
Полная версия
Historical Introductions to the Symbolical Books of the Evangelical Lutheran Church
191. Luther's Fourth Disputation against the Antinomians
Luther's distrust was not unfounded, for Agricola continued secretly to teach his antinomianism, abetted in his sentiments among others also by Jacob Schenck [since 1536 first Lutheran pastor in Freiberg, Saxony; 1538 dismissed on account of his antinomianism 1540 professor in Leipzig; later on deposed and finally banished from Saxony]. Indeed in March, 1540, Agricola even lodged a complaint with the Elector, charging Luther with "calumnies." In the first part of the following month Luther answered these charges in a Report to Doctor Brueck Concerning Magister John Eisleben's Doctrine and Intrigues. (St. L. 20, 1648ff.) About the same time; Count Albrecht of Mansfeld denounced Agricola to the Elector as a dangerous, troublesome man. Hereupon the Elector on June 15 1540, opened formal legal proceedings against Agricola, who, as stated above, removed to Berlin in August without awaiting the trial, although he had promised with an oath not to leave before a legal decision had been rendered. (Drews, 611.) Incensed by the treacherous conduct of Agricola, Luther, September 10, 1540, held a final disputation on a sixth series of theses against the Antinomians, charging them with destroying all order human as well as divine. (St. L. 20, 1647; E. 4, 441.)
Regarding Agricola's duplicity, Luther, in his Report to Brueck, said in substance: According to the statements of Caspar Guettel and Wendelin Faber, Agricola had for years secretly agitated against the Wittenbergers and founded a sect at Eisleben calling themselves Minorish [Minorists]; he had branded and slandered their doctrine as false and impure, and this, too, without conferring with them or previously admonishing them; he had come to Wittenberg for the purpose of corrupting and distracting the Church; his adherents had made the statement that Eisleben would teach the Wittenbergers theology and logic; he had inveigled Hans Lufft into printing his Postil by falsely stating that it had been read and approved by Luther; in his dealings with the Wittenbergers he had acted not as an honest man, let alone a pious Christian and theologian, but treacherously and in keeping with his antinomian principles; parading as a loyal Lutheran at public conventions and laughing and dining with them, he had misled "his old, faithful friend" [Luther] to confide in him, while secretly he was acting the traitor by maligning him and undermining his work. In the Report we read: "Agricola blasphemes and damns our doctrine as impure and false (i. e., the Holy Spirit Himself in His holy Law); he slanders and defames us Wittenbergers most infamously wherever he can; and all this he does treacherously and secretly, although we have done him no harm, but only did well by him, as he himself must admit. He deceives and attacks us [me], his best friend and father, making me believe that he is our true friend. Nor does he warn me, but, like a desperate treacherous villain, secretly works behind our back to cause the people to forsake our doctrine and to adhere to him, thus treating us with an ungratefulness, pride, and haughtiness such as I have not frequently met with before." (1656.)
In his charge against Luther, Agricola had said that it was dangerous to preach the Law without the Gospel, because it was a ministry of death (ministerium mortis). Luther answered in his Report to Brueck: "Behold now what the mad fool does. God has given His Law for the very purpose that it should bite, cut, strike, kill, and sacrifice the old man. For it should terrify and punish the proud ignorant, secure Old Adam and show him his sin and death, so that, being humiliated, he may despair of himself, and thus become desirous of grace, as St. Paul says: 'The strength of sin is the Law; the sting of death is sin,'[1 Cor. 15, 56.] For this reason he also calls it bonam, iustam, sanctam– good, just, holy. Again, Jeremiah [23, 29]: 'My Word is like a hammer that breaketh the rock to pieces.' Again: 'Ego ignis consumens, etc. – I am a consuming fire,' Ps. 9, 21 [20]: 'Constitue legislatorem super eos, ut sciant gentes, se esse homines, non deos, nec Deo similes– Put them in fear, O Lord, that the nations may know themselves to be but men.' Thus St. Paul does Rom. 1 and 2 and 3 making all the world sinners by the Law, casting them under the wrath of God, and entirely killing them before God. But here our dear Master Grickel appears on the scene and invents a new theology out of his own mad and reckless fool's head and teaches: One must not kill and reprove the people, i. e., one must not preach the Law. Here he himself confesses publicly in his suit [against Luther] that he has condemned and prohibited the preaching of the Law." (St. L. 20, 1657.)
The Report continues: "Since, now, the little angry devil who rides Master Grickel will not tolerate the Law, i. e., mortificantem, irascentem, accusantem, terrentem, occidentem legem, – the mortifying, raging, accusing, terrifying, killing Law, – it is quite evident what he intends to do through Master Grickel's folly (for he nevertheless wishes to be praised as preaching the Law after and under the Gospel, etc.), viz., to hide original sin and to teach the Law no further than against future actual sins, for such is the manner of his entire Postil; even as the Turks, Jews, philosophers, and Papists teach who regard our nature as sound; but Master Grickel does not see that it is just this which his little spirit [devil] aims at by his bragging and boasting, that he, too, is preaching the Law… Thus Christ and God are altogether vain and lost. And is not this blindness beyond all blindness that he does not want to preach the Law without and before the Gospel? For are these not impossible things? How is it possible to preach of forgiveness of sins if previously there have been no sins? How can one proclaim life if previously there is no death? Are we to preach to angels who have neither sin nor death concerning forgiveness of sins and redemption from death? But how can one preach of sins or know that there are sins, if the Law does not reveal them? For according to its proper office the Gospel does not say who [is a sinner] and what is sin; it does, however, indicate that there must be some great hurt, since so great a remedy is required; but it does not say how the sin is called, or what it is. The Law must do this. Thus Master Eisleben must in fact (re ipsa) allow the Law to perform its duty (occidere, to kill, etc.) prior to the [preaching of the] Gospel, no matter how decidedly he, with words only, denies it, to spite the Wittenbergers, in order that he also, as novus autor (new author), may produce something of his own and confuse the people and separate the churches." (1658.)
From the 20 theses which Luther treated in his last disputation against the Antinomians we cull the following: "1. The inference of St. Paul: 'For where no law is there is no transgression' [Rom. 4, 15] is valid not only theologically, but also politically and naturally (non solum theologice, sed etiam politice et naturaliter). 2. Likewise this too: Where there is no sin, there is neither punishment nor remission. 3. Likewise this too: Where there is neither punishment nor remission, there is neither wrath nor grace. 4. Likewise this too: Where there is neither wrath nor grace, there is neither divine nor human government. 5. Likewise this too: Where there is neither divine nor human government, there is neither God nor man. 6. Likewise this too: Where there is neither God nor man, there is nothing except perhaps the devil. 7. Hence it is that the Antinomians, the enemies of the Law, evidently are either devils themselves or the brothers of the devil. 8. It avails the Antinomians nothing to boast that they teach very much of God, Christ, grace, Law, etc. 10. This confession of the Antinomians is like the one when the devils cried: 'Thou art the Son of the living God,' [Luke 4, 34; 8, 28.] 12. Whoever denies that the damning Law must be taught in reality simply denies the Law. 14. A law which does not damn is an imagined and painted law as the chimera or tragelaphus. 15. Nor is the political or natural law anything unless it damns and terrifies sinners Rom. 13, 1. 5; 1 Pet. 2, 13ff. 17. What the Antinomians say concerning God, Christ, faith, Law, grace, etc., they say without any meaning as the parrot says its 'chaire, Good day!' 18. Hence it is impossible to learn theology or civil polity (theologiam aut politiam) from the Antinomians. 19. Therefore they must be avoided as most pestilential teachers of licentious living who permit the perpetration of all crimes. 20. For they serve not Christ, but their own belly [Rom. 16, 18], and, madmen that they are, seek to please men, in order that from them, as a man's judgment, they may gain glory." (Drews, 613; St. L. 20, 1647; E. 4, 441.) – Regarding Luther's disputations against the Antinomians Planck pertinently remarks that they compel admiration for his clear and penetrating mind, and rank among the very best of his writings. (1, 18; Frank 2, 311.)
192. "Grickel" Remained Grickel
At the instance of Elector Joachim, negotiations were begun with Luther, which finally led to a sort of peaceful settlement. Agricola was required to send (which he also did) a revocation to the preachers, the council, and the congregation at Eisleben. However, the new and enlarged edition (1541) of the catechism which Agricola had published in 1527 revealed the fact that also this last recantation was insincere; for in it he repeated his antinomistic teaching, though not in the original defiant manner. Little wonder, then, that despite the formal settlement, cordial relations were not restored between Luther and Agricola. When the latter visited Wittenberg in 1545, Luther refused to see the man whom he regarded incurably dishonest. "Grickel," said he, "will remain Grickel to all eternity, Grickel wird in alle Ewigkeit Grickel bleiben."
And "Grickel" he did remain; for in 1565 he published a sermon in which he said: "Every one who is to be appointed as teacher and preacher shall be asked: What do you intend to teach in the church? He shall answer: The Gospel of Jesus Christ. But when further asked: What does the Gospel preach? he shall answer: The Gospel preaches repentance and forgiveness of sins." Considering this a further evidence that Agricola still adhered to, and was now ready once more to champion, his old errors, the preachers of Mansfeld registered their protest in a publication of the same year. A controversy, however, did not materialize, for Agricola died the following year. (Planck 5, 1, 47; Frank 2, 267.)
193. False Propositions of Agricola
Following are some of Agricola's radical statements concerning the Law and the Gospel. The first thesis of his Positions of 1537 reads: "Repentance is to be taught not from the Decalog or from any law of Moses, but from the violation of the Son through the Gospel. Poenitentia docenda est non ex decalogo aut ulla lege Mosis, sed ex violatione Filii per evangelium." (E. 4. 420.) Thesis 13: "In order to keep the Christian doctrine pure, we must resist those [Luther and Melanchthon] who teach that the Gospel must be preached only to such whose hearts have previously been terrified and broken by the Law. Quare pro conservanda puritate doctrinae resistendum est iis, qui docent, evangelium non praedicandum nisi animis prius quassatis et contritis per legem." (421.) Thesis 16: "The Law merely rebukes sin, and that, too, without the Holy Spirit; hence it rebukes to damnation." Thesis 17: "But there is need of a doctrine which does not only condemn with great efficacy, but which saves at the same time; this, however, is the Gospel, a doctrine which teaches conjointly repentance and remission of sins." (421.) In his Brief Summary of the Gospel, Agricola says: "In the New Testament and among Christians or in the Gospel we must not preach the violation of the Law when a man breaks or transgresses the Law, but the violation of the Son, to wit that he who does not for the sake of the kingdom of heaven willingly omit what he should omit, and does not do what he should do, crucifies Christ anew." (St. L. 20, 1622ff.; Frank 2, 313, Gieseler 3, 2, 137; Pieper, Dogm. 3, 265ff.)
A commingling of the Law and Gospel always results in a corruption of the doctrines of conversion, faith, and justification. Such was the case also with respect to Agricola, who taught that justification follows a contrition which flows from, and hence is preceded by, love toward God. Turning matters topsy-turvy, he taught: Repentance consists in this, that the heart of man, experiencing the kindness of God which calls us to Christ and presents us with His grace, turns about, apprehends God's grace, thanks Him heartily for having spared it so graciously, begins to repent, and to grieve heartily and sorrowfully on account of its sins, wishes to abstain from them, and renounces its former sinful life. "This," says Agricola, "is repentance (poenitentia, Buessen) and the first stage of the new birth, the true breathing and afflation of the Holy Spirit. After this he acquires a hearty confidence in God, believing that He will condone his folly and not blame him for it, since he did not know any better, although he is much ashamed of it and wishes that it had never happened; he also resolves, since he has fared so well, never to sin any more or to do anything that might make him unworthy of the benefit received as if he were ungrateful and forgetful; he furthermore learns to work out, confirm, and preserve his salvation in fear and trembling…: this is forgiveness of sins." (Frank 2, 247.) These confused ideas plainly show that Agricola had a false conception, not only of the Law and Gospel, but also of original sin, repentance, faith, regeneration, and justification. Essentially, his was the Roman doctrine, which makes an antecedent of what in reality is an effect and a consequence of conversion and justification. Viewed from this angle, it occasions little surprise that Agricola consented to help formulate and introduce the Augsburg Interim in which the essentials of Lutheranism were denied.
194. Poach, Otto, Musculus, Neander
The antinomistic doctrines rejected, in particular, by Article VI of the Formula of Concord, were represented chiefly by Andrew Poach, Anton Otto, Andrew Musculus, and Michael Neander. Poach, born 1516, studied under Luther and was an opponent of the Philippists, he became pastor in Halle in 1541; in Nordhausen, 1547; in Erfurt, 1550; Uttenbach, near Jena, 1572, where he died 1585. At Erfurt, Poach was deposed in 1572 on account of dissensions due to the antinomistic controversies. He signed the Book of Concord. – Otto [Otho; also called Herzberger, because he was born in Herzberg, 1505] studied under Luther; served as pastor in Graefenthal, and from 1543 in Nordhausen where he was deposed in 1568 for adherence to Flacius. However, when Otto, while antagonizing Majorism and synergism, in sermons on the Letter to the Galatians of 1565 rejected the Third Use of the Law, he was opposed also by Flacius, who reminded him of the fact that here on earth the new man resembles a child, aye, an embryo, rather than a full-fledged man.
In his zealous opposition to the Majorists, Andrew Musculus (Meusel, born 1514; studied at Leipzig 1532-1538, then at Wittenberg; became a zealous and passionate adherent of Luther, whom he considered the greatest man since the days of the apostles; from 1540 till his death, September 29, 1581, professor and pastor, later on, General Superintendent, in Frankfurt-on-the-Oder) also made some extreme statements. Later on, however, he cooperated in preparing and revising the Formula of Concord. Musculus wrote of Luther: "There is as great a difference between the dear old teachers and Luther as there is between the light of the sun and that of the moon; and beyond all doubt, the ancient fathers, even the best and foremost among them, as Hilary and Augustine, had they lived contemporaneously with him, would not have hesitated to deliver the lamp to him, as the saying is." (Meusel, Handl. 4, 709; Richard, 450.)
The most prominent opponents of these Antinomians were the well-known theologians Moerlin, Flacius, Wigand, and Westphal (chiefly in letters to Poach). The controversy was carried on with moderation, and without any special efforts to cause trouble among the people. The main issue was not – as in the conflict with Agricola – whether the Law is necessary in order to effect contrition and prepare men for the Gospel, but the so-called Third Use of the Law (tertius usus legis), i. e., whether the Law is, and is intended to be, of service to Christians after their regeneration; in particular, whether the regenerate still need the Law with respect to their new obedience.
The conflict with Poach arose from the Majoristic controversy. Dealing in particular with the aberrations of Menius, the Synod at Eisenach, 1556, adopted seven theses which Menius was required to subscribe. The first declared: "Although the proposition, Good works are necessary to salvation, may be tolerated hypothetically and in an abstract way in the doctrine of the Law (in doctrina legis abstractive et de idea tolerari potest), nevertheless there are many weighty reasons why it ought and should be avoided no less than this one: Christ is a creature." (Preger 1, 383.) While Flacius, Wigand, and Moerlin defended the thesis, Amsdorf (who first, too, adopted it, but later on withdrew his assent; Seeberg 4, 488), Aurifaber, and especially Poach rejected it. This marked the beginning of the so-called Second Antinomistic Controversy. Poach denied that the Law has any promise of salvation. Even the most perfect fulfilment of the Law, said he, is but the fulfilment of a duty which merits no reward. The only thing one may acquire by a perfect fulfilment is freedom from guilt and punishment. Fulfilment of our duty (solutio debiti) does not warrant any claim on salvation. Yet Poach was careful to declare that this did not apply to the fulfilment of the Law which Christ rendered for us. Why? Poach answered: Because Christ, being the Son of God, was not obliged to fulfil the Law. When, therefore, He did fulfil it in our stead, He rendered satisfaction to divine justice, so that righteousness can now be imputed to us and we become partakers of eternal life.
Poach wrote: "It would not be correct to say: In the doctrine of the Law all the works commanded in the Law are necessary to salvation. In doctrina legis omnia opera mandata in lege sunt necessaria ad salutem." (Schluesselburg 4, 343.) Again: "The works of Christ, which are the fulfilment of the Law, are the merit of our salvation. Our works, which ought to have been the fulfilment of the Law, do not merit salvation, even though they were most perfect, as the Law requires, – which, however, is impossible. The reason is that we are debtors to the Law. Christ, however, is not a debtor to the Law. Even if we most perfectly fulfilled all the commandments of God and completely satisfied the righteousness of God, we would not be worthy of grace and salvation on that account, nor would God be obliged to give us grace and salvation as a debt. He justly demands the fulfilment of His Law from us as obedience due Him from His creature, which is bound to obey its Creator. Etiamsi nos omnia mandata Dei perfectissime impleremus et iustitiae Dei penitus satisfaceremus, tamen non ideo digni essemus gratia et salute, nec Deus obligatus esset, ut nobis gratiam et salutem daret ex debito. Sed iure requirit impletionem legis suae a nobis, ut debitam obedientiam a sua creatura, quae conditori suo obedire tenetur." (274.) Again: "The Law has not the necessity of salvation, but the necessity of obligation (non habet lex necessitatem salutis, sed necessitatem debiti). For, as said, even though a man would most perfectly do the works of the Law, he would not obtain salvation on account of these works. Nor is God under obligation to man, but man is under obligation to God. And in the Law God requires of man the obedience he owes; He does not require an obedience with the promise of salvation." (276.)
As to Otto, he distinguished, in a series of Latin theses a double office of the Law, the ecclesiastical; and political —officium ecclesiasticum and officium politicum. The former is to give knowledge of sin; the latter, to coerce the old man and maintain order among the obstinate. He denied that the Law in any way serves Christians with respect to good works. Otto declared: "The Law is useful and necessary neither for justification nor for any good works. But faith in Christ the Mediator alone is useful and necessary both for justification and the good works themselves. Lex enim non modo ad iustificationem sed neque ad ulla bona opera utilis et necessaria est. Sed sola fides in Christum mediatorem utilis et necessaria est tam ad iustificationem quam ad ipsa bona opera." Quoting Luther, he said: "The highest art of Christians is to know nothing of the Law, to ignore works. Summa ars Christianorum est nescire legem, ignorare opera," i. e., in the article of justification, as Otto did not fail to add by way of explanation. (Luther, Weimar 40, 1, 43; Tschackert, 485.) Seeberg remarks that in reality, Poach and Otto were merely opposed to such an interpretation of the Third Use of the Law as made the Law a motive of good works, and hence could not be charged with antinomianism proper. (4, 488f.)
Planck, Frank, and other historians have fathered upon Otto also a series of radical German theses, which, however, were composed, not by Otto, but probably by some of his adherents. These theses, in which all of the errors of Agricola are revamped, were discussed at the Altenburg colloquy, 1568 to 1569; their author, however, was not mentioned. We submit the following: "1. The Law does not teach good works, nor should it be preached in order that we may do good works. 3. Moses knew nothing of our faith and religion. 5. Evangelical preachers are to preach the Gospel only, and no Law. 7. A Christian who believes should do absolutely nothing, neither what is good nor what is evil. 10. We should pray God that we may remain steadfast in faith till our end, without all works. 14. The Holy Spirit does not work according to the norm or rule of the Law, but by Himself, without the assistance of the Law. 16. A believing Christian is supra omnem obedientiam, above all Law and all obedience. 17. The rebuking sermons of the prophets do not at all pertain to Christians. 21. The Law, good works, and new obedience have no place in the kingdom of Christ, but in the world just as Moses and the government of the Pope. 25. The Law has no place in the Church or in the pulpit, but in the court-house (Rathaus). 28. The Third Use of the Law is a blasphemy in theology and a monstrosity in the realm of nature (portentum in rerum natura). 29. No man can be saved if the Third Use of the Law is true and is to be taught in the Church. The Holy Spirit in man knows nothing of the Law; the flesh, however, is betimes in need of the Law." (Tschackert, 485; Planck 5, 1, 62.) Frank also quotes: "The Christians or the regenerate are deified (vergoettert); yea, they are themselves God and cannot sin. God has not given you His Word that you should be saved thereby (dass du dadurch sollst selig werden); and whoever seeks no more from God than salvation (Seligkeit) seeks just as much as a louse in a scab. Such Christians are the devil's own, together with all their good works." (2, 326. 275.)
Also Musculus is numbered among the theologians who were not always sufficiently discreet and guarded in their statements concerning the necessity of good works and the use of the Law. All expressions of the Apostle Paul regarding the spiritual use of the Law, said Musculus, must be understood as referring to such only as are to be justified, not to those who are justified (de iustificandis, non de iustificatis). But he added: "For these, in as far as they remain in Christ, are far outside of and above every law. Hi enim, quatenus in Christo manent, longe extra et supra omnem legem sunt." (Tschackert. 486.)