Historical Introductions to the Symbolical Books of the Evangelical Lutheran Church

Flacius, however, took the words "substance" and "accident" in a different sense. He distinguished between the material and formal substance, and the latter he regarded as man's true original essence. This essence he explained, consisted in the original righteousness and holiness of man, in the image of God or the will as truly free and in proper relation toward God. He said: "Ipsum hominem essentialiter sic esse formatum, ut recta voluntas esset imago Dei, non tantum eius accidens." (Seeberg 4, 494.) He drew the conclusion that original sin, by which the image of God (not the human understanding and will as such) is lost, cannot be a mere accident, but constitutes the very essence and substance of fallen man. He argued: The image of God is the formal essence of man, or the soul itself according to its best part, by original sin this image is changed into its opposite: hence the change wrought by original sin is not accidental, but substantial, – just as substantial and essential as when wine is changed into vinegar or fire into frost. What man has lost, said Flacius, is not indeed his material substance (substantia materialis), but his true formal substance or substantial form (substantia formalis or forma substantialis). Hence also original sin, or the corruption resulting from the Fall, in reality is, and must be designated, the formal substance or substantial form of natural man. Not all gifts of creation were lost to man by his Fall; the most essential boon, however, the image of God, was destroyed and changed into the image of Satan. "In homine," said Flacius, "et mansit aliquid, et tamen quod optimum in ratione et essentia fuit, nempe imago Dei, non tantum evanuit, sed etiam in contrarium, nempe in imaginem diaboli, commutatum est." The devil, Flacius continued, has robbed man of his original form (forma), the image of God, and stamped him with his own diabolical form and nature. (Luthardt 215; Gieseler 3, 2, 253.)

170. Further Explanations of Flacius

The manner in which Flacius distinguished between material and formal substance appears from the tract on original sin (De Peccati Originalis aut Veteris Adami Appellationibus et Essentia), which he appended to his Clavis Scripturae of 1567. There we read: "In this disputation concerning the corruption of man I do not deny that this meaner matter (illam viliorem materiam) or mass of man created in the beginning has indeed remained until now, although it is exceedingly vitiated, as when in wine or aromas the spirituous (airy) or fiery substance escapes, and nothing remains but the earthy and watery substance; but I hold that the substantial form or the formal substance (formam substantialem aut substantiam formalem) has been lost, yea, changed into its opposite. But I do not speak of that external and coarse form (although it too, is corrupted and weakened very much) which a girl admires in a youth, or philosophy also in the entire man, according to which he consists of body and soul, has an erect stature two feet, hands, eyes, ears, and the like, is an animal laughing, counting, reasoning, etc.; but I speak of that most noble substantial form (nobilissima substantialis forma) according to which especially the heart itself or rather the rational soul, was formed in such a manner that his very essence might be the image of God and represent Him, and that his substantial powers, intellect and will, and his affections might be conformed to the properties of God, represent, truly acknowledge, and most willingly embrace Him." (Preger 2, 314; Gieseler 3, 2, 254.)

Again: "In this manner, therefore, I believe and assert that original sin is a substance, because the rational soul (as united with God) and especially its noblest substantial powers, namely, the intellect and will which before had been formed so gloriously that they were the true image of God and the fountain of all justice, uprightness, and piety, and altogether essentially like unto gold and gems, are now, by deceit of Satan, so utterly perverted that they are the true and living image of Satan, and, as it were, filthy or rather consisting of an infernal flame, not otherwise than when the sweetest and purest mass, infected with the most venomous ferment, is altogether and substantially changed and transformed into a lump of the same ferment." (Gieseler 3, 2, 254.) Original sin "is not a mere accident in man, but his inverted and transformed essence or new form itself, just as when a most wholesome medicine is changed into the most baneful poison." "The matter remains, but it receives a new form, namely, the image of Satan." "Man, who in his essential form was the image of God, has in his essential form become the image of Satan." "This change may be compared to the change which the golden image of a beautiful man undergoes when it is transformed into the image of a dragon, the matter at the same time being corrupted." (Preger 2, 214. 217. 325.)

Dilating on the substantiality of original sin, Flacius furthermore declared: "Original malice in man is not something different from the evil mind or stony heart itself, not something that destroys him spiritually as a disease consumes him bodily, but it is ruined and destroyed nature itself (sed est tantum ipsa perditissima et iam destructissima natura). Original malice was not, as many now think infused from without into Adam in such a way as when poison or some other bad substance is thrown or poured into good liquor, so that by reason of the added bad substance also the rest becomes noxious, but in such a way as when good liquor or bread itself is perverted so that now it is bad as such and poisonous or rather poison (ut illud per se iam malum ac venenatum aut potius venenum sit)." (Preger 2, 313.)

Also concerning the body and soul of fallen man Flacius does not hesitate to affirm that, since they are permeated and corrupted by original sin, "these parts themselves are sin, eas ipsas [partes, corpus et animam] esse illud nativum malum, quod cum Deo pugnat." "Some object," says Flacius, "that the creature of God must be distinguished from sin, which is not of God. I answer: now do separate, if you can, the devil from his inherent wickedness!.. How can the same thing be separated from itself! We therefore can not distinguish them in any other way than by stating that with respect to his first creation and also his present preservation man, even as the devil himself, is of God, but that with respect to this horrible transformation (ratione istius horrendae metamorphoseos) he is of the devil, who, by the force of the efficacious sentence and punishment of angry God: 'Thou shalt die,' not only captured us to be his vilest slaves, but also recast, rebaked, and changed, or, so to speak, metamorphosed us into another man, as the Scripture says, even as he [the devil] himself is inverted." All parts, talents, and abilities of man, Flacius contends, are "evil and mere sins," because they all oppose God. "What else are they than armed unrighteousness!" he exclaims. Even the natural knowledge of God "is nothing but the abominable source of idolatry and of all superstitions." (Preger 316f.; Gieseler 3, 2, 255.)

That the fundamental view of Flacius, however, was much farther apart from Manicheism than some of his radical phrases imply, appears from his "Gnowthi seauton, De Essentia Originalis Institutiae," of 1568. After admitting that Augustine, Luther, and the Apology of the Augsburg Confession are correct when they define original sin as an inordinate disposition, a disorder (ataxia), perversion, and confusion of the parts of man, Flacius proceeds: "The substantial form of a certain thing for the most part, consists in the right position and disposition of the parts; as, for example, if a human body were born which had its eyes, ears, and mouth on the belly or feet, and, vice versa, the toes on the head, no one would say that it was properly a man, but rather a monster. … It appears, therefore, that the inordinate disposition of the parts produces an altogether new body or thing. Thus, forsooth, the horrible perturbation of the soul has also produced, as it were a new kind of monster fighting against God." (Preger 2, 409.) Accordingly, it was not man's body and soul as such, but the alteration of the relation of his powers toward one another and the consequent corruption of these powers, that Flacius had in mind when he designated original sin as the new substantial form, or substance, of sinful man.

Flacius expressly denied that the fall of man or his conversion involved a physical change. "I do not teach a physical regeneration," he declared, "nor do I say that two hearts are created, but I say that this most excellent part of the soul or of man is once more established, or that the image of God is recast and transformed out of the image of Satan, even as before the image of God was transformed into the image of Satan. Physicam renascentiam non assero nec dico duo corda creari, sed dico istam praestantissimam animae aut hominis partem denuo condi aut ex imagine Satanae refundi aut transformari imaginem Dei, sicut antea imago Dei fuit transformata in imaginem Satanae." (Seeberg 4, 495.) Gieseler pertinently remarks: "It is apparent that Flacius did not deviate from the common concept of original sin, but from the concepts of substance and accident, but that here, too, he was uncertain, inasmuch as he employed the terms substantia, forma substantialis, and substantia formalis promiscuously." (3, 2, 255.)

If not necessarily involved in, it was at least in keeping with his extreme position and extravagant phraseology concerning original sin when Flacius, in his De Primo et Secundo Capite ad Romanos, quatenus Libero Arbitrio Patrocinari Videntur, rejected the doctrine of an inborn idea of God and of His Law inscribed in the heart of natural man. On Rom. 1, 19 he comments: It is only from the effects in the world that man infers the existence of a supreme cause. And with respect to Rom. 2, 15 he maintains that Paul's statements were to be understood, not of a law written in the heart of man, but of a knowledge which the heathen had derived by inference, from experience, or from tradition of the fathers. On this point Strigel, no doubt was correct when he objected: If the knowledge of God's existence were really extinguished from the heart, there could be no discipline among men; and if man had no inborn knowledge of the Law, then there could be no such thing as conscience which condemns him when he sins. The fact that man fears punishments even when there is no government to fear, as was the case with Alexander when he had murdered Clitus, proves that in the heart there is a certain knowledge both of God and of His Law. (Preger 2, 213.) However, Flacius did not, as Strigel seems to insinuate, deny that natural man has an obscure knowledge of God's existence and Law, but merely maintained that this knowledge was not inborn or inherited, but acquired from without.

171. Controversy Precipitated by Flacius

Though Flacius, when he first made his statement concerning the substantiality of original sin may not have felt absolutely sure of the exact meaning, bearing, and correctness of his position, yet the facts do not warrant the assumption that afterwards he was in any way diffident or wavering in his attitude. Whatever his views on this subject may have been before 1560 – after the fatal phrase had fallen from his lips, he never flinched nor flagged in zealously defending it. Nor was he ever disposed to compromise the matter as far as the substance of his doctrine was concerned. In 1570 Spangenberg of Mansfeld, who sided with Flacius, suggested that he retain his meaning, but change his language: "Teneat Illyricus mentem, mutet linguam." To this Flacius consented. On September 28 1570, he published his Brief Confession, in which he agreed to abstain from the use of the term "substance." However, what he suggested as a substitute, viz., that original sin be defined as the nature of man (the word "nature," as he particularly emphasized, to be taken not in a figurative, but in its proper meaning), was in reality but another way of repeating his error.

The same was the case in 1572, when Flacius, opposed and sorely pressed by the ministerium of Strassburg (whence he was banished the following year), offered to substitute for the word "substance" the phrase "essential powers." (Preger 2, 371.) Two years later, at the public disputation in Langenau, Silesia, where Flacius defended his doctrine with favorable results for himself against Jacob Coler [born 1537; studied in Frankfort-on-the-Oder, 1564 pastor in Lauban, Upper Lausatia (Oberlausitz); 1573 in Neukirch; 1574 he opposed Leonard Crentzheim and Flacius; 1575 professor in Frankfort; afterwards active first as Praepositus in Berlin and later on as Superintendent in Mecklenburg, published Disputatio De Libero Arbitrio; died March 7, 1612], he declared that he did not insist on his phrase as long as the doctrine itself was adopted and original sin was not declared to be a mere accident. But this, too, was no real retraction of his error. (Preger 2, 387.) In a similar way Flacius repeatedly declared himself willing to abstain from the use of the word "substance" in connection with his doctrine concerning original sin, but with conditions and limitations which made his concessions illusory, and neither did nor could satisfy his opponents.

At the disputation in Weimar, 1560, Wigand and Musaeus, as stated, warned Flacius immediately after the session in which he had made his statement. Schluesselburg relates: "Immediately during the disputation, as I frequently heard from their own lips, Dr. Wigand, Dr. Simon Musaeus, and other colleagues of his who attended the disputation … admonished Illyricus in a brotherly and faithful manner to abstain from this new, perilous and blasphemous proposition of the ancient Manicheans, which would cause great turmoil in the Church of God, and to refute the error of Victorin [Strigel] concerning free will not by means of a false proposition, but with the Word of God. However, intoxicated with ambition, and relying, in the heat of the conflict, too much on the acumen and sagacity of his own mind, Illyricus haughtily spurned the brotherly and faithful admonitions of all his colleagues." (Catalogus 2, 4.) In his book De Manichaeismo Renovato Wigand himself reports: "Illyricus answered [to the admonition of his colleagues to abstain from the Manichean phrase] that he had been drawn into this discussion by his opponent against his own will. But what happened? Contrary to the expectations of his colleagues, Illyricus in the following session continued, as he had begun, to defend this insanity." (Preger 2, 324; Planck 4, 611.) However, it does not appear that after the disputation his friends pressed the matter any further, or that they made any efforts publicly to disavow the Flacian proposition.

In 1567 Flacius published his tract De Peccati Originalis aut Veteris Adami Appellationibus et Essentia, "On the Appellations and Essence of Original Sin or the Old Adam," appending it to his famous Clavis Scripturae of the same year. He had written this tract probably even before 1564. In 1566 he sent it to Simon Musaeus, requesting his opinion and the opinion of Hesshusius, who at that time was celebrating his marriage with the daughter of Musaeus. In his answer, Musaeus approved the tract, but desired that the term "substance" be explained as meaning not the matter, but the form of the substance to which Hesshusius also agreed. After the tract had appeared, Musaeus again wrote to Flacius, June 21, 1568, saying that he agreed with his presentation of original sin. At the same time, however, he expressed the fear that the bold statement which Flacius had retained, "Sin is substance," would be dangerously misinterpreted. (Preger 2, 327.) And before long a storm was brewing, in which animosity registered its highest point, and a veritable flood of controversial literature (one publication following the other in rapid succession) was poured out upon the Church, which was already distracted and divided by numerous and serious theological conflicts.

By the publication of this treatise Flacius, who before long also was harassed and ostracized everywhere, had himself made a public controversy unavoidable. In the conflict which it precipitated, he was opposed by all parties, not only by his old enemies, the Philippists, but also by his former friends. According to the maxim: Amicus Plato, amicus Socrates, sed magis amica veritas, they now felt constrained, in the interest of truth, to turn their weapons against their former comrade and leader. Flacius himself had made it impossible for his friends to spare him any longer. Nor did he deceive himself as to the real situation. In a letter written to Wigand he reveals his fear that the Lutherans and Philippists, then assembled at the Colloquium in Altenburg (held from October 21, 1568, to March, 1569, between the theologians of Thuringia and those of Electoral Saxony), would unite in a public declaration against his teaching. Wigand whose warning Flacius had disregarded at Weimar, wrote to Gallus: Flacius has forfeited the right to request that nothing be published against him, because he himself has already spread his views in print. And before long Wigand began to denounce publicly the Flacian doctrine as "new and prolific monsters, monstra nova et fecunda."

172. Publications Pro and Con

According to Preger the first decided opposition to the Flacian teaching came from Moerlin and Chemnitz, in Brunswick, to whom Flacius had also submitted his tract for approval. Chemnitz closed his criticism by saying: It is enough if we are able to retain what Luther has won (parta tueri), let us abandon all desires to go beyond (ulterius quaerere) and to improve upon him. (Preger 2, 328.) Moerlin characterized Flacius as a vain man, and dangerous in many respects. Flacius answered in an objective manner, betraying no irritation whatever. (332.) In a letter of August 10, 1568, Hesshusius, who now had read the tract more carefully charged Flacius with teaching that Satan was a creator of substance, and before long refused to treat with him any further. In September of the same year Flacius published his Gnothi seauton against the attacks of the Synergists and Philippists, notably Christopher Lasius [who studied at Strassburg and Wittenberg, was active in Goerlitz, Greussen, Spandau, Kuestrin, Cottbus, and Senftenberg, wrote Praelibationes Dogmatis Flaciani de Prodigiosa Hominis Conversione; died 1572]. In the same year Hesshusius prepared his Analysis, which was approved by Gallus and the Jena theologians.

Realizing that all his former friends had broken with him entirely, Flacius, in January 1570, published his Demonstrations Concerning the Essence of the Image of God and the Devil, in which he attacked his opponents, but without mentioning their names. His request for a private discussion was bluntly rejected by the Jena theologians. Wigand, in his Propositions on Sin of May 5, 1570, was the first publicly to attack Flacius by name. About the same time Moerlin's Themata de Imagine Dei and Chemnitz's Resolutio appeared. The former was directed "against the impious and absurd proposition that sin is a substance", the latter, against the assertion "that original sin is the very substance of man, and that the soul of man itself is original sin." Hesshusius also published his Letter to M. Flacius Illyricus in the Controversy whether Original Sin is a Substance. Flacius answered in his Defense of the Sound Doctrine Concerning Original Righteousness and Unrighteousness, or Sin, of September 1, 1570. Hesshusius published his Analysis, in which he repeated the charge that Flacius made the devil a creator of substance.

In his Brief Confession, of September 28 1570, Flacius now offered to abstain from the use of the term "substance" in the manner indicated above. A colloquium, however, requested by Flacius and his friends on the basis of this Confession, was declined by the theologians of Jena. Moreover, in answer to the Brief Confession, Hesshusius published (April 21, 1571) his True Counter-Report, in which he again repeated his accusation that Flacius made the devil a creator of substance. He summarized his arguments as follows: "I have therefore proved from one book [Flacius's tract of 1567] more than six times that Illyricus says: Satan condidit, fabricavit, transformavit veterem hominem, Satan est figulus, that is: The devil created and made man, the devil is man's potter." The idea of a creation out of nothing, however, was not taught in the statements to which Hesshusius referred. (Preger 2, 348.)

Further publications by Andrew Schoppe [died after 1615], Wigand, Moerlin, Hesshusius, and Chemnitz, which destroyed all hopes of a peaceful settlement, caused Flacius to write his Orthodox Confession Concerning Original Sin. In this comprehensive answer, which appeared August 1, 1571, he declares "that either image, the image of God as well as of Satan, is an essence, and that the opposite opinion diminishes the merit of Christ." At the same time he complained that his statements were garbled and misinterpreted by his opponents, that his was the position of the man who asked concerning garlic and received an answer concerning onions, that his opponents were but disputing with imaginations of their own. (349f.)

In the same year, 1571, Wigand published a voluminous book, On Original Sin, in which he charged Flacius with teaching that original sin is the entire carnal substance of man according to both his body and soul. In his description of the Flacian doctrine we read: "Original sin is a substance, as they teach. Accordingly, original sin is an animal, and that, too, an intelligent animal. You must also add ears, eyes, mouth, nose, arms, belly, and feet. Original sin laughs, talks, sews, sows, works, reads, writes, preaches, baptizes, administers the Lord's Supper, etc. For it is the substance of man that does such things. Behold, where such men end!" Flacius replied in his Christian and Reliable Answer to All manner of Sophistries of the Pelagian Accident, 1572, protesting that the doctrine ascribed to him was a misrepresentation of his teaching. In the same year Wigand published Reasons Why This Proposition, in Controversy with the Manicheans: "Original Sin Is the Corrupt Nature," Cannot Stand. Here Wigand truly says: "Evil of the substance and evil substance are not identical. Malum substantiae et mala substantia non sunt idem." (Preger 2, 353. 410.)

In several publications of the same year Hesshusius asserted (quoting testimonies to this effect from Augustine), that the Flacian doctrine was identical with the tenets of the Manicheans, in substance as well as terms. Flacius answered in De Augustini et Manichaeorum Sententia, in Controversia Peccati, 1572, in which he declared: "I most solemnly condemn the Manichean insanity concerning two creators. I have always denied that original sin is something, or has ever been something outside of man; I have never ascribed to this sin any materiality of its own." (355.) This book was followed by another attack by Hesshusius and an answer, in turn, by Flacius.

In the same year Hesshusius, in order to prevent further accessions to Flacianism, published his Antidote (Antidoton) against the Impious and Blasphemous Dogma of Matthias Flacius Illyricus by which He Asserts that Original Sin Is Substance. In this book, which was republished in 1576 and again in 1579, Hesshusius correctly argued: "If original sin is the substance of the soul, then we are compelled to assert one of two things, viz., either that Satan is the creator of substances or that God is the creator and preserver of sin. Si substantia animae est peccatum originis, alterum a duobus necesse est poni, videlicet, aut Satanam esse conditorem substantiarum, aut Deum esse peccati creatorem et sustentatorem." (Gieseler 3, 2, 256.) At this late hour, 1572, Simon Musaeus, too, entered the arena with his Opinion Concerning Original Sin, Sententia de Peccato Originali. In it he taught "that original sin is not a substance, but the utmost corruption of it, in matter as well as form," and that therefore "Pelagianism no less than Manicheism is to be excluded and condemned."