Historical Introductions to the Symbolical Books of the Evangelical Lutheran Church

Strigel illustrated his idea by the following analogy. When garlic-juice is applied to a magnet, it loses its power of attraction, but remains a true magnet, and, when goat's blood is applied, immediately regains its efficaciousness. So the will of man is hindered by original sin from beginning that which is good; but when the impediment has been removed through the operation of the Holy Spirit, the native powers of the will again become efficacious and active. (Tschackert, 524; Planck 4, 672; Preger 2, 198; Luthardt, 211.) Frank remarks: "The example of the temporarily impeded power of the magnet, which was repeated also at this juncture [in the disputation at Weimar], immediately points to the related papal doctrine, for the Catholic Andradius explains the dogma of the Tridentinum to this effect: The free will of natural man may be compared to a chained prisoner who, though still in possession of his locomotive powers, is nevertheless impeded by his fetters." (1, 136.) Also the Formula of Concord, evidently with a squint at Strigel, rejects as a Pelagian error the teaching "that original sin is not a despoliation or deficiency but only an external impediment to these spiritual good powers, as when a magnet is smeared with garlic-juice, whereby its natural power is not removed, but only hindered or that this stain can be easily washed away as a spot from the face or a pigment from the wall." (865, 22.)

163. Strigel's "Cooperation."

When the impediment caused by original sin has been removed, and the will liberated and aroused to activity, man, according to Strigel, is able also to cooperate in his conversion. At Weimar he formulated the point at issue as follows: "The question is whether [in conversion] the will is present idle, as an inactive, indolent subject, or, as the common saying is, in a purely passive way; or whether, when grace precedes, the will follows the efficacy of the Holy Spirit, and in some manner assents —an vero praeeunte gratia voluntas comitetur efficaciam Spiritus Sancti et aliquo modo annuat." (Luthardt, 222.) Following are some of his answers to this question: When incited by the Spirit, the will is able to assent somewhat and to pray for assistance. Inter trepidationem utcumque assentitur, simul petens auxilium. Contrition and faith, as well as other virtues, are gifts of God, "but they are given to those only who hear and contemplate God's Word, embrace it by assenting to it, strive against their doubts and in this conflict pray for the help of God." (230.) The Holy Ghost converts those "who hear the Word of God and do not resist stubbornly, but consent," and God assists such only "as follow His call and pray for assistance." (229.) "The will and heart do not resist altogether, but desire divine consolation, when, indeed, they are assisted by the Holy Ghost." "The will is neither idle nor contumacious; but, in a manner, desires to obey." (Planck 4, 682.) "Man is dead [spiritually] in as far as he is not able to heal his wounds with his own powers; but when the remedy is offered him by the Holy Spirit and the Word, then he, at least in receiving the benefit, is not altogether dead; for otherwise a conversion could not occur. For I cannot conceive a conversion where the process is that of the flame consuming straw (denn ich kann mir keine Bekehrung vorstellen, bei der es zugeht, wie wenn die Flamme das Stroh ergreift). The nature of the will is such that it can reject the Holy Spirit and the Word; or, being supported by the Holy Spirit, can in a manner will and obey. The remedy is heavenly and divine, but the will – not the will alone, but the will supported by the Holy Spirit – is able to accept it. One must ascribe at least a feeble consent and an 'Aye' to the will, which is already supported by the Holy Spirit." (Preger 2, 208.) "In a betrothal, consent is necessary; conversion is a betrothal of Christ to the Church and its individual members; hence consent is required," which the will is able to give when assisted by the Holy Spirit. (Luthardt, 224.)

It is, however, only a languid, wavering, and weak consent which man is able to render (qualiscumque assensio languida, trepida et imbecilla). "Compared with the divine operation," Flacius reports Strigel as having said, "the cooperation of our powers in conversion is something extremely small (quiddam pertenue prorsus). If, after drinking with a rich man, he paying a taler and I a heller, I would afterwards boast that I had been drinking and paying with him – such is cooperation, talis est synergia." (Planck 4, 677; Luthardt, 220. 222.) According to Strigel, therefore, man is not purely passive, but plays an active part in his conversion. With Melanchthon and Pfeffinger he maintained: "These three concur in conversion: the Holy Spirit, who moves the hearts; the voice of God; the will of man, which assents to the divine voice. Concurrunt in conversione haec tria: Spiritus Sanctus movens corda, vox Dei, voluntas hominis, quae voci divinae assentitur." (Tschackert, 524.)

Flacius declared with respect to the issue formulated by Strigel: "I explain my entire view as follows: Man is purely passive (homo se habet pure passive). If you consider the native faculty of the will, its willing and its powers, then he is purely passive when he receives (in accipiendo). But if that divinely bestowed willing or spark of faith kindled by the Spirit is considered, then this imparted willing and this spark is not purely passive. But the Adamic will does not only not operate or cooperate, but, according to the inborn malice of the heart, even operates contrarily (verum etiam pro nativa malitia cordis sui contra operatur)." (Planck 4, 697.) Thus Flacius clearly distinguished between cooperation before conversion (which he rejected absolutely) and cooperation after conversion (which he allowed). And pressing this point, he said to Strigel: "I ask whether you say that the will cooperates before the gift of faith or after faith has been received whether you say that the will cooperates from natural powers, or in so far as the good volition has been bestowed by the renovation of the Holy Spirit. Quaero, an dicas, voluntatem cooperari ante donum fidei aut post acceptam fidem; an dicas, cooperari ex naturalibus viribus aut quatenus ex renovatione Spiritus Sancti datum est bene velle." (Seeberg 4, 492.) Again: I shall withdraw the charge of Pelagianism if you will declare it as your opinion "that only the regenerated, sanctified, renewed will cooperates, and not the other human, carnal, natural will." "Confess openly and expressly and say clearly: 'I affirm that man cooperates from faith and the good will bestowed by God, not from the will he brings with him from his natural Adam —quod homo cooperetur ex fide et bono velle divinitus donato, non ex eo, quod attulit ex suo naturali Adamo.'" "We say, Only the regenerate will cooperates; if you [Strigel] say the same, the controversy is at an end." Strigel, however, who, to use a phrase of Luther (St. L. 18, 1673), was just as hard to catch as Proteus of old, did not reply with a definite yes or no, but repeated that it was only a weak assent (qualiscumque assensio languida trepida et imbecilla) which man was able to render when his will was incited and supported by the prevenient grace of the Holy Spirit. (Preger 2, 217; Luthardt, 217. 222. 227; Frank 1, 115.)

164. Objections Answered

At Weimar, Strigel insisted: The human will must not be eliminated as one of the causes of conversion; for without man's will and intellect no conversion is possible. Flacius replied: The will, indeed, is present in conversion, for it is the will that is converted and experiences conversion; but the inborn power of the natural will contributes nothing to conversion, and therefore the will "is purely passive in the reception of grace." (Preger 2, 217.) "We are pressed hard with the sophistical objection that man is not converted without his knowledge and will. But who doubts this? The entire question is: Whence does that good knowledge originate? Whence does that good volition originate?" (216.) "We certainly admit that in conversion there are many motions of the intellect and will, good and bad. But the dispute among us is not whether in conversion the intellect understands and the will wills; but whence is the capability to think right, and whence is that good willing of the will? Is it of us, as of ourselves, or is this sufficiency of willing and thinking of God alone?" (Planck 4, 711.) The fact that God alone converts man, said Flacius, "does not exclude the presence of the will; but it does exclude all efficaciousness and operation of the natural will in conversion (non excludit voluntatem, ne adsit, sed excludit omnem efficaciam et operationem naturalise voluntatis in conversione)." (Seeberg 4, 492.)

In order to prove man's cooperation in conversion, Strigel declared: "Both [to will and to perform] are in some way acts of God and of ourselves; for no willing and performing takes place unless we will. Utrumque [velle et perficere] aliquo modo Dei et nostrum est non fit velle aut perficere nisi nobis volentibus." Charging Strigel with ambiguity, Flacius replied: "You speak of one kind of synergism and we of another. You cannot affirm with a good conscience that these questions are unknown to you." Strigel, protesting that he was unable to see the difference, answered: "For God's sake, have a little forbearance with me, I cannot see the difference. If that is to my discredit, let it be to my discredit. —Bitte um Gottes willen, man wolle mir's zugut halten; ich kann's nicht ausmessen. Ist mir's eine Schand', so sei mir's eine Schand'." (Frank 1, 136.) Strigel, however, evidently meant that man, too, has a share in producing the good volition, while Flacius understood the phraseology as Luther and Augustine explained it, the latter, e. g., writing in De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio: "It is certain that we will when we will; but He who makes us will is He of whom it is written: It is God who worketh in us to will. Certum est nos velle cum volumus; sed ille facit, ut velimus, de quo dictum est: Deus est, qui operatur in nobis velle." (Frank 1, 238.)

In his objections to the doctrine that man is purely passive in his conversion, Strigel protested again and again that man is not like a block or stone when he is converted. "That is true," said Flacius, "for a block can neither love nor hate God, while man by nature hates God, and scoffs at Him. Rom. 8, 1; 1 Cor. 2. Thus God is dealing with one whose will and heart is altogether against Him. But here [in the denial that man is purely passive in conversion] is buried a popish meritum de congruo and a particle of free will." (Preger 2, 191.) Flacius furthermore explained that in his conversion man is able to cooperate just as little as a stone can contribute to its transformation into a statue. Indeed, man's condition is even more miserable than that of a stone or block (miserior trunco), because by his natural powers he resists, and cannot but resist, the operations of the Spirit. (Planck 4, 696f.)

Strigel reasoned: If man is converted without his consent, and if he cannot but resist the operations of the Holy Spirit, conversion is an impossibility, a contradiction. He said: "If the will, even when assisted by the Holy Spirit, is unable to assent, it must of necessity resist Him perpetually, drive out, reject, and repudiate the Word and Holy Spirit; for it is impossible that motions extremely conflicting and contradictory, the one embracing, the other repudiating and persistently rejecting, should be in the same will. Si voluntas etiam adiuta a Spiritu Sancto non potest assentiri, necesse est, ut perpetuo ei repugnet, ut excutiat, reiiciat et repudiet Verbum et Spiritum Sanctum. Nam impossibile est in eadem voluntate esse motus extreme pugnantes et contradictorios, quorum alter est amplecti, alter repudiare et quidem perstare in reiectione." Flacius replied: You need but distinguish between the sinful natural will inherited from Adam, which always resists, and the new consenting will implanted by God in conversion. "Man consents with the faith given by God, but he resists with the inborn wickedness of his Old Adam." Your error is that you acknowledge only an inciting grace, which mere incitation presupposes powers of one's own to do and to perform (talis incitatio includit proprias vires ad perficiendum). "I plead," said Flacius, "that by original sin man is not only wounded, but, as the Scriptures affirm, entirely dead, and his faculties to do that which is good have been destroyed; on the other hand, however, he is alive and vigorous toward evil (hominem … penitus esse mortuum, extinctum et interfectum ad bonum et contra insuper vivum et vigentem ad malum)." "The will is free with respect to things beneath itself, but not with respect to things above itself. In spiritual matters it is a servant of Satan." Hence, said Flacius, in order to cooperate, new spiritual life must first be imparted to, and created in, man by the grace of God. (Planck 4, 693ff.; Frank 1, 224ff., Luthardt, 224; Preger 2, 216.)

Strigel argued: If man is able only to sin and to resist the grace of God, he cannot be held accountable for his actions. But Flacius replied: "Also the non-regenerate are justly accused [made responsible for their actions] for with the remnant of the carnal liberty they are able at least to observe external decency (Zucht), which God earnestly demands of us, for example, to hear God's Word, to go to church more frequently than into the tavern." "Furthermore, there are many carnal transgressions in which natural man could have done something which he has not done." "God may justly hold us responsible also with respect to things which we are unable to do because He has bestowed uninjured powers upon the human race, which, though forewarned, man has shamefully lost through his own fault." (Preger 2, 214f.)

Time and again Strigel told Flacius that according to his doctrine man is coerced to sin and compelled to resist the grace of God. But the latter replied: As far as his own powers are concerned, the natural will of man indeed sins and resists inevitably and of necessity (voluntas repugnat necessario et inevitabiliter), but not by coercion or compulsion. Necessity to resist (necessitas repugnandi), Flacius explained, does not involve coercion to resist (coactio repugnandi), since there is such a thing as a necessity of immutability (necessitas immutabilitatis), that is to say, man may be unable to act otherwise and yet act willingly. The impossibility of being able to will otherwise than one really wills, does, according to Flacius, not at all involve coercion or compulsion. The holy angels are free from compulsion, although they cannot sin or fall any more. It is the highest degree of freedom and Christian perfection when, in the life to come, our will to remain in union with God is elevated to immutability of so willing. Again, though Satan cannot but sin, yet he is not coerced to sin. Thus too, of his own powers, natural man is able only to resist grace, yet there is no compulsion involved. The fact, therefore, that natural man cannot but sin and resist grace does not warrant the inference that he is compelled to sin; nor does the fact that natural man is not coerced to resist prove that he is able also to assent to grace. The fact, said Flacius, that the wicked willingly will, think, and do only what pleases Satan does not prove an ability to will in the opposite spiritual direction, but merely reveals the terrible extent of Satan's tyrannical power over natural man. (Luthardt 224. 231.) According to Flacius the will always wills willingly when it wills and what it wills. In brief: The categories "coercion" and "compulsion" cannot be applied to the will. This, however, does not imply that God is not able to create or restore a good will without coercion or compulsion. There was no coercion or compulsion involved when God, creating Adam, Eve, and the angels, endowed them with a good will. Nor is there any such thing as coercion or compulsion when God, in conversion, bestows faith and a good will upon man.

In his statements on the freedom of the will, Flacius merely repeated what Luther had written before him, in De Servo Arbitrio: "For if it is not we, but God alone, who works salvation in us, then nothing that we do previous to His work, whether we will or not, is salutary. But when I say, 'by necessity,' I do not mean by coercion, but, as they say by the necessity of immutability, not by necessity of coercion, i. e., man, destitute of the Spirit of God, does not sin perforce, as though seized by the neck [stretched upon the rack] nor unwillingly, as a thief or robber is led to his punishment but spontaneously and willingly. And by his own strength he cannot omit, restrain, or change this desire or willingness to sin, but continues to will it and to find pleasure in it. For even if he is compelled by force, outwardly to do something else, within, the will nevertheless remains averse, and rages against him who compels or resists it. For if it were changed and willingly yielded to force, it would not be angry. And this we call the necessity of immutability, i. e., the will cannot change itself and turn to something else, but is rather provoked to will more intensely by being resisted, as is proved by its indignation. Si enim non nos, sed solus Deus operatur salutem in nobis, nihil ante opus eius operamur salutare, velimus nolimus. Necessario vero dico, NON COACTE, sed, ut illi dicunt, necessitate immutabilitatis, NON COACTIONIS; id est homo cum vacat Spiritu Dei, NON QUIDEM VIOLENTIA, velut raptus obtorto collo, NOLENS facit peccatum, quemadmodum fur aut latro nolens ad poenam ducitur, sed sponte et libenti voluntate facit. Verum hanc libentiam seu voluntatem faciendi non potest suis viribus omittere, coercere aut mutare, sed pergit volendo et lubendo; etiamsi ad extra cogatur aliud facere per vim, tamen voluntas intus manet aversa et indignatur cogenti aut resistenti. Non enim indignaretur, si mutaretur ac volens vim sequeretur. Hoc vocamus modo necessitatem immutabilitatis, id est, quod voluntas sese mutare et vertere alio non possit, sed potius irritetur magis ad volendum, dum ei resistitur, quod probat eius indignatio." (E. v. a. 7, 155f. 134. 157; St. L. 18 1717. 1692. 1718.)

Flacius was also charged with teaching that "man is converted resisting (hominem converti repugnantem)." In their Confession and Opinion Concerning Free Will, of 1561, the Wittenberg theologians repeated the assertion that Flacius taught "converti hominem … repugnantem et hostiliter Deo convertenti adversantem." (Planck 4, 688.) But Flacius protested: "I do not simply say that man is converted resisting (hominem repugnantem converti). But I say that he resists with respect to his natural and carnal free will." "It is not denied that God converts us as willing and understanding (quin Deus nos convertat volentes et intelligentes), but willing and understanding not from the Old Adam but from the light given by God and from the good volition bestowed through the Word and the Holy Spirit." (692.) "Man is converted or drawn by the Father to the Son not as a thief is cast into prison, but in such a manner that his evil will is changed into a good will by the power of the Holy Spirit." (Preger 2, 218.) It is the very essence of conversion that by the grace of God unwilling men are made willing.

In support of his error that natural man is able to cooperate in his conversion Strigel appealed to Rom. 8, 26: "Likewise the Spirit also helpeth our infirmities," etc.; and appealing to the Augustana for the correctness of his interpretation, he declared that this passage proves that one may speak of a languid and weak assent in man even before he is endowed with faith. Flacius replied that this Bible-passage referred to such only as are already converted, and that Strigel's interpretation was found not in the original Augustana, but in the Variata.– From the admonition 2 Cor. 5, 20: "Be ye reconciled to God," Strigel inferred that free will must to a certain extent be capable of accepting the grace offered by God. Flacius answered that it was a logical fallacy, conflicting also with the clear Word of God, to conclude that man by his own powers is able to perform something because God demands it and admonishes and urges us to do it. – From Acts 5, 32: "…the Holy Ghost, whom God hath given to them that obey Him," Strigel argued that the will is able to consent to the Holy Spirit. But Flacius rejoined that this passage refers to special gifts bestowed upon such as are already converted. – In support of his synergism, Strigel also appealed to the Parable of the Prodigal Son, who himself repented and returned to his father. But Flacius answered: If every detail of this parable taken from every-day life were to be interpreted in such a manner, Strigel would have to abandon his own teaching concerning prevenient grace, since according to the parable the repentance and return of the son precedes the grace bestowed by the father. (Preger 2, 210f.)

165. Teaching of the Anti-Synergists

While the Philippists, also in the Synergistic Controversy, endeavored to supplant the authority and doctrine of Luther by that of Melanchthon, their opponents, Amsdorf, Flacius, Wigand, Hesshusius, and others (though not always fortunate in the choice of their phraseology), stood four-square on Luther's teaching of the sola gratia, which, they were fully convinced, was nothing but the pure truth of the Gospel itself. They maintained that, as a result of the Fall, man has lost his original holiness and righteousness or the image of God; that both as to his intellect and will he is totally corrupt spiritually; that of his own powers he is utterly unable to think or will anything that is truly good; that not a spark of spiritual life is found in natural man by virtue of which he might assent to the Gospel or cooperate with the Holy Spirit in his conversion; that his carnal mind is enmity toward God; that of his own powers he is active only in resisting the work of the Holy Spirit, nor is he able to do otherwise; that such resistance continues until he is converted and a new will and heart have been created in him; that conversion consists in this, that men who by nature are unwilling and resist God's grace become such as willingly consent and obey the Gospel and the Holy Spirit; that this is done solely by God's grace, through Word and Sacrament; that man is purely passive in his conversion, inasmuch as he contributes nothing towards it, and merely suffers and experiences the work of the Holy Spirit; that only after his conversion man is able to cooperate with the Holy Spirit; that such cooperation, however, flows not from innate powers of the natural will, but from the new powers imparted in conversion; that also in the converted the natural sinful will continues to oppose whatever is truly good, thus causing a conflict between the flesh and the spirit which lasts till death; in brief, that man's conversion and salvation are due to grace alone and in no respect whatever to man and his natural powers.

The Book of Confutation, of 1559, drafted, as stated above, by the theologians of Jena, designates the synergistic dogma as a "rejection of grace." Here we also meet with statements such as the following: Human nature "is altogether turned aside from God, and is hostile toward Him and subject to the tyranny of sin and Satan (naturam humanam prorsus a Deo aversam eique inimicam et tyrannidi peccati ac Satanae subiectam esse)." It is impossible for the unregenerate man "to understand or to apprehend the will of God revealed in the Word, or by his own power to convert himself to God and to will or perform anything good (homini non renato impossibile esse intelligere aut apprehendere voluntatem Dei in Verbo patefactam aut sua ipsius voluntate ad Deum se convertere, boni aliquid velle aut perficere)." "Our will to obey God or to choose the good is utterly extinguished and corrupted. Voluntas nostra ad Dei obedientiam aut ad bonum eligendum prorsus extincta et depravata est." (Tschackert, 523; Gieseler 3, 2, 229.)