Memoirs and Correspondence of Admiral Lord de Saumarez, Vol. I

Algeziras Bay, 7th July 1801.

Sir,

I have little more to tell you of the fate of his Majesty's ship Hannibal than yourself must have observed; only, that from the number of batteries, and ships' gun-boats, &c. we had to encounter, our guns soon got knocked up; and I found it was impossible to do anything, either for the preservation of the ship, or for the good of the service. Our boats, sails, rigging, and springs being all shot away, and having so many killed and wounded, as will appear by the annexed list, I thought it prudent to strike, and thereby preserve the lives of the brave men that remained.

Had I been successful in the view before me previously to the ship taking the ground, my praises of the conduct of my officers and ship's company could not have exceeded their merits; but I have, notwithstanding, the satisfaction to say, that every order was obeyed and carried into execution with that promptitude and alacrity becoming British officers and seamen.

I am, sir,Your most obedient humble servant,S. Ferris.

To Rear-admiral Sir James Saumarez.

It has now become necessary that we should notice a controversy which has taken place between the authors of the different naval histories on the subject of the Battle of Algeziras; and we have been led to make minute inquiries, first, into the cause of the discrepancies of the different accounts; and, secondly, into the truth, which we have been the better able to do from our personal knowledge and recent communication with some of the officers of the Hannibal and Cæsar, on whose veracity we can depend. We are happy to add that the result of our inquiries has been satisfactory, and, we trust, will completely clear up and reconcile the facts, while it will leave no reflection of a dubious character on the conduct of the heroic commander of the squadron.

It appears that no difference of opinion arose on this subject until the court-martial of Captain Ferris, which took place on the 1st September 1801, at Portsmouth, Rear-admiral Holloway president; when, as usual on trials for the loss of a ship, Captain Ferris read his narrative, which he begins thus:

"In giving a detail of the circumstances which led to the loss of his Majesty's late ship Hannibal, I am sorry that, owing to my clerk being killed, whose remarks were lost,31 I cannot be so particular as to the exact times of signals being made as I otherwise should have been; but I shall state them to you to the best of my recollection."

After this admission, is it not surprising that the controversy should be mainly founded on the time at which the Hannibal struck her colours? Captain Ferris says, "about two o'clock;" while by the log of the Cæsar the action had entirely ceased at thirty-five minutes past one. It may be asked, why did not the court, which must have seen the discrepancy between his narrative and the public and other documents before it, inquire into the truth by requiring the evidence of the officers and crew, none of whom were examined as to the time the ship struck: but the duty of the court being confined to the trial of Captain Ferris, his officers and crew, and it being (whether supported or not) evident and notorious that they had defended their ship to the last extremity, they had (unluckily for Sir James) nothing to do but to pronounce an honourable acquittal.

The next contradiction which appears, relates to the boats which were sent to the assistance of the Hannibal. Captain Ferris says, "The Admiral, having previously made my signal of recall, sent a boat from the Cæsar, and another from the Venerable, to my assistance; but, finding they could afford me none, I sent the Venerable's boat back, and the crew of the Cæsar in one of my own cutters, their pinnace having been sunk by a shot alongside."

I am bound to say that this assertion is not borne out either by the testimony of those who were in the boats of the Cæsar and the Venerable, or by the officers of the Hannibal; because, as will be seen hereafter, these boats never reached the Hannibal, when aground, until after she had struck her colours.

Captain Ferris next relates that "About twelve o'clock our ships were all out of gun-shot of the enemy, and we had the fire of the whole French squadron, batteries, and gun-boats, to contend with alone; against which we continued to keep up as brisk a fire as could be expected, even by men in the most sanguine anticipation of victory, until near two o'clock."

Now this is quite impossible, as, by the log of every ship, the squadron was engaging much later: by the Cæsar, until 1h.35m.; by the Audacious, until 1h.20m.; by the Venerable, until 1h.30m. &c.; before which, the ensign of the Hannibal was seen, from every ship, Union down.

It has been unwarrantably alleged by some that the Hannibal hauled the ensign down, and then hoisted it reversed, as a signal of distress, and afterwards, when she struck, hauled it down; and that the French hoisted it union down to decoy the Calpe,. But, for the refutation of these absurdities, we must refer the reader to the testimony of Colonel Connolly, who was then acting captain of the marines, an officer of the highest character, whose veracity cannot be questioned; and who, moreover, from being the only officer on the poop when the colours were struck, had a better opportunity of knowing the facts than any other. The following are the questions which we put to Colonel Connolly, with his answers, given verbatim:

Did the enemy take possession of the Hannibal before the colours were hoisted union down?

The colours were hauled down by Captain Ferris's orders, and remained so; but, being so near the Formidable, the captain of her was on board of us in two minutes after we had struck, and the colours were hoisted union downwards by the Frenchmen.32

Were the colours hoisted union down by the enemy; or, at any time, by Captain Ferris's orders?

By the enemy.

Did the boats come before or after the colours were hoisted union downwards, to render her assistance?

The boats from our ships did not get near us till after we were in possession of the enemy; and I called to an old shipmate of mine in the Venerable's barge, and told him so, as he came under the starboard quarter; but he persisted in coming on board, and was taken.

What boats were taken; and what boats escaped?

A good many were taken. The Venerable's barge and her first lieutenant; and another lieutenant, in the Cæsar's boat, of some ship lying at Gibraltar; beside the mids. I am not aware indeed that any escaped.

What French officer took possession of the Hannibal?

I am not quite certain whether it was the captain of the Formidable or the Dessaix; they were both very close to us: however, he was a very little fellow.

To what prison were you taken?

The ship's company were divided into two prisons, which appeared to have been stables. There was no water in one of them, and the distress of our poor fellows, on that account, was truly shocking: often, when they would give money to the people outside to bring them some to drink, they would walk off with it, and never bring the water.

On this occasion Colonel Connolly recognised a French officer who had been a short time previously a prisoner on board the Warrior, to whom he had been particularly civil, supplying him with linen, &c.; and who left the ship with protestations of his desire to make every return in his power, if the "fortune of war" should give him an opportunity: but when he claimed the performance of his promise, his reply was, "Monsieur de Connolly, I very sorry for your misfortune; but I wish you good morning!" and left him with a sarcastic sneer.

It is evident, from this testimony, that the colours were only struck once, and hoisted once union down, and only hoisted union down by the Frenchmen; and that the boats of the Cæsar and Venerable were only once on board the Hannibal after she was aground; namely, when their crews were taken prisoners. But both these boats were actually sent to her assistance at a previous period, when the Hannibal was directed by the Admiral to endeavour to obtain a position to rake the Formidable; and it was then that they were sent back. Captain Brenton first received the report of the Hannibal having her colours union downwards between twelve and one, while the Cæsar was engaging the island battery, and the Dessaix and the Muiron.

The Cæsar's boat was sent with others to the assistance of the Hannibal, according to the log, at seventeen minutes past one, and must have reached her certainly before the action ceased, and found her in the hands of the enemy, as described by Colonel Connolly.

It is absurd to suppose that, while actually engaging the enemy, Captain Ferris would haul down his colours, to hoist them as a signal of distress, when he had other ensigns to hoist, and when there was a signal in the book, "In distress, and in want of immediate assistance:" this is a circumstance which, I will venture to assert, never occurred in any naval action.

Captain Brenton, being decidedly of the same opinion, adds, "I can only say, when it was reported to me, while in action, that the Hannibal's colours were reversed, I considered her to be in possession of the enemy: that the Admiral took the same view of the subject, I have not the least doubt; and I think nothing would have induced him to abandon the Hannibal while she was engaged. I will further add, that I never remember the slightest doubt being expressed of the Hannibal having struck before the action terminated, until I read the narrative of Captain Ferris, at his court-martial, some time afterwards."

The moment these champions of "liberté, égalité, et la mort," entered the Hannibal, plunder was the order of the day; and, in their furious haste to get at the officers' trunks, they cruelly trod over the wounded in the cockpit and cable-tiers. Colonel Connolly relates that in a few minutes one of them had taken his new cocked-hat, and appeared on deck with it. He himself had given up seeking his desk, which contained a considerable sum of money besides valuable papers, because he could not get at it without creeping over the wounded; but the French, not so particular, soon found it.

We shall now give the extracts of the various logs to which we have had access. These have never yet been published, and we trust they will set the matter at rest. It is some satisfaction indeed, that all authors agree in declaring that nothing more could have been done, and that the honour of the British flag was to the last gloriously maintained on the 6th of July 1801.

Extract of the Cæsar's log in the Battle of Algeziras, 5th July:

Winds S.W. and variable. At 12h.30m. p.m. up mainsail and in royals; at 2h. made the signal for the squadron to prepare for battle, and, anchoring, bent the sheet cable through the larboard gun-room port to the sheet anchor; at 4h. set steering-sails,—fresh breezes and fair; at 8h. moderate breezes,—Cape Moulinau E.N.E. seven or eight miles; at 12h. (midnight), light airs inclinable to calm,—squadron in company, Venerable S.S.E. one mile. At 12h.30m. (6th), in steering-sails, and at 12h.40m. lowered down the yawl; at 3h.45m. a breeze sprung up,—made the signal for attention; at 4h.5m. beat to quarters,—Cabrita Point, S.E. by E. three or four leagues,—made the Pompée's signal to close; at 5h. set top-gallant steering-sails, and at 6h. the fore-top-mast steering-sail; at 7h. 45m. made the Venerable's signal to haul the wind,—took in the starboard steering-sails; at 8h. in steering-sails; at 8h.5m. in top-gallant sails,—made the signal for being at liberty to engage the enemy in passing; at 8h. do. to take stations for mutual support; at 8h.25m. set top-gallant sails,—the enemy's ships opened their fire,—saw the Venerable break round off,—Cæsar fired at a Spanish battery in passing; at 8h.35m. the action commenced with the Pompée, Venerable, and Audacious; at 8h. 45m. made the signal for the ships astern to make more sail; at 9h. light breezes, and variable,—opened our fire, and the engagement became general; at 9h.15m. passed the Venerable, and came to with the sheet-anchor in nine fathoms,—the sheet-cable became taut,—let go the best bower to steady the ship,—Spencer and Hannibal passed under our lee,—hailed them to get the boats ahead, and tow into action,—light airs; at 9h. 35m. the Spencer opened her fire; at 9h.40m. the Hannibal, do.—our spanker-boom shot away; at 10h.20m. sent boats to the Pompée and Hannibal; at 10h.26m. made the Hannibal's signal to tack,—saw the Pompée had broke her sheer, apparently by a flaw of wind, and was raked by the French Admiral; at 10h.30m. made the Pompée's signal to cut or slip; at 10h.35m., a breeze springing up from the N.W., cut our cable, wore, and made sail, engaging the enemy's ships while passing them; at 10h.50m. the Hannibal opened her fire on the French Admiral; at 10h.52m. made the signal for the squadron to come to,—the wind on the starboard tack; at 11h.5m. made the signal for the boats to tow the Pompée,—Cæsar engaging the southernmost ships,—Audacious, ditto,—Cæsar opened her fire on the island battery,—Audacious and Cæsar becalmed near the island reef,—boats employed towing the ship's head round; afternoon,—light winds and variable weather,—engaging the enemy; at 12h.33m. made the signal for the Hannibal being aground,—employed engaging the southernmost ship; at 1h. 17m. Audacious wore,—made the signal for armed-boats to proceed as denoted; at 1h.35m. the action ceased,—found the main-mast shot through in five places, (and other damage which need not be mentioned,) nine men killed, twenty-five wounded, and seven missing; at 5h. came-to at Gibraltar, with the small bower employed warping alongside of the sheer hulk.

The Venerable's log, which we have examined at the depôt at Deptford, and which is signed by Captain Hood, fully corroborates the above, with the addition,—"At 12h.40m. sent the first lieutenant in the pinnace to assist the Hannibal;" and this officer (Lieutenant Collis) in his own journal mentions the same fact. When he arrived at the Hannibal, she was in possession of the enemy; and he was taken prisoner, with his boat's crew, by persisting to go on board after he was warned by Lieutenant (now Colonel) Connolly, of the Marines. He says it was in consequence of the ensign being reversed that the boats were sent; and, before any of the boats reached her, she was in possession of the French, who hoisted the colours union downwards themselves, and that they never were hoisted in that manner at any other time.

These facts are also corroborated by the logs and journals of the Audacious and Spencer, which will be given in the next chapter. Every ship, indeed, mentions the impossibility of affording any assistance to the Hannibal, and that the signal was not made to leave off action until her situation was utterly hopeless.

The nature of the well-protected road of Algeziras being fully manifest in the diagram facing the 346th page, it is unnecessary to point out the difficulties the squadron had to contend with from the five strong batteries, which were served with much effect by the French artillerymen. The numerous gun-boats stationed at Algeziras for the annoyance of our commerce, were from their constant practice in that kind of warfare, of themselves a most formidable enemy; besides, the assistance they afforded in warping their ships in-shore, and placing them in such a position as to enable the different batteries to support them. But the failure of the attack must be mainly attributed to the unsteadiness and faintness of the wind, which enabled none of the squadron to obtain the position it wished; that is, in-shore of the enemy: while, by falling calm at a moment the most disadvantageous, it left the ships exposed to the enemy's fire without the possibility of returning it.

The loss sustained by each ship was severe. The Cæsar had her master, Mr. William Grave, six seamen, and two marines, killed; her boatswain, G.W. Forster, seventeen seamen, one boy, and six marines, wounded; besides the capture of Lieutenant Janvarin, a volunteer, Mr. Richard Best, and seven seamen, who were taken by boarding the Hannibal when in possession of the enemy. Her masts, particularly the main-mast, and yards, were very much injured; her boats were all cut to pieces, besides that taken at the Hannibal; and there were many shots in her hull. The Pompée had Mr. P. Roxborough, master, Mr. Stewart, midshipman, ten seamen, and three marines killed; Lieutenants Cheesman, Stapleton, and Innes, Messrs. Currie, Hillier, and Hibbert, fifty-three seamen, and ten marines, wounded. She was so completely damaged in masts, rigging, and sails, that all hope of refitting her as promptly as the rest was at an end. The Spencer had Mr. Spencer, a midshipman, and five seamen, killed; Mr. Chatterton, midshipman, twenty-three seamen, and three marines wounded. She was damaged chiefly in her rigging and sails, which were soon repaired. The Venerable had Mr. W. Gibbons, midshipman, and eight seamen, killed; Messrs. Austin and Collins, midshipmen, twenty seamen, and four marines, wounded; and eight missing. The Hannibal had seventy-five killed, among whom were Mr. D. Lindsay, clerk, and Lieut. James Williams, R.M.; and seventy wounded and missing. The Audacious had eight killed; Lieut. Day, of the Marines, thirty-one seamen and marines, wounded. The total loss of the squadron being one hundred and twenty-three killed, two hundred and forty-two wounded, and twenty-two missing.

The loss of the French and Spaniards, by their own accounts, was considerable; the former having three hundred and six killed,—among whom were Captains Moncousu, of the Dessaix, seventy-four, and Lalonde, of the Indomptable, eighty-four,—and near five hundred wounded; five gun-boats were sunk, and others damaged; and the forts, in which eleven men were killed, received considerable injury. The ships suffered a good deal in hull, masts, and rigging; but not so much as was anticipated.

The French, as might be expected, from their usual disregard to truth, made this out one of the most brilliant exploits ever performed. Their account stated that three French ships had completely beaten six English, which took refuge in Gibraltar after leaving the Hannibal in their possession, &c.; saying nothing of the heavy batteries and gun-boats they had to contend with. But the Spaniards, in the Madrid Gazette extraordinary, represented the "action as very obstinate and bloody on both sides; and likewise on the part of the batteries, which decided the fate of the day:" and in another place, "the fire of our batteries was so hot and well supported that the enemy suffered most from them; and particularly it is to the St. Jago we owe the capture of the English ship, for her bold manœuvre of attempting to pass between the French Rear-admiral's ship, the Formidable, and the shore, made her take the ground; and, notwithstanding the utmost exertions to get her afloat, it was found impossible to move her. Then the fire from the battery very soon dismasted her, and compelled her to strike.33

The diagram, besides pointing out the situations of the five strong batteries, which so completely protect the harbour, and which did the greatest execution, shows the first position of the ships about the time they all anchored, and before the enemy's ships had warped near the shore. The second, represented by the outlines, shows the situation of the hostile squadrons at the time the Hannibal struck, when the Pompée had nearly reached the Mole, the distance of which from Algeziras is little more than four miles, and the Spencer was considerably advanced in that direction.

We cannot conclude our account of this action without a few remarks on the circumstances we have related. There cannot be a doubt that, had the enemy remained in the position he held at the commencement of the action, every ship would have been taken. Praise is certainly due to Admiral Linois for his able manœuvre of warping his ships aground, being the only chance he had of escaping; while it was acknowledging that, as long as his ships were continued afloat, he had no confidence in protection from the batteries, strong as they were, against the valour and perseverance of British seamen.

Although the attack was not crowned with the success it merited, in a national point of view the result was as complete as if the whole squadron had been destroyed, as the enemy were thereby prevented from proceeding further in the execution of the ulterior object of their expedition; and the chance of this alone was sufficient to justify Sir James in this bold and daring attempt, which, it will be seen, ultimately led to one of the most glorious achievements which adorn the annals of the empire.34

CHAPTER XV

1801

Observations on the Battle of Algeziras.—Copies of the Journals of the Spencer, Audacious, and Venerable.—Remarks on them.—Further particulars.—The Spanish account.—The French account.—Bulletin from the Moniteur.—Anecdote of an occurrence at St. Malo.—Sword presented to Linois.—Lines on the occasion.—His improvement of Naval tactics.—Epigram.—Anecdote of the intrepidity of one of the Cæsar's men.

It has been mentioned in the preceding chapter that, owing chiefly to the minutes of Captain Ferris's court-martial, and to the discrepancies in different statements, a controversy has arisen on the subject. In order to avoid the possibility of our becoming a party thereto, correct copies of the logs, which are now at the Record Office in the Admiralty, are subjoined, after having been compared with those at Somerset House.

Copy of the Log of his Majesty's ship Spencer, 6th July 1801

Moderate and cloudy,—spoke his Majesty's ship Cæsar, which informed us of having intelligence of three sail of French line-of-battle ships and a frigate being in Algeziras Bay,—answered the signal to prepare for battle at anchor,—employed clearing ship for battle at anchor; at 6h. Apes hill S. E.; at half-past 6 beat the general to quarters,—ship clear for action; a.m. light airs and variable; at 4h. sprung up a breeze from the westward; at 7h.58m. saw three French sail-of-the-line and one frigate, lying under the protection of the Spanish batteries of Algeziras, and a strong fortified island to the southward, and a number of forts and redoubts to the westward of them.

At 8h.17m. the batteries commenced firing on the Venerable, Pompée, and Audacious,—Venerable commenced firing; at 9h.11m. we commenced firing; at 9h.35m. found the sheet-cable cut through by the enemy's shot; at 9h. 48m. anchored between the Cæsar and the Hannibal, Audacious astern, the Pompée on our larboard bow, having a battery and the French Admiral's ship to oppose us on our larboard beam, a battery and gun-boats ahead; at 10h.33m. dismasted and disabled a gun-boat that was rowing to the assistance of the others; at 10h. 39m. cut the cable per Admiral's order whilst wearing,—the gun-boats attempted to approach us from under the land, but the brisk fire that was kept up made them retreat in great disorder; at 11h.3m. answered the signal to come to the wind on the larboard tack (No. 98); at 11h.7m. commenced firing at the outer ships of the enemy, which was kept up at intervals.

At 11h.37m. observed the Hannibal under the batteries at the north end of the town, with her main-top-mast shot away and aground, but keeping up a brisk fire on the enemy's ships and batteries; p.m. Hannibal still on shore, but keeping up a brisk fire at the enemy's ships and batteries; at 1h.16m. observed the Hannibal to slacken her fire, shortly after the ensign hauled down and hoisted union downwards; at 1h.35m. observed the enemy's boats boarding the Hannibal; at 1h.44m. ceased firing,—found the ship had suffered considerably in her hull, having several shots on both sides between wind and water. Our loss in the action was six killed, twenty-seven badly wounded, two of whom died of their wounds. The fore-mast, bowsprit, main-top-mast, main-top-gallant yard, and main-top-sail yard badly wounded; the boats and booms shot through in several places; the cutter and yawl that were towing astern were sunk by the enemy. At 6h.30m. anchored per signal, and moored ship in Rosia Bay, Gibraltar.

The following is a correct copy of the Audacious's log, at Somerset House.

This log, like the former, begins in the evening of the 5th July 1801.

Wind S.W. p.m. moderate and hazy; half-past 2 tacked,—Cape Trafalgar S. E. three or four leagues,—got springs on the anchors; at 8h. standing up the Gut of Gibraltar,—Admiral S. by W. three-quarters of a mile; at 12h. taken aback, came to the wind on the land-tack; at 6h. Gibraltar Rock N. by E. four or five leagues,—shortened sail to let the Pompée go ahead to her station; at half-past 7, saw the enemy's ships at anchor in Algeziras Roads, consisting of three line-of-battle ships, a frigate, gun-boats, &c.; three-quarters past 7, the batteries commenced firing on our ships as they passed; twenty minutes past 8, the enemy's ships began to fire on our ships; at half-past 8, the action became hot on both sides,—the Venerable, Pompée, and Audacious as yet only in action; at half-past 9, the Cæsar, Spencer, and Hannibal joined the action against the ships and batteries; at 11h. cut the cables, and tried to tow the ship's head round to the eastward, to bring the ship's broadside to bear on her opponent, but without effect; by this time the sails and rigging being much cut up, and the ship unmanageable, got the kedge anchor with a five-inch hawser out on the starboard bow, and succeeded in bringing the broadside to bear; at noon, light airs inclining to calm,—Cæsar, Spencer, under way, still in action.