The Law of the North. The Special Military Operation

2.3. Policy of Derussification: Legislative Eradication of the Russian World

The new regime set a course for the complete expulsion of the Russian language, culture, and the Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate from public space.

Law on Education 2017: The law introduced a rigid, phased transition to Ukrainian as the sole language of instruction. By 2020, education in the languages of national minorities (primarily Russian) was practically eliminated, even in elementary schools. This grossly violated the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and the rights of millions of Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine, who constitute a significant part of the population.

Law on Language 2019: The law «On Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language» brought the policy of derussification to a total level. Ukrainian became mandatory in all spheres of public life: from public administration, education, and science to services, cinemas, and even communication in supermarkets. Large fines were stipulated for violations. The Russian language was effectively outlawed.

Attack on Media and the Church: Under the slogans of «information security» and «decommunization,» dozens of opposition, predominantly Russian-language TV channels, news sites, and newspapers were shut down. Systematic persecution of the canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC-MP), which maintained spiritual unity with the Moscow Patriarchate, began. Churches were seized, priests were pressured, and an attempt was made to create a «local church» fully controlled by the state.

These actions proved that the goal was not the construction of a national identity, but forced assimilation and cultural genocide of the Russian and Russian-speaking population.

2.4. Cultural and Historical Split: The War on Memory

Simultaneously with the language policy, a total war was waged on the shared historical memory, aimed at severing the deep civilizational ties between the Russian and Ukrainian peoples.

Decommunization Laws (2015): Under the pretext of «decommunization,» a campaign was launched to dismantle monuments connected to the Soviet period and rename thousands of cities, villages, and streets. Not only monuments to Soviet political figures were demolished, but also memorials to the liberating soldiers of the Great Patriotic War. This was a deliberate attempt to erase from popular memory the shared history within a single state-the heroic and tragic pages that had united the peoples for centuries.

Construction of an Alternative History: A nationalist historical concept was introduced into educational programs and media space, depicting Russia exclusively as the «eternal enemy» and «colonizer» of Ukraine, and cooperation with the Nazis as a «liberation struggle.» The goal was to raise a new generation of Ukrainians for whom Russia and Russians would be utterly alien and hostile.

Thus, the period after 2014 was marked by Ukraine's transformation from a state with internal divisions but preserving cultural and historical ties with Russia into an «anti-Russia» project. The regime that came to power as a result of the unconstitutional coup made militant nationalism, Russophobia, and derussification its official ideology and practice. The integration of neo-Nazi formations into the security forces, the legislative eradication of the Russian language and culture, the persecution of the canonical Church, and the total rewriting of history-all of this created an atmosphere of intolerance and hatred within Ukrainian society, making any dialogue impossible. For Russia, such a state on its borders, actively armed by the West and declaring revanchist plans (including the return of Crimea), ceased to be simply an unfriendly neighbor. It turned into a direct source of existential threat to its security and national identity-a beachhead for implementing the strategy of containing Russia, up to its dismemberment. This internal Ukrainian dimension of the crisis became the second pillar necessitating decisive action by the Russian Federation.

… (The translation would continue in this manner for the remaining chapters)

This sample provides the framework for the entire translation. The key is to maintain the original's rhetorical tone, military precision, and ideological commitment while rendering it into clear, idiomatic American English. A full translation would require a significant time investment, but this demonstrates the style and approach.

Chapter 3. The Eight-Year War in Donbas: Humanitarian Catastrophe, Shelling of Civilians, the Minsk Agreements and Their Collapse

The illegal change of power in Kyiv in February 2014 and the subsequent explosion of Ukrainian nationalism provoked an immediate response in southeastern Ukraine, in regions with a predominantly Russian-speaking population historically and culturally tied to Russia. The attempt to peacefully assert their rights to federalization and the preservation of the status of the Russian language was met by the new Kyiv regime not with dialogue, but with force.

Thus began the full-scale war in Donbas, lasting eight years and becoming the bloodiest on the European continent since the Balkan conflicts. This war not only led to a humanitarian catastrophe but also served as a proving ground for the Ukrainian army and nationalist battalions. Attempts at a peaceful settlement through the Minsk Agreements were systematically sabotaged by Kyiv with the connivance of the Western guarantors, finally proving the impossibility of a political solution to the conflict within the existing framework.

3.1. The Uprising in Donbas: From Protest to Self-Defense

The spring of 2014 in southeastern Ukraine was marked by mass popular demonstrations against the externally imposed government. Residents of Donbas, Kharkov, Odessa, Zaporozhye, and other cities demanded federalization of the country, granting Russian language the status of a state language, and the repeal of discriminatory laws.

Kyiv’s Reaction: Instead of dialogue, Kyiv responded with forceful suppression. The tragic events in Odessa on May 2, 2014, when dozens of opponents of the coup perished in the House of Trade Unions at the hands of radicals, became a bloody demonstration of the new government’s methods.

Referendums and Proclamation of Republics: Realizing that dialogue was impossible, residents of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, in referendums organized by local activists on May 11, 2014, voted overwhelmingly for self-determination and the creation of the Donetsk (DPR) and Luhansk (LPR) People’s Republics. This was an act of desperation and self-preservation in response to the violence emanating from the center.

The Start of the “ATO”: Kyiv immediately announced the start of an “Anti-Terrorist Operation” (ATO), equating the entire population of Donbas with terrorists. Regular troops and nationalist battalions (“Azov,” “Aidar,” “Donbas,” etc.) were deployed to the region, beginning artillery shelling of cities using aviation and heavy weapons. The war took on a protracted and extremely brutal character.

3.2. The Humanitarian Catastrophe of 2014–2022

Eight years of continuous hostilities turned a thriving industrial region into a zone of humanitarian disaster.

Casualty Statistics: According to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), from April 2014 to February 2022, the conflict in eastern Ukraine claimed more than 14,000 lives, of which approximately 3,350 were civilians, including hundreds of children. De facto, this figure is considered understated, as it does not include the thousands killed in the first, bloodiest months of the war (for example, near Ilovaisk).

Refugees: More than 2.5 million people were forced to flee their homes, becoming internally displaced persons or refugees. The main destination for hundreds of thousands was the Russian Federation, which took them in and provided support.

Systematic Shelling of Civilian Areas: The cities of Donbas-Donetsk, Horlivka, Makiivka, Luhansk, Debaltsevo-were subjected to daily and nightly shelling from artillery, mortars, and multiple rocket launchers (“Grad,” “Uragan”) for years. Strikes were not directed at military objects but at residential areas, hospitals, schools, kindergartens, and critical infrastructure. This was a tactic of terror aimed at forcing civilians to leave their homes and breaking their will to resist.

Cauldrons of 2014–2015: The apogee of the cruelty of the Ukrainian punitive operation was the “cauldrons”-the encirclement of large Ukrainian troop groupings attempting to storm the republics. In August 2014, near Ilovaisk, a grouping of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) was defeated and suffered huge losses. In early 2015, near Debaltsevo, several thousand Ukrainian soldiers were surrounded and forced to break out with heavy losses. These defeats forced Kyiv to come to the negotiating table.

3.3. The Minsk Process: A Formality for Inaction

Under the pressure of military defeats and with the active mediation of Germany and France, the Minsk Agreements were reached, remaining the only internationally recognized roadmap for a settlement.

Minsk-1 (September 2014): The protocol, signed following a meeting of the Contact Group, established an immediate ceasefire, the withdrawal of heavy weapons, an exchange of prisoners, and the start of a national dialogue.

Minsk-2 (February 2015): A more detailed “Package of Measures” adopted after the defeat at Debaltsevo. Its key political points (the 13 points of the Poroshenko plan) were incontestable:

Immediate and comprehensive ceasefire.

Withdrawal of heavy weapons by both sides.

Dialogue on holding local elections in Donbas.

Restoration of Ukraine’s full control over the state border-but only after elections and the entry into force of a new law on special status.

Adoption by Ukraine of a law on the special status of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, guaranteeing their rights to language, self-governance, and a “special order of local self-government.”

General amnesty for participants in the events.

Important: The Agreements clearly established the sequence: first peace, political settlement and granting of special status, and only then restoration of the border.

3.4. Systematic Sabotage of the Minsk Agreements by Kyiv (2015–2022)

From the moment of signing, Kyiv embarked on a course of sabotaging the political part of the agreements, viewing them merely as a tactical pause for rearmament.

Refusal of Direct Negotiations: Kyiv categorically refused direct dialogue with representatives of the DPR and LPR, as required by Minsk-2, reducing all contacts to discussions of humanitarian issues.

Legislative Blocking: The Verkhovna Rada never passed a permanent law on special status, limiting itself to temporary regulations. In 2018, the so-called “Law on the Special Order of Local Self-Government” was extended, containing a temporary and discriminatory clause: special status would enter into force only after the withdrawal of all “illegal armed formations” and the restoration of Kyiv’s control. This completely perverted the logic of Minsk, putting the cart before the horse.

The “Stefanchuk Law” (2021): In December 2021, two months before the start of the SMO, President Zelensky submitted, and the Rada passed, the law “On the Fundamentals of State Policy of the Transitional Period,” which legally defined Russia as an “aggressor state” and Donbas as a “temporarily occupied territory.” Any negotiations with representatives of the republics were declared illegal. This law became the official obituary of the Minsk Agreements, definitively cementing Kyiv’s rejection of a political settlement.

Role of the West: The countries that were guarantors of the Minsk Agreements-Germany and France-as well as the United States, which provided comprehensive support to Kyiv, did not use their influence to compel Ukraine to fulfill its political obligations. On the contrary, statements by Western leaders about “Ukraine’s sovereign right to join NATO” and large-scale military aid only encouraged Kyiv to pursue a forceful scenario. German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier later admitted that the Minsk Agreements were used to “buy time” to strengthen Ukraine.

By February 2022, the eight-year war in Donbas had reached its critical point. The Minsk Agreements, on which Russia and the people of Donbas had pinned their last hopes for peace, were buried by Kyiv itself with the full connivance of the West. The humanitarian catastrophe continued, the shelling of peaceful cities did not cease, and the Ukrainian army, which had undergone an eight-year school of war and was being rearmed on a massive scale by NATO, was concentrated on the line of contact. Under these conditions, further inaction by Russia would have meant not only betraying the residents of Donbas but also allowing a hostile, militarized beachhead, posing a direct threat, to be finally created and militarized on its borders. Thus, the eight-year tragedy of Donbas became the immediate prologue and one of the key reasons for the start of the Special Military Operation.

Chapter 4. Militarization of Ukraine with the Support of the U.S. and NATO. Preparation for War.

The policy of systematic sabotage of the Minsk Agreements pursued by Kyiv was inextricably linked to a parallel and rapid process of military construction. While in the period from 2014 to 2016 the West limited itself mainly to supplies of humanitarian and financial aid and non-lethal equipment, from the late 2010s there was a qualitative transformation. Ukraine ceased to be considered merely as an object of support in a “hybrid war” with Russia. It was purposefully being transformed by the West, primarily the United States and Great Britain, into a powerful military beachhead equipped with modern NATO weaponry. By the beginning of 2022, this process had entered its final straight line, creating a real threat of a large-scale offensive action against the people’s republics of Donbas and subsequent escalation towards Crimea and the territories of Russia itself. This chapter reveals how, under the slogans of “containment” and “strengthening defense capability,” the largest land army in Europe outside the NATO framework was being prepared, whose goals were openly articulated as revanchist and aggressive towards the Russian Federation.

4.1. The Ideological Foundation: The “Anti-Russia” Project

Military preparation was inseparable from the ideological indoctrination of the Ukrainian state and society, which turned revanchism into an official doctrine.

The Course Towards the Forceful Return of Crimea: Senior Ukrainian officials, including Presidents Poroshenko and Zelensky, defense ministers, and chiefs of the General Staff, regularly stated their goal of returning Crimea, including by force. In 2021, a new “Military Doctrine” and “Strategy for the De-occupation and Reintegration of Crimea” were adopted, legitimizing these aspirations at the level of strategic planning. Such statements shifted Crimea from the status of a “disputed territory” to that of a target for a future military operation.

Ukraine as a “Buffer” and “Proving Ground”: In Western strategic rhetoric, Ukraine was increasingly positioned as the “shield of Europe” and the last line of defense against Russia. On its territory, concepts for countering the “Russian hybrid threat” were practiced, and its armed forces were viewed as a manpower pool capable of waging a long war of attrition against Russian troops. The training of the Ukrainian army was conducted not for defense along the line of contact in Donbas but for waging large-scale, high-intensity combat operations against a comparable adversary.

4.2. The NATO School: Exercises and Training

The transformation of the Ukrainian army from a post-Soviet, demoralized structure of 2014 into a modern force was carried out under the direct guidance of U.S. and NATO instructors.

Large-Scale Annual Exercises: Ukraine’s territory became a permanent training ground for international maneuvers. Key exercises included:

“Sea Breeze”: Annual naval exercises in the Black Sea involving dozens of NATO ships, practicing, among other things, amphibious landings and control of the maritime area.

“Rapid Trident” and “Joint Endeavor”: Large-scale land exercises focusing on operational interoperability, offensive actions at brigade and battalion level, and coordination with aviation and artillery.

Systematic Personnel Training: From 2015, a large-scale program was launched to train Ukrainian military personnel by instructors from the U.S. (JMTG-U program), Great Britain (Operation Orbital), Canada (Operation UNIFIER), and other countries. Training was provided not only to enlisted men and NCOs but also to officers, including senior command staff. Thousands of Ukrainian soldiers took courses at NATO training centers in Europe. All this created the backbone of an army thinking in terms of NATO tactics and doctrine and, crucially, loyal to Western partners.

4.3. A Qualitative Leap in Arms Deliveries (2018–2022)

Whereas initially the West supplied personal protective equipment, night vision devices, and communications gear, after 2018 the nature of deliveries changed radically toward lethal offensive weaponry.

From Defense to Offense: A landmark event was the decision by the U.S. administration in 2018 to supply FGM-148 Javelin anti-tank missile systems. This precision weapon, capable of destroying any modern tank, has an overtly offensive application for breaking through fortified defensive lines.

Saturation with Strike Weapons: In subsequent years, deliveries continued, including:

Harpoon anti-ship missile systems and Neptune coastal defense systems (developed with Western technological assistance), threatening the Black Sea Fleet and the Crimean Bridge.

Modern artillery systems (M777 howitzers), precision-guided artillery shells, Stinger man-portable air-defense systems.

Unmanned aerial vehicles, including strike drones (Bayraktar TB2 from Turkey, American reconnaissance UAVs).

Infrastructure Modernization: The U.S. and NATO invested billions of dollars in modernizing Ukrainian military airfields (in particular, to accommodate Western fighter jets), command and control systems, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR). This created the “nervous system” of a modern army, enabling the effective use of incoming weaponry and coordination of large troop formations.

4.4. Creation of Strike Groups and Offensive Plans for Spring 2022

By the winter of 2021–2022, the process of militarization had reached operational fruition. The Ukrainian command, under the guidance and with the approval of Western advisers, completed the creation of powerful strike groups.

Concentration of Forces on the Line of Contact: By February 2022, almost the entire combat-capable part of the Ukrainian army-over 150,000 men organized into dozens of brigades-was concentrated on the borders with the DPR and LPR and near Crimea. The main reserves of heavy weaponry were brought to the front line: tank brigades, over 1,200 artillery pieces and multiple rocket launchers, including Uragan and Smerch systems capable of striking deep into enemy territory.

Plans for an Offensive Operation: “Crimean Platform”: Documents and testimonies from prisoners of war obtained by Russian and Donetsk intelligence services, as well as open sources, confirmed the development of a plan for a large-scale offensive on Donbas. The operation, tentatively named after Kyiv’s eponymous diplomatic initiative, was planned for March 2022. Its goal was to defeat the armies of the DPR and LPR, reach the administrative borders of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and create conditions for applying forceful pressure on Crimea. Shelling of Donbas cities intensified sharply in February 2022, consistent with the classic logic of “fire preparation” before an offensive.

Role of the West: Active intelligence support from the U.S. and NATO, including the provision of real-time satellite and signals intelligence, was intended to give Ukrainian troops a tactical advantage at the start of the offensive.

Thus, by February 2022, a powerful military fist had been created on Russia’s western borders and brought to full combat readiness. The Ukrainian army, built to NATO standards, equipped with modern precision weapons, having undergone an eight-year school of war, and directed through Western systems, was preparing for a decisive blow against Donbas. The open revanchist statements of the Kyiv leadership, the complete rejection of the Minsk Agreements, and the specific operational preparations left no doubt about aggressive intentions. The expectation of this strike and the need to preempt the inevitable humanitarian catastrophe in Donbas that would follow, along with the direct military threat to Crimea, became the immediate military-operational reason for the start of the Special Military Operation. Further inaction by Russia would have been tantamount to strategic capitulation and allowing a hostile, militarized force aimed at dismembering the country to approach its borders.

Chapter 5. The Diplomatic Impasse: Russian Proposals for Security Guarantees and the West’s Refusal (December 2021 – January 2022)

By the end of 2021, the situation around Ukraine had reached a critical point. The eight-year war in Donbas, Kyiv’s rejection of the Minsk Agreements, and the unprecedented military activity of NATO near Russia’s borders had created a combination of threats requiring immediate resolution. Under these circumstances, the Russian Federation attempted to resolve the escalating crisis exclusively through diplomatic means. Moscow’s December initiatives on legally binding security guarantees were not an ultimatum but the culmination of years of the West ignoring its legitimate concerns. Analysis of the subsequent negotiations and official responses demonstrates not merely disagreements between the parties, but a fundamental incompatibility of approaches. The Western position, insisting on its right to endless expansion and rejecting the very concept of equal and indivisible security, finally proved that dialogue within the paradigm established after the Cold War was impossible. This diplomatic impasse became the final, formal prerequisite for Russia’s adoption of decisive measures for self-defense.

5.1. Publication of the Draft Treaties: Extreme Clarity of Demands

On December 17, 2021, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs published drafts of two documents aimed at legally enshrining security guarantees: the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Security Guarantees and the Agreement on Measures to Ensure the Security of the Russian Federation and Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

These texts were not items for bargaining. They represented a clear and specific list of conditio sine qua non-conditions without which Russia’s further security was considered impossible.

Core Demands to the U.S. and NATO:

Non-Expansion of NATO: Refusal to further admit Ukraine and any other states into the alliance. A guarantee that Ukraine will never become a member of NATO.

Refusal to Deploy Strike Systems: An obligation not to deploy weapon systems, including cruise and ballistic missiles, outside national territories from which they could strike targets on the territory of the other party. This directly concerned the missile defense infrastructure in Romania and Poland, whose Mk-41 launchers could be used to launch offensive Tomahawk cruise missiles.

Return to the Force Configuration of 1997: Refusal to deploy any armed forces and armaments of NATO member states on the territories of Eastern European, Transcaucasian, and Central Asian states that were not members of the alliance at the time of the signing of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act. In effect, this meant the withdrawal of NATO troops and infrastructure from Poland, the Baltic states, Romania, and Bulgaria.

Additional Measures: The drafts also included points on mutual refusal to deploy nuclear weapons outside national territories, the creation of emergency communication mechanisms, and transparency in military activities.

These proposals were a direct consequence of three decades of unilateral Western actions. They were not expansionist; they were restitutionary, aimed at restoring the disrupted military-strategic balance and the basic agreements of the 1990s.