The German Classics of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, Volume 10

Bismarck did not write out his speeches, and the published accounts of what he said are copied from the official stenographic reports. Logically Bismarck never left a sentence incomplete, but grammatically he often did so when the wealth of ideas qualifying his main thought had grown to greater proportions than he had anticipated. His diction was at all times precise, which led to a multiplicity of qualifications—adjectives, appositions, adverbs, parentheses, and the like. Desirous of convincing his hearers, he often felt the need of repeating the same thought in various ways until he at last hammered it in, as it were, with one big blow—with one phrase easily remembered and readily quoted. It is these phrases which have given the names to many of his speeches, namely: "The Honest Broker," "Practical Christianity," or "We shall never go to Canossa."

He himself readily quoted from the sayings and writings of other great men; and was in this respect wholly admirable both for the catholicity of his taste and the singular appropriateness of his citations. He was apparently as familiar with the great authors of antiquity as with the modern German, French and English writers. Nor was he afraid of using a foreign tongue when no German phrase occurred to him to match the exact meaning of his thought.

The reader will realize, even more than the hearer, that it was not the form of Bismarck's speeches which swept his audiences off their feet, and often changed a hostile Reichstag or Diet into an assembly of men eager to do his bidding, but that it was his firm grasp on the realities of life and his supreme command of everything which makes for true statesmanship. His policies were not based on snap judgments, they were the result of serious thought. All this showed in his speeches, and made him one of the most powerfully effective speakers of all times.

* * * * *

SPEECHES OF PRINCE BISMARCK

* * * * *

PROFESSORIAL POLITICS

December 21, 1863

TRANSLATED BY EDMUND VON HACK, PH.D

[In the Prussian Diet the representative, Johann Ludwig Tellkampf, professor of economics and political science in the University of Breslau, had attacked the policy of Bismarck in regard to Schleswig-Holstein. Bismarck replied as follows:]

The conception which the previous speaker has of the politics of Europe reminds me of a man from the plains who is on his first journey to the mountains. When he sees a huge elevation loom up before him, nothing seems easier than to climb it. He does not even think that he will need a guide, for the mountain is in plain sight, and the road to it apparently without obstacles. But when he starts, he soon comes upon ravines and crevasses which not even the best of speeches will help him to cross. The gentleman comforted us concerning similar obstacles in the path of politics by saying things like these: "It is well known that Russia can do nothing at present; it does not appear that Austria will take a contrary step; England knows very well that her interests are counselling peace; and finally, France will not act against her national principles." If we should believe these assurances, and think more highly of the estimate which the gentleman has made of the politics of Europe than of our own official judgment, and should thereby drive Prussia to an isolated and humiliating position, could we then excuse ourselves by saying, "We could see the danger coming, but we trusted the speaker, thinking he knew probably more than we?" If this is impossible how can we attach to the remarks of the speaker the weight which he wishes us to attach to them!

For all official positions, those of the judges for instance and even those of the subalterns in the army, we require examinations and a practical knowledge—difficult examinations. But high politics—oh, any one can practise them who feels himself called upon to do so. Nothing is easier than to make endless assertions in this field of conjectures and to cast caution to the winds. You know that one must write a whole book to controvert one erroneous thought, and he who voiced the error remains unconvinced. It is a dangerous and far-spread mistake which assumes that a naïve intuition will reveal to the political dilettante what remains hidden from the wisdom of the expert.

[Professor Tellkampf replied, in great excitement: "My whole life as a professor of political science has been devoted to the study of politics, and I should like to ask the president of the ministry, whether he knew more of political science, when he began his political career as a dike-master, than a professor of this science knows?" To which Bismarck replied:]

I do not at all deny the familiarity of the previous speaker with political theories. But he has wandered from the field of theory into that of practice. He has announced with complete assurance to me and to this assembly what each European cabinet will probably do in this concrete case. These are the very things which, I believe, I must know better than he. This belief I have expressed. The previous speaker has referred to his activity in theoretical politics as a professor through many years. If the gentleman had served even one year in practical politics, possibly as a bureau chief in the ministry of foreign affairs, he would not have said what he said today from the speaker's desk. And his advice, after this one year of practical training, would be of greater value to me than if he had been active, even more years than he says, as a professor on the lecture platform.

* * * * *

SPEECH FROM THE THRONE

Written by Bismarck and delivered by William I., July 19, 1870

TRANSLATED BY EDMUND VON MACH, PH.D

[Disturbed by the increasing bonds of union between the northern and the southern German states, in which France saw a lessening of her own prestige across the Rhine, the ministers of Napoleon III. had decided on war against Prussia. They found a pretext in the candidacy of a Hohenzollern prince for the throne of Spain. Contrary to diplomatic usage, they requested the King of Prussia to force the withdrawal of the prince, and even when the father of the prince announced the withdrawal of his son, they were not satisfied, but instructed Benedetti, the French ambassador, to secure from the King of Prussia a humiliating promise for the future. The King indignantly refused, and Bismarck published the occurrence in the famous "Despatch of Ems," July 13, 1870. Thereupon the French cabinet declared war, on July 15, 1870. The formal notice was served on Bismarck, July 19, and on the same day the King of Prussia opened a special session of the Reichstag with the following address, which had been prepared by Bismarck.]

GENTLEMEN OF THE REICHSTAG OF THE NORTH GERMAN FEDERATION:

When I welcomed you here at your last assembly, it was with joy and gratitude because God had crowned my efforts with success. I could announce to you that every disturbance of peace had been avoided, in response to the wishes of the people and the demands of civilization.

If now the allied governments have been compelled by treats of war and its danger to summon you to a special session, you will feel not less convinced than we that it was the wish of the North German Federation to develop the forces of the German people as a support of universal peace, and not as a possible source of danger to it. If we call upon these forces today for the protection of our independence, we are doing nothing but what honor and duty demand.

The candidacy of a German prince for the Spanish throne, with which the allied governments had nothing to do—neither when it was pressed nor when it was withdrawn—and which interested the North German Federation only in so far as the government of a friendly nation seemed to expect of it the assurance of a peaceful and orderly government for its much harassed land—this candidacy offered to the emperor of France the pretense of seeing in it a cause for war, contrary to the long established custom of diplomacy. When the pretense no longer existed, he kept to his views in utter disregard of the rights which our people have to the blessings of peace—views which find their analogy in the history of former rulers of France.

When in earlier centuries Germany suffered in silence such attacks on her rights and her honor, she did so because she was divided and did not know her strength. Today when the bonds of the spiritual and political union, which began with the War of Liberation, are knitting the German races more closely together as time advances, and when our armor no longer offers an opening to the enemy, Germany carries in her bosom the will and the strength to defend herself against renewed French violence.

It is not presumption which dictates these words. The allied governments and I myself—we are fully conscious of the fact that victory and defeat rest with the Lord of battles. We have measured with clear vision the responsibility which attaches, before God and men, to him who drives two peace-loving peoples in the heart of Europe to war. The German and the French people, enjoying in equal measure the blessings of Christian morals and o growing prosperity, are meant for a more wholesome contest than the bloody contest of war.

The rulers of France, however, have known how to exploit by calculated deception, the just, although excitable, pride of the great French nation in furtherance of their own interests and for the gratification of their own passions.

The more conscious the allied governments are of having done everything permitted by their honor and their dignity to preserve for Europe the blessings of peace, and the more apparent it is to everybody that the sword has been forced upon us, the greater is the confidence with which we rely on the unanimous decision of the German governments of the South as well as of the North, and appeal to the patriotism and self-sacrifice of the German people, calling them to the defense of their honor and their independence.

We shall fight, as our fathers did, against the violence of foreign conquerors, and for our freedom and our right. And in this fight, in which we have no other aim than that of securing for Europe lasting peace, God will be with us as He was with our fathers.

ALSACE-LORRAINE A GLACIS AGAINST FRANCE

May 2,1871

TRANSLATED BY EDMUND VON MACH, PH.D

[After the war France had been obliged to return to Germany the two provinces, Alsace and Lorraine, which she had attached to herself in the times of Germany's weakness. It might have been better to unite these provinces with one of the German states, but it was feared that so valuable an increase in territory of one of the twenty-five states that had just been federated in the empire, might lead to renewed dissension. The suggestion, therefore, was made to administer the two provinces, for the present, as common property, and to leave the final arrangements to the future. A bill concerning the immediate disposition of Alsace and Lorraine was submitted to the Reichstag on May 2, 1871; when Prince Bismarck opened the discussion with the following speech.]

In introducing the pending bill I shall have to say only a few words, for the debate will offer me the opportunity of elucidating the various details. The underlying principles are, I believe, not subject to a difference of opinion; I mean the question whether Alsace and Lorraine should be incorporated in the German empire. The form in which this should be done, and especially what steps should first be taken, will be the subject of your deliberations. You will, moreover, find the allied governments ready to weigh carefully all suggestions different from our own which may be made in this connection.

I believe that there will be no difference of opinion concerning the principle itself, because there was none a year ago, nor has any appeared during this year of the war. If we imagine ourselves back one year—or more accurately ten months—we can say to ourselves that all Germany was agreed in her love of peace. There was not a German who did not wish to be at peace with France, as long as this was honorably possible. Those morbid exceptions which possibly desired war in the hope of seeing their own country defeated—they are not worthy of their name, I do not count them among the Germans!

I insist, the Germans were unanimous in their desire for peace. But when war was forced upon them, and they were compelled to take to arms, then the Germans were fully as unanimous in their determination to look for assurances against the likelihood of another similar war, provided God were to give them the victory in this one which they were resolved to wage manfully. If, however, another such war should occur in the future, they intended to see to it now, that our defence then would be easier. Everyone remembered that there probably had not been a generation of our fathers, for three hundred years, which had not been forced to draw the sword against France, and everybody knew the reason why Germany had previously missed the opportunity of securing for herself a better protection against an attack from the west, even at those times when she had happened to be among the conquerors of France. It was because the victories had been won in company with allies whose interests were not ours. Everybody therefore was determined that if we should conquer this time, independently and solely by our own might and right, we should strive to make the future more secure for our children.

In the course of centuries the wars against France had resulted almost always to our disadvantage, because Germany had been divided. This had created a geographical and strategic frontier which was full of temptations for France and of menace for Germany. I cannot describe our condition before the last war, and especially that of South Germany, more strikingly than with the words of a thoughtful South German sovereign. When Germany was urged to take the part of the western powers in the oriental war, although her governments were not convinced that this was in their interest, this sovereign—there is no reason why I should not name him, it was the late King William of Würtemberg—said to me: "I share your view, that we have no call to mix in this war, and that no German interests are at stake of sufficient worth to spill a drop of German blood for them. But what will happen if we should quarrel with the western powers on this account? You may count on my vote in the Bundestag until war is at hand. Then conditions will be altered. I am as ready as the next man to fulfil my obligations. But take care lest you judge people differently from what they are. Give us Strassburg, and we shall be with you at all hazards. As long as Strassburg is a sally-port for an ever armed force, I must fear that my country will be inundated by foreign troops before the North German Alliance can come to my assistance. Personally I shall not hesitate a moment to eat the hard bread of exile in your camp, but my people, weighed down by contributions, will write to me urging a change of policy upon me. I do not know what I shall do, nor whether all will remain sufficiently firm. The crux of the situation is Strassburg, for as long as it is not German, it will prevent South Germany from giving herself unreservedly to German unity and to a national German policy. As long as Strassburg is a sally-port for an ever ready army of from 100,000 to 150,000 men, Germany will find herself unable to appear on the upper Rhine with an equally large army on time—the French will always be here first."

I believe this instance taken from an actual occurrence says everything. I need not add one word.

The wedge which Alsace pushed into Germany near Weissenburg separated South Germany from North Germany more effectively than the political line of the Main. It needed a high degree of determination, national enthusiasm, and devotion for our South German allies not to hesitate one moment but to identify the danger of North Germany with their own and to advance boldly in our company, in spite of that other danger in their own immediate proximity to which a clever conduct of the war on the part of France would have exposed them. That France in her superior position had been ready to yield to the temptation, which this advanced outpost of Strassburg offered her against Germany, whenever her internal affairs made an excursion into foreign lands desirable, we had seen for many decades. It is well known that the French ambassador entered my office as late as August 6, 1866, with the briefly worded ultimatum: "Either cede to France the city of Mayence, or expect an immediate declaration of war." I was, of course, not one moment in doubt about my reply. I said to him: "Well, then, it is war." He proceeded with this reply to Paris. There they changed their mind after a few days, and I was given to understand that this instruction had been wrung from Emperor Napoleon during an attack of illness. The further attempts on Luxembourg and the consequent issues are known to you. I will not revert to them, nor do I believe that it is necessary to prove that France did not always show a sufficiently strong character to resist the temptations which the possession of Alsace brought with it.

The question was, how to secure a guarantee against this. It had to be of a territorial nature, because the guarantees of foreign powers were not of much use to us, such guarantees having at times been subject to supplementary and attenuating declarations. One might have thought that all Europe would have felt the need of preventing the ever recurring wars of two great and civilized peoples in the heart of Europe, and that it would have been natural to assume that the simplest way to do this was to strengthen the defences of that one of the two participants who doubtless was the more pacific. I cannot, however, say that at first this idea appeared convincing everywhere. Other expedients were looked for, and the suggestion was often made that we should be satisfied with an indemnity and the razing of the French fortresses in Alsace and Lorraine. This I always opposed, because I considered it an impracticable means of maintaining peace. The establishment of an easement on foreign territory is very oppressive and disagreeable to the sense of sovereignty and independence of those who are affected by it. The cession of a fortress is felt scarcely more bitterly than the injunction by foreigners not to build on the territory which is under one's own sovereignty. French passions have probably been excited more frequently and more successfully by a reference to the razing of that unimportant place of Hüningen than by the loss of any conquered territory which France had to suffer in 1815. I placed, therefore, no confidence in this means, especially since the geographical configuration of this advanced outpost—as I took the liberty of calling it—would have put the starting place for the French troops just as near to Stuttgart and Munich as it had always been. It was important to put it farther back.

Metz, moreover, is a place of such a topographical configuration, that very little art is needed to transform it into a strong fortress. If anyone should destroy these additions to nature—which would be a very expensive undertaking—they could be quickly restored. Consequently I looked also upon this suggestion as insufficient.

There might have been one other means—and one which the inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine favored—of founding there a neutral territory similar to Belgium and Switzerland. There would then have been a chain of neutral states from the North Sea to the Swiss Alps, which would have made it impossible for us to attack France by land, because we are accustomed to respect treaties and neutrality, and because we should have been separated from France by this strip of land between us. France would have received a protecting armor against us, but nothing would have prevented her from occasionally sending her fleet with troops to our coast—a plan she had under consideration during the last war, although she did not execute it—or from landing her armies with her allies, and entering Germany from there. France would have received a protecting armor against us, but we should have been without protection by sea, as long as our navy did not equal the French. This was one objection, although one of only secondary importance. The chief reason was that neutrality can only be maintained when the inhabitants are determined to preserve an independent and neutral position, and to defend it by force of arms, if need be. That is what both Belgium and Switzerland have done. As far as we were concerned in the last war no action on their part would have been necessary, but it is a fact that both these countries maintained their neutrality. Both are determined to remain neutral commonwealths. This supposition would not have been true, in the immediate future, for the neutrality newly to be established in Alsace and Lorraine. On the contrary, it is to be expected that the strong French elements, which are going to survive in the country for a long while, and whose interests, sympathies, and memories are connected with France, would have induced the people to unite with France in the case of another Franco-German war, no matter who their sovereign might be. The neutrality of Alsace-Lorraine, therefore, would have been merely a sham, harmful to us and helpful to France. Nothing was left, therefore, but to bring both these countries with their strong fortresses completely under German control. It was our purpose to establish them as a powerful glacis in Germany's defence against France, and to move the starting point of a possible French attack several days' marches farther back, if France, having regained her strength or won allies, should again throw down the gauntlet to us.

The chief obstacle to the realization of this idea, which was to satisfy the incontestable demands of our safety, was found in the opposition of the inhabitants themselves, who did not wish to be separated from France. It is not my duty here to inquire into the causes which made it possible for a thoroughly German community to become so deeply attached to a country speaking a different tongue and possessing a government which was not always kind and considerate. To a great extent this may have been due to the fact that all those qualities which distinguish the Germans from the French are found to such a high degree in Alsace-Lorraine, that the inhabitants of this country formed—I may say it without fear of seeming presumption—an aristocracy in France as regards proficiency and exactness. They were better qualified for service, and more reliable in office. The substitutes in the army, the gendarmes, and the civil officers were from Alsace-Lorraine in numbers entirely out of proportion to the population of these provinces. There were one and one half million Germans who knew how to make use of these virtues among a people who have other virtues but who are lacking in these particular ones. Thanks to their excellence they enjoyed a favored position, which made them unmindful of many legal iniquities. It is, moreover, characteristic of the Germans that every tribe lays claim to some kind of superiority, especially over its immediate neighbors. As long as the people of Alsace and Lorraine were French, Paris with its splendor and the grandeur of a united France stood behind them; they could meet their fellow Germans with the consciousness that Paris was theirs, and thus find a reason for their sense of exclusive superiority. I do not wish to discuss further the reasons why everyone attaches himself more readily to a big political system which gives scope to his abilities, than to a divided, albeit related, nation, such as existed formerly on this side of the Rhine, in so far as the Alsatians were concerned. The fact is that such disinclination existed, and that it is our duty to overcome it by patience. We have, it seems to me, many means at our disposal. We Germans are accustomed to govern more benevolently, sometimes more awkwardly—but in the long tun really more benevolently and humanely, than the French statesmen. This is a merit of the German character which will soon appeal to the Alsatian heart and become manifest. We are, moreover, able to grant the inhabitants a far greater degree of communal and individual freedom than the French institutions and traditions ever permitted.

If we watch the present movement in Paris (the Commune), we shall find, what is true of every movement possessing the least endurance, that it contains at bottom a grain of sense in spite of all the unreasonable motives which attach to it, influencing its individual partisans. Without this no movement can attain even that degree of force which the Commune exercises at present. This grain of sense—I do not know how many people believe in it, but surely the most intelligent and best who at present are fighting against their countrymen do believe in it—is, to put it briefly, the German municipal government. If the Commune possessed this, then the better element of its supporters—I do not say all—would be satisfied. We must differentiate according to the facts. The militia of the usurpers consists largely of people who have nothing to lose. There are in a city of two million inhabitants many so-called "repris de justice," or as we should say "people under police supervision," who are spending in Paris the interval between two terms in prison. They are congregating in the city in considerable numbers and are ready to serve disorder and pillage wherever it may be. It is these people who gave to the movement, before we had scrutinized its theoretical aims, the occasionally prominent character which seemed to threaten civilization, and which, in the interest of humanity, I now hope has been overcome. It is, of course, quite possible that it may recur.