The German Classics of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, Volume 10

During the Crimean War, therefore, we were in constant danger of war. The war lasted till 1856, when it was at last concluded by the treaty of Paris, and we found, in the Congress of Paris a sort of Canossa prepared for us, for which I should not have assumed the responsibility, and against which I vainly counseled at the time. We were not at all obliged to play the part of a greater power than we were, and to sign the treaties made there. But we were dancing attendance with the view of being permitted to sign the treaty. This will not again happen to us.

That was in 1856, and as early as in 1857 the problem of Neuchâtel was again threatening us with war. This did not become generally known. In the spring of that year I was sent to Paris by the late king to negotiate with Emperor Napoleon concerning the passage of Prussian troops in an attack upon Switzerland. Everyone who hears this from me will know what this would have meant in case of an understanding, and that it could have become a far-reaching danger of war, and might have involved us with France as well as with other powers. Emperor Napoleon was not unwilling to agree. My negotiations in Paris, however, were terminated because his majesty the king in the meanwhile had come to an amicable understanding in the matter with Austria and Switzerland. But the danger of war, we must agree, was present also during that year.

While I was on this mission in Paris, the Italian War hung in the air. It broke out a little more than a year later and came very near drawing us into a big general war of Europe. We went so far as to mobilize, and we should undoubtedly have taken the field, if the peace of Villafranca had not been concluded, somewhat prematurely for Austria, but just in time for ourselves, for we should have been obliged to wage this war under unfavorable circumstances. We should have turned this war, which was an Italian affair, into a Franco-Prussian war, and its cessation, outcome, and treaty of peace would no longer have depended on us, but on the friends and enemies who stood behind us.

Thus we came into the sixties without the clouds of war having cleared from the horizon for even one single year.

Already in 1863 another war threatened hardly less ominously, of which the people at large knew little, and which will only be appreciated when the secret archives of the cabinets will be made public. You may remember the Polish uprising of 1863, and I shall never forget the morning calls which I used to receive at that time from Sir Andrew Buchanan, the English ambassador, and Talleyrand, the French representative, who tried to frighten me out of my wits by attacking the Prussian policy for its inexcusable adherence to Russia, and who used rather a threatening language with me. At noon of the same days I then used to have the pleasure of listening in the Prussian diet to somewhat the same arguments and attacks which the foreign ambassadors had made upon me in the morning. I suffered it quietly, but Emperor Alexander lost his patience, and wished to draw his sword against the plotting of the western powers. You will remember that the French forces were then engaged with American projects and in Mexico, which prevented France from taking a vigorous stand. The Emperor of Russia was no longer willing to stand the Polish intrigues of the other powers, and was ready to face events in our company and to go to war. You will remember that Prussia was struggling at that time with difficult interior problems, and that in Germany the leaven had begun to work in the minds of the people, and the council of the princes in Frankfort was under contemplation. It may be readily granted, therefore, that the temptation for my gracious master was very strong to cut, and thus to heal, his difficult position at home by agreeing to a military undertaking on a colossal scale.

At that time war of Prussia and Russia together against those who were protecting the Polish insurrection against us would undoubtedly have taken place if his majesty had not recoiled from the thought of solving home difficulties, Prussian as well as German, with foreign help. We declined in silence, and without revealing to the other German powers who had hostile projects against us the reasons which had determined our course. The subsequent death of the King of Denmark changed the trend of thought of everybody interested. But all that was needed to bring about the great coalition war in 1863 was a "Yes" instead of a "No" from His Majesty the King in Gastein. Anybody but a German minister would perhaps have counseled affirmatively, from reasons of utility and opportunism in order to solve thereby our home difficulties. You see neither our own people nor foreigners really have a proper appreciation of the amount of national loyalty and high principles which guides both the sovereign and his ministers in the government of German states.

The year 1864—we just spoke of 1863—brought a new pressing danger of war. From the moment when our troops crossed the Eider, I was ready every week to see the European Council of Elders interfere in this Danish affair, and you will agree with me that this was highly probable. But in those days we could observe that it is not so very easy for Europe to attack Austria and Prussia when they are united; and remember that the German federation which supported these two states at that time had not nearly the same military importance which the identical countries possess today. The difficulty of an attack on Austria and Prussia showed itself even then, but the danger of a war remained the same.

In 1865 it faced about, and the preparations for the war of 1866 were beginning. I only remember a meeting of the Prussian cabinet which took place in Regensburg in 1865 with a view to procuring the necessary money, but which was rendered futile by the agreement of Gastein. In 1866, however, the war broke out in full force, as you know. A circumspect use of events alone enabled us to ward off the existing danger of turning this duel between Prussia and Austria into a fierce European war of coalition, when our very existence, our life and all we had, would have been at stake.

This was in 1866, and in 1867 the Luxembourg problem arose, when only a somewhat firmer reply was needed to bring about the great French war in that year,—and we might have given it, if we had been so strong that we could have counted on sure success. From then on, during 1868, 1869, and up to 1870 we were living in constant apprehension of war, and of the agreements which in the time of Mr. von Beust were being made in Salzburg and other places between France, Italy, and Austria, and which, we feared, were directed against us. The apprehension of war was so great at that time that I received calls—I was the President of the cabinet—from merchants and manufacturers, who said: "The uncertainty is unbearable. Why don't you strike the first blow? War is preferable to this continued damper on all business!" We waited quietly until we were struck, and I believe we did well to arrange matters so that we were the nation which was assailed and were not ourselves the assailants.

Now, since the great war of 1870 was waged, has there been a year, I ask you, without the danger of war? In the first years of the seventies—the very moment we came home, the question arose: "When will be the next war? When will revenge be given? Within five years at the latest, no doubt?" We were told: "The question whether we shall have to fight and with what success surely rests with Russia now-a-days. Russia alone holds the hilt." It was a representative of the Catholic party who thus remonstrated with me in the Reichstag. I may possibly revert to this subject later. In the meanwhile I wish to complete the picture of the forty years by saying that in 1876 the clouds of war again began to gather in the south. In 1877 the Balkan War was waged, which would have led to a conflagration of the whole of Europe, if this had not been prevented by the Congress gathered in Berlin. After the Congress an entirely new eastern picture presented itself to us, for Russia was offended by our attitude in the Congress. I may revert to this later, if my strength permits.

Then there followed a period when we felt the results of the intimate relations of the three emperors, which for some time permitted us to face the future with greater placidity. But at the first symptoms of any instability in the relations of the three emperors or of the termination of the agreements which they had made with one another, public opinion was possessed by the same nervous and, I believe, exaggerated excitement with which we have had to contend these last years, and which I consider especially uncalled for today.

From my belief that this excitement is uncalled for I am far from drawing the conclusion that we do not need an increase in our armaments. The very opposite is my view, and this may explain the tableau of forty years which I have just exhibited before you, possibly not for your enjoyment, and I ask your pardon.

But if I had omitted even one of those years, which you yourselves have lived through with trembling, you would not have received the impression that the state of apprehension of great wars is permanent with us. Great complications and all kinds of coalitions, which no one can foresee, are constantly possible and we must be prepared for them. We must be so strong, irrespective of momentary conditions, that we can face any coalition with the assurance of a great nation which is strong enough under circumstances to take her fate into her own hands. We must be able to face our fate placidly with that self reliance and confidence in God which are ours when we are strong and our cause is just. And the Government will see to it that the German cause will be just always.

We must, to put it briefly, be as strong in these times as we possibly can be, and we can be stronger than any other nation of equal numbers in the world. I shall revert to this later—but it would be criminal if we were not to make use of our opportunity. If we do not need our full armed strength, we need not summon it. The only problem is the not very weighty one of money—not very weighty I say in passing, because I have no wish to enter upon a discussion of the financial and military figures, and of the fact that France has spent three milliards for the improvement of her armaments these last years, while we have spent scarcely one and one half milliards, including what we are asking of you at this time. But I leave the elucidation of this to the minister of war and the representatives of the treasury department.

When I say that it is our duty to endeavor to be ready at all times and for all emergencies, I imply that we must make greater exertions than other people for the same purpose, because of our geographical position. We are situated in the heart of Europe, and have at least three fronts open to an attack. France has only her eastern, and Russia only her western frontier where they may be attacked. We are also more exposed to the dangers of a coalition than any other nation, as is proved by the whole development of history, by our geographical position, and the lesser degree of cohesiveness, which until now has characterized the German nation in comparison with others. God has placed us where we are prevented, thanks to our neighbors from growing lazy and dull. He has placed by our side the most warlike and restless of all nations, the French, and He has permitted warlike inclinations to grow strong in Russia, where formerly they existed to a lesser degree. Thus we are given the spur, so to speak, from both sides, and are compelled to exertions which we should perhaps not be making otherwise. The pikes in the European carp-pond are keeping us from being carps by making us feel their teeth on both sides. They also are forcing us to an exertion which without them we might not make, and to a union among us Germans, which is abhorrent to us at heart. By nature we are rather tending away, the one from the other. But the Franco-Russian press within which we are squeezed compels us to hold together, and by pressure our cohesive force is greatly increased. This will bring us to that state of being inseparable which all other nations possess, while we do not yet enjoy it. But we must respond to the intentions of Providence by making ourselves so strong that the pikes can do nothing but encourage us.

Formerly in the years of the Holy Alliance—I am just thinking of an American song which I learned of my late friend Motley: "In good old colonial times, when we lived under a King"—well those were the good old patriarchal times when we had many posts to guide us, and many dikes to protect us from the wild floods of Europe. There were the German Union, and the real support and consummation of the German Union, the Holy Alliance. We had support in Russia and in Austria, and, above all, the guaranty of our diffidence that we should never express an opinion before the others had spoken.

All this we have lost; we must help ourselves. The Holy Alliance was wrecked in the Crimean War—not through our fault. The German Union has been destroyed by us, because the existence which we were granted within it was unbearable in the long run for ourselves and the German people as well. After the dissolution of the German Union and the war of 1866, Prussia, as it was then, or North Germany, would have become isolated, if we had been obliged to count with the fact that nobody would be willing to pardon our new successes—the great successes which we had won. No great power looks with favor on the successes of its neighbors.

Our relations with Russia, however, were not disturbed by the experience of 1866. In that year the memory of Count Buol's policy and of the policy of Austria during the Crimean War was too fresh in Russia to permit the rise of the thought that Russia could assist the Austrian monarchy against the Prussian attack, or could renew the campaign, which Emperor Nicholas had fought for Austria in 1849—ask your pardon, if I sit down for a moment. I cannot stand so long.

Our most natural support, therefore, still remained with Russia, due very properly to the policy of Emperor Alexander I. in this century—not to speak of the last century at all. In 1813 he might well have turned back at the Polish frontier, and have made peace, and later he might have dropped Prussia. We certainly owed our reëstablishment on the old basis at that time to the benevolence of Emperor Alexander I.—or, if you wish to be sceptical, you may say to the Russian policy, which was such as Prussia needed. Gratitude for this dominated the reign of Frederick William III. The credit, however, which Russia had in the Prussian accounts was used up by the friendship, I may even say servility, of Prussia during the entire reign of Emperor Nicholas, and was, I own, wiped out at Olmütz. There Emperor Nicholas did not take the part of Prussia, nor did he keep us from evil experiences or certain humiliations, for Emperor Nicholas really preferred Austria to Prussia. The idea that we owed Russia any thanks during his reign is a historical myth.

We did, nevertheless, not break our traditional relations with Russia while he lived; and in the Crimean War we remained true, as I said before, to our Russian duty, in spite of many threats and great dangers. His Majesty, the late King, had no desire to play a decisive part in the war by a great levy of troops, as I believe we could have done. We had made certain treaties requiring us to put in the field 100,000 men after the lapse of a stated time; and I proposed to His Majesty to levy not 100,000 but 200,000 men, and mounted at that, whom we could use as well toward the right as toward the left, in which case, I said, Your Majesty will be the arbiter of the Crimean War. But the late King did not cherish warlike enterprises, and the people ought to be grateful to him. I was younger then, and less experienced than I am today. At any rate we harbored no resentment for Olmütz during the Crimean War. We came out of this war as the friends of Russia, and I was enabled to enjoy the fruit of this friendship, when as ambassador I was most kindly received in St. Petersburg, both at court and in society at large. Even our espousing the cause of Austria in the Italian War, while not to the liking of the Russian cabinet, showed no harmful effects. Our war of 1866 was regarded in Russia with a certain amount of satisfaction, for the Russians were glad to see Austria suffer. In our French war of 1870 we were fortunate enough to be able to serve the Russian interests in the Black Sea at the same time that we were successful in defending and guarding our own. The contracting parties probably would not have removed their restrictions from the Black Sea, if the victorious German troops had not been standing near Paris. If we had been beaten, the London agreement in the interest of Russia would not have been made so easily, I believe. Thus also the war of 1870 carried in its train no disagreement between us and Russia. I mention these matters in order to explain to you the origin of our treaty with Austria, which was published a few days ago, and to defend the policy of His Majesty against the reproach of having enlarged the possibilities of war for the German empire, by adding to them the chances which may befall Austria without any fault of her own. I am, therefore, going to describe to you how it happened that our traditional relations with Russia, which I had always and very gladly fostered, became so altered that we were induced to conclude the treaty published day before yesterday.

The first years after the French war passed in the best of friendship. In 1875 there suddenly appeared the inclination of my Russian colleague, Prince Gortschakoff, to work for popularity with France rather than with us, and to make the world believe, by means of certain artificially created events and an interpolated telegram, that we had harbored the idea, however remote, of invading France, and that his intercession alone had saved France from this danger. This occasioned the first estrangement between us, and led to a serious discussion between me and my former friend and later colleague. All this time and subsequently we were still clinging to the task of maintaining peace among the three emperors, and of continuing the relationship begun by the visits of the emperors of Russia and Austria here in Berlin in 1872, and the subsequent return visits. We were succeeding in this, when in 1876, before the Turkish War, pressure was brought to bear upon us to choose between Russia and Austria. This we refused to do. I do not deem it advantageous to discuss the details. They will be known some time. The result of our refusal was that Russia turned to Vienna directly, and entered into an agreement with Austria—I believe it was in January, 1877—concerning the possibilities of an Oriental crisis, granting her, if The crisis should take place, the occupation of Bosnia, etc. Then the war took place, and we were very glad that the storm raged further south than it had threatened at first. The war was definitely concluded here in Berlin by the Congress, after the preliminaries had been settled by the peace of San Stefano. The peace of San Stefano, I am convinced, was not more risky for the anti-Russian powers nor much more favorable for Russia than the subsequent congressional treaty. The stipulations of San Stefano were realized, one may say, of their own accord later on, when the little state of East Rumelia, with only 800,000 souls I believe, joined Bulgaria and thereby reestablished on its own responsibility the old San Stefano frontier, although not quite exactly. The damage, therefore, which the Congress inflicted on the agreements of San Stefano was not very considerable. Whether these agreements were masterpieces of diplomacy I leave undecided. We had then very little desire to mix in Oriental affairs, just as we have today.

I was seriously ill in Friedrichsruh when I was officially notified of the Russian wish to call a Congress of the great powers in Berlin for the definite settlement of the war. I was at first not favorably inclined, because I was physically incapacitated, and because I did not wish to involve ourselves in these matters to the extent which the presidency of a Congress necessitates. My final compliance was partly due to the German sense of duty, which does anything in the interest of peace, and partly to the grateful memory of the favors of Alexander I., which I have always remembered, and which induced me to grant also this request. I declared my willingness, provided we could secure the acceptance of England and Austria. Russia undertook to secure the consent of England, and I agreed to recommend the plan in Vienna. We were successful, and the Congress took place.

During the Congress, I may well say, I played my part—without hurting the interests of my country or of our friends—just as if I had been the fourth Russian plenipotentiary—I may almost say the third, for I can hardly accept Prince Gortschakoff as a representative of the then Russian policy, which was more truly represented by Count Schuwaloff.

During the whole course of the congressional deliberations I heard of no Russian wish which I did not recommend and push through. Thanks to the confidence which Lord Beaconsfield—unfortunately dead now—reposed in me, I called at his sickbed in the middle of the night during the most difficult and critical moments of the Congress, when disruption seemed near, and obtained his consent. In short my behavior in the Congress was such that I said to myself when it was over: "If the highest Russian decoration set in diamonds had not been bestowed upon me long ago, I should surely receive it now." I had the feeling of having done something for a foreign power which is rarely vouchsafed to a foreign minister to do.

What, then, were my surprise and natural disappointment, when gradually a sort of newspaper campaign began in St. Petersburg, attacking the German policy, and casting suspicion on my personal intentions. These attacks increased in the following year to the strong request, in 1879, for pressure to be exerted by us on Austria in matters where we could not attack the Austrian rights as such. I could not consent, for, if we should have been estranged from Austria, we should necessarily have fallen into a dependence on Russia, unless we were satisfied with standing entirely alone in Europe. Would such a dependence have been bearable? Formerly I had believed it might be, when I had said to myself: "We have no conflicting interests at all. There is no reason why Russia should ever cancel our friendship." At least I had never contradicted my Russian colleagues when they expounded such theories to me. The Russian behavior concerning the Congress disappointed me and told me that we were not protected from being drawn into a conflict with Russia against our wishes, even if we placed our policy (for a time) completely at her disposal. The disagreement concerning instructions which we had given or had not given to our representatives in the south grew, until threats resulted, threats of war from the most authoritative quarter.

This is the origin of our Austrian Treaty. By these threats we were compelled to choose between our two former friends, a decision which I had avoided through several decades. At that time I negotiated in Gastein and in Vienna the treaty which was published day before yesterday and which is in force between us today.

The publication has been partly misunderstood in the newspapers, as I read yesterday and the day before. People have wanted to see in it an ultimatum, a warning, and a threat. A threat could not possibly be contained in it, since the text of the treaty has been known to Russia for a long while, and not only since November of last year. We considered it due to the sincerity of so loyal a monarch as the Emperor of Russia not to leave a doubt concerning the actual state of affairs.

Personally I see no chance for us not to have concluded this treaty. If we had not done it, we should have to do it now. It possesses the finest quality of an international treaty, in that it is the expression of the lasting interests of both parties, Austria as well as ourselves. No great power can for any length of time cling to the wording of a treaty against the interests of its own people; it will at last be forced to declare openly: "Times have changed; we can no longer do this;" and will have to defend its action as best it can before its own people and the other contracting party. But no power will approve a course which leads its own people to destruction, for the sake of the letter of a treaty signed under different conditions. Nothing of this kind, however, is contained in these treaties. The treaty concluded with Austria, as well as other similar ones existing between us and other powers, notably some agreements into which we have entered with Italy, are the expression of common interests in mutual aspirations and dangers. Italy, like ourselves, has been obliged to fight against Austria for her right to establish her national union. At present both of us are living in peace with Austria, sharing with her the wish to ward off the dangers which are threatening all alike. Together we wish to preserve the peace, which is as dear to the one as to the other, and to protect our home—developments to which all of us are determined to devote ourselves. It is these aims and the mutual confidence that the treaties will be kept, and that no one will grow more dependent by them than their own interests permit, which make these treaties firm, durable and permanent!