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Historical Introductions to the Symbolical Books of the Evangelical Lutheran Church
Historical Introductions to the Symbolical Books of the Evangelical Lutheran Churchполная версия

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Historical Introductions to the Symbolical Books of the Evangelical Lutheran Church

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From these additions of 1548 we cite: "Nor does conversion occur in David in such a manner as when a stone is turned into a fig: but free will does something in David; for when he hears the rebuke and the promise, he willingly and freely confesses his fault. And his will does something when he sustains himself with this word: The Lord hath taken away your sin. And when he endeavors to sustain himself with this word, he is already assisted by the Holy Spirit." (C. R. 21, 659.) Again: "I therefore answer those who excuse their idleness because they think that free will does nothing, as follows: It certainly is the eternal and immovable will of God that you obey the voice of the Gospel, that you hear the Son of God, that you acknowledge the Mediator. How black is that sin which refuses to behold the Mediator, the Son of God, presented to the human race! You will answer: 'I cannot.' But in a manner you can (immo aliquo modo potes), and when you sustain yourself with the voice of the Gospel, then pray that God would assist you, and know that the Holy Spirit is efficacious in such consolation. Know that just in this manner God intends to convert us, when we, roused by the promise wrestle with ourselves, pray and resist our diffidence and other vicious affections. For this reason some of the ancient Fathers have said that free will in man is the faculty to apply himself to grace (liberum arbitrium in homine facultatem esse applicandi se ad gratiam); i. e., he hears the promise, endeavors to assent, and abandons sins against conscience. Such things do not occur in devils. The difference therefore between the devils and the human race ought to be considered. These matters however, become still clearer when the promise is considered. For since the promise is universal, and since there are no contradictory wills in God, there must of necessity be in us some cause of difference why Saul is rejected and David is received; i. e., there must of necessity be some dissimilar action in these two. Cum promissio sit universalis, nec sint in Deo contradictoriae voluntates, necesse est in nobis esse aliquam discriminis causam, cur Saul abiiciatur. David recipiatur, id est, necesse est aliquam esse actionem dissimilem in his duobus. Properly understood, this is true, and the use [usus] in the exercises of faith and in true consolation (when our minds acquiesce in the Son of God, shown in the promise) will illustrate this copulation of causes: the Word of God, the Holy Spirit, and the will." (C. R. 21, 659f.)

At the colloquy of Worms, 1557, Melanchthon, interpellated by Brenz, is reported to have said that the passage in his Loci of 1548 defining free will as the faculty of applying oneself to grace referred to the regenerated will (voluntas renata), as, he said, appeared from the context. (Gieseler 3, 2, 225; Frank 1, 198.) As a matter of fact, however, the context clearly excludes this interpretation. In the passage quoted, Melanchthon, moreover, plainly teaches: 1. that in conversion man, too, can do, and really does, something by willingly confessing his fault, by sustaining himself with the Word, by praying that God would assist him, by wrestling with himself, by striving against diffidence, etc.; 2. that the nature of fallen man differs from that of the devils in this, that his free will is still able to apply itself to grace, endeavor to assent to it, etc.; 3. that the dissimilar actions resulting from the different use of this natural ability accounts for the fact that some are saved while others are lost. Such was the plain teaching of Melanchthon from which he never receded, but which he, apart from other publications, reaffirmed in every new edition of his Loci. For all, including the last one to appear during his life (1559), contain the additions of 1548. "The passage added by the author [Melanchthon, 1548] after Luther's death is repeated in all subsequent editions," says Bindseil. (C. R. 21, 570.)

The sections which were added to the Loci after 1548 also breathe the same synergistic spirit. In 1553 Melanchthon inserted a paragraph which says that, when approached by the Holy Spirit, the will can obey or resist. We read: "The liberty of the human will after the Fall, also in the non-regenerate, is the faculty by virtue of which man is able to govern his motions, i. e., he can enjoin upon his external members such actions as agree, or such as do not agree, with the Law of God. But he cannot banish doubts from his mind and evil inclinations from his heart without the light of the Gospel and without the Holy Spirit. But when the will is drawn by the holy Spirit, it can obey or resist. Cum autem trahitur a Spiritu Sancto, potest obsequi et repugnare." (21, 1078; 13, 162.)

Other publications contain the same doctrine. While in his Loci of 1543 he had spoken only of three causes of a good action (bonae actionis), Melanchthon, in his Enarratio Symboli Nicaeni of 1550, substituted "conversion" for "good action." We read: In conversion these causes concur: the Holy Spirit, the voice of the Gospel, "and the will of man, which does not resist the divine voice, but somehow, with trepidation, assents. Concurrunt in conversione hae causae: Spiritus Sanctus … vox Evangelii … et voluntas hominis, quae non repugnat voci divinae, sed inter trepidationem utcumque assentitur." Again: "And concerning this copulation of causes it is said: The Spirit comes to the assistance of our infirmity. And Chrysostom truly says: God draws, but he draws him who is willing." Again: God's promise is universal, and there are no contradictory wills in God; hence, though Paul is drawn in a different manner than Zacchaeus, "nevertheless there is some assent of the will (tamen aliqua est voluntatis assensio)." "God therefore begins and draws by the voice of the Gospel but He draws him who is willing, and assists him who assents." "Nor is anything detracted from the glory of God, but it is truly affirmed that the assistance of God always concurs in the beginning and afterwards (auxilium Dei semper initio et deinceps concurrere)." (23, 280 ff.) Accordingly, God merely concurs as one of three causes, among which the will of man is the third. In his Examen Ordinandorum of 1554, Melanchthon again replaced the term "good action" by "conversion." He says: "In conversion these causes concur: the Word of God, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father and Son send to kindle our hearts, and our will, assenting and not resisting the Word of God (et nostra voluntas assentiens et non repugnans Verbo Dei). And lest we yield to diffidence, we must consider that both preachings are universal, the preaching of repentance as well as the promise of grace… Let us therefore not resist but assent to the promise, and constantly repeat this prayer: I believe, O Lord, but come to the help of my weakness." (23, 15.) Finally in his Opinion on the Weimar Book of Confutation, March 9, 1559, Melanchthon remarks: "Again, if the will is able to turn from the consolation, it must be inferred that it works something and follows the Holy Spirit when it accepts the consolation. Item, so sich der Wille vom Trost abwenden mag, so ist dagegen zu verstehen, dass er etwas wirket und folget dem Heiligen Geist, so er den Trost annimmt." (9, 768.)

W. Preger is right when he says: "According to Melanchthon's view, natural man is able to do the following [when the Word of God is preached to him]: he is able not to resist; he is able to take pains with respect to obedience; he is able to comfort himself with the Word… This [according to Melanchthon] is a germ of the positive good will still found in natural man which prevenient grace arouses." (Flacius Illyricus 2, 189 f.) Schmauk writes: Melanchthon found "the cause for the actual variation in the working of God's grace in man, its object. This subtle synergistic spirit attacks the very foundation of Lutheranism, flows out into almost every doctrine, and weakens the Church at every point. And it was particularly this weakness which the great multitude of Melanchthon's scholars, who became the leaders of the generation of which we are speaking, absorbed, and which rendered it difficult to return, finally, after years of struggle, to the solid ground, once more recovered in the Formula of Concord." (Conf. Principle, 601.)

R. Seeberg characterizes Melanchthon's doctrine as follows: "A synergistic trait therefore appears in his doctrine. In the last analysis, God merely grants the outer and inner possibility of obtaining salvation. Without man's cooperation this possibility would not become reality; and he is able to refuse this cooperation. It is, therefore, in conversion equally a cause with the others. Sie [die Mitwirkung des Menschen] ist also freilich eine den andern Ursachen gleichberechtigte Ursache in der Bekehrung." God makes conversion possible, but only the decision of man's free will makes it actual, – such, according to Seeberg, was the "synergism" of Melanchthon. (Seeberg, Dogg., 4, 444. 446.)

Frank says of Melanchthon's way of solving the question why some are converted and saved while others are lost: "The road chosen by Melanchthon has indeed led to the goal. The contradictions are solved. But let us look where we have landed. We are standing – in the Roman camp!" After quoting a passage from the Tridentinum, which speaks of conversion in terms similar to those employed by Melanchthon, Frank continues: "The foundation stone of Luther's original Reformation doctrine of salvation by grace alone; viz., that nothing in us, not even our will moved and assisted by God, is the causa meritoria of salvation, is subverted by these propositions; and it is immaterial to the contrite heart whether much or little is demanded from free will as the faculty of applying oneself to grace." Frank adds: "What the Philippists, synchronously [with Melanchthon] and later, propounded regarding this matter [of free will] are but variations of the theme struck by Melanchthon. Everywhere the sequence of thought is the same, with but this difference, that here the faults of the Melanchthonian theory together with its consequences come out more clearly." (1, 134f.) The same is true of modern synergistic theories. Without exception they are but variations of notes struck by Melanchthon, – the father of all the synergists that have raised their heads within the Lutheran Church.

156. Pfeffinger Champions Synergistic Doctrine

Prior to 1556 references to the unsound position of the Wittenberg and Leipzig theologians are met with but occasionally. (Planck 4, 568.) The unmistakably synergistic doctrine embodied in the Loci of 1548, as well as in the Leipzig Interim, did not cause alarm and attract attention immediately. But when, in 1555, John Pfeffinger [born 1493; 1539 superintendent, and 1543 professor in Leipzig; assisted 1548 in framing the Leipzig Interim; died January 1, 1573] published his "Five Questions Concerning the Liberty of the Human Will —De Libertate Voluntatis Humanae Quaestiones Quinque. D. Johannes Pfeffinger Lipsiae Editae in Officina Georgii Hantschi 1555," the controversy flared up instantly. It was a little booklet containing besides a brief introduction, only 41 paragraphs, or theses. In these Pfeffinger discussed and defended the synergistic doctrine of Melanchthon, maintaining that in conversion man, too, must contribute his share though it be ever so little.

Early in the next year Pfeffinger was already opposed by the theologians of Thuringia, the stanch opponents of the Philippists, John Stolz, court-preacher at Weimar composing 110 theses for this purpose. In 1558 Amsdorf published his Public Confession of the True Doctrine of the Gospel and Confutation of the Fanatics of the Present Time, in which he, quoting from memory, charged Pfeffinger with teaching that man is able to prepare himself for grace by the natural powers of his free will, just as the godless sophists, Thomas Aquinas, Scotus, and their disciples, had held. (Planck 4, 573. 568.) About the same time Stolz published the 110 theses just referred to with a preface by Aurifaber (Refutatio Propositionum Pfeffingeri de Libero Arbitrio). Flacius, then professor in Jena, added his Refutation of Pfeffinger's Propositions on Free Will and Jena Disputation on Free Will. In the same year, 1558, Pfeffinger, in turn published his Answer to the Public Confession of Amsdorf, charging the latter with falsification, and denouncing Flacius as the "originator and father of all the lies which have troubled the Lutheran Church during the last ten years." But at the same time Pfeffinger showed unmistakably that the charges of his opponents were but too well founded. Says Planck: "Whatever may have moved Pfeffinger to do so, he could not (even if Flacius himself had said it for him) have confessed synergism more clearly and more definitely than he did spontaneously and unasked in this treatise." (4, 574.) Frank: "Pfeffinger goes beyond Melanchthon and Strigel; for the action here demanded of, and ascribed to, the natural will is, according to him, not even in need of liberation by prevenient grace… His doctrine may without more ado be designated as Semi-Pelagianism." (1, 137.)

At Wittenberg, Pfeffinger was supported by George Major, Paul Eber, and Paul Crell and before long his cause was espoused also by Victorin Strigel in Jena. Disputations by the Wittenberg and Leipzig synergists (whom Schluesselburg, 5, 16, calls "cooperators" and "die freiwilligen Herren") and by their opponents in Jena increased the animosity. Both parties cast moderation to the winds. In a public letter of 1558 the Wittenberg professors, for example, maligned Flacius in every possible way, and branded him as "der verloffene undeutsche Flacius Illyricus" and as the sole author of all the dissensions in the churches of Germany. (Planck 4, 583.)

157. Statements of Pfeffinger

Following are some of the synergistic deliverances made by Pfeffinger in his Five Questions Concerning the Liberty of the Human Will. Par. 11 reads: "Thirdly, when we inquire concerning the spiritual actions, it is correct to answer that the human will has not such a liberty as to be able to effect the spiritual motions without the help of the Holy Spirit (humanam voluntatem non habere eiusmodi libertatem, ut motus spirituales sine auxilio Spiritus Sancti efficere possit)." Par. 14: "Therefore some assent or apprehension on our part must concur (oportet igitur nostram aliquam assensionem seu apprehensionem concurrere) when the Holy Spirit has aroused (accenderit) the mind, the will and the heart. Hence Basil says: Only will, and God anticipates; and Chrysostom: He who draws, draws him who is willing; and Augustine: He assists those who have received the gift of the call with becoming piety, and preserve the gifts of God as far as man is able. Again: When grace precedes, the will follows —praeeunte gratia, comitante voluntate." In Par. 16 we read: "The will, therefore, is not idle, but assents faintly. Voluntas igitur non est otiosa sed languide assentitur."

Paragraph 17 runs: "If the will were idle or purely passive, there would be no difference between the pious and the wicked, or between the elect and the damned, as, between Saul and David, between Judas and Peter. God would also become a respecter of persons and the author of contumacy in the wicked and damned; and to God would be ascribed contradictory wills, – which conflicts with the entire Scripture. Hence it follows that there is in us a cause why some assent while others do not. Sequitur ergo in nobis esse aliquam causam, cur alii assentiantur, alii non assentiantur." Par. 24: "Him [the Holy Spirit], therefore, we must not resist; but on the part of our will, which is certainly not like a stone or block, some assent must be added —sed aliquam etiam assensionem accedere nostrae voluntatis, quam non sicut saxum aut incudem se habere certum est." Par. 30: "But apprehension on our part must concur. For, since the promise of grace is universal, and since we must obey this promise, some difference between the elect and the rejected must be inferred from our will (sequitur, aliquod discrimen inter electos et reiectos a voluntate nostra sumendum esse), viz., that those who resist the promise are rejected, while those who embrace the promise are received… All this clearly shows that our will is not idle in conversion or like a stone or block in its conduct. Ex quibus omnibus manifestissimum apparet, voluntatem nostram non esse otiosam in conversione, aut se ut saxum aut incudem habere."

Par. 34 reads: "Some persons, however, shout that the assistance of the Holy Spirit is extenuated and diminished if even the least particle be attributed to the human will. Though this argument may appear specious and plausible, yet pious minds understand that by our doctrine – according to which we ascribe some cooperation to our will; viz., some assent and apprehension (qua tribuimus aliquam SYNERGIAM voluntati nostrae, videlicet qualemcumque assensionem et apprehensionem) – absolutely nothing is taken away from the assistance rendered by the Holy Spirit. For we affirm that the first acts (primas partes) must be assigned and attributed to Him who first and primarily, through the Word or the voice of the Gospel, moves our hearts to believe, to which thereupon we, too, ought to assent as much as we are able (cui deinde et NOS, QUANTUM IN NOBIS EST, ASSENTIRI oportet), and not resist the Holy Spirit, but submit to the Word, ponder, learn, and hear it, as Christ says: 'Whosoever hath heard of the Father and learned, cometh to Me.'" Par. 36: "And although original sin has brought upon our nature a ruin so sad and horrible that we can hardly imagine it, yet we must not think that absolutely all the knowledge (notitiae) which was found in the minds of our first parents before the Fall has on that account been destroyed and extinguished after the Fall, or that the human will does not in any way differ from a stone or a block; for we are, as St. Paul has said most seriously, coworkers with God, which coworking, indeed, is assisted and strengthened by the Holy Spirit —sumus synergi Dei, quae quidem synergia adiuvatur a Spiritu Sancto et confirmatur." Evidently no comment is necessary to show that the passages cited from Pfeffinger are conceived, born, and bred in Semi-Pelagianism and rationalism.

Planck furthermore quotes from Pfeffinger's Answer to Amsdorf, 1558: "And there is no other reason why some are saved and some are damned than this one alone, that some, when incited by the Holy Spirit, do not resist, but obey Him and accept the grace and salvation offered, while others will not accept it, but resist the Holy Spirit, and despise the grace." (4, 578.) Again: "Although the will cannot awaken or incite itself to spiritually good works, but must be awakened and incited thereto by the Holy Ghost, yet man is not altogether excluded from such works of the Holy Ghost, as if he were not engaged in it and were not to contribute his share to it —dass er nicht auch dabei sein und das Seine nicht auch dabei tun muesse." (576.) Again: In the hands of the Holy Spirit man is not like a block or stone in the hands of a sculptor, which do not and cannot "know, understand, or feel what is done with them, nor in the least further or hinder what the artist endeavors to make of them." (576.) "But when the heart of man is touched, awakened, and moved by the Holy Ghost, man must not be like a dead stone or block, … but must obey and follow Him. And although he perceives his great weakness, and, on the other hand, how powerfully sin in his flesh opposes, he must nevertheless not desist, but ask and pray God for grace and assistance against sin and flesh." (577.) Planck remarks: According to Pfeffinger, the powers for all this are still found in natural man, and the only thing required is, not to recreate them, but merely to incite them to action. (579.)

In 1558, in an appendix to his disputation of 1555, Pfeffinger explained and illustrated his position, in substance, as follows: I was to prove nothing else than that some use of the will [in spiritual matters] was left, and that our nature is not annihilated or extinguished, but corrupted and marvelously depraved after the Fall. Now, to be sure, free will cannot by its own natural powers regain its integrity nor rise after being ruined, yet as the doctrine [the Gospel] can be understood by paying attention to it, so it can also in a manner (aliquo modo) be obeyed by assenting to it. But it is necessary for all who would dwell in the splendor of the eternal light and in the sight of God to look up to and not turn away from, the light. Schluesselburg adds: "Haec certe est synergia– This is certainly synergism." (Catalogus 5, 161.)

Tschackert summarizes Pfeffinger's doctrine as follows: "When the Holy Spirit, through the Word of God, influences a man, then the assenting will becomes operative as a factor of conversion. The reason why some assent while others do not must be in themselves… Evidently Pfeffinger's opinion was that not only the regenerate, but even the natural will of man possesses the ability either to obey the divine Spirit or to resist Him." (521.) According to W. Preger, Pfeffinger taught "that the Holy Spirit must awaken and incite our nature that it may understand, think, will and do what is right and pleasing to God," but that natural free will is able "to obey and follow" the motions of the Spirit. (2, 192. 195.)

No doubt, Pfeffinger advocated, and was a candid exponent and champion of, nothing but the three-concurring-causes doctrine of Melanchthon, according to which God never fails to do His share in conversion, while we must beware (sed nos viderimus, C. R. 21, 658) lest we fail to do our share. Pfeffinger himself made it a special point to cite Melanchthon as his authority in this matter. The last (41st) paragraph in his Five Questions begins as follows: "We have briefly set forth the doctrine concerning the liberty of the human will, agreeing with the testimonies of the prophetic and apostolic Scriptures, a fuller explanation of which students may find in the writings of our preceptor, Mr. Philip (prolisciorem explicationem requirant studiosi in scriptis D. Philippi, praeceptoris nostri)." And when, in the subsequent controversy Pfeffinger was publicly assailed by Amsdorf, Flacius, and others, everybody knew that their real target was none other than – Master Philip. Melanchthon, too, was well aware of this fact. In his Opinion on the Weimar Confutation, of March 9, 1559, in which the synergism of the Philippists is extensively treated, he said: "As to free will, it is apparent that they attack me, Philip, in particular." (C. R. 9, 763.)

158. Strigel and Huegel Entering Controversy

The synergistic controversy received new zest and a new impetus when, in 1559, Victorin Strigel and Huegel (Hugelius), respectively professor and pastor at Jena, the stronghold of the opponents of the Wittenberg Philippists, opposed Flacius, espoused the cause of Pfeffinger, championed the doctrine of Melanchthon, and refused to endorse the so called Book of Confutation which Flacius had caused to be drafted particularly against the Wittenberg Philippists and Synergists, and to be introduced. The situation thus created was all the more sensational because, in the preceding controversies, Strigel had, at least apparently, always sided with the opponents of the Philippists.

The "Konfutationsbuch– Book of Confutation and Condemnations of the Chief Corruptions, Sects, and Errors Breaking in and Spreading at this Time" was published in 1559 by Duke John Frederick II as a doctrinal norm of his duchy. In nine chapters this Book, a sort of forerunner of the Formula of Concord, dealt with the errors 1. of Servetus, 2. of Schwenckfeld, 3. of the Antinomians, 4. of the Anabaptists, 5. of the Zwinglians, 6. of the Synergists, 7. of Osiander and Stancarus, 8. of the Majorists, 9. of the Adiaphorists. Its chief object, as expressly stated in the Preface, was to warn against the errors introduced by the Philippists, whose doctrines, as also Planck admits, were not in any way misrepresented in this document. (4, 597. 595.) The sixth part, directed against synergism bore the title: "Confutatio Corruptelarum in Articulo de Libero Arbitrio sive de Viribus Humanis– Confutation of the Corruptions in the Article Concerning Free Will or Concerning the Human Powers." The Confutation was framed by the Jena theologians, Strigel and Huegel also participating in its composition. However, some of the references to the corruptions of the Philippists must have been rather vague and ambiguous in the first draft of the book; for when it was revised at the convention in Weimar, Flacius secured the adoption of additions and changes dealing particularly with the synergism of the Wittenbergers, which were energetically opposed by Strigel.

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