Memoirs and Correspondence of Admiral Lord de Saumarez, Vol. I

He had, however, resided there but a short time, when he was appointed first lieutenant of the Edgar of seventy-four guns, then fitting at Woolwich for the broad pendant of Commodore Elliot. After receiving his letter of appointment, he was obliged to wait some time for an opportunity to cross the channel; but at length availed himself of the Ambuscade, which touched at Guernsey. Having arrived at the Isle of Wight, Captain Phipps, her commander, ascertained that the squadron under Admiral Drake, to which he belonged, had sailed from Spithead; therefore without touching at Portsmouth to land Lieutenant Saumarez, he proceeded to join the Channel fleet, which he found twenty leagues to the westward of Scilly, having on the way retaken the Helena sloop of war; to command which Sir John Warren, then first lieutenant of the Victory, was appointed, and Mr. Saumarez was ordered in his stead to join the Victory, then bearing the flag of Sir Charles Hardy, at whose request he was continued in that ship, where he was third lieutenant in seniority, but supernumerary on the books. Besides the commander-in-chief of the Channel fleet, Rear-Admiral Kempenfelt, as first, and Captain Collings, as second captain, were both on board the Victory detached to cruise off Brest, commencing in June 1779, and returning occasionally to port until May 31st, 1780. After the death of Sir Charles Hardy, which took place on the 9th May 1780, Admiral Geary, and then Sir Francis Drake, succeeded to the command, with Captain Clayton as captain.

The Victory continued on the same service until the spring of 1781, when Admiral Hyde Parker hoisted his flag, and Mr. Saumarez now became first lieutenant. He had been so zealously attentive to his duty, that for several months he never went on shore, till at length he yielded to the persuasion of his messmates. On arriving at Point Beach, Portsmouth, he was accosted by a person in French, who demanded the way to the admiral's house, and at the same time informed him that he had just landed with the intelligence that Jersey had been attacked by the French. Mr. Saumarez immediately went with the messenger to the admiral, who despatched him as a courier to town, and he returned in a remarkably short time with orders respecting it. In short, his diligence and zeal were so manifest in every service on which he was employed, that he soon gained the esteem and friendship of Vice-admiral Hyde Parker, who, in June 1781, was appointed to the command in the North Seas, and shifted his flag into the Fortitude, Captain Robertson. The squadron in those seas, when under command of Commodore Keith Stewart, was of inconsiderable strength, but had now risen to a force of five ships of the line, besides one fifty, one forty-four, and three frigates. Notwithstanding the desire of Lord Sandwich, then first lord of the admiralty, to provide for his own friends, the admiral succeeded in carrying with him, from the Victory, Lieutenants Waghorne and Saumarez. On the 3rd of June they sailed from Spithead to Sheerness, and, after refitting and touching at Leith, sailed to bring home the Baltic convoy from Elsineur, about the beginning of July.

The squadron, which might have been made much stronger, consisted of the Fortitude, seventy-four, Captain Robertson; the Princess Amelia, eighty, Captain Macartney; the Berwick, seventy-four, Captain Fergusson; the Bienfaisant, sixty-four, Captain Braithwaite; the Buffalo, sixty, Captain Truscott; the Preston, fifty, Captain Græme; the Dolphin, forty-four, Captain Blair; the Latona, thirty-eight, Sir Hyde Parker (the admiral's son); the Belle Poule, thirty-six, Captain Patton; the Cleopatra, thirty-two, Captain Murray; and the Surprise, cutter, Lieutenant Rivett.

The Dutch by this time had declared war, and, being perfectly aware of the force of Admiral Parker's squadron, sailed with a large convoy for the Baltic, under command of Admiral Zoutman, whose squadron was one ship of the line superior; it became, therefore, necessary to take the Dolphin, of forty-four guns, into the line, although she had only eighteen-pounders on the lower deck.

But before entering into the details of the action which took place on the 5th of August 1781, it is proper to give some of the particulars of each squadron. That of Admiral Parker was totally unfit for the line of battle; the ships had been but a short time together, and had only two or three times practised the usual manœuvres of forming the line, &c. The Fortitude was a small seventy-four, but well manned. The Princess Amelia was an old eighty-gun ship, with reduced metal and masts. The Berwick was a good ship, and, in addition to her metal, had two sixty-eight-pounder carronades on the poop; but next to her was the Dolphin, forty-four, with only twenty twelve-pounders on the lower-deck, which could not be expected to make any impression on a sixty-four. The Buffalo was formerly the Captain, of seventy guns; but, in the commencement of hostilities, not being thought efficient as a ship of war, she was fitted up as a mast-ship and her name changed; but, probably for want of vessels, she was again equipped for war with sixty guns, but only with eighteen-pounders on the lower deck. The Preston was a good fifty-gun ship, with her proper metal, twenty-four-pounders on the lower, and twelve-pounders on the upper deck. The Bienfaisant had the metal on her lower deck reduced. The Artois, which afterwards joined the squadron, was the finest frigate then known; had twenty-eight, eighteen-pounders on her main deck, with, in addition to her complement of guns, heavy carronades on the quarter-deck and forecastle; she was manned with three hundred men. The Latona was a fine thirty-eight gun frigate, with eighteen-pounders; the Belle Poule and Tartar were excellent of their class.

The Dutch squadron consisted of one seventy-four, one sixty-eight, one sixty-four, and five fifty-fours. In the action there were five frigates, the other five having gone off with the convoy; the list of both will be found in the Appendix to this volume, with that of the killed and wounded.

The Dutch squadron and convoy, which were bound to the Baltic, were discovered at four o'clock in the morning about six leagues to leeward; and there being a fine commanding breeze and smooth water, everything was favourable, as well for detaching the convoy, which was immediately done by signal to the Tartar, as for making dispositions to attack the enemy. The admiral seeing that they had their own port (the Texel) directly to leeward, and being doubtful that they would run in there for shelter, or at least go nearer to the shore, made the signal to chase at thirty-five minutes past four, which obliged every ship to make sail instead of preparing for action with a superior enemy. At five, Admiral Zoutman hoisted Dutch colours, and his men-of-war drew out from the convoy, which took their station under the lee to await the event. At half-past five, the admiral made the Tartar's signal to stay by, and part company with the convoy, which then hauled their wind, made sail to the south-west, and was soon out of sight and danger.

At ten minutes past six, the signal for the line of battle abreast was made, which allowed the headmost ships to take in small sails; and immediately after another signal was given for the Dolphin and Preston to change stations; this was a serious mistake, as it led our squadron to believe that the admiral meant to engage the ship ahead of the Dutch admiral, and not that of the latter, which was actually his intention. This unfortunately placed the Dolphin in opposition to one of the largest of the enemy's vessels; and while it left the rear-ship (the Bienfaisant) for some time without an opponent, the van-ship Berwick and the Dolphin had to engage three of the enemy.

In the mean time, the Dutch were regularly drawn up in a line of battle ahead, on the larboard tack, the ships being about a cable's length apart, and keeping a point from the wind, with their sails well proportioned to each other. They appeared in excellent order, their hammocks stowed, and marines drawn up on the poop.

At fifty-six minutes past seven, the signal for close action was made, and, to the astonishment of our squadron, the enemy never fired a shot, although they might have done considerable damage to our ships had they opened their fire on them as they approached end on to them, on their weather beam. Not a gun was fired on either side until within half-musket shot, when the red flag was hoisted on both ships. Up to that moment all was silent, and it is scarcely possible to conceive a silence more solemn and impressive! At the same instant, they saw the signal go to the mast-head of Zoutman's ship. The dreadful silence was now broken by the tremendous roar of cannon when within pistol-shot, and the battle raged with the utmost fury for three hours and forty minutes.

At ten o'clock, the signal for close action which had been made, was repeated. The Berwick, having forced the van-ship of the enemy to edge off, fell to leeward of the line, and was consequently obliged to make sail, tack, and regain her station in support of the Dolphin, which had then two ships on her, and was also thrown to leeward. The admiral, having now slackened the Dutch admiral's fire, passed ahead of the Buffalo, on which the ships astern closed up to the Buffalo; and the Berwick took the station ahead of the admiral. At thirty-five minutes past eleven, the ships became unmanageable; and, the Dutch dropping to leeward, the action ceased.

By some it has been affirmed that Admiral Parker should have renewed the action: Lieutenant Saumarez says, it was certainly his intention to do so; but the state of his own ship, and the reports he received from others, rendered it quite impossible.3

The Dutch convoy had about the middle of the conflict bore up for the Texel. The protection of them was no longer an object, and Admiral Zoutman, as soon as he could possibly get his ships collected and put before the wind, made the best of his way into the port; but during the night the Hollandia, Dutch seventy-four, was seen sunk in twenty-two fathoms water, and her pendant was hauled down by Captain Patton, of the Belle Poule, and brought to the admiral. As no ship was taken, both claimed the victory: but, the convoy being sent back into port and one ship sunk, should certainly decide it to Admiral Parker; and had the English admiral not inadvertently rendered his van too weak by the mistake in the signal which also extended his line beyond their rear, thereby rendering one ship for a time useless, he would have obtained a decisive victory.

While Admiral Zoutman must be admired for his cool intrepidity, it must be admitted that he was much to blame in forbearing to avail himself of the opportunity of attacking and disabling the approaching fleet, which he might have done with great effect. After the Fortitude had been put into a condition to make sail, Lieutenant Saumarez was sent to conduct the Preston, one of the disabled ships, into port; her commander, Captain Græme, having lost his arm in the action. When Admiral Parker arrived at the Nore, his Majesty paid the squadron a visit; but the veteran commander, indignant at the conduct of ministers, who, he conceived, ought to have reinforced his squadron instead of allowing some fine ships to lie idle in port, received the King with that rough hauteur peculiar to himself, observing, "I wish your Majesty better ships and younger officers. As for myself, I am now too old for the service."

On this occasion Lieut. Saumarez was presented to George III. The King inquired if he was related to the captains of the same name one of whom had circumnavigated the globe with Anson, and who had fallen gloriously in the service of their country: the admiral replied in the affirmative, saying, "Yes, please your Majesty; he is their nephew, and as brave and as good an officer as either of them."

In consequence of the bravery and skill he displayed in this action, Lieut. Saumarez was promoted to the rank of commander, although only second lieutenant; the first being wounded early in the action, the duty had fallen on our hero: and he was immediately appointed to the Tisiphone, a fire-ship constructed on a new plan, and armed with carronades, which was then fitting at Sheerness; his commission as "master and commander," bearing date for that ship, the 23rd August 1781.

When lieutenant of the Fortitude, with Admiral Sir Hyde Parker,—who, from his acerbity of temper, was distinguished from others of the same name by the sobriquet of "Vinegar Parker,"—the old admiral betrayed his ill-humour by unwarrantably finding fault with him one morning when Mr. Saumarez commanded the watch; but soon after, probably to make amends for such hasty and unguarded conduct towards an officer for whom he had the greatest regard, he sent to invite him to dinner, an honour which the young lieutenant declined in terms sufficiently strong to indicate that his feelings had been hurt. On this, the admiral sent for him and exclaimed, "What! can't you put up with the fractious disposition of an old man?" The admiral, who could not bear to be, even for a day, at variance with Lieutenant Saumarez, would do anything to serve him; and, when he obtained the command on the East India station, offered to take him with him in the Cato, which sailed, and was supposed to have foundered off the Cape of Good Hope, as she was never afterwards heard of; and he happily escaped sharing the fate of that gallant chief and unfortunate crew.

The Tisiphone having been fitted out at Sheerness, and the complement of men having been filled up by supernumeraries from the Conquestadore at the Nore, Captain Saumarez, by order from Admiral Roddam, placed himself under the command of Captain Allen, of the Sceptre, on the 6th September 1781, from whom he received the following order:

You are hereby required and directed to put yourself under my command, and to follow all such orders and directions as you shall from time to time receive from me for his Majesty's service, and to hold yourself in constant readiness to sail at a moment's warning; and in case of separation by any unavoidable accident, you are to make the best of your way without loss of time to Torbay, and put yourself under the command of Admiral Darby.

(Mem.) In case of your parting company with his Majesty's ship Sceptre, and falling in with any ships or vessels belonging to France or French subjects, Spain or Spanish subjects, the States General of the United Provinces, or to his Majesty's rebellious subjects in the colonies of North America, that you can cope with, you are to use your best endeavours to take, seize, sink, burn, or destroy the same: giving me an account of your arrival at Torbay, and of anything you may have so taken or destroyed.

Signed.   Wm. Allen.

In pursuance of these orders Captain Saumarez sailed from the Nore, and, arriving at Torbay on the 17th, found that Admiral Darby had sailed in the Britannia on the 15th, after having left orders for the Tisiphone to cruise a week off the Lizard. Here he was directed to proceed for Plymouth, where he arrived on the 1st of October; and having received further orders to repair to Spithead without loss of time, he arrived there on the 13th October, to fit for Channel service. He now joined the fleet under Lord Howe, and, after a cruise off Brest, returned to Portsmouth on the 21st of November: his ship was found to sail extremely well.

Captain Saumarez was now ordered to place himself under the command of Admiral Kempenfelt, who, with a detachment of twelve sail of the line, was destined to intercept Count de Guichen, who had put to sea from Brest, after having returned from his last severe campaign. The count had been ordered to use every exertion to refit and prepare the French fleet for sea, notwithstanding the lateness of the season. The objects in view could be accomplished only by extreme diligence and the most profound secrecy, as it was absolutely necessary to reinforce Count de Grasse, with both ships and troops in the West Indies, as also M. Des Ornes and Admiral Suffrein in the East. It was evident that De Grasse, after his hard service on the coast of North America during the preceding campaign, must stand in need of a vast supply of naval and military stores; and the service he was about to undertake in the West Indies would increase the want of provisions, and almost every necessary of life and of warfare: neither was the demand for naval and military stores in the East Indies less urgent. Accordingly, a numerous convoy of transports, store-ships, and victuallers were prepared and equipped at the same time as the fleet, which was now extended to such a number of men-of-war as was considered sufficient for the protection of the convoys until fairly out of reach. This part of the service, as well as the charge of the whole expedition, was, as we have stated, confided to Count Guichen; and the command of the squadron and fleet destined to the West Indies, to M. de Vaudreuil. The Tisiphone was the look-out ship of the squadron, which sailed from Spithead at the end of November.

At day-break on the 12th December, Captain Saumarez, being the first to discover the enemy, made known his situation to the admiral; which was, that the men-of-war were too far ahead and too much to leeward of the convoy to afford any protection to it. The admiral, with that decision and professional skill by which he was so eminently distinguished, determined to profit by their situation, and boldly pushed between the convoy and the greater part of the enemy's line-of-battle ships, and succeeded in capturing twenty sail. In this affair Captain Saumarez had a noble opportunity of distinguishing himself, by attacking the ship of war, of thirty-six guns, which was bringing up the rear of the convoy, and capturing her after an action of twenty minutes.

Besides those captured, many others had struck; but, the weather at this time becoming thick and squally, the admiral discontinued the chase of those which had been cut off, and which made sail in every direction, that he might collect his squadron before dark, many of his ships being at a great distance astern with the prizes. At daylight next morning, the enemy's ships of war, twenty-one sail of the line, were seen formed to leeward; but their force was so much superior, that the admiral did not think it advisable to risk an action. The captured ships consisted of twenty-one sail of transports, having on board eleven thousand troops, besides their crews of seven thousand seamen; the greatest part of which were taken by this squadron, and the Agamemnon, which picked up five or six more.

It was now evident that the force under Count Guichen, destined to assist Count de Grasse in the capture of the valuable island of Jamaica; was much greater than had been supposed by the English government; and, consequently, it became of the utmost importance to give the earliest information of the approach of such a formidable enemy to Sir Samuel Hood. Accordingly, Captain Saumarez, whose gallant conduct and zeal had been so manifest, was selected for this service. His men were returned to the Tisiphone from the captured ships; and he was detached with orders to push past the French fleet, and make the best of his way to Barbadoes, (see Appendix) where he arrived on the 28th of January; and finding the Pegasus, Captain John Stanhope, he delivered his despatches, and received the following orders from that officer:

You are hereby required and directed to proceed (without a moment's loss of time) to the island of Antigua, where, on your arrival off English Harbour, you are to send a boat in for intelligence respecting Sir Samuel Hood and the fleet under his command; which having received from the senior officer in that port, you will proceed in search of the commander-in-chief, and deliver him the despatches you are charged with from Rear-admiral Kempenfelt, as also those you will receive herewith.

Given on board his Majesty's ship Pegasus,

Carlisle Bay, this 28th Jan. 1782.

(Mem.) I recommend that particular attention may be paid to keep well to windward of the French islands.

Signed   John Stanhope.

To Captain Saumarez, H.M. fire-ship

Tisiphone.

In pursuance of these orders, Captain Saumarez sailed from Barbadoes on the 28th of January. In the mean time, the Comte de Grasse, who had been beating to windward for some days with the intention of attacking Barbadoes, but without gaining ground, had abandoned his plan, and bore away for St. Kitts. On his arrival there, he landed eight thousand men, and took possession of greater part of the island: General Frazer, with a small party of six hundred men, was obliged to retire to Brimstone Hill Fort.

Sir Samuel Hood, notwithstanding the superiority of the enemy, (twenty-nine sail of the line,) resolved on a sudden and unusually bold manœuvre, namely, to sail and attack the enemy's fleet at anchor. It was for this purpose that he had put to sea with twenty-two sail of the line, and proceeded to Antigua, where he took in provisions, and embarked the twenty-eighth and two companies of the thirteenth regiment, under command of General Prescott.

Captain Saumarez, according to the orders he had received, proceeded for Antigua, and keeping "well to windward," as he had been directed to do, fell in with the Triumphante and Terrible, two French line-of-battle ships, of the squadron which had been attacked by Admiral Kempenfelt on the 12th December, and which had been detached by Comte de Guichen to Martinique. These ships immediately gave chase; but, night coming on, Captain Saumarez had recourse to stratagem in order to effect his escape, which would otherwise have been impossible in consequence of the Tisiphone having carried away her fore-top-mast in a squall, an accident which was fortunately not observed by his pursuers: he now made night-signals by hoisting lights and burning false fires; which having led the enemy to suppose he was communicating with an English squadron, they abandoned the pursuit after a chase of half-an-hour.

At the moment the fore-top-mast was carried away, Mr. Robb, one of the midshipmen, who was looking out at the fore-top-gallant-mast-head, fell on the forecastle without receiving any injury. This young gentleman was an elève of Captain Saumarez, continued with him to the end of that war, and embarked with him on board the Crescent in 1793. After the capture of La Réunion, he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant.

The fore-top-mast of the Tisiphone was soon replaced; and next day, on reaching English Harbour, he learned that Sir Samuel Hood, with his squadron was at anchor in Basseterre Roads, St. Kitts, where he had three times repulsed the enemy of a much superior force, but which had now taken up such a position as rendered it impossible for him to communicate with the admiral; for, unless he would venture to push through the intricate channel between Nevis and St. Kitts, he would run the greatest risk of being captured. Undismayed, however, at the danger of navigating an unknown passage, he fearlessly proceeded where no ship had ever before ventured; and by sounding as he advanced, and by the dexterous management of his ship, he succeeded in carrying the Tisiphone to the anchorage at St. Kitts in safety; and delivered his despatches to Sir Samuel Hood, who informed him that the intelligence was of such importance, that it was necessary it should be immediately sent on to Sir Peter Parker at Jamaica. But when the admiral proposed to send the Tisiphone on with it, Captain Saumarez, desirous of remaining at the seat of warlike operations, represented to him that the Tisiphone was a fine fast-sailing ship on a new construction, that in the existing state of affairs she might be useful, and that he should be happy to contribute by his own personal exertions to the promotion of the public service; whereas any vessel could run down with the trade-wind to Jamaica. Sir Samuel, no less pleased with the proposal, and the manner in which it was made, than convinced of the advantage he would derive from having with him a fast-sailing vessel commanded by so zealous an officer, whose tact and intrepidity had already been manifested, determined to keep the Tisiphone with his squadron, and send a less useful vessel with the intelligence to Jamaica. The admiral soon reaped the advantage of this decision. Captain Saumarez, during the time the fleet remained there and at Antigua, was the most active in harassing the enemy. He commanded several boat expeditions, and cut out a vessel in a most gallant style from Basseterre Roads and several other small vessels from the back of the island.