The 56th Division

The success of the whole plan depended on the capture of Masnières and Marcoing, at which point the cavalry would be passed through the break, and, as speed was the essence of the operation, in order to obtain liberty of movement before the enemy could organise either counter-attack or a fresh line of defence by bringing up fresh troops, the leading cavalry divisions would have to pass through on the afternoon or evening of zero day.

Meanwhile, the IV Corps would be pushing forward on the left, with the first object of establishing a line from Noyelles, along the Canal de l’Escaut, through Fontaines, and relieve the cavalry on Bourlon, or fight for that position, and join with the original front line in the Louverval sector.

Surprise was essential, so there would be no preliminary bombardment, and these instructions insisted that the greatest care should be taken not to divulge the presence of increased artillery to the enemy. Registration and calibration was to be carried out by order of the General Officer Commanding the Third Army Artillery.

One of the first tasks was to erect camouflage over all positions which would be occupied by the artillery. Then weatherproof cover for ammunition would be constructed. But little more than this could be done in the time at the disposal of the Army. In any case, the accumulation of ammunition would have to be spread over as long a period as possible, so as to minimise the increase of activity on the railways.

The action of the artillery would consist mainly in the formation of smoke screens and barrages, on the front and flanks of the attack (to cover the advance of the Tanks), and the neutralisation of hostile batteries, the bombardment of positions of assembly, rest billets, telephone routes, and known centres of communication and command. But the very nature of the operation precluded the careful registration of all batteries.

All the elaborate preparations of a trench-to-trench attack would be reduced to a minimum, and in many items must be done away with. Cover from weather would have to be provided for the full number of troops when concentrated, but no extensive scheme of hutting or new camps could be undertaken. In thick woods tents, suitably camouflaged, could be erected, and in thin woods wire netting must be stretched horizontally amongst the trees, about ten feet from the ground, and have twigs scattered on the top of it, thus making a sort of roof under which bivouacs could be pitched.

As to concentration, the idea was to complete the move of the artillery before the infantry was brought into the area, to have the extra infantry in the area as short a time as possible, and to bring up the Tanks at the very last moment.

Finally, No. 15 Squadron R.F.C. was ordered to note particularly whether any of the work being carried out was noticeable from the air.

The rôle of the 56th Division in all this was to make a demonstration on Z day and attract the attention of the enemy, and later on take part in the operation of rolling up the Hindenburg Line. When Bourlon Wood had been captured, the IV Corps would secure a line Rumancourt-Buissy-Inchy, which would cut off the German divisions in the Quéant salient and threaten with immediate capture their gun positions. In this move two brigades of the 36th Division would take part on the east bank of the canal and one brigade on the west of the canal, starting from the Spoil Heap near Hermies and moving in the direction of Mœuvres and Inchy.

The 169th Brigade, which would be on the right of the 56th Divisional front, would be responsible for joining hands with the 109th Brigade, 36th Division, and with them attack in the direction of Tadpole Copse. In this attack Tanks were to be employed, but the number was never given.

Nothing amuses troops more than to deceive the enemy—and we say “amuse” advisedly, for though it is in the midst of a battle, with death and destruction going on all round them, men will be as keen as children in carrying out the scheme of make-believe, and if it succeeds will roar with laughter. Such a scheme was on foot for the 56th Division.

For the purpose of making the demonstration on the divisional front as realistic as possible, a number of dummy Tanks were to be made by the C.R.E., while brigades would amuse themselves by making dummy figures of men to act as supporting infantry. The Tanks were to be put out in No Man’s Land during the night, and would be half hidden by the smoke barrage in the morning when the attack started; the figures would be pushed above the trenches as though infantry were just emerging. A motor-bicycle in the front-line trench was to imitate the noise of a Tank.

As might well be expected, excitement ran high in the division. The construction of dummy figures and dummy Tanks was taken in hand at once, and by the 19th November a dozen full-sized Tanks were ready, together with some two hundred and fifty figures to each brigade front.

On the 6th November wire-cutting was commenced by trench mortars in the neighbourhood of Quéant—250 rounds a day being fired—the Germans would probably think a raid was contemplated, which would account for any suspicious movements!

The time was short and, as preliminary preparation was to be cut down to a minimum, fatigues were not very arduous. There was a certain amount of work done on the roads near the front line, but the greatest care had to be exercised not to make improvements of an apparent nature. In the back areas, however, the strain was becoming intolerable. There were troops in every hole and corner. Tents were crammed full; huts, ruins, any place where men could find a little shelter was used. And the weather was cold, and regulations about lights and fires were very stringent.

In the front line every precaution against accidents was taken. The attacking divisions occupied their positions in line, but the old troops remained in the outpost line in case the enemy should secure identification; also patrols were ordered to avoid any possibility of capture.

On the 14th November the Corps ordered the 56th Division to hold the line with two brigades instead of three, so as to have a concentrated force ready to act in case of necessity. So on the night of the 18th the 167th Brigade extended its left and took over the frontage of the 168th Brigade, which concentrated in Fremicourt and Beugny, to the east of Bapaume.

On the night of the 19th the dummy Tanks were put in position about 300 yards from the front line. At 2 a.m. on the 20th gas drums were projected into the German lines where the wire-cutting had taken place (Quéant), and at 6.20 a.m. the whole of the artillery on the Third Army front opened on the enemy lines with one stupendous crash.

In the 56th Division front line all was activity. The parties with the dummy figures moved them up and down in as lifelike a manner as they could, and other parties hurled smoke grenades so that the enemy might not see too clearly.

The “make-believe” attack was a great success. The Germans opened frantic and furious fire with machine-guns and artillery, and the dummy Tanks were shelled until mid-day!

By 9.15 a.m. the 36th Division (109th Brigade) had advanced along the west bank of the canal from the Spoil Heap to the Bapaume-Cambrai road, where the 169th Brigade joined up with it on the old German outpost line.

Meanwhile, great events had been taking place on the right. The III Corps, on which so much depended, advanced through the Hindenburg Line in grand style and, thanks to the rapid action of the 29th Division (General de Lisle), which was to wait until news arrived of the capture of the Hindenburg Support Line before advancing but attacked instead on observer reports, seized Marcoing and Masnières. The first bit of bad luck happened at Masnières, where the enemy had only partially destroyed the iron bridge over the Escault Canal. It might have been sufficiently strong for cavalry to cross over, or it might have been repaired to enable them to do so, but a Tank attempted to cross first and broke through it altogether. This unfortunate accident did not stop a squadron of Canadian cavalry, who, with the dash usually associated with that arm, rode over a flimsy bridge across a lock on the Marcoing side of the town and attacked the enemy on Rumilly Ridge. It was probably troopers from this very gallant squadron who reached the outskirts of Cambrai.

Lieut.-Col. Johnston took the 2nd Hampshires across in a similar way and secured the crossing. But in Marcoing other troops of the 29th Division secured the bridge intact.

The III Corps had therefore done its job, but the IV Corps was not so fortunate. Havrincourt Wood had been of great service to the IV Corps in the assembly. The 51st and 62nd Divisions, with a fringe of the 36th Division in front of them until the last moment, had completed their concentration without a hitch. On the nights of the 16th, 17th, and 18th all the Tanks were moved into Havrincourt Wood, and except that a battery of 6-inch howitzers got into difficulties farther north, and that a lorry “ran into a train carrying Tanks,” the whole concentration was carried out as desired. But, although we do not believe it made much difference, the enemy were aware of the attack. Unfortunately, some men were captured in a raid on the 36th Divisional front, and from the statements of prisoners they evidently divulged the fact that an attack was contemplated. The time and the extent of it, however, seems to have been a complete surprise to the Germans.

At zero hour the Tanks advanced, followed by the 51st and 62nd Divisions. There was in this sector some of the most formidable wire on the whole of the western front, but the Tanks crushed wide lanes through it and the troops advanced steadily. There was some obstinate fighting in Havrincourt village and park, where parties of the enemy held out until the afternoon, but otherwise the Hindenburg front line was captured by 8 o’clock. A pause of two hours was allowed here to enable troops and Tanks to reorganise for the attack on the Hindenburg Support.

Once more the attack moved forward. The 62nd Division on the left met with little opposition, and that portion of the support line allotted to them was in their hands between 10 and 11 o’clock. But the 51st Division on the right met with resistance at the village of Flesquières. The infantry were prevented from advancing by machine guns and uncut wire, and the Tanks, which came up on the ridge, were at once put out of action by field guns, which had been pulled out of their pits on to the slopes to the north of the village. Six Tanks were to be seen here in a line, smashed to bits by a very gallant German Battery Commander, who, it was said, served and fired the guns himself, when his men had bolted.

The 51st Division could make no progress, but on their left the 62nd moved forward to Graincourt, and the 36th, still farther on the left, had moved along the canal to the Cambrai road. And on the right troops of the III Corps were well on towards Cantaign. The 51st Division made a second attempt with Tanks and again failed.

What follows is one of the mysteries of the Cambrai battle. A patrol of King Edward’s Horse, operating with the 62nd Division, rode into Flesquières soon after mid-day from the direction of Graincourt. They reported only a few of the enemy there and do not appear to have suffered any casualties themselves. But the 1st Cavalry Division, which had been concentrated in the neighbourhood of Equancourt, had been ordered at 8.25 a.m. to move forward with their head on Metz, ready to advance. This they did. About 11 o’clock they were ordered to push forward through the Hindenburg Support Line, but found that Flesquières was still in the hands of the enemy, and they were unable to pass. About 2.30 p.m. they were ordered to pass at least two regiments by Ribecourt and Premy Chapel and work round Flesquières from the north-east and assist the 51st Division in their attack from the south. But they found they were unable to carry out this co-operation on account of the delay which had occurred, due to their first effort, and also that Nine Wood was not clear of the enemy. At 4 p.m. the Third Army ordered the cavalry to push forward in full strength through Marcoing and carry out the original plan of a break-through at that point; but darkness had come on and the order was modified, one brigade being ordered to occupy Cantaign and cut off the enemy retreating from Flesquières. Cantaign, however, was found to be too strongly held for the cavalry to capture it, and therefore the leading brigade remained at Noyelles for the night. It would seem that the opportunity was missed.

As dusk fell, the 62nd and 36th Divisions were well forward towards the Bourlon Ridge, the former just short of Anneaux, and then forming a long flank back east of Graincourt and to the west of Flesquières, where they connected with the 51st Division. Farther to the right of the IV Corps the III Corps had also pushed well forward and made a similar flank facing west, the ground between the two points of greatest advance about Orival Wood being occupied by the enemy’s artillery. (Line C.)

Immediately after the capture of the Hindenburg system the redistribution of the artillery and machine guns began. The machine guns, which had been massed under corps control, reverted to their divisions. Four brigades of Field Artillery, one 60-pounder battery, and one, horsed, 6-inch Howitzer battery were placed under the orders of each of the 36th, 62nd, and 51st Divisions. But a fortunate circumstance arose: it was found difficult to get the heavy artillery across No Man’s Land into the Flesquières salient, and the congestion there was such that the supply of ammunition would have been uncertain; so it was decided to move the bulk of the artillery to the left, close to the old front line round about Demicourt, Hermies, and Morchies. In this position they assisted very materially in breaking up the great German attack on the 30th November.

During this first day the Queen Victoria’s Rifles were on the right of the 169th Brigade, and worked along the German outpost line in touch with the 109th Brigade, who were clearing the Hindenburg Line, as far as the Cambrai road. The 2nd London Regt. was on the left of the Queen Victoria’s Rifles.

It had been calculated that no large hostile reinforcements would be likely to reach the scene of action for forty-eight hours after the commencement of the attack, and Sir Douglas Haig had informed General Byng that the advance would be stopped after that time, unless the results then gained, and the general situation, justified its continuance. Although, as we have said, the movements of the Canadian Cavalry and King Edward’s Horse would seem to suggest that the opportunity of passing other cavalry through had been missed, there remained one day when, given success, they could still be employed. The 51st and 62nd Divisions were therefore ordered to capture the Bourlon position, when the 1st Cavalry Division would follow up the attack and seize the passages of the Canal du Nord between Palleul and Sains-les-Marquion; and the 36th Division was to continue the advance on the west of the canal, and hold the two brigades on the eastern bank ready to push through and seize the canal, between Sains-les-Marquion and Mœuvres, as soon as Bourlon was taken. The 56th Division would be drawn farther into the operations on the left in the direction of Tadpole Copse.

When the day broke, Flesquières was found, by the 51st Division, to be unoccupied by the enemy; they therefore pushed on to the Marcoing-Graincourt road, capturing a number of guns in the valley which the enemy had not been able to remove in the night. The 1st Cavalry Division then advanced and took Cantaing, after some stiff fighting in which some of the 51st Division took part. On the left the 62nd Division captured Anneaux and Anneaux Chapel, after heavy fighting, and made more progress north of the Cambrai road, where they established themselves on the ridge west of Bourlon Wood, and also gained a further stretch of the Hindenburg Support Line. On the left of the 62nd the 36th Division advanced along the west bank of the canal, meeting increased opposition, and for a time held the south of the village of Mœuvres. On their left again the Queen Victoria’s Rifles worked along the outpost line and captured a machine gun with its crew of seven. Resistance, however, was stiffening. The dividing line between the 109th and the 169th Brigades was the grid line to the west of Mœuvres, and any farther advance to the north would bring the 56th Division in contact with the Hindenburg Line itself.

Meanwhile, in the centre of the battlefield, progress was not what had been hoped it would be. The 51st Division were to work round Bourlon Wood from the east, and join hands with the 62nd Division; but they met with such opposition as delayed their advance, and they did not capture Fontaine until late in the afternoon. The capture of Bourlon was not achieved. At nightfall the 51st Division was holding a line north of Cantaing forward to Fontaine, making a dangerous salient, and then in a westerly direction to the north of Anneaux, where, joining with the 62nd, the line was carried north of the Cambrai road, forming another salient north of the Sugar Factory. The 36th Division then carried on the line, which bent back towards the road near the canal bridge and then forward again to Mœuvres. Due west of Mœuvres the 56th Division held the line to the old British trenches. The Tanks, in diminished numbers, had assisted during the day, but no advance had been made without a struggle. (Line D.)

In the III Corps area there had been some heavy fighting during the day, which resulted in some improvement of our positions. Heavy counter-attacks were launched by the enemy, and much useful and gallant work was done by dismounted cavalry beating off these attacks. But the forty-eight hours had expired, and the high ground at Bourlon Village and Wood, as well as certain tactical features to the east and west of the wood, still remained in the enemy’s hands. It seemed fairly clear that the surprise break-through and complete disorganisation of the enemy’s back areas would not be accomplished. Sir Douglas Haig had to decide whether to continue the offensive or take up a defensive attitude and rest content with what had been done.

“It was not possible, however, to let matters stand as they were. The positions captured by us north of Flesquières were completely commanded by the Bourlon Ridge, and unless the ridge were gained it would be impossible to hold them, except at excessive cost. If I decided not to go on, a withdrawal to the Flesquières ridge would be necessary, and would have to be carried out at once.

On the other hand, the enemy showed certain signs of an intention to withdraw. Craters had been formed at road junctions, and troops could be seen ready to move east. The possession of Bourlon Ridge would enable our troops to obtain observation over the ground to the north, which sloped gently down to the Sensée River. The enemy’s defensive lines south of the Scarpe and the Sensée Rivers would thereby be turned, his communications exposed to the observed fire of our artillery, and his positions in this sector jeopardised. In short, so great was the importance of the ridge to the enemy that its loss would probably cause the abandonment by the Germans of their carefully prepared defence systems for a considerable distance to the north of it....

It was to be remembered, however, that the hostile reinforcements coming up at this stage could at first be no more than enough to replace the enemy’s losses; and although the right of our advance had been definitely stayed, the enemy had not yet developed such strength about Bourlon as it seemed might not be overcome by the numbers at my disposal. As has already been pointed out, on the Cambrai side of the battlefield I had only aimed at securing a defensive flank to enable the advance to be pushed northwards and north-westwards, and this part of my task had been to a large extent achieved.

An additional and very important argument in favour of proceeding with my attack was supplied by the situation in Italy, upon which a continuance of pressure on the Cambrai front might reasonably be expected to exercise an important effect, no matter what measures of success attended my efforts. Moreover, two divisions previously under orders for Italy had on this day been placed at my disposal, and with this accession of strength the prospect of securing Bourlon seemed good.

After weighing these various considerations, therefore, I decided to continue the operations to gain the Bourlon position.”

But in the morning, about 9.30 a.m., the enemy launched a heavy counter-attack on the 62nd Division west of Bourlon Wood which, although it did not succeed in driving them back, prevented any advance. And about 10.30 they attacked Fontaine from the north-west and east, and after heavy fighting drove the 51st Division out and clear of the village.

During the afternoon the Germans again attacked the 62nd Division, but were again repulsed, as they had been in the morning. On the left of the 62nd, the 36th were unable to gain ground on the east of the canal, and on the west bank entered Mœuvres for the second time, but after an hour or so were driven out. (Line E.)

On this day, the 22nd November, the 56th Division played a more important part. The 169th Brigade were still on the right of the division. The Queen Victoria’s Rifles, in touch with the 109th Brigade, were holding a line of posts across No Man’s Land and in the old German outpost line. The Queen’s Westminster Rifles were ordered to concentrate, slightly to the north of the Cambrai road, and to advance, in conjunction with the 109th Brigade, at 11 o’clock along the front trench of the Hindenburg Line which runs to Tadpole Copse. They would also work their way up the communication trenches to the second line of the Hindenburg first system, and clear both lines as far as Tadpole Copse. The London Rifle Brigade were ordered to assemble in the captured Hindenburg Line south of the Cambrai road, and follow the attack of the 109th Brigade to where the Hindenburg system turned away from the canal at Mœuvres (see Map); they would then follow the Queen’s Westminsters in two columns, one in the first line and one in the second, and reinforce if necessary. The 5,000 yards of British line up to the Hirondelle River were held by the 167th Brigade.

The instructions were to carry out a determined advance. The idea, of which this was the preliminary operation, was for the 36th Division to move forward through Mœuvres and Inchy, while the 56th Division captured the Hindenburg Line up to Quéant.

It was entirely a bombing fight, and was supported by an artillery barrage, which lifted off Swan Lane at 11.30 a.m. and moved forward at the rate of fifty yards every five minutes. The division, until the night 21st/22nd, had been covered by the 281st Brigade R.F.A. only—as was usual in these battles, the artillery was switched about from one command to another—but during the night the 280th Brigade R.F.A. had moved to positions near Boursies and took part in this attack.

It was hard and slow fighting, as is generally the case in bombing fights. Colonel Glazier, of the Queen’s Westminsters, writes:

“The barrage got some way ahead of our men, but owing to the uncertainty of the position of the troops it was impossible to bring it back. At 12.30 p.m. a runner came with a request for more bombs, and the news that our men had passed the Boursies-Mœuvres road and were using German bombs.... Bombs were sent forward; large quantities were taken forward by the Queen Victoria’s Rifles.”

News of progress was very slow in coming in, and the first definite information indicating success was obtained from observers, who reported at 2.40 p.m. that the enemy were shelling Tadpole Copse. Not until 5.30 was it known for certain that the copse was occupied by three companies of the Queen’s Westminsters. They captured 3 officers, 70 men, and 3 machine guns.

The London Scottish had arrived at the old British front line about Louverval at mid-day with the object of relieving the Queen’s Westminsters and carrying on the attack. They were informed that the attack would not be continued that day, and so formed a flank from the south of Tadpole Copse to the old British line, although for the moment they were unable to dislodge the enemy from a deep crater at the road junctions some two hundred yards south-west of the copse. At dawn they relieved the forward companies of the Queen’s Westminsters and made ready for the morning attack.