The 56th Division

On the 15th instant, as the result of a conference with the Corps Commander and the G.O.C. 8th Division, the starting line was altered.

Owing to the date fixed for the attack, an inter-battalion relief was necessary on the night 14/15th. In fact the ground was so bad that there were reliefs, or remains of reliefs, going on every night. It was not possible to undertake any patrolling to gain a knowledge of the ground, and in daylight the shelling was so constant and accurate that study of the country was most difficult.

The General writes:

“The darkness of the night, the boggy state of the ground, heavy shelling of all approaches, and the fact that the division was strange to the ground and had little opportunity for reconnaissance and preparation presented great difficulties in carrying out the assembly … but the difficulties were surmounted and the troops assembled in time, though there is no doubt that the state of the ground caused much fatigue.”

So by 4 a.m. the 53rd Brigade, with the 7th Bedford, 6th Berkshire, and 4th London Regts. in line, was on the right. In the centre was the 169th Brigade with the 5th and 2nd London Regts. in line. On the left the 167th Brigade with the 8th Middlesex and 1st London Regts. in line.

At 4.45 a.m. on the 16th August the barrage opened and the assaulting troops clambered out of their mud holes. Red and green lights were fired from the enemy rear lines, but his barrage did not answer to these signals for some minutes. But the new enemy system of defence in depth and by means of concrete forts was to be met for the first time by the 56th Division. The barrage was good and, if anything, crept forward too slowly, but the concrete fort was immune from damage by shells from the lighter batteries, and the German machine-gunner was able to fire through our barrage.

The 7th Bedford Regt. was stopped at once by one of these forts on the north-west of Inverness Copse. The failure to capture this point reacted on the 4th London Regt., which suffered very heavy loss and was brought to a standstill to the north of the western side of the wood; they managed to work their way forward and form a defensive flank along the southern edge of Glencorse Wood.

* * * * * * *

The 169th Brigade progressed well at first. The London Rifle Brigade and the 2nd London Regt. disposed of isolated parties with machine guns dotted about in shell holes on their front, but soon bumped into a marsh. The 2nd London Regt. edged to the right, pushing the London Rifle Brigade still farther away. And the same obstruction being met by the 167th Brigade, the 8th Middlesex edged to the left, to avoid the marsh, pushing the 1st London Regt. as they did so. There was then a big gap between the two Brigades very soon after the start.

The enemy resistance was found by the 169th Brigade beyond the marsh in the centre of Glencorse Wood. Here, along a sunken road, was a line of concrete forts, or pill-boxes. Hard fighting and heavy casualties followed. The artillery was no longer helpful, but Glencorse Wood was finally cleared. The leading waves of the two battalions then went on and reached Polygon Wood, but what happened to them is not known. The second waves were checked at Polygon Wood by heavy fire from the front and the flanks, and before they could steady themselves were thrown back by a counter-attack which was only stopped by the Queen Victoria’s Rifles, who were coming up in support. Later in the day a second and heavier counter-attack from the east and south drove the whole of the brigade back to the original front line.

5. The Battle of Langemarck 1917.

The 167th Brigade, on the left, made better progress than any of the others—for a time. The gap between the 169th and 167th Brigades was never filled, so that when the 8th Middlesex came across a second lake of mud, four feet deep, about the north end of Nonne Bosschen, their right flank was exposed. And on the left the 1st London Regt. had been heavily shelled before the start, so that when they did advance the rear waves pressed on the leading wave until all became mixed, and no one carried out the special task of clearing the ground as it was won; the position was that, although the main weight of the attack was carried forward to the left of the 8th Middlesex, many enemy snipers were behind both battalions of the 167th Brigade. There is also, on this flank, the mystery of a company that disappeared. Although it seems pretty clear that the waves bunched up together, they must also have split; the third wave, composed of the larger part of a company, was reported by its company commander, in writing sent by runner, to be in a position north of Polygon Wood; and no doubt he got there, but neither he nor his men were heard of again. A thin wave of the 8th Division reached this same line, but were immediately driven back by a massed and carefully timed counter-attack.

But the attack of the 167th Brigade was completely held up. At 7 a.m. the 8th Middlesex saw the troops of the 169th Brigade falling back through Glencorse Wood; they then took up a position to their rear, their southern flank being refused so as to gain touch with the 169th Brigade. The situation remained unaltered through the afternoon.

About 3 p.m. the enemy was reported to be massing opposite the 25th Brigade on the left of the 56th Division, and shortly after to be attacking all along the 167th Brigade front. In view of the barrier of mud it is probable that he was only trying to reoccupy the ground from which he had retired. But our artillery had direct observation and heavy fire was opened on him, and his troops dispersed.

About 5 p.m. the 167th Brigade again retired to a more favourable position, which gave them a net gain of 400 yards beyond their original line. They were then in touch with the 25th Brigade, 8th Division.

All attacking battalions were withdrawn and the line was held by the Queen Victoria’s Rifles, the Queen’s Westminster Rifles, and the 7th Middlesex Regt. The division was relieved the following night by the 14th Division, and moved to Steenvoorde E., Ouderdom, Wippenhoek, the brigades being quartered in that numerical order.

The total casualties from the 13th to the 17th August were 111 officers and 2,794 other ranks. The loss in senior officers was particularly heavy: Lieut.-Col. H. Campbell, Major V. A. Flower, Major J. E. L. Higgins, and Major M. R. Harris, all of the 13th London Regt. (Kensingtons); Lieut.-Col. R. R. Husey of the 5th London Regt.; Lieut.-Col. J. P. Kellett of the 2nd London Regt.; Lieut.-Col. P. L. Ingpen of the 8th Middlesex; and Lieut.-Col. F. W. D. Bendall of the 7th Middlesex Regt. were all wounded.

Maybe the confusion was inevitable, but it makes a sorry story in which the great gallantry of the London Territorials stands forth like something clean and honest in the midst of slime and mud. Gen. Dudgeon gives us some of the causes of the failure to reach the desired objective.

“Insufficient time for preparation and explanation of the scheme of attack to those taking part, and insufficient time to study the terrain.

The portion of the 25th Division relieved by the 167th Brigade had only been in the line twenty-four hours previously, and could not assist much.

Lack of previous preparation. No dumps of any kind were taken over in the area, and there was insufficient time to form all those that were necessary.

Indifferent communications. Tracks east of Château Wood were non-existent, and the tapes were soon obliterated by the mud.

Difficulty of maintaining signal communication.

Fatigue of troops previous to the attack, owing to the bad weather.

The condition of the ground over which the attack took place. The bog at the source of the Hanebeck made a gap between the 169th and 167th Brigades, which laid their left and right flanks respectively open to counter-attack. It also caused great fatigue to the troops.

The nature of the hostile defences and new system of defence in depth. The enemy’s counter-attacks were so timed as to strike the leading waves about the same time as they reached their objectives, when they were more or less disorganised, and had been unable to consolidate the ground gained.

The concentration of hostile guns opposite the front. The heavy shelling prevented the moving up of reinforcements, machine guns, and replenishment of ammunition.”

It seems very certain that the British Staff was somewhat rattled by the German tactics in defence. Questions—long lists of them—were sent out, and reports asked for. The pill-box, it was agreed, disorganised our assaulting waves, although it did not stop them. But there is a limit to the possible advance of troops in a rush, and this had been calculated by the enemy, who placed his main forces so as to counter-attack the exhausted leading waves of attackers before they had time to consolidate, or even mop up the ground behind them. How was this to be overcome?

All officers of the 56th Division seemed to agree on this question. The answer was, “Do not try to penetrate too deeply.” Five hundred yards was a distance which troops could cover without exhaustion, and they would then be at such a distance from any troops assembled for counter-attack as would give them time to consolidate, bring up machine guns, and be ready for the counter-attack. Something of the sort was eventually done, so the experience of the 56th Division was of some service.

The attack was not renewed on this sector of the front until the 20th September, when the Second Army (Sir Herbert Plumer’s command was extended to his left) captured Glencorse and the half of Polygon Wood.

The fighting in Flanders was carried on until November. The French launched a big attack at Verdun on the 20th August, which met with notable success. Ludendorff confesses to a feeling of despair. Concrete had failed him, and as to his troops, “At some points they no longer displayed the firmness which I, in common with the local commanders, had hoped for.” By limiting the depth of penetration and breaking up the German counter-attacks with artillery fire the British troops were slowly eating their way through the defences in Flanders, in spite of having to wade through mud. Many were the consultations at German Headquarters. “Our defensive tactics had to be developed further, somehow or other.” The wastage of troops had “exceeded all expectations.” Seven divisions were sent to Italy. A countering blow was the best defence.

Sir Douglas Haig hoped that the phenomenal wet summer would be followed by a normal autumn, and continued his attacks through October. But the wet still continued, and important engagements, with large numbers of troops and tremendous expenditure of ammunition, only resulted in a “nibble” at the enemy territory.

The German-Austrian attack on Italy started on the 24th October, and resulted in the Italian Armies being driven back almost to the outskirts of Venice. This misfortune had the immediate effect of reducing the British Army on the Western Front by several divisions, which were sent under the command of Sir Herbert Plumer, and later of Lord Cavan, to help our Italian Allies; it also determined Sir Douglas Haig to continue his operations in Flanders. The fierce battle for Passchendaele, in which the proud divisions from Canada added to their immortal fame, was fought, and operations in Flanders reached their final stages about the middle of November.

For the effort expended, the gain in territory was small, the number of prisoners was 24,065, the number of guns captured (74) was insignificant. But the balancing of results is a very delicate affair. During the three and a half months of the offensive the enemy had employed 78 divisions (18 of them had been engaged a second or third time after having rested and refitted). Deductions from such facts, however, are a weak basis for argument. Sir Douglas Haig wrote: “It is certain that the enemy’s losses considerably exceeded ours,” but, apart from considerations of expediency, it is not clear how he arrived at this startling conclusion.

To compare the number of prisoners we captured with the number of bayonets which the Germans could transfer from the Russian front is absurd. What then have we left to show as a result for this costly enterprise? Only damage to that highly important but very elusive thing which we call “enemy moral.” The enemy charges us, perhaps with some truth, with being clumsy soldiers with no imagination, but he speaks with respect of the determination of the British infantry, in a manner which suggests a growing conviction that they could never be defeated.

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An interesting figure was compiled by the II Corps giving the amount of ammunition fired by the artillery of that corps from the 23rd June to 31st August—2,766,824 rounds with a total weight of 85,396 tons, delivered by 230 trains of 37 trucks and one of 29 trucks.

The battles of Ypres, 1917, are as follows: Battle of Pilckem Ridge, 31st July-2nd August; Battle of Langemarck, 16th-18th August; Battle of the Menin Road Ridge, 20th-25th September; Battle of Polygon Wood, 26th September-3rd October; Battle of Broodseinde, 4th October; Battle of Poelcappelle, 9th October; First Battle of Passchendaele, 12th October; Second Battle of Passchendaele, 26th October-10th November.

BATTERY POSITION, ZOUAVE WOOD, HOOGE, AUGUST 1917

From a photograph taken by Lt. Wallis Muirhead, R.F.A.

CHAPTER VI

CAMBRAI

The Divisional Headquarters opened at Reninghelst on the morning of the 18th August; brigades were quartered at Steenvoorde and Wippenhoek. These forward areas did not give uninterrupted rest; frequent and close attention was paid to them by aeroplanes, and during the following night two lorries were set on fire by bombs dropped by the night birds.

On the 22nd, 23rd, and 24th the division moved back, resting at Busseboom, and eventually arrived at the peaceful area of Eperleques. The 5th Cheshire Regt., however, remained in the battle area until the 29th. A further move started on the 30th, by train, to the ruined villages to the east and south of Bapaume, with Divisional Headquarters at Fremicourt.

Sports, horse-shows, and the Divisional Band now played a more prominent part in the life of the soldier, and we find the divisional canteen being enlarged—a greengrocery, eggs, and butter department being added, also a wholesale beer department. And, of course, there was training!

At the commencement of the war the British infantry were the greatest riflemen in the world. Then came a period when everyone was mad on throwing bombs, and the rifle was neglected. At the end of the war one sighed in vain for a half, even a quarter of the efficiency of the pre-war rifleman.

Training in 1917 was based on four weapons, and the platoon. The platoon, we were told, was the smallest unit comprising all the weapons with which the infantry was armed. Exclusive of Headquarters, twenty-eight other ranks was the minimum strength, and when the platoon was below that strength the necessary numbers would be obtained by the temporary amalgamation of companies, platoons, or sections. We draw attention to these words because the order was afterwards reversed.

The platoon was comprised of a rifle section, a Lewis-gun section, a bomber section, and a rifle-grenade section. The principles governing training were based on these various weapons. The rifle and bayonet were for assault, for repelling attack, or for obtaining superiority of fire, and the training of this section was considered of much importance. Each man should be a marksman, first class with bayonet and bomb, and a scout, in addition to being either a Lewis-gunner or rifle grenadier. Bayonet fighting was recommended to all sections, as it produced “lust for blood.”

The bomb was called the second weapon of all N.C.O.s and men, and was to be used for dislodging the enemy from behind cover or killing him below ground. The section should study bombing attacks and the duties of “moppers-up.” These last individuals should work in pairs. They were to drop into their objectives and work laterally outwards. They killed the enemy met with in the trenches, and they also guarded the entrances to dug-outs and side trenches. They were not to penetrate down dug-outs until the platoon they were working for arrived.

The rifle grenade was described as the howitzer of the infantry, and was used to dislodge the enemy from behind cover and to drive him below ground. The section was trained to a rifle-grenade barrage.

The Lewis gun was the weapon of opportunity. Its mobility and the small target it presented made it peculiarly suitable for working round an enemy’s flank.

In each section sufficient ammunition was carried for immediate requirements. Every man (except bombers, signallers, scouts, runners, and Lewis gunners who carried 50 rounds) carried at least 120 rounds of rifle ammunition and 2 bombs. The Lewis-gun section carried 30 “drums.” The bombers (with the exception of “throwers,” who carried 5) carried at least 10 bombs each.

The men of the rifle-grenade section each carried at least six grenades. With this organisation training was carried out in trench-to-trench warfare and the enveloping of strong points.

In 1917 the strength of a platoon was not definitely laid down by the Higher Command. It was suggested that a suitable number for each section was nine—1 non-commissioned officer and 8 men. But there was an order to leave 10 officers and 50 other ranks out of line for “reconstruction.” They would not be available as reinforcements, but were, generally, specialists and good instructors, on whom the battalion could be rebuilt if casualties were heavy. Most units carried out the suggestion of 9 to a section, and any extra men, exclusive of the 50 for reconstruction, were used as reinforcements during the battle.

On arrival in the Third Army area (now under the command of General Byng, General Allenby having been given command in Egypt), the strength of the 56th Division was very low.

The four battalions of the 167th Brigade totalled altogether 63 officers and 1,754 other ranks; the Machine Gun Company, 7 officers and 150 other ranks; the Trench Mortar Battery, 5 officers and 50 other ranks.

The four battalions of the 168th Brigade totalled 94 officers and 2,802 other ranks; the Machine Gun Company, 7 officers and 160 other ranks; the Trench Mortar Battery, 5 officers and 90 other ranks.

The four battalions of the 169th Brigade totalled 61 officers and 1,921 other ranks; the Machine Gun Company, 10 officers and 145 other ranks; the Trench Mortar Battery, 2 officers and 75 other ranks.

It was therefore probable that when the period of rest was over the division would go into a quiet bit of the line.

All doubts as to the ultimate destination of the division were laid at rest on the 4th September, when the 168th Brigade relieved the 9th Brigade, 3rd Division, in the Lagnicourt section. The 169th Brigade relieved the 8th Brigade in the Louverval section on the 5th; and the 167th Brigade relieved the 76th Brigade in the Morchies section on the 6th. The situation was quiet, and the weather fine and hot.

Patrolling, of an active nature, commenced at once, and on the 10th September the 167th Brigade secured a man of the 31st Reserve Infantry Regt.; and on the same night the 168th Brigade secured two of the 86th Reserve Infantry Regt. Various enemy posts were visited from time to time, and occasionally entered, but the gem of these small enterprises was that of the Queen’s Westminster Rifles. On the 29th September 2/Lieut. W. H. Ormiston, with thirty men, lay in wait in the middle of No Man’s Land and successfully ambushed a patrol of fifteen Germans. Eleven were killed and two brought in; unfortunately, the remaining two proved swift of foot and got away. It was not done without a fight. Six of the Queen’s Westminsters were wounded. Both Corps and Army Commanders sent their congratulations to this well-known and gallant regiment, with the added message that the identification was of great importance. The prisoners were of the 414th Infantry Regt.

During this month six hundred gas projectors were dug into the 56th Divisional Front.

During the month of October raids were attempted by the London Scottish and the Kensingtons, but the enemy were found alert and the parties failed to enter the German line. The Kensingtons, however, were successful in rescuing a British pilot whose machine was brought down in No Man’s Land, but they had to fight for him.

The only incident of importance in the month of October was a visit of ten days of Major-Gen. Bloxom, U.S.A., with his chief of staff, with the object of gaining experience.

The strength of the division remained about the same.

On the 2nd November a document headed “IV Corps, No. H.R.S. 17/48” was received, into which we must enter at some length.

The Third Army stretched from the little stream of l’Omignon, which runs into the St. Quentin Canal a few miles above that town, to Gavrelle, north of the Scarpe. It was composed of the VII, III, IV, VI, and XVII Corps from right to left (and later, the V Corps). The III Corps had its right on 22 Ravine, between Villers-Guislain and Gonnelieu, and its left to the east of Trescault. Then came the IV Corps, with its left north of Lagnicourt, on a little stream called the Hirondelle. These two corps were facing the Hindenburg Line, and had in their immediate rear the battlefields of the Somme, and the country which the Germans had laid to waste in their retreat in the early spring.

At the time when our pursuing troops were brought to a standstill in front of this celebrated line, preparations were at once commenced for attack. Several actions had been fought on this sector before it settled down to a “quiet sector”; assembly trenches existed, and adequate shelter for brigade and battalion headquarters had been constructed. It was now chosen as a sector to be attacked.

At this time our Italian Allies were in serious difficulties, and seven German divisions were engaged in this theatre. And, although the movement of whole divisions had started from Russia without exchange from the Western Front, a mass of enemy troops were still pinned down in Flanders. It seemed as though a sudden surprise attack might benefit the Italian Armies and also improve the position on the Western Front. But there was the obvious difficulty of a lack of troops at Sir Douglas Haig’s disposal; the Flanders adventure had been a most costly one for us, for practically the whole of the British Army had passed through the salient inferno Ypres. Finally it was decided that sufficient troops could be mustered to justify the attack, and as the French not only promised to engage the enemy’s attention elsewhere, but actually set aside a large force of cavalry and infantry to help in the attack (they started to move on the 20th November), the order was given.

The scheme, as set forth in this document, was for the infantry to break through the German defensive system with the aid of Tanks on a front from Gonnelieu to Hermies, seize the crossings of the Canal de l’Escaut at Masnières and Marcoing, cut the last of the enemy’s defences on the Beaurevoir-Masnières line, and pass the cavalry through the break thus made.

The cavalry were then to capture Cambrai and Bourlon Wood, cut all railway communications into Cambrai, and to occupy the crossings of the Sensée between Paillencourt and Palleul to the north of Cambrai. They would come up from Gouzeaucourt and Metz-en-Couture.

If this part of the plan was accomplished, the whole of the Third Army would participate in further operations to complete the surrounding of all the enemy forces in the Quéant salient. Presumably our Allies would have been called upon as well.

The III Corps, composed of the 20th, 6th, 12th, 29th Divisions, and 2nd and 3rd Brigades, Tank Corps (less three companies) would secure the canal crossings at Marcoing and Masnières, and form a flank from Gonnelieu through Bois Lateau, Creve-cœur, to a spot called la Belle Etoile a few miles south-east of Cambrai.

The IV Corps, composed of the 51st, 62nd, 36th, 56th Divisions, and 1st Brigade, Tank Corps, would attack with two divisions, on the left of the III Corps, and the right of the Canal du Nord, towards Flesquières and Graincourt.