The German Classics of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, Volume 10

With these explanations I have answered to the best of my ability the first part of the interpellation concerning the present state of affairs in the Orient, and I fear, gentlemen, that I have said nothing new to any one of you.

The other parts of the question refer to the position which Germany has taken or intends to take in view of the now existing conditions and innovations.

As to the position which we have already taken I cannot now give you any information, for officially we have been in possession of the papers to which I have referred only a very short while, I may say literally only since this very morning. What we knew beforehand was in general agreement with these papers, but not of a nature to make official steps possible. It consisted of private communications for which we were indebted to the courtesy of other governments.

Official steps, therefore, have not yet been taken, and would be premature in view of the conference, which I hope is at hand. All this information will then be available and we shall be in a position to exchange opinions concerning these matters. Any alterations, therefore, of the stipulations of 1856 will have to be sanctioned. If they should not be, the result would not necessarily be another war, but a condition of affairs which all the powers of Europe, I think, have good cause to avoid. I am almost tempted to call it making a morass of matters. Let us assume that no agreement about what has to be done can be reached in the conference, and that the powers who have a chief interest in opposing the Russian stipulations should say: "At the present moment it does not suit us to go to war about these questions, but we are not in accord with your agreements, and we reserve our decision"—would not that establish a condition of affairs which cannot be agreeable even to Russia? The Russian policy rightly says, "We are not desirous of exposing ourselves to the necessity of a Turkish campaign every ten or twenty years, for it is exhausting, strenuous, and expensive." But the Russian policy, on the other hand, cannot wish to substitute for this Turkish danger an English-Austrian entanglement recurring every ten or twenty years. It is, therefore, my opinion that Russia is equally interested with the other powers in reaching an agreement now, and in not deferring it to some future and perhaps less convenient time.

That Russia could possibly wish to force the other powers by war to sanction the changes which she deems necessary I consider to be beyond the realm of probability. If she could not obtain the sanction of the other signers of the clauses of 1856, she would, I suppose, be satisfied with the thought "Beati possidentes" (happy are the possessors). Then the question would arise whether those who are dissatisfied with the Russian agreements and have real and material interests at stake, would be ready to wage war in order to force Russia to diminish her demands or to give up some of them. If they should be successful in forcing Russia to give up more than she could bear, they would do so at the risk of leaving in Russia, when the troops come home, a feeling similar to that in Prussia after the treaties of 1815, a lingering feeling that matters really are not settled, and that another attempt will have to be made.

If this could be achieved by a war, one would have to regard, as the aim of this war, the expulsion of Russia from the Bulgarian strongholds which she is at present occupying, and from her position which no doubt is threatening Constantinople—although she has given no indication of a wish to occupy this city. Those who would have accomplished this by a victorious war, would then have to shoulder the responsibility of deciding what should be done with these countries of European Turkey. That they should be willing simply to reinstate the Turkish rule in its entirety after everything said and determined in the conference, is, I believe, very improbable. They would, therefore, be obliged to make some kind of a disposition, which could not differ very much in principle from what is being proposed now. It might differ in geographical extent and in the degree of independence, but I do not believe that Austria-Hungary, for instance, the nearest neighbor, would be ready to accept the entire heritage of the present Russian conquest, and be responsible for the future of these Slavic countries, either by incorporating them in the state of Hungary or establishing them as dependencies. I do not believe that this is an end which Austria can much desire in view of her own Slavic subjects. She cannot wish to be the editor of the future in the Balkan peninsula, as she would have to be if she won a victory.

I mention all these eventualities, in which I place no faith, for the sake of proving how slight the reasonable probability of a European war appears to be. It is not reasonably probable that the greater or lesser extent of a tributary State—unless conditions were altogether unbearable—should induce two neighboring and friendly powers to start a destructive European war in cold blood! The blood will be cooler, I assure you, when we have at last come together in a conference.

It was to meet these eventualities that the idea of a conference was first proposed by the government of Austria-Hungary. We were from the start ready to accept it, and we were almost the first to do so. Concerning the selection of a place where the conference should be held, difficulties arose which I consider out of proportion to the significance of the whole matter. But even in this direction we have raised no objections and declared ourselves satisfied with the places which have been mentioned. They were Vienna, Brussels, Baden-Baden, Wiesbaden, Wildbad, a place in Switzerland—I should, however, say Wildbad was mentioned by no one but itself. Stuttgart was also mentioned. Any of these places would have been agreeable to us. It now seems—if I am correctly informed, and the decision must be made in a few days—that the choice will fall on Baden-Baden. Our interest, which is shared by those powers with whom we have corresponded, is the despatch of the conference irrespective of the choice of a place, which is for us of little consequence. As regards places in Germany I have expressed no opinion beyond this, that on German soil the presidency would have to be German. This view has nowhere been opposed. After the general acceptance of this principle it will depend on the men sent to attend this conference whether for reasons of expediency it must be adhered to. Personally I believe the conference is assured, and I expect that it will take place in the first half of next March. It would be desirable that the conference should take place sooner—and the uncertainty concerning it be ended. But before the powers join in a conference, they naturally desire an exchange of opinion the one with the other; and the connections with the seat of war are really very slow. The delay of the communications which reached us was, and still is, explained by the delay with which news comes from the seat of war. The suspicion which has for some time been felt in the press that this delay was intentional becomes unfounded when one realizes that the advance of the Russian army following January 30 was in consequence of the stipulations of the armistice, and did not constitute an advantage taken of an opportune moment. The boundaries within which the Russian army is stationed today are the lines of demarcation expressly mentioned in the armistice. I do not believe in any intentional delay from anywhere; on the contrary, I have confidence in the good intentions everywhere to send representatives to the conference speedily. We certainly shall do our part to the best of our ability.

I now come to the most difficult part—excuse me if I continue for the present seated—I come to the most difficult part of the task set me, an explanation, so far as this is possible, of the position which Germany is to take in the conference. In this connection you will not expect from me anything but general indications of our policy. Its programme Mr. von Bennigsen has developed before you clearly and comprehensively, almost more so than nay strength at the present moment permits me to do.

When from many quarters the demand has been made upon us—to be sure from no government, but only from voices in the press and other well meaning advisers—that e should define our policy from the start and force it on the other governments in some form, I must say that this seems to me to be newspaper diplomacy rather than the diplomacy of a statesman.

Let me explain to you at once the difficulty and impossibility of such a course. If we did express a definite programme, which we should be obliged to follow when we had announced it officially and openly not only before you, but also before the whole of Europe, should we not then place a premium on the contentiousness of all those who considered our programme to be not favorable to themselves!

We should also render the part of mediation in the conference, which I deem very important, almost impossible for ourselves, because everybody with the menu of the German policy in his hand could say to us: "German mediation can go just so far; it can do this, and this it cannot do." It is quite possible that the free hand which Germany has preserved, and the uncertainty of Germany's decisions have not been without influence on the preservation of peace thus far. If you play the German card, laying it on the table, everybody knows how to adapt himself to it or how to avoid it. Such a course is impracticable if you wish to preserve peace. The adjustment of peace does not, I believe, consist in our playing the arbiter, saying: "It must be thus, and the weight of the German empire stands behind it." Peace is brought about, I think, more modestly. Without straining the simile which I am quoting from our everyday life, it partakes more of the behavior of the honest broker, who really wishes to bring about a bargain.

As long as we follow this policy we are in the position to save a power which has secret wishes from the embarrassment of meeting with a refusal or an unpleasant reply from its—let me say, congressional opponent. If we are equally friendly with both, we can first sound one and then say to the other: "Do not do that, try to arrange matters in this way." These are helps in business which should be highly esteemed. I have an experience of many years in such matters, and it has been brought home to me often, that when two are alone the thread drops more frequently and is not picked up because of false shame. The moment when it could be picked up passes, people separate in silence, and are annoyed. If, however, a third person is present, he can pick up the thread without much ado, and bring the two together again when they have parted. This is the function of which I am thinking and which corresponds to the amicable relations in which we are living with our friendly neighbors along our extensive borders. It is moreover in keeping with the union among the three imperial courts which has existed for five years, and the intimacy which we enjoy with England, another one of the powers chiefly concerned in this matter. As regards England we are in the fortunate position of not having any conflicting interests, except perhaps some trade rivalries or passing annoyances. These latter cannot be avoided, but there is absolutely nothing which could drive two industrious and peace-loving nations to war. I happily believe, therefore, that we may be the mediator between England and Russia, just as I know we are between Austria and Russia, if they should not be able to agree of their own accord.

The three-emperor-pact, if one wishes to call it such, while it is generally called a treaty, is not based on any written obligations, and no one of the three emperors can be voted down by the other two. It is based on the personal sympathy among the three rulers, on the personal confidence which they have in one another, and on the personal relations which for many years have existed among the leading ministers of all three empires.

We have always avoided forming a majority of two against one when there was a difference of opinion between Austria and Russia, and we have never definitely taken the part of one of them, even if our own desires drew us more strongly in that direction. We have refrained from this for fear that the tie might not be sufficiently strong after all. It surely cannot be so strong that it could induce one of these great powers to disregard its own incontestably national interests for the sake of being obliging. That is a sacrifice which no great power makes pour les beaux yeux of another. Such a sacrifice it makes only when arguments are replaced by hints of strength. Then it may happen that the great power will say: "I hate to make this concession, but I hate even worse to go to war with so strong a power as Germany. Still I will remember this and make a note of it." That is about the way in which such things are received. And this leads me to the necessity of vigorously opposing all exaggerated demands made on Germany's mediation. Let me declare that they are out of the question so long as I have the honor of being the adviser of His Majesty.

I know that in saying this I am disappointing a great many expectations raised in connection with today's disclosures, but I am not of the opinion that we should go the road of Napoleon and try to be, if not the arbiter, at least the schoolmaster of Europe.

I have here a clipping given me today from the Allgemeine Zeitung, which contains a noteworthy article entitled "The Policy of Germany in the Decisive Hour." This article demands as necessary the admission of a third power to the alliance of England and Austria. That means, we shall take part with England and Austria and deprive Russia of the credit of voluntarily making the concessions which she may be willing to grant in the interest of European peace. I do not doubt that Russia will sacrifice for the sake of peace in Europe whatever her sense of nationality and her own interests and those of eighty million Russians permit. It is really superfluous to say this. And now please assume that we took the advice of the gentlemen who think that we should play the part of an arbiter—I have here another article from a Berlin paper, called "Germany's Part as Arbiter"—and that we declared to Russia in some polite and amicable way: "We have been friends, it is true, for hundreds of years, Russia has ever been true-blue to us when we were in difficulties, but now things are different. In the interest of Europe, as the policemen of Europe, as a kind of a justice of the peace, we must do as we are requested, we can no longer resist the demands of Europe …," what would be the result?

There are considerable numbers of Russians who do not love Germany, and who fortunately are not at the helm now, but who would not be unhappy if they were called there. What would they say to their compatriots, they and perhaps other statesmen who at present are not yet avowedly hostile to us? They would say: "With what sacrifices of blood and men and money have we not won the position which for centuries has been the ideal of Russian ambition! We could have maintained it against those opponents who may have a real interest in combating it. It was not Austria, with whom we have lived on moderately intimate terms for some time, it was not England, who possesses openly acknowledged counter-interests to ours—no, it was our intimate friend Germany who drew, behind our back, not her sword but a dagger, although we might have expected from her services in return for services rendered, and although she has no interests in the Orient."

Those approximately would be the phrases, and this the theme which we should hear in Russia. This picture which I have drawn in exaggerated lines—but the Russian orators also exaggerate—corresponds with the truth. We, however, shall never assume the responsibility of sacrificing the certain friendship of a great nation, tested through generations, to the momentary temptation of playing the judge in Europe.

To jeopardize the friendship which fortunately binds us to most European states and at the present moment to all,—for the parties to whom it is an eyesore are not in power,—to jeopardize, I say, this friendship with one friend in order to oblige another, when we as Germans have no direct interests, and to buy the peace of others at the cost of our own, or, to speak with college boys, to substitute at a duel—such things one may do when one risks only one's own life, but I cannot do them when I have to counsel His Majesty the Emperor as regards the policy of a great State of forty million people in the heart of Europe. From this tribune I therefore take the liberty of saying a very definite "No" to all such imputations and suggestions. I shall under no condition do anything of the kind; and no government, none of those primarily interested, has made any such demands. Germany, as the last speaker remarked, has grown to new responsibilities as it has grown stronger. But even if we are able to throw a large armed force into the scales of European policies, I do not consider anybody justified in advising the emperor and the princes (who would have to discuss the matter in the Bundesrat if we wished to wage an offensive war) to make an appeal to the proven readiness of the nation to offer blood and money for a war. The only war which I am ready to counsel to the emperor is one to protect our independence abroad and our union at home, or to defend those of our interests which are so clear that we are supported, if we insist on them, not only by the unanimous vote of the Bundesrat, which is necessary, but also by the undivided enthusiasm of the whole German nation.

SALUS PUBLICA—BISMARCK'S ONLY LODE-STAR

February 24, 1881

TRANSLATED BY EDMUND VON MACH, PH.D

[On February 24, 1881, the budget of the empire for the ensuing year was under discussion. The representative, Mr. Richter, made use of this opportunity to attack the home-politics of the chancellor in their entirety. He felt great concern about the growing power of the chancellor, and called upon his liberal colleagues to stem the tide, and to curb the power of the chancellor. "Only if this is done will the great gifts which distinguish the chancellor continue to be fruitful for Germany. If this is not possible, and if we go on as we have been going, the chancellor will ruin himself, and he will ruin the country." Prince Bismarck replied:]

The remarks of the previous speaker have hardly touched on the subject under discussion, the budget, since I have been here. Consequently I am excused, I suppose, from adding anything to what the secretary of the treasury has said. The previous speaker has mainly concerned himself with a critique of my personality. The number of times the word "chancellor" appears in his speech in proportion to the total number of words sufficiently justifies my assertion. Well, I do not know what is the use of this critique, if not to instruct me and to educate me. But I am in my sixty-sixth year and in the twentieth of my tenure of office—there will not be much in me to improve. You will have to use me up as I am or push me aside. I, on my part, have never made the attempt to educate the Honorable Mr. Richter—I do not think I am called upon to do it; nor have I endeavored to force him from his sphere of activity—I should not have the means of doing this, nor do I wish it. But I believe he in his turn will lack the means of forcing me from my position. Whether he will be able to compress me and circumscribe me, as toward the end of his speech he said was desirable, I do not know. I am, however, truly grateful to him for the concern he expressed about my health. Unfortunately, if I wish to do my duty, I cannot take such care of myself as Mr. Richter deems desirable—I shall have to risk my health.

When he said that every evil troubling us, even the rate of interest and I know not what else, was based on the uncertainty of our conditions, and when he quoted the word of a colleague of a "hopeless confusion"—well, gentlemen, then I must repeat what I have said elsewhere and in the hearing of the Honorable Mr. Richter: Make a comparison and look about you in other countries! If our conditions with their ordered activities and their assured future at home and abroad constitute a "hopeless confusion," how shall we characterize the conditions of many another country? I can see in no European country a condition of safety and an assured outlook into the future similar to that prevailing in the German empire. I have already said on the former occasion that my position as minister of foreign affairs made it impossible for me to be specific. But everyone who will follow my remarks with a map in his hand, and a knowledge of history during the past twenty years, will have to say that I am right. I do not know what is the use of these exaggerations of a "hopeless confusion" and "a lack of assurance and uncertainty of the future." Nobody in the country believes it; and isn't that the chief thing? The people in the country know perfectly well how they are off, and all who do not fare as they wish are pleased to blame the government for it. When a candidate comes up for election, and says to them: "The government—or to quote the previous speaker—the chancellor is to blame for all this," he may find many credulous people, but in the majority he will find people who will say: "The chancellor surely has his faults and drawbacks"—but most people will not be convinced that I am to blame for everything. I am faring in this respect like Emperor Napoleon twelve years and more ago, who was accused, not in his own country but in Europe, as the cause of all evils, from Tartary to Spain, and he was not nearly so bad a creature as he was said to be—may I not also claim the benefit of this doubt with Mr. Richter? I, too, am not so bad as I am painted. His attack upon me, moreover, if he will stop to reflect, is largely directed not against me personally, or against that part of my activities in which I possess freedom of action, no—it is directed primarily against the constitution of the German empire. The constitution of the German empire knows no other responsible officer but the chancellor. I might assert that my constitutional responsibility does not go nearly so far as the one actually placed upon me; and I might take things a little easier and say: "I have nothing to do with the home policies of the empire, for I am only the emperor's executive officer." But I will not do this. From the beginning I have assumed the responsibility, and also the obligation, of defending the decisions of the Bundesrat, provided I can reconcile them with my responsibility, even if I find myself there in the minority. This responsibility I will take as public opinion understands it. Nobody, however, can be held responsible for acts and resolves not his own. No responsibility can be foisted on anybody—nor did the imperial constitution intend to do this—for acts which do not depend on his own free will, and into which he can be forced. The responsible person, therefore, must enjoy complete independence and freedom within the sphere of his responsibility. If he does not, all responsibility ceases; and I do not know on whose shoulders it will rest—so far as the empire is concerned it has disappeared completely.

As long, therefore, as Mr. Richter does not change the constitution, you yourselves must insist on having a chancellor who is absolutely free and independent in his decisions, for no man can hold him responsible for those things which he is unable to decide for himself, freely and independently. Mr. Richter has expressed the wish of limiting in several directions this constitutional independence of the chancellor. In the first place, in one direction where it is already limited and where he wishes to have it disappear entirely. This concerns his responsibility for those acts in our political life which the constitution assigns to the emperor in connection with the decisions of the Bundesrat and the Reichstag. There can be no doubt that these acts include also those which have to be performed, as the constitution says, in the name of the emperor; the submission, for instance, to the Reichstag of a resolve of the Bundesrat. Mr. Richter has correctly quoted an incident, mentioned in the North German Gazette, concerning the resolves on some collected cases of accidents, which I considered it incompatible with my responsibility to submit to you in the name of the emperor. I, therefore, did not do it. One may well ask: What has the constitutional law to say on this point? Was I justified in not acting? Was the emperor justified in not acting! Or was His Majesty the Emperor bound by the constitution to submit to you the resolve of the Bundesrat?