History of Julius Caesar Vol. 2 of 2

It was the end of June. The wind from the north-west, which on this coast blows habitually at this period of the year, retarded the departure of the fleet twenty-five days; at length a favourable wind rose, and the army received orders to embark. In the middle of the bustle and confusion of starting, Dumnorix left the camp secretly with the Æduan cavalry, and took the road for his own country. When this was known, the embarkment was suspended, and a great part of the cavalry went in pursuit of the fugitive, with orders to bring him back dead or alive. Dumnorix, soon overtaken, resists, and is surrounded and slain. The Æduan cavalry all returned to the camp.

On the 20th of July, we believe, the fleet raised anchor at sunset, with a light breeze from the south-west. This wind having ceased towards midnight, the fleet was carried rather far out of its route by the current of the rising tide. At daybreak, Cæsar perceived that he had left Britain to his left. (See Plate 16.) But then came on the shifting of the current, of which he took advantage, and, aided by the reflux (jusant), laboured with all oars to gain the part of the isle found, in the preceding year, to offer an easy landing. Under these circumstances, the soldiers, with a persevering energy, succeeded, by means of their oars, in giving to the transport ships, in spite of their heaviness, the speed of galleys. The army landed, towards noon, on several points at once,391 without any appearance of the enemy. Prisoners reported subsequently that the barbarians, terrified at the view of so great a number of ships, had withdrawn to the heights.392

March into the interior of the Country.

III. Having effected the landing, Cæsar established his camp in a good position, near the sea.393 The fleet, left at anchor near the shore, on a level beach without shoals, under the command of Atrius, inspired him with no uneasiness.394 As soon as he knew where the enemy was posted, he began his march at the third watch (midnight), leaving ten cohorts395 and 300 cavalry to guard the fleet. After having proceeded during the night about twelve miles, the Romans at daybreak came in sight of the barbarians, posted on the heights of Kingston, beyond a stream of water now called the Little Stour.396 These caused their cavalry and chariots to advance as far as the bank of the stream, seeking, from their commanding position, to dispute the passage; but, repulsed by the cavalry, they withdrew into a forest where there was a place singularly fortified by nature and art, a refuge constructed in former times in their intestine wars.397 Numerous abatis of felled trees closed all the avenues. The Romans pushed the enemy up to the border of the wood, and made an attempt to carry the position. The Britons issued forth in small groups to defend the approaches of their oppidum; but the soldiers of the 7th legion, having formed the tortoise and pushed a terrace up to the inclosure, obtained possession of the retrenchment, and drove them out of the wood without sensible loss. Cæsar prevented the pursuit; he was unacquainted with the country, and wished to employ the rest of the day in fortifying his camp.398

Destruction of a part of the Fleet.

IV. Next morning, he divided the infantry and cavalry into three bodies, and sent them separately in pursuit of the enemy. The troops had advanced a considerable distance, and already the hindmost of the fugitives were in view, when a party of cavalry, despatched by Q. Atrius, came to announce that, in the preceding night, a violent tempest had damaged and thrown on shore nearly all the vessels. Neither anchors nor cordage had been strong enough to resist; the efforts of pilots and sailors had been powerless, and the shocks of the vessels against one another had caused serious loss. At this news, Cæsar called in his troops, ordered them to limit their efforts to repulsing the enemy as they retired, and hurried on before them to his fleet. He verified the correctness of the losses which were announced: about forty ships were destroyed, and the repair of the others required a long labour. He took the workmen attached to the legions, and brought others from the continent; wrote to Labienus to build, with his troops, the greatest number of ships possible; and lastly, in order to place his fleet in safety from all danger, he resolved, in spite of the labour it must entail upon him, to haul all the vessels on land, and inclose them in the camp by a new retrenchment.399 The soldiers employed ten entire days in this work, without interruption, even during the night.400

Cæsar resumes the offensive.

V. The vessels once placed on dry ground and surrounded with substantial defences, Cæsar left in the camp the same troops as before, and returned towards the localities where he had been obliged to abandon the pursuit of the Britons. He found them collected in great number. The general direction of the war had been entrusted to Cassivellaunus, whose states were separated from the maritime districts by the Thames, a river which was about eighty miles distant from the coast.401 This chief had heretofore had to sustain continual wars against the other peoples of the island; but, in face of the danger, all, with unanimous accord, agreed in giving him the command.

The enemy’s cavalry, with the war-chariots, attacked vigorously the cavalry in its march; they were everywhere beaten and driven back into the woods or to the heights. A short time after, while the Romans were labouring without distrust at their retrenchments, the Britons suddenly issued from the woods and attacked their advanced posts. The struggle becoming obstinate, Cæsar sent forward two picked cohorts, the first of two legions. They had hardly taken their position, leaving a slight interval between them, when the barbarians, manœuvring with their chariots according to custom, so intimidated the Romans by this mode of fighting, that they passed and repassed with impunity across the interval between the cohorts. The enemy was only repulsed on the arrival of re-enforcements. Q. Laberius Durus, a military tribune, perished in this action.

The description of this battle, as given in the “Commentaries,” has been differently understood. According to Dio Cassius, the Britons had at first thrown the ranks of the Romans into disorder by means of their chariots; but Cæsar, to baffle this manœuvre, had opened for them a free passage by placing his cohorts at greater intervals. He would thus have repeated the dispositions taken by Scipio at the battle of Zama, to protect him against the Carthaginian elephants.

This engagement, which took place before the camp and under the eyes of the army, showed how little the Roman tactics were fitted for this kind of warfare. The legionary, heavily armed, and accustomed to combat in line, could neither pursue the enemy in his retreat, nor move too far from his ensigns. There existed a still greater disadvantage for the cavalry. The Britons, by a simulated flight, drew them away from the legionaries, and then, jumping down from their chariots, engaged on foot in an unequal struggle; for, always supported by their cavalry, they were as dangerous in the attack as in the defence.402

The following day, the enemies took a position far from the camp, on the heights; they only showed themselves in small parties, isolated, harassing the cavalry with less ardour than before. But, towards the middle of the day, Cæsar having sent three legions and the cavalry, under the orders of the lieutenant C. Trebonius, to forage, they rushed from all sides upon the foragers with such impetuosity, that they approached the eagles and legions which had remained under arms. The infantry repulsed them vigorously, and, though they usually left to the cavalry the care of the pursuit, this time they did not cease to drive them before them till the cavalry, feeling themselves supported, came themselves to complete the rout. These left them time neither to rally nor to halt, nor to descend from their chariots, but made a great carnage of them. After this defeat, the Britons resolved to combat no more with their forces united, but to confine themselves to harassing the Roman army, so as to drag on the war in length.403

March towards the Thames.

VI. Cæsar, penetrating their design, hesitated no longer, in order to terminate the campaign promptly, to advance to the very centre of their strength: he directed his march towards the territory of Cassivellaunus, passing, no doubt, by Maidstone and Westerham. (See Plate 16.) Arriving at the banks of the Thames, which was then fordable only at one place, perhaps at Sunbury, he perceived a multitude of enemies drawn up on the opposite bank.404 It was defended by a palisade of sharp pointed stakes, before which other stakes driven into the bed of the river remained hidden under the water. Cæsar was informed of this by prisoners and deserters, and he sent the cavalry forward (probably a certain distance above or below), in order to turn the enemy’s position and occupy his attention, while the infantry destroyed the obstacles and crossed the ford. The soldiers entered the river resolutely, and, although they were in the water up to their shoulders, such was their ardour that the enemy could not sustain the shock, but abandoned the bank and fled. Polyænus relates that on this occasion Cæsar made use of an elephant to facilitate the passage; but, as the “Commentaries” do not mention such a fact, it is difficult to believe.405

Submission of a part of Britain.

VII. This check deprived Cassivellaunus of all hope of resistance; he sent away the greatest part of his troops, and only kept with him about 4,000 men, mounted in chariots. (Supposing six essedarii to the chariot, this would still amount to the considerable number of 660 carriages.) Sometimes confining himself to watching the march of the army, at others hiding in places of difficult access, or making a void before the march of the Roman columns; often, also, profiting by his knowledge of the localities, he fell unexpectedly with his chariots on the cavalry when it ventured far plundering and sacking, which obliged the latter to keep near the legions. Thus the damage inflicted on the enemy could not extend beyond the march of the infantry.

Meanwhile the Trinobantes, one of the most powerful peoples of Britain, sent deputies to offer their submission and demand Mandubratius for their king. This young man, flying from the anger of Cassivellaunus, who had put his father to death, had come to the continent to implore the protection of Cæsar, and had accompanied him into Britain. The Roman general listened favourably to the demand of the Trinobantes, and exacted from them forty hostages and wheat for the army.

The protection obtained by the Trinobantes engaged the Cenimagni, the Segontiaci, the Ancalites, the Bibroci, and the Cassi (see p. 168), to follow their example. The deputies of these different peoples informed Cæsar that the oppidum of Cassivellaunus (St. Albans) stood at a short distance, defended by marshes and woods, and containing a great number of men and cattle.406 Although this formidable position had been further fortified by the hands of men, Cæsar led his legions thither, and attacked it on two points without hesitation. After a feeble resistance, the barbarians, in their attempt to escape, were slain or captured in great numbers.

Nevertheless, Cæsar was operating too far from his point of departure not to tempt Cassivellaunus to deprive him of the possibility of returning to the continent, by seizing upon his fleet. In effect, Cassivellaunus had ordered the four kings of the different parts of Cantium (Kent), Cingetorix, Carvilius, Taximagulus, and Segovax, to collect all their troops, and attack unexpectedly the camp in which the Roman ships were inclosed. They hastened thither; but the cohorts did not leave them time to attack; they made a sortie, killed a great number of barbarians, captured one of their principal chiefs, Lugotorix, and re-entered their camp without loss. On the news of this defeat, Cassivellaunus, discouraged by so many reverses and the defection of several peoples, employed Commius to offer his submission.407

Re-embarkment of the Army.

VIII. Summer approached its end (they were in the last days of August). Cæsar, aware that there no longer remained sufficient time to be employed with advantage, prepared for his departure; he wished, moreover, to pass the winter on the continent, fearing sudden revolts on the part of the Gauls. He therefore caused hostages to be delivered to him, fixed the tribute to be paid annually by Britain to the Roman people, and expressly prohibited Cassivellaunus from all acts of hostility against Mandubratius and the Trinobantes.

After receiving the hostages, Cæsar hastened to return in person to the coast, and ordered his army to follow him afterwards; he found the ships repaired, and caused them to be put afloat. His great number of prisoners, and the loss of several of his ships, obliged him to pass the army across the channel in two convoys. It is remarkable that, of so many ships employed several times in the passage this year or the year before, not one of those which carried the troops was lost; but, on the contrary, the greater part of the ships which returned empty, after having landed the soldiers of the first transport, and those built by Labienus, to the number of sixty, did not reach their destination; they were nearly all thrown back upon the coast of the continent. Cæsar, who had resolved to leave Britain only with the last convoy, waited for them some time in vain. The approach of the equinox led him to fear that the period favourable for navigation would pass by, and he decided on overloading his ships with soldiers, sailed in a moment of calm at the beginning of the second watch (nine o’clock), and, after a favourable passage, landed at daybreak.408

This second expedition, though more successful than the first, did not bring as its result the complete submission of the isle of Britain. According to Cæsar, the Romans did not even obtain any booty; yet Strabo speaks of a considerable booty,409 and another author confirms this fact by relating that Cæsar formed out of the spoils of the enemy a cuirass ornamented with pearls, which he consecrated to Venus.410

Observations.

IX. Several indications enable us again to fix precisely the period of the second expedition to Britain. We know, from a letter from Quintus to his brother Cicero, that Cæsar was at the end of May at Lodi (we admit the 22nd of May).411 He might therefore have arrived towards the 2nd of June on the shores of the ocean, where he inspected his fleet. During the interval before it assembled at the Portus Itius, he proceeded to the country of the Treviri, where he did not remain long; for, towards the middle of the summer (ne æstatem in Treviris consumere cogeretur), he started for Boulogne, where he arrived at the end of June. The winds from the north-west retained him there twenty-five days, that is, till towards the end of July. On another hand, Cicero wrote to Atticus on the 26th of July: “I see, from my brother’s letters, that he must already be in Britain.”412 In reply to another letter of Quintus, dated on the 4th of the Ides of August (the 8th of August), he rejoices at having received on the day of the Ides of September (9th of September), the news of his arrival in that island.413 These data fix the departure of the expedition to the end of July, for the letters took from twenty to thirty days to pass from Britain to Rome.414 When the army moved from the coasts, the news was naturally much longer on the way; and in the month of October, Cicero wrote to his brother, “Here are fifty days passed without the arrival of letter or sign of life from you, or Cæsar, or even from where you are.”415 Having ascertained the month of July for that of his departure, we have next to find the day on which that departure took place.

Cæsar sailed at sunset, that is, towards eight o’clock (solis occasu naves solvit, leni Africo provectus). The wind having ceased at midnight, he was drawn by the currents towards the north; and when day broke, at four o’clock in the morning, he saw on his left the cliffs of the South Foreland; but then, the current changing with the tide, by force of rowing he made land towards midday, as in the preceding summer, near Deal.

To determine the day on which Cæsar landed, it is necessary, in the first place, to know to what part the Roman fleet was carried during the night. It is evident, first, that it was borne towards the north-east by the current of the rising tide or flux, for otherwise we could not understand how Cæsar, at sunrise, could have perceived Britain on his left. We may add that it wandered from its way till it came to the latitude of the Northern Sea, which is situated to the east of Deal, and at about ten maritime miles from the coast. (See Plate 14.) In fact, according to the text, the fleet took advantage of the current contrary to that which had carried it away, and consequently of the reflux or current of the ebbing tide, to reach the coast. Now, we are obliged by this fact to conclude that it had been carried northward at least to the latitude of Deal; for, if it had only arrived to the south of that latitude, the reflux would necessarily have thrown it back into the Straits. Lastly, to cause the fleet by force of rowing and aided by the reflux to require eight hours to effect the last part of its passage to Deal, it must, according to the best information obtained from sailors, have been, at sunrise, ten miles from the coast.

This being granted, it is evidently sufficient, for determining the day of landing, to resolve this question: on what day of the month of July in the year 700 the current of the descending tide began to be perceived at sunrise, that is, towards four o’clock in the morning, in the part of the sea at ten miles to the east of Deal? or otherwise, if we consider that the reflux begins there about four hours and a half after the hour of high tide at Dover,416 what day of the month of July in the year 700 it was high tide at Dover towards half-past eleven o’clock at night?

By following a train of reasoning similar to that which we applied to determine the day of Cæsar’s first landing in Britain, and remarking that the tides of the days preceding the full moon of the month of July, 700, which fell on the 21st, correspond to those of the days which preceded the full moon of the 26th of July, 1858, we find that it was either fifteen days or one day before the 21st of July of the year 700, that is, the 6th or the 20th of July, that it was high tide at Dover towards half-past eleven at night. Cæsar, therefore, landed on the 7th or on the 21st of July. We adopt the second date, because, according to Cicero’s letter cited above, he received, before the 26th of July, at Rome news of his brother, which must have been of the 6th of the same month, as the couriers were twenty days on the road. In this letter Quintus announced his approaching departure for Britain.

This date, according to which the Roman army would have landed on the eve of the day of the full moon, is the more probable, as Cæsar, immediately on his arrival in Britain, made a night march, which would have been impossible in complete darkness. The passage of the sea had taken fifteen hours. In the return, it only took nine hours, since Cæsar started at nine o’clock in the evening (secunda inita cum solvisset vigilia), and arrived at Boulogne at daybreak (prima luce), which, in the middle of September, is at six o’clock in the morning.417

The date of his return is nearly fixed by a letter of Cicero, who expresses himself thus: “On the 11th of the Calends of November (17th of October), I received letters from my brother Quintus, and from Cæsar; the expedition was finished, and the hostages delivered. They had made no booty. They had only imposed contributions. The letters, written from the shores of Britain, are dated on the 6th of the Calends of October (21st of September), at the moment of embarking the army, which they are bringing back.”418 This information accords with the date of the equinox, which fell on the 26th of September, and which, according to the “Commentaries,” was close at hand (quod equinoctium suberat). Cæsar had, then, remained in Britain about sixty days.

Presumed Dates of the Second Campaign in Britain.

Примечание 1419

Distribution of the Legions in their Winter Quarters.

XI. Cæsar had no sooner arrived on the continent than he caused his ships to be brought on ground, and then held at Samarobriva, (Amiens) the assembly of Gaul. The defective harvest, caused by the dryness of the season, obliged him to distribute his winter quarters differently from the preceding years, by spreading them over a greater extent.420 The number of his legions was eight and a half, because, independent of the eight legions brought together at Boulogne before the departure for Britain, he had no doubt formed five cohorts of soldiers and sailors employed on his fleet. The troops were distributed in the following manner: he sent one legion into the country of the Morini (to Saint Pol), under the orders of C. Fabius; another to the Nervii (at Charleroy), with Quintus Cicero;421 a third to the Essuvii (at Sées, in Normandy), under the command of L. Roscius; a fourth, under T. Labienus, to the country of the Remi, near the frontier of the Treviri (at Lavacherie, on the Ourthe).422 He placed three in Belgium,423 one at Samarobriva itself (Amiens), under the orders of Trebonius; the second in the country of the Bellovaci, under M. Crassus, his questor, at twenty-five miles from Amiens (Montdidier); the third under L. Munatius Plancus, near the confluence of the Oise and the Aisne (at Champlieu). The legion last raised424 among the Transpadans repaired with five cohorts, under the orders of Titurius Sabinus and Aurunculeius Cotta, to the Eburones, whose country, situated in great part between the Meuse and the Rhine, was governed by Ambiorix and Catuvolcus. It occupied a fortress named Aduatuca (Tongres).425 This distribution of the army appeared to Cæsar a more easy manner to supply it with provisions. Moreover, these different winter quarters, with the exception of that of M. Roscius, who occupied the most peaceable part of Gaul, were all included within a circle of a hundred miles radius (148 kil.). It was Cæsar’s intention not to leave them until he knew that the legions were firmly established and their quarters fortified. (See Plate 14, the sites of the winter quarters.)

There was among the Carnutes (country of Chartres) a man of high birth, named Tasgetius, whose ancestors had reigned over that nation. In consideration of his valour and of his important military services, Cæsar had replaced him, during three years, in the rank held by his forefather, when his enemies publicly massacred him. The men who had participated in this crime were so numerous, that there was reason for fearing that the revolt would spread over the whole country. To prevent it, Cæsar despatched in the greatest haste L. Plancus at the head of his legion, with orders to establish his quarters in the country of the Carnutes, and to send him the accomplices in the murder of Tasgetius.426

Defeat of Sabinus at Aduatuca.

XII. He received at the same period (the end of October), from the lieutenants and the questor, the news that the legions had arrived and retrenched in their quarters. They had indeed been established in them about a fortnight, when suddenly a revolt took place at the instigation of Ambiorix and Catuvolcus. These chiefs had at first repaired to the limits of their territory to meet Sabinus and Cotta, and had even furnished them with provisions; but soon after, urged on by the Treviran Indutiomaras, they raise the country, fall unexpectedly on the soldiers occupied in seeking wood, and attack the camp of Sabinus with considerable forces. Immediately the Romans run to arms and mount on the vallum. The Spanish cavalry makes a successful sortie, and the enemies retire, deceived in their hope of carrying the retrenchments by storm. Having then recourse to stratagem, they utter, according to their custom, loud cries, and demand to enter into negotiations and deliberate on their common interests, C. Arpineius, a Roman knight and the friend of Sabinus, and the Spaniard Q. Junius, who had been employed on several missions to Ambiorix, were sent to them. Ambiorix declared that he had not forgotten the numerous benefits he had received from Cæsar, but that he was forced to follow the movement of Gaul, which had conspired in a common effort to recover its liberty. That very day, according to his statement, the various quarters were to be attacked at the same time, so as to hinder them from lending each other mutual succour; the Germans had passed the Rhine, and would arrive in two days; Sabinus had no other chance of safety but by abandoning his camp and rejoining Cicero or Labienus, who were at a distance of fifty miles. In the end, Ambiorix promised under an oath to give him a free passage. The envoys reported to Sabinus and Cotta what they had heard. Troubled at this news, and the more disposed to put faith in it because it was hardly credible that so small a people as the Eburones would have dared alone to brave the Roman power, the two lieutenants submitted the affair to a council of war: it became the subject of warm disputes. Cotta, and with him several of the tribunes and centurions of the first class, were of opinion that they should not act hastily, but wait for orders from Cæsar. Their camp was strong enough to resist all the forces of the Germans; they were not pressed by want of food; they might receive succours, and, under circumstances of so much gravity, it would be disgraceful to take their counsel from the enemy.