Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856 (4 of 16 vol.)

I am, sir, your most obedient humble servant,

J. H. CRAIG.

John Henry, Esq.

Copy of the "Credential" given by Sir James Craig to Mr. Henry

The bearer, Mr. John Henry, is employed by me, and full confidence may be placed in him for any communication which any person may wish to make to me in the business committed to him. In faith of which I have given him this under my hand and seal at Quebec, the 6th day of February, 1809.

[Copies of the letters from Mr. Henry to Sir James Craig, relative to his mission to the United States, in the year 1809.]

No. 1

Answer to the letter of Mr. Secretary Ryland, proposing the mission, &c.

Montreal, Jan. 31, 1809.

Sir: I have to acknowledge the favor of your letter of the 26th instant, written by the desire of his Excellency, the Governor-in-Chief, and hasten to express, through you, to his Excellency, my readiness to comply with his wishes.

I need not add how very flattering it is to receive from His Excellency the assurance of the approbation of His Majesty's Secretary of State, for the very humble services that I may have rendered.

If the nature of the service in which I am to be engaged will require no other disbursements than for my individual expenses, I do not apprehend that these can exceed my private resources.

I shall be ready to take my departure before my instructions can be made out.

I have the honor to be your most obedient servant,

J. H.

H. W. Ryland, Esq., Secretary, &c.

No. 2

To His Excellency the Governor General, &c., in answer to his letter of instructions, &c

Montreal, Feb. 10, 1809.

Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letter of instructions, the letter of credence, and the cipher for carrying on my correspondence. I have bestowed much pains upon the cipher, and am, notwithstanding this, deficient in some points which might enable me to understand it clearly. I have compared the example with my own exemplification of the cipher, and find a difference in the results; and as the present moment seems favorable to the interference of His Majesty's Government in the measures pursued by the Federal party in the Northern States, and more especially as the Assembly of Massachusetts is now in session, I think it better to set forward immediately, than wait for any further explanation of the means of carrying on a secret correspondence, which the frequency of safe private conveyances to Canada will render almost wholly unnecessary. Should it, however, be necessary at any time, I take leave to suggest that the index alone furnishes a very safe and simple mode. In it there is a number for every letter in the alphabet, and particular numbers for particular phrases; so that when I do not find in the index the particular word I want, I can spell it with the figures which stand opposite to the letters. For example, if I want to say that "troops are at Albany," I find under the letter T, that No. 16 stands for "troops," and number 125 for "Albany;" the intervening words "are at" I supply by figures corresponding with the letters in these words.

It will be necessary to provide against accident by addressing the letters to Mr. – , of Montreal, with a small mark on the corner of the envelope, which he will understand. When he receives it he will then address the enclosure to your Excellency, and send it from Montreal by mail. I will be careful not to address your Excellency in the body of the letter, nor sign my name to any of them. They will be merely designated by the initials A. B.

If this mode should, in any respect, appear exceptionable, your Excellency will have the goodness to order a more particular explanation of the card. It would reach me in safety enclosed to – , Boston.

I have the honor to be, with profound respect, your Excellency's most obedient servant, &c.

J. H.

No. 3

Burlington, (Vt.,) Feb. 14, 1809.

Sir: I have remained here two days in order fully to ascertain the progress of the arrangements heretofore made for organizing an efficient opposition to the General Government, as well as to become acquainted with the opinions of the leading people relative to the measures of that party which has the ascendant in the National Councils.

On the subject of the embargo laws there seems to be but one opinion; namely, that they are unnecessary, oppressive, and unconstitutional. It must also be observed, that the execution of them is so invidious as to attract toward the officers of Government the enmity of the people, which is of course transferable to the Government itself; so that, in case the State of Massachusetts should take any bold step toward resisting the execution of these laws, it is highly probable that it may calculate upon the hearty co-operation of the people of Vermont.

I learn that the Governor of this State is now visiting the towns in the northern section of it, and makes no secret of his determination, as Commander-in-Chief of the militia, to refuse obedience to any command from the General Government which can tend to interrupt the good understanding that prevails between the citizens of Vermont and His Majesty's subjects in Canada. It is further intimated that, in case of a war, he will use his influence to preserve this State neutral, and resist, with all the force he can command, any attempt to make it a party. I need not add that, if these resolutions are carried into effect, the State of Vermont may be considered as an ally of Great Britain.

To what extent the sentiments which prevail in this quarter exist in the neighboring States, or even in the eastern section of this State, I am not able to conjecture. I only say with certainty, that the leading men of the Federal party act in concert; and therefore infer that a common sentiment pervades the whole body throughout New England.

I have seen a letter from a gentleman now in Washington to his correspondent in this place; and, as its contents may serve to throw some light on passing events there, I shall send either the original, or a copy, with this despatch. The writer of the letter is a man of character and veracity; and, whether competent or not to form correct opinions himself, is probably within the reach of all the knowledge that can be obtained by the party to which he belongs.

It appears by his statement that there is a very formidable majority in Congress on the side of the Administration; notwithstanding which, there is every reason to hope, that the Northern States, in their distinct capacity, will unite, and resist, by force, a war with Great Britain. In what mode this resistance will first show itself is probably not yet determined upon; and may, in some measure, depend upon the reliance that the leading men may place upon assurances of support from His Majesty's representatives in Canada; and as I shall be on the spot to tender this whenever the moment arrives that it can be done with effect, there is no doubt that all their measures may be made subordinate to the intentions of His Majesty's Government. Great pains are taken by the men of talents and intelligence to confirm the fears of the common people, as to the concurrence of the Southern Democrats in the projects of France; and every thing tends to encourage the belief, that the dissolution of the Confederacy will be accelerated by the spirit which now actuates both political parties. I am, &c.

A. B.

No. 4

Windsor, (Vt.,) Feb. 19, 1809.

Sir: My last (No. 3) was written at Burlington, the principal town in the northern part of the State of Vermont. I am now at the principal town in the eastern section.

The fallacy of men's opinions, when they act under the influence of sensibility, and are strongly excited by those hopes which always animate a rising party, led me to doubt the correctness of the opinions which I received in the northern section of this State; which from its contiguity to Canada and necessary intercourse with Montreal, has a stronger interest in promoting a good understanding with His Majesty's Government. Therefore, since my departure from Burlington, I have sought every favorable occasion of conversing with the Democrats on the probable result of the policy adopted by the General Government. The difference of opinion is thus expressed. The Federal party declare that, in the event of a war, the State of Vermont will treat separately for itself with Great Britain; and support to the utmost the stipulations into which it may enter, without any regard to the policy of the General Government. The Democrats, on the other hand, assert, that in such a case as that contemplated, the people would be nearly divided into equal numbers; one of which would support the Government, if it could be done without involving the people in a civil war, but, at all events, would risk every thing in preference to a coalition with Great Britain. This difference of opinion is not to be wholly ascribed to the prejudices of party. The people in the eastern section of Vermont are not operated upon by the same hopes and fears as those on the borders of the British colony. They are not dependent on Montreal for the sale of their produce nor the supply of foreign commodities. They are not apprehensive of any serious dangers or inconvenience from a state of war; and although they admit that the Governor, Council, and three-fourths of the representation in Congress are of the Federal party, yet they do not believe that the State would stand alone and resist the National Government. They do not, however, deny that, should the State of Vermont continue to be represented as it is at present, it would in all probability unite with the neighboring States in any serious plan of resistance to a war which it might seem expedient to adopt. This, I think, is the safer opinion for you to rely on; if, indeed, reliance ought to be placed on any measure depending upon the will of the rabble, which is ever changing, and must ever be marked with ignorance, caprice, and inconsistency. As the crisis approaches, the difficulty of deciding upon a hazardous alternative will increase; and, unfortunately, there is not in Vermont any man of commanding talents capable of attracting general confidence, of infusing into the people his own spirit; and, amidst the confusion of conflicting opinions, dangers, and commotion, competent to lead in the path of duty or safety. The Governor is an industrious, prudent man, and has more personal influence than any other; but his abilities are not suited to the situation in which a civil war would place him. I am, &c.

A. B.

No. 5

Amherst, (N. H.,) Feb. 23, 1809.

Sir: A gentleman going direct to Canada affords a safe and favorable opportunity of giving you some further account of my progress.

I will not make use of the post offices when I can avoid it, because private occasions supersede the necessity of writing in cipher; and the contempt of decency and principles, which forms part of the morals of the subaltern officers of a democracy, would incline them to break a seal with the same indifference that they break their words, when either curiosity or interest is to be indulged.

I have not had sufficient time nor evidence to enable me to form any opinion for myself, of the lengths to which the Federal party will carry their opposition to the National Government in the event of a war; which may be inferred from the result of the election of Governors which, within two months, will be made in the States of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island. From all I know, and all I can learn of the General Government, I am not apprehensive of an immediate war. The embargo is the favorite measure; and it is probable that other means will be employed to excite England to commit some act of hostility, for the sole purpose of placing the responsibility of war on that country. This I most particularly recommend to the consideration of ministers. The dread of opposition, and of the loss of popularity, will certainly keep the ruling party at Washington inactive. They will risk any thing but the loss of power; and they are well aware, that their power would pass away with the first calamity which their measures might bring upon the common people, from whom that power emanates, unless, indeed, they could find a sufficient excuse in the conduct of Great Britain. This impression cannot be too deeply felt by His Majesty's Ministers; nor too widely spread throughout the British nation. It will furnish a sure guide in every policy that may be adopted toward the United States.

I have the honor to be, &c.

A. B.

No. 6

Boston, March 5, 1809.

Sir: I am favored with another opportunity of writing to you by a private conveyance; and think it probable, at this season, that the frequency of these will render it unnecessary to write to you in cipher.

It does not yet appear necessary that I should discover to any person the purpose of my visit to Boston; nor is it probable that I shall be compelled, for the sake of gaining more knowledge of the arrangements of the Federal party in these States, to avow myself as a regular authorized agent of the British Government, even to those individuals who would feel equally bound with myself to preserve, with the utmost inscrutability, so important a secret from the public eye. I have sufficient means of information to enable me to judge of the proper period for offering the co-operation of Great Britain, and opening a correspondence between the Governor General of British America, and those individuals who, from the part they take in the opposition to the National Government, or the influence they may possess in any new order of things that may grow out of the present differences, should be qualified to act on behalf of the Northern States. An apprehension of any such state of things as is pre-supposed by these remarks, begins to subside, since it has appeared, by the conduct of the General Government, that it is seriously alarmed at the menacing attitude of the Northern States. But, although it is believed that there is no probability of an immediate war, yet no doubts are entertained that Mr. Madison will fall upon some new expedients to bring about hostilities. What these may be, can only be deduced from what appears to be practicable. A non-intercourse with England and France will probably supersede the embargo; which, by opening with the rest of Europe a partial, legitimate commerce, and offering strong temptations to that which is illegal, will expose the vessels to capture, detention, and embarrassment; will justify the present policy, and produce such a degree of irritation and resentment as will enable the Government of this country to throw the whole blame and responsibility of war from its own shoulders upon those of the British Ministry. If, in this, the party attached to France should calculate with correctness, and the commerce of New England should greatly suffer, the merchants, being injured and discouraged, would not only acquiesce in the restrictive system, but even submit to war. On the other hand, should the small traffic, permitted by a non-intercourse law, be lucrative and uninterrupted, the people would be clamorous for more, and soon compel the Government to restore the friendly relations between the two countries.

While I offer my opinion upon this subject, I cannot but express a strong hope that, if any terms should be proposed by either Government, to which the other might think proper to accede, that a principal motive to the adjustment of differences should be understood to arise from the amicable disposition of the Eastern States, particularly of the State of Massachusetts. This, as it would increase the popularity of the friends of Great Britain, could not fail to promote her interests. If it could not be done formally and officially, nor in a correspondence between Ministers, still, perhaps, the administration in the Parliament of Great Britain might take that ground, and the suggestion would find its way into the papers both in England and America.

It cannot be too frequently repeated, that this country can only be governed and directed by the influence of opinion, as there is nothing permanent in its political institutions; nor are the populace, under any circumstances, to be relied on, when measures become inconvenient and burdensome. I will soon write again, and am yours, &c.

A. B.

(In cipher.) No. 7

Boston, March 7, 1809.

Sir: I have now ascertained, with as much accuracy as possible, the course intended to be pursued by the party in Massachusetts that is opposed to the measures and politics of the Administration of the General Government.

I have already given a decided opinion that a declaration of war is not to be expected; but, contrary to all reasonable calculation, should the Congress possess spirit and independence enough to place their popularity in jeopardy by so strong a measure, the Legislature of Massachusetts will give the tone to the neighboring States, will declare itself permanent until a new election of members, invite a Congress, to be composed of delegates from the Federal States, and erect a separate government for their common defence and common interest. This Congress would probably begin by abrogating the offensive laws, and adopting a plan for the maintenance of the power and authority thus assumed. They would, by such an act, be in a condition to make or receive proposals from Great Britain; and I should seize the first moment to open a correspondence with your Excellency. Scarcely any other aid would be necessary, and perhaps none required, than a few vessels of war from the Halifax station, to protect the maritime towns from the little navy which is at the disposal of the National Government. What permanent connection between Great Britain and this section of the Republic would grow out of a civil commotion, such as might be expected, no person is prepared to describe; but it seems that a strict alliance must result of necessity. At present the opposition party confine their calculations merely to resistance; and I can assure you that, at this moment, they do not freely entertain the project of withdrawing the Eastern States from the Union, finding it a very unpopular topic; although a course of events, such as I have already mentioned, would inevitably produce an incurable alienation of the New England from the Southern States.

The truth is, the common people have so long regarded the Constitution of the United States with complacency, that they are now only disposed in this quarter to treat it like a truant mistress, whom they would, for a time, put away on a separate maintenance, but, without further and greater provocation, would not absolutely repudiate.

It will soon be known in what situation public affairs are to remain until the meeting of the New Congress in May, at which time, also, this Legislature will again assemble. The two months that intervene will be a period of much anxiety.

In all I have written I have been careful not to make any impression analogous to the enthusiastic confidence entertained by the opposition, nor to the hopes and expectations that animate the friends of an alliance between the Northern States and Great Britain.

I have abstracted myself from all the sympathies these are calculated to inspire; because, notwithstanding that I feel the utmost confidence in the integrity of intention of the leading characters in this political drama, I cannot forget that they derive their power from a giddy, inconstant multitude; who, unless in the instance under consideration they form an exception to all general rules and experience, will act inconsistently and absurdly. I am yours, &c.

A. B.

No. 8

Boston, March 9, 1809.

Sir: In my letter No. 6, I took the liberty to express my opinion of the probable effect of the non-intercourse law, intended to be enacted; and of the mode by which Great Britain may defeat the real intention of the American Government in passing it. But as this sort of impunity recommended might, in its application to every species of commerce that would be carried on, be deemed by Great Britain a greater evil than war itself, a middle course might easily be adopted, which would deprive France of the benefits resulting from an intercourse with America, without, in any great degree, irritating the maritime States.

The high price of all American produce in France furnishes a temptation which mercantile avarice will be unable to resist. The consequence is obvious. But if, instead of condemning the vessels and cargoes which may be arrested in pursuing this prohibited commerce, they should be compelled to go into a British port, and there permitted to sell them, I think the friends of England in these States would not utter a complaint. Indeed, I have no doubt that if, in the prosecution of a lawful voyage, the British cruisers should treat the American ships in this manner, their owners would, in the present state of the European markets, think themselves very fortunate, as it would save them the trouble and expense of landing them in a neutral port, and from thence reshipping them to England, now the best market in Europe for the produce of this country. The Government of the United States would probably complain, and Bonaparte become peremptory; but even that would only tend to render the opposition in the Northern States more resolute, and accelerate the dissolution of the confederacy. The generosity and justice of Great Britain would be extolled; and the commercial States exult in the success of individuals over a Government inimical to commerce, and to whose measures they can no longer submit with patient acquiescence. The elections are begun; and I presume no vigilance or industry will be remitted to insure the success of the Federal party. I am, &c.

A. B.

P. S. Intelligence has reached Boston that a non-intercourse law has actually passed, and that Martinique has surrendered to British forces.

No. 9

Boston, March 13, 1809.

Sir: You will perceive, from the accounts that will reach you in the public papers, both from Washington and Massachusetts, that the Federalists of the Northern States have succeeded in making the Congress believe that, with such an opposition as they would make to the General Government, a war must be confined to their own territory, and might be even too much for that Government to sustain. The consequence is, that, after all the parade and menaces with which the session commenced, it has been suffered to end without carrying into effect any of the plans of the Administration, except the interdiction of commercial intercourse with England and France, an event that was anticipated in my former letters.

Under what new circumstances the Congress will meet in May, will depend on the State elections and the changes that may in the mean time take place in Europe. With regard to Great Britain, she can scarcely mistake her true policy in relation to America. If peace be the first object, every act which can irritate the maritime States ought to be avoided, because the prevailing disposition of these will generally be sufficient to keep the Government from hazarding any hostile measures. If a war between America and France be the grand desideratum, something more must be done; an indulgent and conciliatory policy must be adopted, which will leave the Democrats without a pretext for hostilities; and Bonaparte, whose passions are too hot for delay, will probably compel this Government to decide which of the two great belligerents is to be its enemy. To bring about a separation of the States, under distinct and independent governments, is an affair of more uncertainty, and, however desirable, cannot be effected but by a series of acts and a long-continued policy tending to irritate the Southern and conciliate the Northern people. The former are agricultural, the latter a commercial people. The mode of cherishing and depressing either is too obvious to require illustration. This, I am aware, is an object of much interest in Great Britain, as it would forever secure the integrity of His Majesty's possessions on this continent, and make the two Governments, or whatever number the present confederacy might form into, as useful and as much subject to the influence of Great Britain as her Colonies can be rendered. But it is an object only to be attained by slow and circumspect progression, and requires, for its consummation, more attention to the affairs which agitate and excite parties in this country than Great Britain has yet bestowed upon it.