The German Classics of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, Volume 10

Nevertheless, the Berlin budget for the poor amounts to 5,000,000 marks—these are the latest figures—and for the care of the sick poor to 1,900,000 marks. Why these two items should be separated I do not know. Together, therefore, they amount to about 7,000,000 marks, or 7 marks per capita, while the average of the large cities is 4 marks. If such a poor-tax of 7 marks per capita were extended to the whole empire, it would yield 300,000,000 marks; and if the direct taxes of Berlin, amounting to 23 marks per capita, were levied on the empire, we should receive more than one milliard marks in direct taxes, including those on rents and incomes. Fortunately not all the people of the empire are living under a liberal ring, and least of all the inhabitants of cities where the majority of the workingmen have joined unions or similar associations. We have discovered the remarkable fact that Oberneunkirchen with its large factory population pays only 0.58 mark, and Duttweiler 0.72 mark per capita for the care of their poor.

These are instances which throw light on the relief of the communities if a system similar to that of the unions would be introduced. I do not at all intend to make so expensive a proposition to you, and I have already said that we shall have to work on this legislation for at least a generation. But look at the glaring examples of Duttweiler and Oberneunkirchen. Without their unions their budgets for the poor would perhaps not rise to the Berlin figure, but they would easily amount to 5 marks per capita. Actually, however, they are less than 1 mark, and almost as low as 1/2 mark. What a tremendous burden will be taken from the charity departments of a city of ten thousand inhabitants by a law like the one under discussion! Why, then, should they not be asked to make some kind of a contribution to the insurance fund? But the contributions should not be made by the districts, but by larger units, and, since the State is the largest, I insist that the contributions should be made by the State. If you do not yield in this point to the allied governments, I shall look placidly, and without being offended, toward further discussions and another session of the Reichstag. This I consider to be the all-important part of the law, and without it the bill would no longer appear to me to be as valuable as I have thought it was, and would seem to lack the chief characteristic which induced me to become its sponsor.

The previous speaker and the Honorable Mr. Bamberger have looked askance at the Economic Council. This, gentlemen, was perfectly natural, for competition in eloquence is as much disliked as in business; and there are in this Council not only men of exceptionally great practical knowledge, but also some very good speakers. When the Council has been more firmly established these men will perhaps deliver as long and expert speeches as those representatives are doing who pass themselves off as the expert spokesmen of labor. I really do not consider it to be polite, or politically advantageous, to refer to the councillors who have come here, at the call of their king, to voice their honest opinions with as much contempt as the representatives whom I have mentioned have done. Most woods return the echo of what we call into them; and why should the representative Mr. Richter unnecessarily make for himself even more enemies than he has? He is like me, in that the number of his opponents is growing, and is no longer small. His ear, however, is not so keen as mine to detect the existence of an opponent, and I am satisfied to wait and see which one of us in the long run will appear to have been right. Possibly, this may not be decided in our lifetime. That also will be agreeable to me.

The representative Mr. Bamberger has expressed his astonishment, in discussing matters with the Council, that the delegates of the sea-coast cities had been granted the right to decide about questions relating to gunpowder and playing-cards. Well, gentlemen, the delegates from the inland districts are far more numerous than those from the seacoast, and we have not made this division arbitrarily. Since we look upon the free-trade theory as an epidemic, which is afflicting us like the Colorado Beetle, or similar evils, you cannot possibly expect that we should ask the free traders to represent the whole country in matters where we happen to have the choice. Generally speaking, the free traders represent the interests of maritime commerce, of merchants, and of a very few other people. Opposed to them is the much greater weight of all the inland districts. The more, therefore, the Economic Council will be perfected, the more the propriety and reasonableness of the present arrangement will be appreciated. The Council has, to my great delight, excellent chances of extending its usefulness over the whole empire. These remarks will scarcely win me, I believe, the good graces of Messrs. Richter and Bamberger. If they did, it would be for me an argumentum e contrario. I am always of the opinion that the very opposite of their views is serviceable for the State and the interests of the fatherland, as I understand them.

I have already replied to the reproach of home-socialism. One of the previous speakers, however, goes so far as to identify me with foreigners, because I am glad to assume the responsibility for this law and its intellectual origin. These foreigners are, no doubt, excellent men, but they have nothing to do with our affairs. They are men like Nadaud, Clemenceau, Spuller, Lockroy, and others. I believe this was intended to be a complicated reproach of both socialism and communism. You see, it is always the same tune. Then he mentioned the "intrepidity," which I translate for myself to mean the "frivolous levity," of the government in suggesting such matters. The considerate politeness of the speaker induced him to call it "intrepidity." Gentlemen, our intrepidity springs from our good conscience. We are convinced that what we are proposing is the result of dutiful and careful consideration, and is not in the least tinged with party-politics. In this we are superior to our opponents, who will never be able to free themselves from the soil of party-warfare which clings to their boots.

The previous speaker compared us also with the Romans. You see he made his historical excursions not only into France, but also into the past. The difference between Mr. Bamberger's and our point of view—which Mr. Lasker may call aristocratic, if he chooses—appears in his very choice of words. Mr. Bamberger spoke of theatres which we were erecting for the "sweet rabble." Whether there is anything sweet in the rabble for Mr. Bamberger I do not know. But we are filled with satisfaction at the thought that we may be able to do something in the legislature for the less fortunate classes—whom he designates as rabble—and to wrest them, if you will grant the money, from the evil influences of place-hunters whose eloquence is too much for their intelligence.

The expression "rabble" did not fall from our lips, and if the representative spoke of the "rabble" first, and afterwards of "those who cut off coupons," I deny having used also this word. "To cut off coupons" is linguistically not familiar to me. I believe I said "those who cut coupons." The meaning, of course, remains the same. But let me remark that I consider this class of people to be highly estimable, and from a minister's point of view exceedingly desirable, because they combine wealth with that degree of diffidence which keeps them from all tainted or dangerous enterprises. The man who pays a large tax and loves peace is from the ministerial point of view the most agreeable of citizens. He must, of course, not try to escape the burdens which his easily collected income should bear in comparison with others. And you will see that he really does not do it. He is an honest man, and when we shall at last have outgrown the finance-ministerial mistrust of olden times—which my present colleagues no longer share—we shall see that not everybody is willing to lie for his own financial benefit, and that even the man who cuts coupons will declare his wealth honestly, and pay his taxes accordingly. The Honorable Mr. Bamberger also asked: "Where will you find the necessary money?" This law really implies few new expenses, as I have already said, because all the government asks is to be permitted to substitute the State for the communities, which at present are taking care of the poor, and to make a very modest allowance to those who cannot earn their living. This allowance should be entirely at the disposal of the recipient and be inalienable from him. It will thus secure for him independence even when he is an invalid. The increase over the present cost of caring for the poor is slight. I do not know whether it should be estimated at half of one-third—one sixth—or even at less.

I am, therefore, of the opinion that a State which is at war with the infernal elements recently described to you here in detail, and which possesses among its citizens an overwhelming majority of sincere adherents of the Christian religion, should do for the poor, the weak, and the old much more than this bill demands—as much as I hope to be able to ask of you next year. And such a State, especially when it wishes to demonstrate its practical Christianity, should not refuse our demands, for its own sake and for the sake of the poor!

* * * * *WE GERMANS FEAR GOD, AND NOUGHT ELSE IN THE WORLD

February 6, 1888

TRANSLATED BY EDMUND VON MACH, PH.D.

[In view of the constantly increasing armaments in France, the government had secured from the Reichstag of 1887 an increase also of the German army. Danger, however, was threatening from Russia as well as from France, and it became necessary to arrange matters in a way which would place the full strength of the German people at the disposal of the government. A bill to this effect was introduced in the Reichstag on December 9, 1887, and another bill, which was to procure the money for this increase in armaments, was introduced on January 31, 1888. Both bills were on the calendar of February 6. Prince Bismarck opened the discussion with the following speech, the effect of which was electric, and resulted in the Reichstag passing both bills by a unanimous vote.]

In addressing you today I do not intend to recommend to you the acceptance of the bill which your president has just mentioned. I have no fear concerning its acceptance, nor do I believe that I can do anything to increase the majority with which it will be passed, although this is, of course, of great importance both at home and abroad. The representatives of the various parties have, no doubt, decided how they will vote, and I am confident that the German Reichstag will grant us again an increase in our armed force and thus reëstablish the standard which we gradually gave up between 1867 and 1882, and will do so, not on account of the position in which we happen to find ourselves, nor of any fears which may be swaying the stock exchange and public opinion, but because of an anticipatory estimate of the general conditions of Europe. In addressing you, therefore, I shall have to say more about these conditions than about the bill.

I do not like to do this, for in these matters one unskilful word can do great harm, and many words can do small good beyond making people understand the situation at home and abroad, which they will do in due time anyhow. I do not like to speak, but if I should keep silence the nervous excitement of public opinion at home and abroad will be increased rather than decreased, I fear, in view of the expectations which have been based on today's debate. People would believe the situation to be so difficult and critical that a minister of foreign affairs did not even dare to touch upon it. For these reasons I am addressing you, but I must say that I am doing it reluctantly.

I might be satisfied with a reference to what I said here just about a year ago, for matters are but slightly changed. A newspaper clipping has been handed to me containing a summary in the Liberal News, an organ which has closer relations, I believe, with my political friend, the Honorable Mr. Richter, than with myself. This clipping might offer me a starting point from which to develop the situation as a whole, but I can refer to it, and the chief points made there, only with the general declaration that the situation has been improved rather than otherwise, if it has been changed at all.

A year ago we were largely concerned with the possible cause of war emanating from France. Since then a peace-loving president has dropped the reins of government, and another peace-loving president has succeeded him. It is a favorable sign that the French government did not dip into Pandora's box in calling to office another chief magistrate, and that we may be assured of the continuance under President Carnot of the peaceful policy which President Grévy was known to represent. Changes in the French cabinet are even more reassuring than the change in the presidency, where a great many different reasons had to be considered. The ministers who might have been ready to subordinate the peace of their own country and of Europe to their personal plans have resigned, and others have taken their places of whom we need not fear this. I believe, therefore that I may state that our outlook toward France is more peaceful and less explosive today than it was a year ago and I am glad to do this, because I wish to quiet, not to excite, public opinion.

The fears which have sprung up during the last twelve months have had to do more with Russia than with France, or I may say with the exchange of mutual excitement, threats, insults, and challenges in the French and Russian papers during the past summer.

Nevertheless, I believe that our relations with Russia have not changed from what they were last year. The Liberal News has stated, in especially heavy type, that I said a year ago: "Our friendship with Russia has suffered no interruption during our wars, and is today beyond a doubt. We expect of Russia neither an attack nor a hostile policy." The reason why this was printed in heavy type may have been either to give me an easy starting point, or because the writer hoped that I had changed my mind since I said these things, and was at present convinced that I had erred in my confidence in the Russian policy a year ago. This is not the case. The only events which could have occasioned a change of opinion are the attitude of the Russian press and the allocation of the Russian troops.

As regards the press, I cannot assign any importance to it per se. People say that it is of greater consequence in Russia than in France. I believe the very opposite to be true. In France the press is a power influencing the decisions of the government. In Russia it is not, nor can it be. In both cases, however, the press is, so far as I am concerned, mere printer's ink on paper, against which we do not wage war. It cannot contain a challenge for us. Back of each article in the press there stands after all only the single man who guided the pen which launched this particular article into the world. Even in a Russian sheet—suppose it to be an independent Russian sheet, one which maintains relations with the French secret funds, it is of no consequence. The pen which there indites an anti-German article is backed by no one but him who is guiding it, the solitary man who is concocting the sad stuff in his office, and the protector which every Russian sheet is accustomed to have. He is some kind of a higher official, run wild in party politics, who happens to bestow his protection on this particular paper. Both weigh like feathers in the scale against the authority of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia.

In Russia the press has not the same influence on public opinion as in France. At best its declarations are the barometer by which to gauge how much can be printed according to the Russian press-laws, but they do not obligate the Russian government or His Majesty the Emperor of Russia in any way. In contrast with the voices of the Russian press I have the immediate testimony of Emperor Alexander himself, when a few months ago I had again the honor of being received by him in audience after the lapse of several years. I was then able to convince myself afresh that the emperor of Russia harbors no hostile feelings against us and does not intend to attack us, or to wage any aggressive wars at all. What the Russian press says, I do not believe, what Emperor Alexander says, I believe; I have absolute confidence in it. When both are in the scales, the testimony of the Russian press, with its hatred of Germany, rises light as a feather, and the personal testimony of Emperor Alexander has the only effective weight, so far as I am concerned. I repeat, therefore, the press does not induce me to consider our relations with Russia to be worse today than they were a year ago.

I now come to the other point, the allocation of the troops. It used to take place on a big scale, but only since 1879, when the Turkish war was concluded, has it assumed the proportions which today seem threatening. It may easily appear as if this accumulation of Russian troops near the German and Austrian frontiers—where their support is more difficult and more expensive than farther inland—could only be dictated by the intention of surprising and attacking one of the neighbors unprepared, sans dire gare! (I cannot for the moment think of the German expression.) Well, I do not believe this. In the first place, it would be contrary to the character of the sovereign and his own words, and secondly its object could not easily be understood. Russia cannot intend to conquer any Prussian provinces, nor, I believe, any Austrian provinces. Russia has, I believe, as many Polish subjects as it cares to have, and has no desire to increase their numbers. To annex anything but Polish districts from Austria would be even more difficult. No reason exists, no pretense which could induce a European monarch suddenly to assail his neighbors. I even go so far in my confidence as to be convinced that a Russian war would not ensue if we should become involved in a French war because of some explosive happenings in France, which no one can foresee and which surely are not intended by the present French government. A French war, on the other hand, would be an absolute certainty if we should be involved in a Russian war, for no French government would be so strong that it could prevent it, even if it was inclined to do so. But as regards Russia I still declare that I am not looking for an attack; and I take back nothing from what I said last year.

You will ask: "If that is so, what is the use of this expensive allocation of the Russian troops?" That is one of the questions for which one hardly can expect an answer from a ministry of foreign affairs, itself vitally interested. If we should begin to ask for explanations, we might receive forced replies, and our surrejoinders would also have to be forced. That is a dangerous path which I do not like to tread. Allocations of troops are things for which one does not take the other country to task, asking for categorical explanations, but against which one takes counter precautions with equal reserve and circumspection. I cannot, therefore, give an authentic declaration concerning the motives of this Russian allocation, but, having been familiar through a generation with foreign politics and the policy of Russia, I can form my own ideas concerning them. These ideas lead me to assume that the Russian cabinet is convinced, probably with good reason, that the weight of the Russian voice in the diplomatic Areopagos of Europe will be the weightier in the next European crisis, the stronger Russia is on the European frontier and the farther west the Russian armies stand. Russia is the more quickly at hand, either as an ally or as a foe, the nearer her main army, or at least a large army, is to her western frontier.

This policy has directed the Russian allocation of troops for a long while. You will remember that the army assembled in the Polish kingdom during the Crimean War was so large that this war might have ended differently if the army had started on time. If you think farther back, you will see that the events of 1830 found Russia unprepared and not ready to take a hand, because she had an insufficient number of troops in the western part of her empire. I need not, therefore, draw the conclusion from the accumulation of Russian troops in the western provinces (sapadnii Gubernii, as the Russians say), that our neighbors mean to attack us. I assume they are waiting, possibly for another Oriental crisis, intending then to be in the position of pressing home the Russian wishes by means of an army situated not exactly in Kasan, but farther west.

When may such an Oriental crisis take place, you ask. Forsooth, we have no certainty. During this century we have had, I think, four crises, if I do not include the smaller ones and those which did not culminate. One was in 1809 and ended with the treaty which gave Russia the Pruth-frontier, and another in 1828. Then there was the Crimean War of 1854, and the war of 1877. They have happened, therefore, at intervals of about twenty years and over. Why, then, should the next crisis take place sooner than after a similar interval, or at about 1899, twenty years after the last one? I for one should like to reckon with the possibility of its being postponed and not occurring immediately.

Then there are other European events which are wont to take place at even intervals, the Polish uprisings, for instance. Formerly we had to expect one every eighteen or twenty years. Possibly this is one reason why Russia wishes to be so strong in Poland that she may prevent them. Then there are the changes of government in France which also used to happen every eighteen or twenty years; and no one can deny that a change of government in France may bring about such a crisis that every interested nation may wish to be able to intervene with her full might—I mean only diplomatically, but with a diplomacy which is backed by an efficient army close at hand.

I assume on the strength of my purely technical-diplomatic judgment, which is based on my experience, that these are the intentions of Russia and that she has no wish to comply with the somewhat uncouth threats and boastings of the newspapers. And, if this is so, then there is surely no reason why we should look more gloomily into the future now than we have done at any time during the past forty years. The Oriental crisis is undoubtedly the most likely to occur, and in this our interests are only secondary. When it happens, we are in a position to watch whether the powers, who are primarily interested in the Mediterranean and the Levante, will make their decisions and come to terms, if they choose, or go to war with Russia about them. We are not immediately called upon to do either. Every great power which is trying to influence or to restrain the policies of other countries in matters which are beyond the sphere of its interests is playing politics beyond the bounds which God has assigned to it. Its policy is one of force and not of vital interests. It is working for prestige. We shall not do this. If Oriental crises happen, we shall wait before taking our position until the powers who have greater interests at stake than we have declared themselves. There is, therefore, no reason, gentlemen, why you should look upon our present situation with unusual gravity, assuming this to be the cause of our asking for the mighty increase of our armaments which the military bill contemplates. I should like to separate the question of reëstablishing the Landwehr of the second grade, in short the big military bill and the financial bill, from the question of our present situation. It has to do, not with a temporary and transient arrangement, but with the permanent invigoration of the German empire.

That no temporary arrangement is contemplated will be perfectly clear, I believe, when I ask you to survey with me the dangers of war which we have met in the past forty years without having become nervously excited at any one time.

In the year 1848, when many dikes and flood gates were broken, which until then had directed the peaceful flow of countless waters, we had to dispose of two questions freighted with the danger of war. They concerned Poland and Schleswig-Holstein. The first shouts after the Martial days were: war with Russia for the rehabilitation of Poland! Soon thereafter the danger was perilously near of being involved in a great European war on account of Schleswig-Holstein. I need not emphasize how the agreement of Olmütz, in 1850, prevented a great conflagration—a war on a gigantic scale. Then there followed two years of greater quiet out of general ill feeling, at the time when I first was ambassador in Frankfort. In 1853 the earliest symptoms of the Crimean War made themselves felt. This war lasted from 1853 to 1856, and during this whole time we were near the edge of the cliff, I will not say the abyss, whence it was intended to draw us into the war. I remember that I was obliged at that time, from 1853 to 1855 to alternate like a pendulum, so to speak, between Frankfort and Berlin because the late king, thanks to the confidence he had in me, used me as the real advocate of his independent policy whenever the insistence of the western powers that we too should declare war on Russia grew too strong, and the opposition of his cabinet too flabby for his liking. Then the play was staged—I do not know how often—when I was called back here and ordered to write for His Majesty a more pro-Russian dispatch, and Mr. von Manteuffel resigned, and I requested to be instructed by His Majesty to follow Mr. von Manteuffel, after the dispatch was gone, into the country or anywhere else, and to induce him to resume his office. Yet each time Prussia, as it was then constituted, was hovering on the brink of a great war. It was exposed to the hostility of the whole of Europe, except Russia, if it refused to join in the policies of the west European powers, and, if it did, it was forced to break with Russia, possibly for a very long while, because the defection of Prussia would probably have been felt very painfully in Russia.