A Short History of H.M.S. Victory

On preparations being made in June 1790, in expectation of war with Spain, the “Victory” was again commissioned. Lord Howe at first had his flag in her, but when the Queen Charlotte was ready, he went to that ship, and Lord Hood succeeded him in the “Victory.” She remained at the North ready for service throughout that year, and part of the next, when Hood was appointed to command the Northern Fleet, fitting out in case our friendly relations with Russia, then trembling in the balance, could not be maintained; but the difficulty passed away, and in the summer of 1791 she was paid off and returned into ordinary.

But in February, 1793, when the French Republic had sealed its former acts of lawlessness by the execution of the King, Louis XVI, and had further cut itself off from civilization by declaring war against the world, or against such parts of the world as it was not already fighting with, that war which is known in our annals as the “War with the Republic,” commenced in earnest.

England’s fleets were at once brought forward, and the “Victory” was again manned as the flagship of Lord Hood, who was now appointed Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean. He hoisted his flag at Portsmouth on the evening of the 6th of May, and his Lordship sailed on the 22nd of the same month, accompanied by 6 two-deckers and 5 frigates, which composed the last detachment of the fleet he was to command; 14 other line-of-battle ships and some frigates having preceded him, under Vice-Admirals Hotham and Cosby, and Rear-Admirals Goodall and Gell.

On the 24th a junction was effected with Admiral Hotham’s divisions, and after waiting off Scilly a fortnight for the passing of a convoy, Hood bore away for Gibraltar with 11 sail of the line.

The first object of importance in the Mediterranean was the reduction of Toulon if possible. In that port, the great Southern French Arsenal, were known to be upwards of 30 sail of the line, 17 of them ready for sea, under the orders of Admiral Trogoff, but as that officer was a staunch monarchist, he was not expected to do anything that would further the cause of republicanism, and the existence of a strong royalist party in the south of France, favoured the supposition that instead of resisting the British, the Toulonese would receive them with open arms, as their only chance of protection from that republic they so thoroughly hated and feared.

Such being the posture of affairs, Hood hurried out to his station, watering his ships at Cadiz, (for Spain was now our ally against the common enemy) and Gibraltar. From the latter place the fleet sailed, on June 27th, and on the 7th July fell in with a Spanish fleet of 24 sail whose Admiral sent a message to Lord Hood, to say that he had 1900 men sick and was going into Carthagena, and, said the Captain of the frigate “no wonder, for we have been 60 days at sea.” This speech did not raise their new allies in the estimation of the British, who laughed at such a notion, and left the Spaniards to follow to Toulon, which was sighted on the 19th July, and a flag of truce was sent in to propose an exchange of prisoners. To this the enemy would not accede, but they were now acquainted with the presence of Lord Hood’s fleet off the port, and those causes of dissension we have mentioned began to operate, with the most important final results.

Lord Hood cruised for a fortnight in sight of Toulon, then sailed for Nice to show himself there, and on his return on 20th August, heard that proposals were being made in Toulon to put themselves under his protection. On the 23rd, Commissioners came on board the “Victory” from Marseilles with full powers to treat for peace, offering a conditional surrender of Toulon and all the shipping, declaring a monarchical government the leading object of their negotiation, and praying for speedy help against the armies of the convention that were at that moment approaching.

Our space will not permit a full account of the proceedings at this time, and we must satisfy ourselves by stating that Toulon was taken possession of on the 27th August, without a blow, despite the threatened opposition of Admiral St. Julien, the second in command, who was thorough republican; the Spanish fleet hove in sight the same day, and Toulon was soon occupied by the combined forces, and vigorous steps taken to keep possession of our “extraordinary acquisition,” as Nelson in one of his letters calls it. But the enemy were at hand, mustering stronger and stronger every day, and by November, General Dugommier was besieging the town with 40,000 men, while the defenders, who only mustered 16,000, were of different nationalities and had to man a line 15 miles in length. On December 16th a position on the heights commanding Toulon was carried by the besiegers, and a council of war, hastily summoned, determined to evacuate the town, carry off as many ships as possible, and burn the rest. The evacuation was carried out successfully, the troops and seamen were all embarked, and 15,000 of the inhabitants took refuge from the rage of their countrymen on board the fleets. But the rest of the programme was not so completely performed; the Spaniards had charged themselves with the destruction of the ships in the inner harbour, but either by carelessness or treachery, they very imperfectly performed their task. They did not fire the ships of war but did set alight to the powder vessels which it was arranged should be scuttled; these blew up, nearly destroying Captain Sidney Smith, who was burning the ships in the outer mole; he gallantly attempted to repair the omission, but was repulsed by the fire of the republicans who were already in the town, and had to retire, leaving the work but half done. Of 58 ships in the port when Lord Hood arrived, 14 were destroyed, 19 carried off, and 25 left to the French.

In all these operations the men of the “Victory,” if not the ship herself, bore an active part, as they were landed, and helped to man the batteries with the other ship’s companies, and suffered great losses in the continual bombardment to which they were exposed. On one occasion, indeed, the ship was like to have become the heroine of an adventure which might have ended her days, for, on October 23rd, in one of the disputes, which, as might be expected, were not unfrequent between our quondam enemies the Spaniards and ourselves, Don Juan de Langara, the Spanish Admiral, placed three of his three-deckers round the “Victory,” as she lay in the outer road of Toulon, as a “gentle moral persuasion” on behalf of his demands. As the English fleet at that time was reduced by the absence of detachments to 10 sails, and their crews were weakened by the landing parties, the Spanish Admiral with his 17 sail, could have destroyed our ships, had he dared to carry matters so far; but Lord Hood was firm, and the Spanish ships resumed their former positions without any further demonstrations.

The British fleet now withdrew to Hyères, where they lay and revictualled; and on the 24th of January, 1794, thinking that something might yet be done to assist the royalist faction in Corsica, Lord Hood proceeded with a fleet of 60 sail, including transports, for the Bay of Fiorenzo. While on the passage, a furious gale arose which dispersed them, and the “Victory,” amongst others, was nearly disabled, losing her mainyard and many of her sails, and was at one time in danger of being lost. The scattered fleet put into Porto Ferrajo on the 29th. Detachments of ships were sent from here, with the troops, to attack San Fiorenzo, the principal port of Corsica; and on the 19th February, after standing a bombardment of eleven days, this town capitulated. By this time the “Victory” herself had arrived.

Lord Hood then tried to persuade General Dundas, who commanded the troops, of the practicability of taking Bastia, the capital of the island; but that officer differed, and not only refused to take any part in the attempt, but would not even lend a mortar or gun, or any stores for the service, so that Hood had actually to send to Naples for these most necessary articles for a siege; for, probably believing that the energy of Nelson, then Captain of the Agamemnon, who had borne a most prominent part in these previous undertakings, was sufficient to carry anything through with success, the Admiral determined to attempt it alone with his sailors, and 1000 men of different regiments who were embarked in the ship as marines. He cruised in the “Victory” for some days, before Bastia, and then returned to San Fiorenzo, leaving everything to the direction of Nelson, who worked as he always did, untiringly. On April 4th Hood again went round and assisted with his men, etc., in raising the shore batteries; and on the 11th, when all was ready, a boat from the “Victory” went in to demand the capitulation of the town. This was refused with scorn, by the brave Frenchman, St. Michel, who replied, that he “had red-hot shot for our ships, and bayonets for our men;” the “Victory,” on receiving this reply, hoisted a red flag, the preconcerted signal, and immediately the batteries opened. The town replied, and for some weeks the siege went on with varying success.

During this period General D’Aubant, who had succeeded General Dundas, would ride over with his staff from San Fiorenzo, a distance of only twelve miles, and watch the operations, his own men remaining inactive the while, and it was his extraordinary conduct that urged the seamen to exertions of which they might otherwise have been incapable. The fire of the besiegers grew hotter and hotter; new batteries were erected, and guns mounted on heights deemed insurmountable, and on 19th May, their efforts were rewarded by a boat from the town coming on board the “Victory,” with a proposal of surrender.

The preliminaries were speedily arranged, and on the 22nd the town and two frigates were given up. “When I reflect on what we have achieved,” says Nelson in a letter to his wife, “I am all astonishment. I always was of opinion, have ever acted up to it, and never have had any reason to repent it, that one Englishman was equal to three Frenchmen.”

Calvi, the other principal town in Corsica, was now looked upon as a desirable acquisition, but before anything could be done, Hood received intelligence that the French fleet had left Toulon, and immediately sailed in pursuit. He met Admiral Hotham’s squadron next day, and with 13 sail of the line, sighted the Frenchmen on June 10th. The enemy were chased for two days, but before they could be overtaken they escaped into Gourjean Bay, where it was found impossible to attack them, and Lord Hood returned with the “Victory” and three other ships to Martello Bay, leaving Vice-Admiral Hotham, with the remainder, to watch the French, which we may remark, he did for five months without success.

Nelson had been sent back to Bastia with his ship, as soon as the inferiority of the enemy’s fleet had been ascertained, and as General Stuart, who had arrived with a reinforcement, and was now in command of the troops, was a very different man to either of his successors, and as anxious as Nelson himself to lose no time in attacking Calvi, the Agamemnon and transports went at once from Bastia to a small bay about 3 miles from Calvi, where they arrived on June 19th, and proceeded to land. On the same day the “Victory” and Britannia anchored in Martello Bay, and after sending parties of men by land to join Stuart and Nelson, they came round to Calvi on the 27th, with all the munitions of war they could muster, and lay off and on during the siege.

The “Victory” landed 7 of her own lower deck guns for the batteries, as well as some guns she had from the Commerce de Marseilles, and sent a strong party of seamen to assist, but was not able to get into action herself from the strength of the sea defences of the town. The seamen from Agamemnon, “Victory,” and transports, guided and incited by Nelson’s indomitable energy, again performed prodigies in the way of work; they once more dragged guns up to positions considered by the troops unattainable, made the batteries, and fought them, and gained the warm praise and thanks of General Stuart, for the valuable assistance they afforded.

The town surrendered on August 10th, after enduring a siege of 51 days. In these operations, several officers and men of the “Victory” were killed and wounded.

Nelson himself was nearly slain, but got off with the loss of an eye. His wound was never reported, and he only casually mentioned that he had received a slight hurt which laid him up one day. All this time, Lord Hood, on whose health the anxious work at Toulon had told considerably, remained on board the “Victory” and sent supplies to the shore parties when required. The ship was once blown off by a gale, but resumed her position after an absence of a week.

The “Victory” next proceeded to Genoa, and in the first week of November, she left for England, taking Lord Hood with her, his health not being able to stand the fatigues of the command any longer. She arrived at Portsmouth in December, and Lord Hood went on leave, but rehoisted his flag on the 14th April following, after the ship had had a thorough refit.

On May 1st, 1795, the “Victory” was again a spectator of the destruction of a sister first rate, the Boyne of 98 guns, which caught fire and blew up at Spithead, where remnants of her remain to this day off Southsea Castle, marked by a green buoy.

On 2nd of May, as Lord Hood was on the point of leaving to resume his command, he was ordered to strike his flag, and “Victory” sailed out on 24th May, as a private ship,2 with Rear-Admiral Man, who was taking a reinforcement out to Admiral Hotham, then confirmed Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean. Man joined Hotham’s fleet off Minorca on June 14th, and on 8th July, on the fleet weighing from San Fiorenzo Bay, to pursue the enemy, he shifted his flag to the “Victory.”

The French fleet of 17 sail, under Admiral Martin, were sighted off Hyères at daylight on July 13th, and the signal for a general chase was thrown out by the Britannia, Admiral Hotham’s flagship.

The “Victory” was always celebrated for her good sailing qualities, and on this occasion they shone out particularly conspicuous, for, at half-past noon, she, with the Culloden and Cumberland, came within range of the rearmost of the enemy, while the rest of their companions were astern at distances ranging from 1 to 9 miles, the Commander-in-Chief being one of the farthest, for the Britannia was as bad a sailer as the “Victory” was a good one. They opened fire, but at this moment the wind unfortunately failed, and they were unable to get into close action, though at the end of an hour the Alcide, a seventy-four, struck. They still hoped to make more prizes, but had by four o’clock drifted so near the shore, that the signal to discontinue the action was made, and the French escaped through the shoals, the passages between which they were familiar with, into Fréjus Bay.

The Alcide, which had made a most gallant defence, unluckily took fire shortly after striking, and blew up with the loss of all her crew, save 200. In the skirmish, the “Victory” was the greatest sufferer, having her rigging much cut, and all her lower masts badly wounded. She lost 5 killed (2 officers), and 16 wounded.

Man retained his flag in her until October, when he shifted to the Windsor Castle, and was succeeded by Vice-Admiral Robert Linzee, who flew his flag in the “Victory” for a month only. During this period she was cruising with a fleet, watching Toulon, and going from port to port in that vicinity, until the 3rd of December, 1795, when being at San Fiorenzo in Corsica, Sir John Jervis, who had arrived from England a few days before, hoisted his flag in her as Commander-in-Chief, and at once proceeded off Toulon. He remained cruising between that port and Minorca, with a fleet of about 13 sail, until the autumn of 1796, but up to this time no incidents took place that are worth recording.

Spain had made a peace with France in 1794; and now in August 1796, an alliance, offensive and defensive, was concluded between the two powers. This put Sir John Jervis in a very critical position, as the united French and Spanish fleets amounted to 38 ships of the line, while Sir John, who was at Martello Bay, had but 15. It was determined accordingly, to evacuate Corsica, as the power of the French republic, and the deeds of their countryman, Buonaparte, were awaking feelings in the inhabitants that were not amicable to England. This was completed on the 2nd November, and Sir John and all his fleet sailed from Corsica, and escorted the transports to Gibraltar, which was reached on December 11th. On the 16th he went on to Lisbon to meet some expected reinforcements from home.

Here he remained until the 18th January, when he sailed with 10 ships only; but on February 6th 5 more joined from England, when his force consisted of the following line-of-battle ships, with which he cruised, awaiting news of the enemy.

On the 13th, when off Cape St. Vincent, Commodore Nelson in the Minerve frigate, joined, and reported having been chased by the Spaniards. This was a fleet of 27 sail of the line, which had passed the Straits on the 5th, and was then working up for Cadiz, with the intention of picking up more ships there, and then proceeding for Brest to join the French.

The morning of the 14th, the ‘glorious St. Valentine’s day,’ 1791, broke thick and misty, but as soon as daylight made its appearance, the Spaniards were sighted to the S.W.; one by one they were made out through the fog, and reported to the Admiral, who received the report of their increasing numbers with imperturbability, and when the whole 27 sail were fully in sight, and Captain Calder expressed some hesitation about the wisdom of coping with such odds, he exclaimed, “Enough Sir, were there fifty I will go through them.”

The Spanish fleet were much scattered and in no particular order, but some eight ships were considerably to leeward of the rest, leaving a distinct gap, which was, however, rapidly narrowing, by the nineteen ships to windward running down to join their companions. For this gap the British ships pushed with all sail in a compact line, “Victory” in the centre. A few minutes hesitation might have been fatal, for had the enemy got all his ships together, the 15 English vessels would have fought against great odds; but Jervis was a bold Commander, to whom indecision was unknown, and who was well aware of the value of the presence of a man like Nelson, and, indeed, it was mainly by the latter’s daring manœuvre at a later period of the action, that the Spaniards were prevented from effecting their junction.

As it was, they were just in time, and as soon as the weather division of Spaniards saw the head of the English line between them and their friends, they hauled to the wind on the opposite tack, hoping to get round the rear of the British line, and so effect their purpose. Their lee division still stood determinedly on, and attempted to cut the British line ahead of the “Victory” herself, but she, by her rapid advance, frustrated this, and forced the Principe de Asturias, of 112 guns, to put about to avoid a collision. The Spanish ship, which bore the flag of one of their Rear Admirals, let fly her broadside as she shot up in the wind, but either from the obscurity caused by smoke, or by mistaken orders this was done at the wrong time, and extraordinary to relate, not a shot struck the “Victory.” With a ringing cheer of derision from her crew, the British flagship re-paid the compliment, but with interest, for as the Spanish three-decker slowly turned round and presented her stern to her, the whole of the “Victory’s” guns were discharged into it with destructive effect. The Spaniard ran straight away to leeward, followed by his whole division, and until the close of the day, never appeared again in the action.

In the mean time, the weather division, as has been said, were intending to round the rear of our line, and so join their ships to leeward, but Nelson, in the Captain, the third ship of the line from the rear, saw their object the instant their van bore up together astern, and immediately wearing round, plunged fearlessly into their midst. He was followed by the Culloden and Excellent, and the Spanish Admiral, daunted by this spirited conduct, hauled to the wind, and gave up the attempt.

The annexed plan may help to the comprehension of the position of affairs at this period of the action.

The other British ships in the meantime were tacking in succession, and one after another came into action to the support of their comrades.

The “Victory” engaged the Salvador del Mundo, a 112 gun ship, which had already been mauled by the Excellent, and forced her to strike her colours. This was at 3, p.m., and shortly afterwards, Sir John, who was discreet as he was bold, observing that about 24 Spaniards (composed of the 8 lee ships, and odd ships of the weather division, who were all fresh) were bearing down on them, made the signal to close up to cover the prizes; this was immediately done, and the Spaniards, not liking the look of the compact line of the British, hauled off, and made no effort to continue the action.

In this battle, Nelson particularly distinguished himself, as in his little 74, the Captain, he boarded in succession, and took, the San Nicholas, of 80, and San Josef, of 112 guns; the “Victory” passing just at that time, gave the gallant Captain three cheers. Nelson went on board the “Victory” after the action, and was warmly embraced by Sir John Jervis, on the very quarter-deck on which he was to fall, covered with glory, eight years later, and not far from the place where this battle had been fought.

But for all these details we must refer the reader to James’s, Drinkwater’s, and other accounts.

The “Victory,” strange to say, had but 1 man killed, and 8 wounded; the total loss in the English fleet being about 350 killed and wounded.

The fruits of the victory were the San Josef, Salvador del Mundo, 112, San Nicholas, 80, and San Isidro, 74; a result, that considering these prizes were wrested from 27 ships by 15, cannot but be considered as most glorious.

The enemy, next day, had it in their power to renew the action with 21 ships. Who can say what the result might have been, for some of our vessels were so disabled as to render it necessary to tow them; but though the Spaniards once made a feint, as if they would attack, they finally disappeared, allowing our fleet and prizes to arrive safely at Lagos Bay, in Portugal, where they anchored on the 16th.

On the 19th, they experienced a gale of wind that drove the “Victory” from her anchors, whereby she had a most narrow escape of being wrecked. On the 23rd they sailed, and arrived at Lisbon on the 28th, without accident or molestation.

The news of the battle of Cape St. Vincent, as it was called, was received in England with frantic joy; great rejoicings took place throughout the kingdom, the fleet received the thanks of both Houses of Parliament, Sir John Jervis was created Earl of St. Vincent, Admirals Thompson and Parker were made Baronets, and the gallant Commodore Nelson was invested with the honours of the Bath.

On the 28th March Sir John Jervis was reinforced by a squadron from England, when he shifted his flag on the 30th from the “Victory” to the Ville de Paris, a new three-decked ship.

The fleet sailed next day (the “Victory” being now a private ship) and proceeded off Cadiz, where Nelson had been cruising for some time watching the Spanish ships, who, ever since the 16th of February had lain in that port, hooted and jeered at by the populace, and their Admirals and Captains disgraced.