, XL. 50.

32

Cicero, Orat. de Provinciis Consularibus, 14.

33

Cicero, Orat. de Provinciis Cousularibus, 12.

34

It is stated in the “Commentaries” that Cæsar placed in winter quarters four legions among the Belgæ, and the same number among the Ædui. (De Bello Gallico, VIII. 54.) – “Cæsar had with him but 5,000 men and 300 horse. He had left the rest of his army beyond the Alps.” (Plutarch, Cæsar, 36, and Appian, Civil Wars, II. 34.)

35

Appian, Civil Wars, II. 35.

36

De Bello Gallico, VIII. 55.

37

Suetonius, Cæsar, 68.

38

In Suetonius, Cæsar, 56. – Cicero, Brutus, 75.

39

Preface of Hirtius to Book VIII. of the “Commentaries.”

40

De Bello Gallico, VI. 13.

41

De Bello Gallico, IV. 10.

42

Strabo, IV. 3, p. 160

43

The Narbonnese reminded the Romans of the climate and productions of Italy. (Strabo, IV. 1, p. 147.)

44

Pomponius Mela, who compiled in the first century, from old authors an abridgement of Geography, says that Gaul was rich in wheat and pastures, and covered with immense forests: “Terra est frumenti præcipue ac pabuli forax, et amœna lucis immanibus.” (De Situ Orbis, III. 2.) – (De Bello Gallico, I, 16.) – The winter was very early in the north of Gaul. (De Bello Gallico, IV. 20.) Hence the proverbial expression at Rome of heims Gallica. (Petronius, Satir. 19. – Strabo, IV., 147-161.) – See the “Memoire on the Forests of Gaul” read before the Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, by M. Alfred Maury.

45

Strabo, IV., p. 147. – Diodorus Siculus, V. 26.

46

Cæsar, after having said (V. 3) that the forests of the Ardennes extended from the Rhine to the frontier of the Remi, ad initium Remorum, adds (VI. 29) that it extended also towards the Nervii, ad Nervios. Nevertheless, according to chapter 33 of book VI., we believe that this forest extended, across the country of the Nervii, to the Scheldt. How otherwise could Cæsar have assigned to the forests of the Ardennes a length of 500 miles, if it ended at the eastern frontier of the Nervii? This number is, in any case, exaggerated, for from the Rhine (at Coblentz) to the Scheldt, towards Ghent and Antwerp, it is but 300 kilomètres, or 200 miles.

47

De Bello Gallico, VIII. 5.

48

“Citra flumen Ararim … reliqui sese fugæ mandarunt atque in proximas silvas abdiderunt.” (De Bello Gallico, I. 12.)

49

“Menapii propinqui Eburonum finibus, perpetuis paludibus silvisque muniti.” (De Bello Gallico, VI. 5.)

50

“(Morini et Menapii) … silvas ac paludes habebant, eo se suaque contulerunt.” (De Bello Gallico, III. 28.)

51

“(Sugambri) primos Eburonum fines adeunt … non silvæ morantur.” (De Bello Gallico, VI. 35.)

52

Strabo, p. 163, edit. Didot.

53

De Bello Gallico, IV. 2.

54

Strabo, pp. 121, 155, 170, edit. Didot.

55

“Carpenta Gallorum.” (Florus, I. 13) – “Plurima Gallica (verba) valuerunt, ut reda ac petorritum.” (Quintilian, De Institutione Oratoria, lib. I., cap. v. 57.) – “Petorritum enim est non ex Græcia dimidiatum, sed totum transalpibus, nam est vox Gallica. Id scriptum est in libro M. Varronis quarto decimo Rerum Divinarum; quo in loco Varro, quum de petorrito dixisset, esse id verbum Gallicum dixit.” (Aulus Gellius, XV. 30.) – “Petoritum et Gallicum vehiculum est, et nomen ejus dictum esse existimant a numero quatuor rotarum. Alii Osce, quod hi quoque petora quatuor vocent. Alii Græce, sed αἱλικὡς dictum.” (Festus, voc. Petoritum, p. 206, edit. Müller.) – “Belgica esseda, Gallicana vehicula. Nam Belga civitas est Galliæ in qua hujusmodi vehiculi repertus est usus.” (Servius, Commentaries on the Georgics of Virgil, lib. III. v. 204. – Cæsar, De Bello Gallico, IV. 33, and passim.

56

De Bello Gallico, II. 5.

57

De Bello Gallico, I. 7.

58

De Bello Gallico, VII. 11.

59

De Bello Gallico, VII. 34, 53.

60

De Bello Gallico, VII. 58.

61

The reckoning of these contingents is the most positive element for estimating the state of the population. We find in the “Commentaries” three valuable statements: 1st, the numerical state of the Helvetian immigration in 696 (De Bello Gallico, I. 29.); 2nd, that of the Belgic troops, in the campaign of 697 (De Bello Gallico, II. 4.); 3rd, the census of the Gaulish army which, in 702, attempted to raise the siege of Alesia (De Bello Gallico, VII. 75.) Of 368,000 men, composing the agglomeration of the Helvetii and their allies, 92,000 were able to bear arms; that is, about a quarter of the population. In the campaign of 697, the Belgic coalition counted 296,000 combatants, and, in 702, at the time of the blockade of Alesia, the effective force of a great part of Gaul amounted to 281,000 men. But, in order not to count twice the different contingents of the same states, we suppress from the enumeration of the year 702 the contingents of the countries already mentioned in the census of 697, which reduces the effective force to 201,000 men. Yet this number cannot represent the total of men fit for war; it comprises only the troops which could easily be sent out of the territory, and which were more numerous accordingly as the people to which they belonged were nearer to the theatre of military operations. Thus Cæsar informs us that the Bellovaci, who could bring into the field 100,000 men, only furnished 60,000 picked men in 697, and 10,000 in 702. The contingent of the Atrebates, which had been 15,000 men in 697, was reduced to 4,000 in 702; that of the Nervii, of 50,000 in the former year, sank to 5,000; and that of the Morini similarly from 25,000 to 5,000. From these circumstances we may be allowed to infer that the Gauls armed three-fifths of their male population when the enemy was near their territory, and only one-fifth, or even one-sixth, when he was more distant.

If, then, we would form an idea of the total number of men able to carry arms in Gaul, we must augment the contingents really furnished, sometimes by two-fifths, sometimes in a higher proportion, according to the distances which separated them from the seat of war. By this calculation, the levies of 697 represent 513,600 men capable of carrying arms, and those of 702, at least 573,600; we add together these two numbers, because, as stated above, each army comprises different populations, which gives 1,087,200 men, to whom we must add 92,000 Helvetii; moreover, it is indispensable to take into account the contributive capability of the populations which are not mentioned in the “Commentaries” among the belligerents at the two epochs indicated above, such as the Pictones, the Carnutes, the Andes, the Remi, the Treviri, the Lingones, the Leuci, the Unelli, the Redones, the Ambivareti, and the peoples of Armorica and Aquitaine. By an approximate estimate of their population according to the extent of their territory, we shall obtain the number of 625,000 men. Adding together these four numbers, to obtain the total number of men capable of bearing arms, we shall get 513,600 + 573,600 + 92,000 + 625,000 = 1,804,200 men. Quadrupling this number to get, according to the proportion applied to the Helvetii, the total of the population, we shall have 7,216,800 inhabitants for Gaul, the Roman province not included. In fact, Diodorus Siculus, who wrote in the first century of our era, says (lib. V., c. 25) that the population of the different nations of Gaul varies from 200,000 to 50,000 men, which would make a mean of 125,000 men. If we take the word ἁνδρες in the sense of inhabitants, and if we admit with Tacitus that there were in Gaul sixty-four different nations, we should have the number of 8,000,000 inhabitants, very near the preceding.

62

Pliny expresses himself thus: “The country comprised under the name of Gallia Comata is divided into three peoples, generally separated by rivers. From the Scheldt to the Seine is Belgic Gaul; from the Seine to the Garonne, Celtic, called also Lyonnese; from thence to the Pyrenees is Aquitaine.” (Hist. Nat., IV. xxxi. 105.)

63

Peoples composing the Roman Province:

The Albici (the south of the department of the Lower Alps, and the north of the Var). (De Bello Civil., I. 34; II. 2.)

The Allobroges, probably of Celtic origin, inhabited the north-west of Savoy, and the greater part of the department of the Isère.

The Helvii, inhabitants of the ancient Vivarais (the southern part of the department of the Ardèche), separated from the Arverni by the Cévennes. (De Bello Gallico, VII. 8.)

The Ruteni of the province (Ruteni Provinciales), a fraction of the Celtic nation of the Ruteni, incorporated into the Roman province, and whose territory extended over a part of the department of the Tarn.

The Sallyes, or Salluvii (the Bouches-du-Rhône, and western part of the Var). (De Bello Civil., I. 35, edit. Nipperdey.)

The Vocontii (department of the Drôme and Upper Alps, southern part of the Isère, and the northern part of the Ardèche).

The Volcæ occupied all Lower Languedoc, from the Garonne to the Rhone. They had emigrated from the north of Gaul. They were subdivided into the Volcæ Tectosages, who had Tolosa (Toulouse) for their principal town; and the Volcæ Arecomici.