The German Classics of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, Volume 10

What are these allusions to an imminent social revolution? Where are they to be found? Why does not the public prosecutor cite them? I call upon him to do so. But he cannot cite them. There is no passage in this pamphlet which will bear out his insinuations on this point.

It is true, throughout this pamphlet I make frequent use of the words "revolutionary" and "revolution;" although I do not speak of an "imminent social revolution," as the public prosecutor alleges. What I speak of is a social revolution which supervened in February, 1848. But with this word, "revolution," the public prosecutor hopes to crush me. For he, taking the word in its narrower legal sense alone, cannot read this word, "revolution," without conjuring up before his fancy the brandishing of pitchforks. But such is not the meaning of the word in its scientific use, and the consistent use of the term in my pamphlet might have apprised the public prosecutor of the fact that the term is there employed in its alternative, scientific signification. So, for instance, I speak of the development of the territorial principality as a "revolutionary" phenomenon.

And so again, on the other hand, I expressly declare that the peasant wars, which, assuredly, were sufficiently garnished with violence and bloodshed,—I declare these wars to have been a movement which was revolutionary only in the imagination of those who participated in them, whereas they were in reality not a revolutionary, but a reactionary movement.

The progress of industry which took place in the sixteenth century, on the contrary, I repeatedly and constantly characterize as a "really and veritably revolutionary fact" (page 7), although no sword was drawn on its account. Likewise I characterize (page 7) the invention of the spinning jenny in 1775 as a radical and effectual revolution.

Is this an abuse of language, or am I hereby introducing a novel use of words in making use of the term "revolution" in this sense,—in that I apply it to peaceful developments and deny it to sanguinary disturbances!

The elder Schelling says (Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit, Vol. VII, p. 351): "The happy thought of making freedom the all in all of Philosophy has not only made the human intellect free as regards its own motives and effected a greater change in this science in all directions than any earlier revolution," etc. The elder Schelling, at least, does not, like the public prosecutor's fancy, see pitchforks flashing before his eyes at the sound of the word "revolution." Applying the word, as he does, to the effects wrought by a philosophical principle, he takes it, as I do, in a sense which has no relation whatever to physical violence.

What, then, is the scientific meaning of this word "revolution," and how does revolution differ from reform? Revolution means transmutation, and a revolution is, accordingly, accomplished whenever, by whatever means, with or without shock or violence, an entirely new principle is substituted for what is already in effect. A reform, on the other hand, is effected in case the existing situation is maintained in point of principle, but with a more humane, more consequent or juster working out of this principle. Here, again, it is not a question of the means. A reform may be effected by means of insurrection and bloodshed, and a revolution may be carried out in piping times of peace. The peasant wars were an attempt at compelling a reform by force of arms. The development of industry was a full-blown revolution, accomplished in the most peaceable manner; for in this latter case an entirely new and novel principle was put in the place of the previously existing state of affairs. Both these ideas are developed at length and with great pains in the pamphlet under consideration.

How comes it that the public prosecutor alone has failed to understand me? Why is all this unintelligible to him alone, when every workingman understands it?

Now, even suppose that I had spoken of an "imminent social revolution," as in point of fact I did not; would I, therefore, necessarily have been talking of pitchforks and bayonets?

Professor Huber is a thoroughly conservative man, a strenuous royalist, a man who, on the adoption of the constitution of 1850, voluntarily resigned the professor's chair which he held in the University of Berlin, because, if I am rightly informed, he had scruples about subscribing to it; but at the same time he is a man who is with the deepest affection devoted to the welfare of the working classes, who has given the most painstaking study to their development and has written most excellent works upon that subject, particularly upon the history of industrial corporations or labor organizations. After having shown that the labor organizations of England, France, and Germany already have in hand a capital of fifty million thalers, Professor Huber says in this latest work (Concordia, p. 24):

"Under these circumstances and under the influences herein at work, and in view of the historical facts above indicated in outline, it is to be hoped that I need enter no disclaimer against Utopian daydreams of a universal millenium when I say that not only is a very substantial reform of the existing political conditions of the factory population practicable in such a measure as to bring about an elevation of their entire social and economic situation, but such a reform is to be looked for as in the natural course of things the assured outcome of the growth of labor organizations."

Here we have a prediction of a thoroughgoing social transmutation spoken of as the assured outcome of the labor-organization movement working out its effects simply within the lines of the peaceable and conventional course of things. But how if I, with all the stronger reason, had spoken of a prospective social change that might be expected to result from the combined force of the two factors, organized labor and universal suffrage?

But how can I be held accountable for the public prosecutor's literary limitations? for his lack of acquaintance with what is going on all around us in modern times and what science has already accepted and made a matter of record? Am I the scientific whipping-boy of the public prosecutor? If that were the case, the punishment which it would be for you, Mr. President and Gentlemen of the Court, to mete out to me would be something stupendous. But all that apart, how can an allusion to an imminent social revolution, even to a pitchfork revolution, constitute an instigation to hatred and contempt of the bourgeoisie? And this is, after all, what the public prosecutor must be held to allege in the passage cited, and this in fact is what he does allege. Hatred and contempt can be aroused against any man only by his own acts and their publicity. But how can anything done by Peter excite the hatred and contempt of Paul? If any one were to tell us: "The workingmen are going to get up a social revolution," how could that remark arouse hatred and contempt of the bourgeoisie? The passage in question, then, shows itself to have been one that makes no sense, either in point of grammar or in point of logic. It is not only untrue with a threefold untruth, but it is contradictory and meaningless. At least it is quite unintelligible to me.

I have as great difficulty in understanding the public prosecutor's language as he has in understanding mine. The Greeks were in the habit of calling any one barbaros (a barbarian) who did not understand the current speech. So the public prosecutor and I are both barbarians, the one to the other.

But this passage in the indictment which I have been analyzing brings up a third point at which I am alleged to have been guilty of inciting to hatred and contempt of the bourgeoisie. This is introduced with the word "particularly." The exposition and the allusions above spoken of are alleged to have incited to hatred and contempt, "particularly because the address contains a direct appeal to make the mastery of the working classes over the other classes of society the end of their endeavors, to be pursued with the most ardent and consuming passion." Suppose that such were the case; an exhortation addressed to a given class of society to pursue the vain ambition of a mastery over the other classes would be worthy of all reprobation, but it would still be legally permissible unless it urged to criminal acts. Every class in society is at liberty to strive for the control of the State, so long as it does not seek to realize its end by unlawful means. No political purpose is punishable, the means employed alone are. Now, the character of this prosecution, as a prosecution directed against a political bias, appears plainly and should be manifest to every one in every line of the indictment, in that it constantly charges incitement to the seeking of certain ends; it never attempts to show that criminal means have been employed, or that I have, in my address, urged the employment of such means. But even if I had been guilty of urging the working classes to resort to criminal means for gaining control over the other classes of society, then I could only have been indicted under Article 61,60 or some other article of the criminal code, but never under Article 100, or as having offended against that article by an instigation of the workingmen to hatred and contempt; for such an exhortation addressed to the working classes to make themselves masters of the other classes of society must have incited the workingmen to political ambition, but by no means to hatred and contempt of any third party. This ambition on the part of the workingmen could, of course, not have been fathered upon the bourgeoisie; and since responsibility for it could not have been put upon them, hatred and contempt of them could not have been aroused by the fact of such an ambition. It therefore appears again that this passage is quite devoid of grammatical and logical content. But upon what ground has the public prosecutor read into my address an exhortation urging to the pursuit of "mastery on the part of the workingmen over the other classes of society?"

All that I have to say in my pamphlet bearing on this head is that it is the destiny of the historical epoch beginning with February, 1848, to install the ethical principle of the working classes as the dominant principle of society, to make it the guiding principle of the State; the nature of this principle is expounded in my pamphlet, and I have already restated it in outline in the introductory part of my speech.

I repeatedly and explicitly express myself to the same effect. So I say (page 31) that, as in 1789 the revolution was a revolution of the third estate, so in this later case it was a revolution of the fourth estate, "which now seeks to erect its principle into the dominant principle of society and to permeate all institutions with it." Or again (page 32): "Whoever, therefore, appeals to the principle of the working class as the dominant principle of society;" and, further, on the same page: "We have now to examine, in three several hearings, this principle of the working class as the dominant principle of society." And (page 33): "Perhaps the idea of making the principle of the lowest class of society the dominant principle of the State and of society may seem to be a dangerous idea." I, then, proceed to develop, from page 39 onward, the difference between the ethical and political principle of the bourgeoisie and the ethical and political principle of the working class, and conclude on page 42 with the words: "This, then, is it, Gentlemen, that is to be characterized as the political principle of the working class," etc.

And because I present an exalted ethical principle, the noblest ethical principle which my intelligence is capable of grasping, the noblest ethical principle yet achieved by political philosophy, because I proclaim this as destined to become the guiding principle of the present period of history; because of this and because I bring evidence to show that this principle, as being the expression of the natural instinct due to the economic situation of the working classes, is properly to be designated as the principle of the working classes,—this is what the public prosecutor has construed into an atrocious crime, and has accused me of urging the working classes to aim at making their own class the masters of the other classes of society.

The public prosecutor appears to believe that I aspire to see the propertied classes reduced to servitude under the working classes, that I would invert history and make the landed gentry and the manufacturers the servants of the workingmen.

But however widely we may differ in the use of language, however much we may mutually be barbarians to one another, could such a misapprehension, or anything approaching it, be at all possible?

I develop (page 32) my view, explicitly and in detail, to the effect that this is precisely the characteristic mark of the fourth estate, that its principle contains no ground of discrimination, whether in point of fact or in point of law, such as could be erected into a domineering prerogative and applied to reconstruct the institutions of society to that end. The words I use are as follows (page 32): "Laborers we all are, in so far as we are willing to make ourselves useful to human society in any way whatever. This fourth estate, in the recesses of whose heart there lies no germ of a new and further development of privilege, is therefore a term coincident with the human race. Its concerns are, therefore, in truth the concerns of mankind as a whole; its freedom is the freedom of mankind itself; its sovereignty is the sovereignty of all men." And I thereupon go on to say: "Therefore, whoever appeals to the principle of the working class as the dominant principle of society, in the sense in which I have presented this idea,—his cry is not a cry designed to divide the classes of society," etc. And while I, with all my heart and soul, am making an appeal for the termination of all class rule and all class antagonism, the public prosecutor charges me with inciting the laborers to establish class rule over the propertied classes. I ask again: How is such an astonishing misunderstanding to be explained? Permit me once again, to quote the father against the son:

"The medium," says Schelling (Vol. I, p. 243, Abhandlungen zur Erläuterung des Idealismus der Wissenschaftslehre)—"The medium whereby intellects understand one another is not the circumambient atmosphere, but the joint and common freedom whose movements penetrate to the innermost recesses of the soul. A human spirit not consciously replete with freedom is excluded from all spiritual communion, not only with others but even with himself. No wonder, therefore, that he remains incomprehensible to himself as well as to others, and wearies himself in his pitiable solitude with empty words which stir no friendly response whether in his own or in another's breast. To be unintelligible to such an unfortunate is a credit and an honor before God and man."

So says Schelling, the father.

Gentlemen, I have now reached the close of my argument. It were bootless to ask whether this charge could possibly have any weight with you, Mr. President and Gentlemen of the Court. But there was probably another design at the root of the prosecution. The political struggle between the bourgeoisie and the government has lately shown some slight signs of life. It has, not improbably, been thought that under these circumstances a prosecution for incitement of the unpropertied classes to hatred and contempt of the propertied classes would create an effective diversion; it was probably hoped that even if such an accusation were dismissed by you, still—you remember the ancient adage: calumniare audacter, semper aliquit haeret61—it would serve as a wet towel to bind about the slightly-inflamed countenance of our bourgeoisie,—and so, with this in view, Gentlemen, I was selected as the scapegoat to be driven out into the wilderness. But even this design, Gentlemen, will fail.

It will fail shamefully through the mere reading of my pamphlet, which I most particularly commend to the bourgeoisie. It will fail before the force of my own voice; and precisely with this in view I felt called on to go so extensively into the facts of the case in my defense. We are all, bourgeoisie and laborers, members of one people, and we stand firmly together against our oppressors.

Let me now close. Upon a man who, as I have presented the matter to you, has devoted his life under the motto, "Science and the Workingmen," even a sentence which may meet him on the way will make no other impression beyond that made upon a chemist by the breaking of a retort used by him in his scientific experiments. With a momentary knitting of the brow and a reflection on the physical properties of matter, as soon as the accident is remedied he goes on with his experiments and his investigation as before.

But I appeal to you that for the sake of the nation and its honor, for the sake of science and its dignity, for the sake of the country and its liberty under the law, for the sake of your own memory as history shall preserve it, Mr. President and Gentlemen of the Court, acquit me.

* * * * *

OPEN LETTER TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE (1863)

FOR THE SUMMONING OF A GENERAL GERMAN WORKINGMEN'S CONGRESS AT LEIPZIG BY FERDINAND LASSALLETRANSLATED BY E.H. BABBITT, A.B

Assistant Professor of German, Tufts College

Gentlemen:—You have asked me in your letter to express my opinion, in any way that seems suitable to me, on the workingmen's movement and the means which it should use to attain an improvement of the condition of the working class in political, material, and intellectual matters—especially on the value of associations for the class of people who have no property.

I have no hesitation in following your wishes, and I choose the form which is simplest and most suitable to the nature of the matter—the form of a public letter of reply to your communication.

Last October in Berlin, at a time when I was absent from here, during your first preliminary discussion concerning the German Workingmen's Congress—a discussion which I followed in the newspapers with interest—two opposing views were brought forward in the meeting.

One was to the effect that you have no concern whatever with political agitation and that it has no interest for you.

The other, in distinction from this, was that you were to consider yourselves an appendix to the Prussian Progressive party, and to furnish a sort of characterless chorus or sounding-board for it.

If I had attended that meeting, I should have expressed myself against both views. It is utterly narrow-minded to believe that political agitation and political progress do not concern the workingman. On the contrary, the workingman can expect the realization of his legitimate ambitions only from political liberty.

Even the question to what extent you are allowed to meet, discuss your interests, form general and local unions for their consideration, etc., is a question which depends upon the political situation and upon political legislation, and therefore it is not worth the trouble even to refute such a narrow view by further consideration.

No less false and misleading was the other view which was placed before you, namely, to consider yourselves politically a mere annex of the Progressive party.

It would certainly be unjust not to recognize that the Progressive party, in its struggle with the Prussian Government, performed at that time a certain service, though a moderate one, in behalf of political liberty, by its insistence upon the right of granting appropriations and its opposition to the reorganization of the army in Prussia.

Nevertheless the realization of that suggestion is completely out of the question, for the following reasons:

In the first place, such a position was in no way fitting for a powerful independent party with much more important political purposes, such as the German Workingmen's party should be, with reference to a party which, like the Prussian Progressive party, has set up as its standard, in the matter of principle, only the maintenance of the Prussian constitution, and, as the basis of its activity, only the prevention of the one-sided organization of the army—which is not even attempted in other German countries; or the insistence upon the right of granting appropriations—which is not even disputed in other German countries.

In the second place, it was in no way certain that the Prussian Progressive party would carry on its conflict with the Prussian Government with that dignity and energy which alone are appropriate for the working class, and which alone can count upon its warm sympathy.

In the third place, it was also not certain that the Prussian Progressive party, even if it had won a victory over the Prussian administration, would use this victory in the interest of the whole people, or merely for the maintenance of the privileged position of the bourgeoisie; in other words, that it would apply this victory toward the establishment of the universal equal and direct franchise, which is demanded by democratic principles and by the legitimate interests of the working class. In the latter case it evidently could not make the slightest claim to any interest on the part of the German working class.

That is what I should have said to you at that time with reference to that suggestion.

Today I can add furthermore that in the meantime it has been shown by facts—a thing which at that time would not have been very difficult to foresee—that the Progressive party is completely lacking in the energy which would have been required to carry to a conclusion, in a dignified and victorious manner, even such a limited conflict between itself and the Prussian administration.

And since it continues, in spite of the denial by the Government of the right of granting appropriations, to meet and to carry on parliamentary affairs with the ministry, which has been declared by the party itself criminally liable, it humiliates, by this contradiction, itself and the people through a lack of force and dignity without parallel.

Since it continues to meet, to debate, and to arrange parliamentary affairs with the administration itself—in spite of the violation of the constitution which it has declared to exist—it is a support to the administration and aids it in maintaining the appearance of a constitutional situation.

Instead of declaring the sessions of the Chamber closed until the administration has declared that it will no longer continue the expenditures refused by the Chamber, instead of thus placing upon the administration the unavoidable alternative either of respecting the constitutional right of the Chamber or of renouncing every appearance of a constitutional procedure, of ruling openly and without prevarication as an absolute government, of taking upon itself the tremendous responsibility of absolutism, and thus of precipitating the crisis which must necessarily come, in time, as the result of open absolutism, this party by its own action enables the administration to unite all the advantages of absolute power with all the advantages of an apparently constitutional procedure.

And since, instead of forcing the administration into open and unconcealed absolutism and by that action enlightening the people as to the non-existence of constitutional procedure, it consents to continue to play its part in this comedy of mock constitutionalism, it helps maintain an appearance which, like every system of government based on appearances, must have a confusing and debasing effect upon the intelligence of the people.

Such a party has in this way shown that it is, and always will be, utterly impotent against a determined administration.

Such a party has shown that it is for this very reason entirely incapable of accomplishing even the slightest genuine development of the interests of liberty.

Such a party has shown that it has no claim to the sympathies of the democratic classes of the population, and that it has no realization and no understanding of the feeling of political honor which must permeate the working class.

Such a party has, in a word, shown by its action that it is nothing else than the resurrection of the unsavory Gotha idea, decked out with a different name.

I can add today also the following facts: Today, as at that time, I should have been obliged to say to you that a party which compels itself through its dogma of Prussian leadership to see in the Prussian administration the chosen Messiah for the German renaissance—while there is not a single German administration (even including Hesse), which is more backward than the Prussian in political development, and while there is hardly a single German government (and this includes Austria) which is not far ahead of Prussia—for this reason alone loses all claim to representing the German working class; for such a party shows by this alone a depth of illusion, self-conceit, and incompetence drunken with the sound of its own words, which must dash all hope of expecting from it a real development of the liberty of the German people.