The Law of the North. The Special Military Operation

Preemptive Precision Strikes: In the first hours of the operation, cruise and ballistic missiles hit key targets of Ukraine’s air defense system (Buk, S‑300), military airfields (including Chuguev, Mirgorod, Ozerne), command posts, and supply depots throughout the country. This significantly disorganized the AFU’s air defense system and troop command.

Deployment of the Ground Offensive:

From the North: Russian columns, supported by airborne landings at Gostomel airfield near Kyiv, began rapid advances through Chernihiv and Kyiv oblasts, reaching the outskirts of the capital by the end of the first week. Goal: psychological pressure.

From the South: Formations from Crimea took Kherson (the first major city to come under Russian control) almost without a fight, reached Melitopol and Berdyansk, and blockaded Mariupol. The advance on Nikolaev began.

From the East: The armies of the DPR and LPR, with the support of Russian troops, went on the offensive along the entire front, beginning the operation to encircle the Donetsk‑Horlivka AFU grouping.

First Reaction of Kyiv and the West: Panic gripped Kyiv; part of the political elite fled. However, the military and political leadership, having received guarantees of full support from Washington and London, quickly moved to implement the plan of urban defense. The West announced unprecedented sanctions and the immediate start of large‑scale arms deliveries. Already in the first days, it became clear that the calculation for a rapid political collapse of the Kyiv regime had failed-on the contrary, it consolidated under external management.

The first week of the SMO demonstrated a clash of two fundamentally different approaches to waging war. Russia’s strategy of “forcing peace” through the demonstration of force and rapid advance encountered a prepared, rigid strategy of urban defense designed to prolong the conflict. Russian troops managed to achieve tactical surprise and inflict significant damage on military infrastructure, but operational and strategic surprise was lost due to the work of NATO intelligence. The plan to quickly force Kyiv’s surrender did not achieve its goal because the enemy was prepared and motivated for prolonged resistance, ensured by a continuous flow of Western resources. The war entered a new, more complex, and protracted phase, where issues of logistics, attrition, and the ability of the sides to adapt to changing conditions came to the forefront.

Chapter 9. First Stage (February – April 2022): Offensive on All Axes, the Battle for Kyiv, Liberation of the Southern Regions, Negotiations in Istanbul

The first stage of the Special Military Operation, lasting from late February to early April 2022, was a period of the most intense maneuver warfare. It was characterized by the Russian side’s attempt to implement the concept of rapidly forcing the enemy into peace through deep envelopment of key centers and disorganization of Ukraine’s state and military command system. This stage revealed both the strengths of the Russian Armed Forces (the power of the initial strike, successes in the southern direction) and the underestimation of the enemy, its readiness to resist, and the depth of the AFU’s integration into NATO’s intelligence and support infrastructure. The culmination of this period was the Istanbul talks, where the contours of a possible compromise first emerged, only to be immediately disrupted by the direct intervention of Western handlers.

9.1. Multi‑Axis Offensive: Attempt at Strategic Envelopment

From the very start of the operation, Russian troops launched offensives along three main strategic axes, seeking to paralyze the AFU’s resistance.

Northern (Kyiv) Axis: Strike groupings from Belarus advanced in the general direction of Kyiv, splitting into two prongs. One struck through Chernihiv, the other through Sumy oblast. The goal was to envelop the capital from the east and west, take control of key bridges over the Dnieper, and create conditions for a possible assault or complete blockade of the city, which, according to the plan, was supposed to lead to the political collapse of the regime.

Eastern (Kharkov‑Donbas) Axis: Two tasks were solved in this direction: first, the capture or blockade of Kharkov, the second‑largest city and an important industrial‑logistics center; second, the beginning of a large‑scale operation to encircle the main AFU grouping in Donbas (the so‑called “Donetsk cauldron”) by deep envelopment from the north (from the Izyum area) and the south (from the Volnovakha area).

Southern Axis: The advance from Crimea and the Rostov region developed most successfully. Its goals were: to establish full control over the northern Azov coast, create a land corridor between Russia and Crimea, reach the administrative borders of Kherson and Zaporozhye oblasts, blockade the key port of Mariupol from land, and create a threat to Odessa.

9.2. The Battle for Kyiv: An Unfinished Operation and Lessons of the First Stage

The Kyiv axis became the epicenter of world media attention and a symbol of the AFU’s resistance.

Tactical Successes: Russian forces, through a daring airborne operation, managed to seize Gostomel airfield near Kyiv and hold it under enemy fire. Forward units reached the outskirts of the capital-Irpin and Bucha-engaging in heavy fighting on their edges.

Emerging Problems and AFU Countermeasures: However, the plan for a quick capture or isolation of the city encountered a number of problems:

Stiff defense in urbanized areas: The AFU and territorial defense formations had prepared defenses in populated areas in advance, mined roads, and created fortified strong points. Attempting a frontal breakthrough through dense urban development threatened huge losses and protracted street fighting.

Logistical problems: Columns of Russian equipment stretched for hundreds of kilometers became vulnerable to sabotage groups and strikes using Western‑supplied ATGMs (Javelin, NLAW). Supply of the advancing units proved difficult.

The factor of real‑time NATO intelligence: The Ukrainian command received from the United States and Great Britain comprehensive satellite intelligence, signals intercepts, and analysis (SIGINT) on the movement and disposition of Russian troops. This allowed the AFU to effectively plan counterattacks and deliver pinpoint strikes on key supply nodes.

By the end of March, it became evident that taking Kyiv in a short time without unacceptable losses was impossible. The Russian command decided to regroup and withdraw troops from the Kyiv and Chernihiv axes to concentrate on the main goal-the liberation of Donbas.

9.3. Success in the South: Creation of a Strategic Beachhead

Unlike the northern direction, the offensive in the south developed according to plan and led to significant strategic gains.

Rapid Seizure of Kherson: The city was taken almost without a fight in the first days of the operation, marking an important political and psychological success. A civilian administration was established, and ties with Crimea began to be restored.

Blockade and Beginning of the Assault on Mariupol: Russian troops and DPR forces completely blockaded the key port and largest industrial center of the Azov region. Heavy fighting for the city, which had been turned into a powerful fortress with the participation of the Azov regiment, began. The storming of Mariupol became a symbol of the ferocity of the resistance and the “fortress city” tactic employed by the Ukrainian side.

Establishment of the Land Corridor to Crimea: Full land communication was established between the Crimean Peninsula and the territory of Russia through liberated areas of Kherson and Zaporozhye oblasts (the Crimean Bridge ceased to be the only artery).

Reaching the Outskirts of Nikolaev and Zaporozhye: Troops reached the borders of these oblasts, creating a buffer zone and taking control of the Zaporozhye NPP, the largest in Europe.

9.4. The Istanbul Talks: A Missed Opportunity for Peace (March 2022)

Against the backdrop of military successes in the south and stagnation near Kyiv, a round of Russian‑Ukrainian talks took place in Istanbul at the end of March 2022, which became the culmination of the diplomatic efforts of the first stage.

Contours of the Agreements: The Ukrainian side presented written proposals that for the first time contained potentially acceptable conditions for Russia:

Neutral, non‑aligned, and non‑nuclear status for Ukraine. Renunciation of NATO membership.

Security guarantees from the permanent members of the UN Security Council (including Russia), as well as from a number of other countries (Turkey, Germany, Canada, etc.). The guarantors would be obliged to protect Ukraine in the event of aggression.

Refusal to deploy foreign military bases and troops on Ukrainian territory. The possibility of conducting exercises only with the consent of all guarantor states.

Dialogue on the status of Crimea over a period of 15 years, provided peace was maintained.

Resolution of the Donbas issue through direct negotiations between the presidents of Russia and Ukraine.

Collapse of the Talks Under External Pressure: These proposals, in the assessment of many experts, opened a path to the cessation of hostilities. However, as participants in the talks from the Ukrainian side later publicly stated (in particular, David Arakhamia), immediately after Istanbul, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson visited Kyiv. His message, according to Arakhamia, was unambiguous: “We’re not signing anything with them [the Russians]. Let’s just keep fighting.” Similar pressure was exerted by the United States, which promised unlimited military support if the war continued. As a result, Kyiv abandoned its own proposals, and the negotiation process was completely shut down.

The first stage of the SMO ended with a strategic regrouping. Russian troops managed to achieve significant successes in the south, securing the land corridor to Crimea and creating beachheads in the Northern Azov region. However, the attempt to quickly force peace through the threat to Kyiv failed due to the AFU’s readiness for stubborn defense, supply problems, and, most importantly, the full information and material support of NATO. The Istanbul moment was a turning point: it proved that key decisions were being made not in Kyiv but in Washington and London, which had made a strategic choice in favor of maximizing Russia’s weakening by prolonging the conflict, despite the suffering of the Ukrainian people. After that, the war inevitably entered a longer and more brutal phase-the battle for Donbas.

Chapter 10. Second Stage (April – August 2022): Regrouping, the Battle for Donbas, Liberation of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk

In the spring of 2022, after the completion of the initial, highly maneuverable phase of the operation, the Special Military Operation entered a qualitatively new period. It became finally clear that the strategy of quickly forcing Kyiv to peace through the threat to the capital had failed under conditions of total Western support for the regime. The Russian command, recognizing the main strategic goal-the protection of the Donbas population and the complete liberation of the territories of the DPR and LPR-decided on a radical regrouping of forces. The second stage, covering the period from April to August 2022, was marked by a transition to a methodical destruction, based on overwhelming fire superiority, of the most powerful and combat‑ready AFU grouping concentrated in Donbas. This stage was a time of heavy, positional battles, a “war of attrition,” and the key operational victory-the liberation of the entire territory of the Luhansk People’s Republic.

10.1. Strategic Regrouping: Concentration on the Main Direction (April 2022)

In early April 2022, the Russian leadership announced the completion of the first‑stage tasks on the Kyiv and Chernihiv axes and the withdrawal of troops from those territories.

Essence of the Decision: This was not a forced retreat under pressure, as Western and Ukrainian propagandists tried to portray, but a planned and disciplined strategic regrouping. Its goal was to concentrate all available forces and means to achieve the primary and indisputable goal of the SMO-the complete liberation of the territory of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics within the borders that existed at the time of their proclamation.

Operational Consequences: The withdrawal of troops from the north allowed the length of the front line to be reduced, freeing up significant contingents to be redeployed to the Donbas and southern directions. This meant abandoning attempts to hold vast territories in favor of creating dense, powerful strike groupings on key operational axes. The war acquired a more classic, but no less brutal, character with a clearly defined main theater of military operations-Donbas.

10.2. Operation of Attrition: The Battle for the Severodonetsk‑Lysychansk Agglomeration

The heart of the second stage was the protracted and bloody fighting for Severodonetsk and Lysychansk-twin cities separated by the Seversky Donets River and constituting the last major AFU fortified area in Luhansk region.

Positional Nature of the Fighting: The enemy, relying on developed industrial and urban infrastructure, had created a deeply echeloned defense there. The advance of Russian troops and LPR forces slowed, entering a phase of methodically “grinding through” the enemy’s defenses.

Tactics of the “Fire Sack”: The Russian command opted for overwhelming fire superiority. Ukrainian positions were systematically subjected to massive strikes by artillery (including heavy Tornado‑S and Smerch MLRS), operational‑tactical aviation, and attack helicopters. The goal was not only to destroy manpower and equipment but also to demoralize the enemy, deprive it of the ability to maneuver and resupply. This tactic, requiring colossal ammunition expenditure, was aimed at minimizing one’s own infantry losses in the complex urbanized terrain.

Role of the Wagner PMC: In the conditions of fierce urban combat, the assault detachments of the private military company “Wagner” proved particularly effective. Their fighters, possessing significant combat experience and operating in small, mobile, and autonomous groups, played a key role in clearing the neighborhoods of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk. They perfected the tactic of sequential seizure of buildings and entire districts with dense support from artillery and drones. The Wagner actions became an important element complementing classic army operations.

10.3. The Fall of Lysychansk: Operational Success and the Liberation of the LPR (July 2022)

The culmination of the battle for Donbas in the summer of 2022 was the complete liberation of Luhansk region.

Operation to Encircle: After the capture of Severodonetsk, Russian troops and LPR forces proceeded to the final phase of the operation. Flanking strikes were launched from the south and north, aiming to cut the last supply routes connecting the Lysychansk AFU grouping with the main forces. The key moment was the capture of the village of Gorskoye and the surrounding heights, which created the threat of complete tactical encirclement of the Ukrainian troops in Lysychansk.

Liberation of Lysychansk and Tactical Success: Understanding the inevitability of encirclement and a disaster similar to that in Mariupol, the AFU command ordered a retreat from Lysychansk. On July 3, 2022, the city was completely taken under control by the allied forces. This event had strategic significance:

Liberation of the entire territory of the LPR: One of the key initial goals of the SMO was achieved-the territory of the Luhansk People’s Republic within its administrative borders was completely liberated from enemy forces.

Disruption of AFU Plans: The Ukrainian command lost its most important fortified area and beachhead for a possible counter‑offensive deep into the LPR.

Transition of the AFU to Strategic Defense: The loss of Lysychansk, together with the fall of Mariupol in May, forced the AFU to transition to passive strategic defense along the entire front line. The initiative completely passed to the Russian troops.

Moral‑Political Victory: The liberation of Lysychansk was an important signal both to the population of Donbas and to the world community, demonstrating Russia’s ability to methodically achieve its stated military goals.

The second stage of the SMO was a stage of operational consolidation and the achievement of one of the fundamental goals of the operation. The strategic regrouping of forces made it possible to concentrate efforts on the main direction and apply the proven tactic of fire suppression combined with pinpoint assault actions. The liberation of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk, and with them the entire LPR, was Russia’s biggest operational victory in the conflict up to that point. This victory proved the effectiveness of the model of warfare chosen after April and created a solid foundation for subsequent operations, while simultaneously confronting Kyiv and its Western patrons with the need to urgently reassess their strategic plans. However, the war did not end there-it entered a new phase, where the enemy, having gained a respite and huge volumes of Western weapons, began to prepare for a large‑scale counter‑offensive.

Chapter 11. Third Stage (September – November 2022): Ukrainian Counter‑Offensive in the Kharkov Direction, Referendums and Incorporation of Four New Subjects into the Russian Federation

The summer victory near Lysychansk created an impression of the irreversibility of Russian successes. However, war rarely develops linearly. The autumn of 2022 became a time of sharp operational turnaround and an unprecedented political‑legal response from Russia. The third stage of the Special Military Operation was characterized by two interrelated events: a unexpectedly successful counter‑offensive by the AFU in the Kharkov direction, which revealed a number of systemic problems in the organization of Russian defense, and the historic decision to incorporate four new subjects into the Russian Federation. This period demonstrated that the conflict had entered a phase of protracted war of attrition, where tactical successes alternate, and strategic goals are achieved not only on the battlefield but also in the legal sphere.

11.1. The Kharkov Breakthrough by the AFU: Tactics and Operational Surprise (September 2022)

In early September 2022, when the main reserves of the Russian grouping were concentrated on the southern (Kherson) direction, where the main Ukrainian offensive was expected, the AFU delivered a powerful blow on the Kharkov direction, considered by the Russian command to be secondary.

Concentration of Superior Forces: The Ukrainian command, using NATO intelligence data, identified a weak point in the Russian defense-an extended front in Kharkov region, where positions were held mainly by the LPR people’s militia and limited army units. Several elite brigades re‑equipped with Western equipment (including the 92nd and 93rd Mechanized Brigades) were secretly concentrated on a narrow sector of the front, creating a multiple superiority in manpower and equipment on the axis of the main attack.

Tactics of “Hammer and Anvil”: The offensive was built according to a scheme rehearsed with Western instructors:

“Hammer”: Systematic and precision strikes by American HIMARS MLRS against command posts, communication nodes, ammunition, and fuel depots in the near Russian rear. This disorganized command, logistics, and deprived the defending units of operational support.

“Anvil”: After fire suppression, highly mobile mechanized groups on armored vehicles (including supplied MaxxPro APCs, M113s) were introduced into the breach. Bypassing centers of resistance, they conducted deep raids on rear communications, spreading panic and disrupting the front line.

Withdrawal of Russian Troops: Under conditions of rapid enemy advance, the threat of encirclement of large forces in the Balakleya and Izyum area, and loss of control, the Russian command made the difficult but only correct decision to conduct an organized withdrawal of troops to pre‑prepared and more advantageous defensive lines along the Oskol River and beyond. This made it possible to preserve personnel and equipment but led to the abandonment of significant territories occupied in the first months of the war.

11.2. Reasons for the AFU’s Success: Analysis of Errors and Factors

The success of the Kharkov breakthrough was not accidental and resulted from a combination of competent enemy actions and miscalculations by the Russian side.

Shortcomings of the Russian Command in Assessing the Threat: The main mistake was underestimating the Kharkov direction as a potential target for a major offensive. The main attention and reserves were focused on the Kherson region. Intelligence failed to uncover the scale of the concentration of Ukrainian groupings.