Pax mundi

At the Conference at Berlin in 1885, where fifteen States were represented, just principles were adopted for the navigation of the Congo and the Niger. Free navigation and commerce on these rivers was secured to the flags of all nations. The same principle was likewise extended to their tributaries and lakes, together with canals and railroads which might in the future be constructed to get past the unnavigable portions of the Congo and Niger. Not even in time of war may the freedom of communication and commerce be interrupted. The transport of contraband of war alone is forbidden. An international commission takes care that all these international agreements are kept in force. This authority, composed of delegates from each of the States which took part in the Berlin Conference, is independent of the local authorities in Congo-land.

Now, every free people has naturally an independent right to arrange its own affairs as it chooses, upon condition that it grants the same right to every other State.

In consequence of this principle in international law, neutralization is applied in very varied ways according to the very varying conditions of those who have the benefit of it, and altogether in harmony with their wishes. Thus, for example, neutralization when it concerns a territory, consists not only in forbidding any warlike operation in the domain thus rendered inviolate, but involves a similar prohibition with respect to any marching or countermarching of armies, or smaller detachments, even of single officers or soldiers.

A canal or a strait may be so neutralized, on the other hand, that all warlike operations are forbidden in it, but nevertheless it is open for passage through, yet upon condition that no belligerent has a right, in passing through, to land upon the shores of the neutralized region.

This is the kind of neutralization which appears applicable to the Scandinavian seas.

One question which for a long time came up constantly at the congresses of Peace Societies, was the Neutralization of the Suez Canal, until it became at last solved in practice. After tedious negotiations, this burning question was settled by an agreement between England and France in the treaty of October 24, 1887, which was later entered into by the other powers interested and that important channel of communication became at all times inviolate.24

Upon the programme of the friends of peace questions have long been mooted respecting the neutralization of Elsass-Lothringen, and of the Balkan States, together with that of the Danube, Bosphorus, Sea of Marmora, Dardanelles, and their European coasts; whereupon should follow the rendering inviolate of Constantinople; as also of the Baltic, and as a result of this, the neutralization of the Scandinavian kingdoms.

In connection with the neutralization of the Sound has arisen the still newer question of the non-German region north of the North Sea Canal, now in course of construction, between the mouth of the Elbe and the naval port of Kiel.

By constituting Elsass-Lothringen into an independent neutral State, a division would be made between France and Germany, and these great powers would be separated by a huge wall of neutral States which would also narrow in an essential degree the European battle-field.

The same result is hoped for from a confederacy of neutral States on the Balkan, with respect to the relations between Russia and Austria, as well as with respect to the whole of Europe.

The Sound is one of the most important arteries of the world's commerce. About one hundred vessels of all nations pass daily through this strait, but only about ten (on the average, however, certainly larger ships) pass through the Suez Canal, which in the interests of the world's trade has become neutral.

It can be nothing but a gain to Europe that the entrances both into the Baltic and the Black Sea should be rendered inviolate.

In an address upon the importance of the Sound to the North, given to the National Economic Society, Mr. Bajer pointed out that so long as the Sound and its coasts were not rendered inviolate, military devastations will be carried on in and around the strait by belligerent powers; also that the facts that the Sound is not Danish only, but Swedish also, and that Sweden has a common foreign policy with Norway, make it probable that it may the sooner be understood to be for the European interest that all three northern kingdoms should be simultaneously neutralized, and not one of them only.25

In consequence of Mr. Bajer's indefatigable zeal for the united co-operation of the northern kingdoms in the cause of peace, this idea has gained many influential adherents in foreign countries also; and on his proposition, two international congresses, Geneva, Sept. 16th, 1883, and Berne, Aug. 6th, 1884, unanimously accepted the following resolution, which in its general meaning was adopted by the First Northern peace Meeting at Gotenberg, Aug. 19th, 1885: —

Considering that, —

1. The geographical position of the three northern States, is such, that they might, with a larger military and commercial naval power than they now possess, hold the keys of the Baltic:

2. Whilst the very weakness of these States probably removes all danger of their using the advantages of this position against Europe, the same weakness may one day expose them, either by force or fraud, to be plundered by their powerful neighbours:

3. The inviolability of the three northern States, and their independence of every foreign influence, is in the true interest of all Europe, and their neutralization would tend to the general order.

4. Their independence, which is indeed a common right of all nations, can only be secured to the northern nations by their neutralization.

5. This neutralization ought to have for its object and legal effect:

Firstly, To place beyond all danger of war all those portions of land and sea which belong to Sweden, Denmark and Norway.

Secondly, To secure at all times, even during war, to all merchant and war-ships, whatever flag they carry, whether that of a belligerent or not, full liberty to run into the Baltic from the North Sea, or vice versâ, whether sailing singly or in fleets.

On these accounts the meeting declares, —

That Denmark, Sweden and Norway ought to be neutralized, and that this neutralization ought to include: —

1. With respect to the mainland and islands of Norway, Sweden and Denmark, that all parts of this territory shall be at all times entirely neutral.

2. With respect to the Sound and the Little Belt, that in time of war, ships belonging to any belligerent power shall be forbidden to show themselves in these seas; which, on the other hand, shall be always open for merchant craft, even those belonging to belligerent powers, as well as for war-ships belonging to neutrals.

3. With respect to the Great Belt, that this strait shall always be open for merchant and war-ships of every flag, including belligerents, whether singly or in fleets; but that these ships shall be entirely forbidden to undertake any inimical action on the coasts of the above-named strait, or in its seas, within a distance exceeding the maximum range of its artillery before sailing in or sailing out, or indeed any attack, seizure, privateering, blockade, embargo, etc., or any other warlike action whatever.

The meeting expressed its desire to see an international congress arrange and conclude a treaty which should be open for all European nations to enter into and sign, which should establish on the above-named basis, under the guarantee of the signatory powers, the neutrality of the northern States, together with the creation of a really solid tribunal of arbitration, which, as the highest court of appeal, should solve all difficulties that might arise with respect to the said treaty.

That the neutralization of the Suez Canal, so long looked upon as a pious wish, may in the near future lead to the inviolability of Egypt, will doubtless be suggested. When this is accomplished, the good understanding between France and England will be further strengthened, and a foundation thereby laid for an extended co-operation in the service of the peace of the world, in the young Congo State, with its twenty millions of inhabitants and a territory equal to half Europe; a realm founded without costing a drop of blood, from its first commencement sanctioned and declared a neutral community by the European powers unanimously, which will some day be looked upon as one of the fairest pages in the history of the human race.

FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS

In other ways the European powers have shown that, with a little willingness to do so, they can work together in the interests of peace.

We have an illustrative instance of this in the Danube Commission, which, since 1856, has watched over the traffic in the Delta of the Danube, neutralized by the Treaty of Paris.

This commission, which is composed of members from all the great powers and Turkey and Roumania, and was originally appointed only for a short time, has, in consideration of its great value as an international institution, been renewed from year to year, and has had its power gradually extended. The commission possesses its own flag, its customs and pilotage, its police, its little fleet, and so on. It has for thirty years exercised an almost unlimited power over the mouths of the Danube, has made laws, raised a loan, carried out works, and in many other respects given evidence of the possibility of united co-operation amongst the powers under many changing and intricate international relations.

In the so-called European concert is seen a commencement of an extended co-operation in a similar direction. The war between Servia and Bulgaria was confined within certain limits by the united will of the powers, and Greece was obliged to subdue her fierce military ardour.

Again, so far as concerns such coalitions as it is evident are not formed for the whole of Europe, but are said to aim at securing peace by accumulating forces, it could hardly be expected, from their very nature, that they would fulfil the alleged design in themselves. But, on the other side, it would be short-sighted to overlook their importance as a link in the gradually progressive development of the interests of various nations in the common concerns of Europe. One token in this direction is the proposal which was brought forward in the beginning of 1888 by a number of deputies in the Austrian Parliament, urging the Government, after procuring the consent of the Hungarian Government, to initiate negotiations with Germany for the purpose of getting a Germano-Austrian Alliance adopted by the Parliaments of both realms, and constitutionally incorporated in the fundamental law of both States. This proposal may have hardly any practical result, but it is worth notice as one of the small rays of light which from time to time point the way to a common goal.

Thither point too, though indeed from afar, those propositions for disarmament which now and then crop up, but which, quite naturally, fade away as quickly as they come, so long as the principle of arbitration does not prevail in Europe.

"Europe's only salvation is a general disarmament," cries the illustrious Frenchman Jules Simon, and yet louder the Italian ex-minister, Bonghi. The latter a distinguished Conservative statesman, utters these powerful words in the International Review (Rome).

"The ideas of peace, which I have just expressed and which are also entertained by the masses, sound almost like a jest in the menaces of war which we hear around us. And they are ridiculous if the policy which the Government follows is considered serious. The great thing is to be able to guess how long the ludicrous shall be regarded as serious, and the serious as ludicrous; and how long a proceeding so devoid of sound reason as that of the great European powers will be counted as sense. I, for my part, am persuaded that such a confusion as to the meaning of the words cannot endure continually, and that the present condition of things, whether people will or not, must soon cease. But we ought not to wait until the change is brought about by violence, nor indeed till it comes by violence from – below. Dynasties must give heed to this, and must hold me responsible for saying it – I, who am a royalist by conviction."

In the English House of Commons, Mr. A. Illingworth, May 30th, 1889, questioned the First Lord of the Treasury, Mr. W.H. Smith, "Whether the Government had recently made a proposal to the continental Governments that they should agree upon a considerable and early reduction of armaments? and with what result? And if not, whether Her Majesty's Government would without delay initiate such negotiations, having for their object to lessen the military burdens and the dangers which menace the peace of Europe."

In his answer the First Lord of the Treasury26 said: "If any favourable opportunity manifested itself, the Government would have pleasure in using its influence in the direction indicated by the honourable member. But the questioner should bear in mind, that an interference in a question of this sort often does more harm than good to the object he wishes to attain. I can assure him that the Government is as deeply impressed with this question as himself, and it has often expressed its view in the House, that the present armed condition of Europe is a great misfortune and a danger to the peace of the world."

In the German Parliament, also, similar utterances may be heard; in the latest instance from one of the Centre, Reichensperger, who in the military debate, June 28th, 1890, expressed the wish that they could set in motion a general disarmament. The speaker had certainly spoken in favour of the Government bill for adding 18,000 men to the peace footing of the army. But he wished alongside of that to say, that as the decision of the Emperor in summoning a conference of working men from all parts of Europe had been greeted with applause, so would the civilized world, with still greater applause greet the tidings that William II. had advocated a general disarmament.

Many entertain the belief that the first condition of such a disarmament must be to absolve the rulers themselves from the dangerous power they possess in being able at their discretion to declare war, conclude peace, and make alliances one with another for warlike aims.

In our country many propositions have been brought forward for limiting this power especially with regard to the concluding of treaties without so much as consulting the whole Swedish Cabinet.

As is well known, even in the time of Gustavus Adolphus, the royal power did not extend beyond the king having to consult the Riksdag, and to obtain its consent, whether he were engaging in a war or entering into an alliance with foreign powers. The absolute monarchs seized upon greater power, and the law-makers of 1809 simply ratified this dangerous extension of it.

Now we are unceasingly told, when the subject of defence is on, about sacrifices. They declare to us that no sacrifice should be esteemed too great. The State has the right of enlisting soldiers by compulsion, fathers, husbands and sons, for the defence of the country; and not only when it is really a question of defence, but when it is a matter of preparation for defence, that is drill, even if this extend to years of barrack life in time of peace.

These are the sacrifices demanded from the people.

There are those who think, would it not be much better if the people, on their side, demanded a little security that the country should not be far too thoughtlessly plunged into war – war which can no longer be carried on by paid volunteers, but with members of families conscripted by force, by means of compulsory service?

Such security could be effected by changing the formulas of government §§ 12 and 13, and the constitutional law § 26, partly so that the conclusion of treaties should require the confirmation of a united meeting of the Swedo-Norse cabinet councils, and partly also, that certain treaties, namely such as include a greater political intricacy, should be subjected to the confirmation of the Riksdag and the Storting, as has been the case with certain treaties of commerce – bagatelles in comparison with the entanglement of the kingdoms in war.

It is simply an assertion, refuted by experience, that the king cannot make use of the law here treated of.

During the Crimean war, according to a treaty, we should have been entangled in the war, had not the Peace of Paris intervened. So also during the last Dano-German war, when interference on our part, as the result of a treaty, would have taken place, had not the death of King Frederic VII. occurred.

The same thing would have happened during the last Franco-German war, if the battle of Wörth had not thrown out the reckoning, according to a treaty which entailed our interference. Into all these treaties the king could enter without giving the whole Cabinet the opportunity of expressing its opinion.

The danger of such a power begins to be increasingly felt, especially in England. In 1886, Henry Richard raised in the House of Commons the question of abolishing the right of the sovereign to declare war without the consent of Parliament. The proposition was certainly rejected, but with the large minority of 109 against 115 votes. That the proposition could gather round it such a minority may certainly be regarded as a remarkable sign of the times. In 1889, W.R. Cremer made a similar motion in the House. He proposed that a "parliamentary committee should be chosen to examine and arrange foreign matters, which were then to be laid before Parliament." This proposal fell through but progress was made, and Mr. Cremer still awaits a suitable occasion for renewing it.

A characteristic expedient is pointed out by the well-known Belgian professor of political economy, de Molinari, in an article published in the Times.

He shows, in the first place, how solidarity among the civilized States of the world has lately increased in a marvellous degree, for not long ago the foreign trade of a civilized nation and the capital invested in other States was of very small importance. Each country produced nearly all the requisites for its own consumption, and employed its capital in its own undertakings. In 1613, the whole of England's imports and exports amounted to only five million pounds sterling. A hundred years later, indeed, the united foreign trade of the whole of Europe did not amount to so much as the present foreign trade of little Belgium. Still more unimportant were the foreign loans. Holland was the only country whose capitalists lent to foreign Governments, and persons were hardly to be found who ventured to put their money into industrial undertakings in foreign lands, or even beyond the provinces in which they dwelt. Consequently at that time a neutral State suffered little or no injury when two States were at war. A quarrel between France and Spain or Germany then did no more harm to English interests than a war between China and Japan would do now.

At present it is quite otherwise. Trade and capital have in our day become international. While the foreign traffic of the civilized world two hundred years ago did not exceed one hundred millions sterling, it runs up now to about five thousand millions; and foreign loans have augmented in the same degree. In every country there is a constantly increasing portion of the population dependent for its subsistence upon relations with other peoples, either for the manufacture or exportation of goods, or for the importation of foreign necessaries. In France a tenth part of the population is dependent in this way upon foreign countries, a third in Belgium, and in England probably not far from a third.

So long as there is peace, this increasing community of interests is a source of well-being, and advances civilization; but if a war breaks out, that which was a blessing is turned into a common ill. For, not to mention the burden which preparations for defence impose upon the neutral nations, they suffer from the crisis which war causes in the money market, and from the cessation or curtailing of their trade with the belligerent powers.

From these facts, de Molinari deduces a principle of justice – Neutral States have the right to forbid a war, as it greatly injures their own lawful interests.

If two duellists fight out their quarrel in a solitary place, where nobody can be injured by their balls or swords, they may be allowed without any great harm to exercise their right of killing. But if they set to work to shoot one another in a crowded street, no one can blame the police if they interfere, since their action exposes peacable passers-by to danger. It is the same with war between States. Neutral States would have small interest in hindering war, if war did not do them any particular harm; and under those circumstances their right to interfere might be disputed. But when, as is now the case, war cannot be carried on without menacing a great and constantly increasing portion of the interests of neutrals, yes, even their existence, their right to come in and maintain order is indisputable.

The worst is that, after all, the belligerent nation itself never decides its own fate. That is settled by a few politicians and military men, who have quite other interests than those of business. It is often done by a single man; and it may be said without exaggeration, that the world's peace depends upon the pleasure of three or four men, sovereigns or ministers, who can any day, at their discretion, let slip all the horrors of war. They can thereby bring measureless misery and ills upon the whole civilized world's peaceable industries, not excepting even those of neutral nations, with whom they have nothing to do. The most absolute despots of the rude old times had no such power.

Self-interests of purely political nature give the neutral States, especially the smaller ones, the right to do what they can to prevent war between other powers; because it is an old experience that war among the great powers readily spreads itself to the little ones.

De Molinari states further that the neutral States may so much the more easily ward off all this evil, as they have not only the right, but also the power, if they would set themselves to do it.

Thereupon he unfolds his proposition: —

"With England at the head, and with Holland, Belgium, Switzerland and Denmark as members, there might be formed a confederation, 'The Neutral League,' for the purpose of attacking any of the other powers who should begin a war, and of helping the attacked. The States named have a united strength of 460,000 men, and can place on a war footing 1,200,000. To these may be added the fleets of England, Holland and Denmark, which together form the strongest naval power in the world."27

Suppose that a complication takes place between two great powers on the continent of Europe – Germany, France, Austria, or Russia – there can be no doubt that if the "League" united its strength with the threatened power, that power would become thereby so superior to its opponent that victory would be certain.

For this reason a peaceable interference on the part of the League before the war broke out, would make the most warlike amongst the powers consider.

But the fact that no State could stir up a war without meeting a crushing superior force would lead to a constant and lasting state of peace, and disarmament.

De Molinari thinks his plan would be advanced by forming an association in the countries named, which should work for an agreement between them in the above-named direction.

The proposition will never of itself lead to any practical result. But it is at least useful in having pointed out the growing interest which neutral powers have in maintaining peace unmolested. This interest shows itself already in general politics in the zealous pains with which, on the outbreak of war, all powers not implicated unite to "localize" war, that is, to limit it to as few partisans, and to as, small an area, as possible. The peace interests of neutral States become year by year more powerful factors in politics.

Here we must bear in mind that more States are continually passing over into the condition of unconsciously forming "a neutral league." They are approaching the goal which they have long been striving after by arms and by diplomacy. "They are," to quote Bismarck, "satisfied and do not strive for more." Such States are Germany and Italy, which have achieved their unity, and Hungary, which has gained its freedom.