The Journal of Negro History, Volume 4, 1919

In the main, however, Downing was persistently urging the Dutch to make a settlement of the cases of the Royal Company's two ships, the "Charles" and the "James," and of the right of the Dutch to blockade the Gold Coast on the pretext of war with the natives. In December, 1663, at the instigation of the West India Company, the States General maintained that only a few ships were necessary to blockade the small native states on the Gold Coast, since in each case there were but one or two outlets to the sea.280 On February 1, 1664, Downing obtained a conference with DeWitt and the representatives of the States General and the West India Company. The company's representatives boldly admitted that they had hindered the English ships from trading at Komenda and Cape Corse, because the natives had burned their factory at the former place and had seized their fortress at Cape Corse. This irritating assumption of their ownership of Cape Corse aroused Downing. So far, he had contented himself in supporting the Danish and even the Swedish claims to Cape Corse. Now, notwithstanding the inconsistency of his position, he remarked that, if it was a question of the ownership of Cape Corse, the English could show more rights to the place than any one, since they had been the first to settle it and to trade there; and that even if the Dutch were in possession of it, the English still had a right to trade to the Danish fort of Fredericksburg which was located in the same harbor.281

When the discussion turned on the requirements of an effective blockade the Dutch advocate stoutly maintained that "it is nott for any other to prescribe how and in what manner the company shall proceed to retake their places, that if they think that the riding with a few shipps before a place and that att certaine times onely whereby to hinder other nations from trading with it, be a sufficient meanes for the retaking thereof, they have no reason to be att further charge or trouble." He further declared that a certain sickness in that region, known as "Serenes," caused by the falling dew, made it impossible for Europeans to engage in a blockade by land, and therefore "in this case itt was to be counted sufficient and to be called a besieging, though the place were onely blocked up by sea."282 Downing scoffed at this as an unheard of theory and asked what would happen if the Royal Company instituted blockades of this character and pretended "Serenes" whenever it seemed convenient. With such a display of feeling it is no wonder little could be done toward adjusting the difficulties. DeWitt suggested a new treaty for the regulation of such affairs both in Europe and abroad. Downing flatly refused to consider such a proposition if it was meant thereby to dispose of the cases of the "Charles" and the "James." He remained firm in his demand for reparation for these two ships.283 A few days after this conference Downing learned of the misfortunes which had befallen the Royal Company's ship, the "Mary," during the previous year. On February 16, he apprised the States General of this additional cause for complaint and demanded satisfaction as in the case of the other two vessels284.

If Downing was becoming exasperated, the people in England were scarcely less so when they heard of the troubles of the "Mary" and other similar occurrences. Secretary Cunaeus declared that the animosity in England towards Holland was growing exceedingly among the common people. Led by the duke of York, governor of the Royal Company, the courtiers had also become exceedingly indignant at the treatment accorded the company's ships and factories in Africa285. One of Valckenburg's statements regarding the Dutch ownership of the Gold Coast had been circulated on the Royal Exchange, where it became the chief topic of conversation. Indeed so great was the sensation it stirred up that Samuel Pepys declared on April 7, 1664, that everybody was expecting a war286. On the 21st of April the members of the House of Commons resolved that the damages inflicted by the Dutch in India, Africa, and elsewhere constituted a very great obstruction to English trade. They, therefore, petitioned the king for redress for these various injuries, and promised to support any action he took with their lives and fortunes.

At last the Dutch realized that the African situation was becoming serious, and Downing therefore found it somewhat easier to bring them to a discussion of the subject. DeWitt proposed that the case of the three Royal Company's ships as well as that of two East India ships, the "Bona Esperanza" and the "Henry Bonaventure," should be included in the list of damages provided for by the treaty of September, 1662. Downing absolutely refused to consider such a makeshift on the ground that the ships of the Royal Company had been injured after the treaty had been signed, and therefore in accordance with its provisions these losses should be submitted to the Netherlands for compensation.287

Since he had failed to induce Downing to permit the three ships to be included in the list of damages, DeWitt had exhausted the last means of delay. On May 6, 1664, Downing announced in letters to Bennet and Clarendon that DeWitt had at last consented to accommodate the matter of the three ships. He was willing, moreover, to enter into an agreement, for the prevention of all such future troubles, along the lines which Downing had laid down. Regarding the two East India ships, however, whose case was quite different from those of the Royal Company, DeWitt would not alter his stubborn refusal of compensation. Downing was intent on gaining a complete victory and at once rejoined that no new commercial regulations could be considered until entire satisfaction had been rendered for the damages which the Dutch had committed.288

Although an attempt was made to suppress the first tidings of Holmes' actions on the Gambia, the rumor of them soon spread. It was not long until it was well known in London and Amsterdam that he had taken Cape Verde and captured several Dutch vessels.289 The West India Company bitterly accused the English of having covered their designs in Africa with a cloak of complaints regarding the Royal Company's ships. The company reminded the States General that this was the same Holmes who, in 1661, had set up a claim to the whole coast and who was to have been exemplarily punished on his return by the king of England. Since it was evident that all the Dutch factories and forts in Guinea were in danger of capture from Holmes, the company asked the States General for some vessels of war which should be sent to the African coast for the protection of its property290.

It was now the turn of the Dutch to seek compensation and restitution of their property. Since Downing was a very exasperating man with whom to deal they were undoubtedly pleased when toward the end of May, 1664, he suddenly returned to England291. The Dutch, therefore, decided to send VanGogh to London, with the hope that he could obtain more satisfactory results there than had ever been possible with Downing at The Hague. VanGogh was instructed to seek for the restitution of the West India Company's property; to remind the king of the unfulfilled promises which he had made regarding Holmes and the voyage of 1661;292 and to seek for new commercial regulations which would prevent future trouble on the African coast293.

Very soon after his arrival in England VanGogh gained an audience with the king who, in reply to his demands, answered that as yet his knowledge of the Holmes' affair was very imperfect; that he had not given Holmes orders to seize Cape Verde; and that in case he had exceeded his instructions he would be punished upon his return, according to the exigency of the case294. Such a reply sounded too much like the king's former promise of August 14, 1661, to satisfy DeWitt. He instructed VanGogh to insist that his Majesty make these promises in writing295. VanGogh answered DeWitt that it was hopeless to think of inducing the English to return Cape Verde, in view of the preparations then in progress for carrying on trade to the west coast of Africa. He declared that already they were boasting in London that a contract was to be made with the Spanish for the delivery of 4,000 slaves per annum296. As early as the middle of June the Royal Company had eight ships loading in London with goods worth 50,000 pounds destined for the Guinea coast297.

In midsummer, 1664, Andries C. Vertholen and other Dutchmen, whom Holmes had carried from Cape Verde to the Gold Coast, returned to Holland, where they reported at length Holmes' actions at Cape Verde and on the way to the Gold Coast298. These details did not tend to DeWitt's peace of mind. Hence it is no wonder, upon Downing's return to Holland, that the two men "fell very hard upon the busines of Cabo Verde" in their very first conversation. As he had instructed VanGogh to do, so DeWitt demanded of Downing that the English king make a written promise that no more hostilities would be committed on the Guinea Coast, or the Dutch would be in duty bound to assist their company. Downing, who now felt the advantage which the success of Holmes' expedition gave him, replied to DeWitt as follows: "I must say," that the West India Company has "ever since his Majtye's return played the devills & pirats, worse thn Argiers, taken 20 English ships, hindered others, putt out a declaration whereby they claymed al the coast to thmselves; & was it lawfull for thm so to demean thmselves & only lawfull for the English to suffer, tht yet his Majty did not intermeddle, but only the one company against the other, & no wonder if at last the English did stirr a little; & tht Holms was the companye's servt & tht should his Majty have given or lent thm an old ship or two, yet he had nothing to doe in the ordering their designe." Furthermore, he declared that if the Dutch took it upon themselves to assist the West India Company "his Majty would find himself equally obliged to assist his company."299

To every one it now seemed as if an open conflict must come. Toward the last of July, Pepys declared that all the talk was of a Dutch war,300 although even Coventry, a director of the Royal Company, admitted that there was little real cause for it and that the damage done to the company, which had brought on Holmes' expedition, did not exceed the paltry sum of two or three hundred pounds.301 In Holland, also, the disposition toward war was increased by the realization that the next report from Holmes might bring news of the total loss of the Gold Coast, including the main fortress of Elmina. Under these circumstances the king's promise to punish Holmes according to the exigency of the case meant little or nothing. The maritime provinces, especially Holland, were determined to assist the West India Company against English aggression in Africa.

When Downing discussed the situation with DeWitt, however, he was surprised to hear him still express the possibility of giving satisfaction for the seizure of the Royal Company's ships, and not "so hott" for sending a fleet immediately to Guinea as he had been at first.302 Even Downing was for the time being deceived. His spy, who was well within DeWitt's immediate circle, for once was not on duty to give his usual faithful report to his benefactor. DeWitt was accustomed to resort to the same trickery and deceitful diplomacy that was so characteristic of Downing. Indeed it would be difficult to decide which of these two men was the greater master of this questionable art. The English had sent Holmes to Africa totally unknown to the Dutch and had taken half the coast from them before they were even aware of the expedition. It is little wonder then that the idea occurred to DeWitt to retaliate in kind on the English and to keep his plans a profound secret.

In 1661 the Dutch had sent a fleet under Admiral DeRuyter to the Mediterranean Sea in conjunction with an English squadron commanded by Sir John Lawson, for the purpose of punishing the Algerian and other pirates who had been infesting Dutch and English commerce. DeRuyter and Lawson had succeeded in making a number of favorable treaties with the pirates, though the task of quelling them was by no means complete. DeWitt realized that a fleet could scarcely be dispatched to Guinea from Holland without being discovered. Therefore, he together with six of his councillors decided to send secret orders to DeRuyter to sail at once for the coast of Guinea. On account of a peculiarity of the Dutch government, however, it was impossible to dispatch these orders without first securing a resolution of the States General. DeWitt was well aware that somehow these resolutions of the States General usually became known to Downing and the English. He therefore determined that, while the States General should pass the order, he would arrange the matter so that no one would know of it, except those who were already in the plan. On August 11, 1664, the secretary of the States General read the resolution very quickly, during which time DeWitt and his six cohorts raised so much disturbance by loud conversation that no one in the room heard what was being read.303 The trick succeeded admirably. DeWitt was now in possession of the necessary authority, and orders were dispatched at once to DeRuyter to leave his post in the Mediterranean and to sail for the west coast of Africa without revealing his destination to Lawson, the English commander. He was instructed to recover for the West India Company those places which Holmes had seized and to deliver to Valckenburg, the Dutch general on the Gold Coast, all the effects of the English which were not necessary for the different factories of the company.304

In order not to arouse Downing's suspicions by apparent apathy, the Dutch began to prepare several ships ostensibly for Africa. For the purpose of misleading Downing still further the Dutch agreed to accept an offer made by the French for mediation of the difficulties. DeWitt still insisted, however, that a written promise be given him that the forts and factories which Holmes had seized on the African coast would be restored to the West India Company.305 Later, in the same month of August, 1664, Downing submitted to the States General the draft of a proposed agreement for the settling of future disputes in the East Indies and in Africa.306 Downing was of the opinion that, although the Dutch could never be depended on to keep such an agreement, it would be a good thing in the East Indies because "ye (the English) are the weaker ther." In Africa the situation appeared different to Downing, for there the English had the advantage. "I hope in the meantime," he declared, "while we are (negotiating) Holmes will doe the work ther," because there "never will be such a opportunity as this to make clear work in Affrica."307 A few days later he advised that everything on the African coast should be done "so as (the) king of England may not appeare in it, but only (the) Rll Company, & they takeing occasion from our affront."308 Still later he asserted that even in Holland everyone believed that since the king and the Royal Company had gone so far, they would seize the entire African coast so that the whole affair might be worth while.309

Although DeWitt had been successful in sending the secret orders to DeRuyter concerning his voyage to Guinea, he could not long hope to deceive the ever-watchful Downing. Indeed with all due respect to his crafty rival one is almost surprised that Downing's suspicions were not aroused for more than a month after the commands were despatched. When the possibility of DeRuyter's having been ordered to Africa dawned on Downing, he at once demanded of DeWitt where DeRuyter was going when he left Cadiz. Without hesitation DeWitt replied that he had returned to Algiers and Tunis to ransom some Dutch people.310 The bald falsehood disarmed Downing's suspicions and, although he advised that Sir John Lawson keep a watchful eye on DeRuyter, he assured Bennet that the report that the latter had gone to Guinea was without foundation.311 The report continued to be whispered about,312 however, and although two weeks later DeWitt repeated his falsehood, Downing began to fear that he was being deceived. He declared that although he was certain that the States General had given no orders in the usual way for DeRuyter's departure to Guinea, he was very well aware that the Dutch could find means to do those things which they deemed necessary. The more he considered the matter, the likelihood of secret orders having been given to DeRuyter seemed to him more and more probable. "I am sure if I were in their case, I would do it," he finally declared, and therefore he again advised Bennet to have Sir John Lawson watch DeRuyter closely.313

The news of Holmes' success at Cape Verde had stirred up extraordinary activity in the Royal Company. In September, 1664, the company was busily enlisting factors and soldiers for the Guinea coast. A number of ships, several of which belonged to the king, and some of which the company hired, were being prepared for the voyage to Guinea.314 To add to the company's bright prospects, a vessel from the Gold Coast arrived in England at the end of September,315 bringing the account of Holmes' capture of Cape Corse and other factories on the African coast. The Royal Company now saw itself master of West Africa. Pepys declared that the news from Holmes would certainly make the Dutch quite "mad."316 It did indeed create a very great impression in Holland, where many had believed that Cape Corse was impregnable. Downing, of course, rejoiced exceedingly. Oftentimes in the past he had supported the Danish and Swedish claims to Cape Corse, but now he found no difficulty in showing Carisius and Appleborne, the Danish and Swedish representatives at The Hague, that their claims were as before, against the Dutch. Omitting to say anything of the English claim to Cape Corse, Downing explained to them that since the Dutch had been in possession of Cape Corse, Holmes had seized it together with other places on account of the numerous injuries done to the Royal Company. "They both replied that they took it so."317

In London, VanGogh lost no time in obtaining an interview with Charles II concerning Holmes' latest activities. Again the king asserted that Holmes' violent actions on the African coast were without his knowledge, especially the affair at Cape Verde, which place he declared was of no importance and not worth one hundred pounds.318 Regarding his responsibility for the capture of Cape Corse he refrained from committing himself so definitely, but he assured the Dutch ambassador that Cape Corse belonged to the English; that their claim to it would be satisfactorily established; and that he intended to preserve these new acquisitions by sending Prince Rupert with a fleet to the coast of Africa.319 On the 28th of October, after learning of Holmes' capture of New Amsterdam, Charles II boldly threw aside his reserve and declared that the taking of Cape Corse, as well as of New Amsterdam, "was done with his knowledge & by his order as being a business wch properly belonged to the English, that the ground was theirs & that they had also built upon the same, that the same was afterwards taken from the English by the Netherlands West India Compa, & … that the English will justify & demonstrate their right to all this."320 If Holmes' actions in Guinea have so far seemed very extraordinary, they can hardly be so regarded any longer in view of the light which the king himself threw over the whole situation in this remarkable statement. To be sure he had not as yet assumed responsibility for the capture of Cape Verde. However, his direct responsibility for the other actions of Holmes, which were much more important, makes it a matter of little consequence whether the capture of Cape Verde is to be attributed to him or not.

It may have seemed to Downing that there was less excuse for the seizure of Cape Verde than for the other places. At any rate he held out some hope to DeWitt that it would be restored to the Dutch. This must have been a bitter sop to DeWitt, who was well aware that as for Cape Corse he need entertain no such hope.321 There was one feature of the situation, however, which somewhat pleased DeWitt,322 Downing could no longer maintain that the troubles in Guinea were merely quarrels between two commercial companies in which the king had no direct interest or connection. DeWitt would not therefore be at a loss to find numerous reasons why DeRuyter had been sent to Africa when the time came for defending that action.

By this time every one in London and Amsterdam was in a state of extreme suspense as to whether or not DeRuyter was on the Guinea coast. On the 14th of October, 1664, news was received both in Holland and in England from Cadiz to the effect that DeRuyter intended to sail to Guinea upon his departure from that port.323 In Amsterdam, encouraged by this vigorous rumor, the stocks of the West India Company began to rise from the low point where they had been for some time.324 When Downing chided DeWitt about DeRuyter, the latter replied in a bantering fashion that if he believed the report, notwithstanding what had been said to the contrary, to continue in the belief; it could do no harm.325 In London, the apprehension of DeRuyter's expedition greatly checked the enthusiasm of the Royal Company, and caused the king to postpone Prince Rupert's departure to the African coast. VanGogh reported the cry that was heard everywhere in London, "Guinea is lost. What now is it possible to do with the Dutch."326 The Dutch ambassador, who did not cease to haunt the king's chambers over Holmes' seizures, found Charles II irritable and greatly displeased with affairs. When questioned as to whether he would punish Holmes, the king declared that Holmes did not need to fear punishment at home since the Dutch had evidently sent forces to do it themselves.327

The news concerning DeRuyter's successful expedition to the African coast, which arrived in England just before Christmas, 1664, showed, as Pepys expressed it, that the English had been "beaten to dirt at Guinea."328 Indeed DeRuyter's conquest of the coast in the end was as complete as that of Holmes.329 With one exception DeRuyter captured all the English factories and forts, including Kormentine, which he delivered with their goods to the agents of the West India Company. The English retained only Cape Corse, which, because of its strong position and the loyalty of the natives, DeRuyter decided would offer a successful resistance.330

Up to the time that DeRuyter departed for the African coast it is conceivable that by mutual concessions the troublesome questions existing between England and the United Provinces might have been amicably settled. The Dutch, however, had decided that this could not be done with honor and advantage to themselves, and therefore they chose to answer the warlike actions of Holmes in kind. When the English learned of DeRuyter's activities on the African coast the growing animosity between the two countries was so greatly intensified that war was inevitable. The members of the Royal Company who realized the gravity of the situation begged the king to come to the company's assistance.331 The king, who considered the company to be of great importance to the colonial trade, and who realized his own intimate connection with its formation, declared on January 2, 1665, that he was resolved "to assist, protect & preserve the said company in the prosecution of their said trade,"332 a declaration which was tantamount to war.

The Anglo-Dutch war of 1665-7 was, therefore, as has long been known, a war over trade privileges. Furthermore, in the popular mind, it was the dispute over trading privileges on the West African coast which "became the Occasion, at least the Popular Pretence of the war with Holland."333 In international disputes some facts, although of minor importance, are often seized upon with great vigor by the contending parties. It is very probable that both England and the United Provinces greatly overestimated the value of the African forts and factories, but, at that time, the possession of them seemed very important. To many of these places plausible claims were advanced by both the English and the Dutch. There was plenty of opportunity therefore for disputes, and the representatives of the two great commercial companies did not fail to utilize it.

If the factors of the two companies in Guinea found it impossible to reconcile their differences, the same observation may be made concerning Downing and DeWitt at The Hague. One is not inclined to excuse the deceit of the latter nor to sympathize with the apathetic neglect with which he met all English claims. On the other hand, Downing was perhaps the match for DeWitt in cunning and his master in argument. His contempt for the Dutch made it impossible for him to deal with them without gaining a complete victory. Compromise is the basis of most diplomacy, but such a word was scarcely in Downing's vocabulary. There were men in England who realized that Downing was slowly but surely leading the two countries into war. Clarendon reproved him for overzealousness; and Lord Hollis, the English ambassador in France, informed him that he saw no "causam belli, onely litigandi," and asked him if he could not temper his speech "by pouring in oyle & not vinegar," and thus prevent a war if possible.334 In Downing's behalf it may be said, however, that his attitude was the same as that of the mercantile interests in England which he so well represented. The increasing importance of the mercantile element, both in England and Holland, and their desire to encroach on the trade of one another in all parts of the world, especially in Guinea, was responsible for the war.335 When the war was inevitable, representatives of the English commercial interests assured the government of their loyal support and assistance.336 As for the Dutch they, too, entered the conflict with high hopes for they did not fear Charles II as they had feared Cromwell.