The Influence of sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire 1793-1812, vol I

Nelson's Narrative. Dispatches, vol. ii. pp. 340, 343.

145

James states that these ships first came to the wind on the starboard tack, heading as did the British, "as if intending to weather the whole British fleet." The superior speed and weatherliness of the Spanish ships, if well handled, might have enabled them very seriously to molest the British in their attack; but, from the whole conduct of the Spaniards on this day, it is probable that the movement, if made, was only one of the successive vacillations of men who had put themselves in a false position. (Vol. ii. p. 39.)

146

Notably in Keppel's action in 1778, in which he bore a distinguished part. See Mahan's Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783, p. 351.

147

"When the 'Prince George' tacked, the two three-deckers [of the Spanish lee division] tacked after us, and which the rest of the enemy's rear were about to do; but the commander-in-chief, with the ships of [our] centre and rear, following close, covered us from their attack upon the rear of the ships with me, and obliged them to re-tack … and effectually divided the enemy's fleet." (Sir William Parker's narrative of the conduct of the British van. Nelson's Dispatches, vol. ii. p. 473.) The gallant admiral's style is confused, but his meaning is clear enough after half a dozen readings. He must not be taken for the very distinguished officer of the same name, but of the next generation.

Both Parker and Nelson (Dispatches, vol. ii. pp. 340, 344) speak of the main Spanish division as "the van." In truth, when the "Culloden" interposed, the whole enemy's fleet were so nearly joined on the port tack as to seem in line, though disorderly and not quite connected.

148

Nelson's Narrative, Dispatches, vol. ii. pp. 341, 345.

149

Annual Register, 1797, p. 148.

150

Life of Lord Minto, vol. ii. p. 379.

151

See Chapter X.

152

For a striking incident of St. Vincent's energy in suppressing mutiny, see note at end of this chapter.

153

April 19, 1797. Napoleon's Correspondence, vol. ii. p. 655.

154

Napoleon's Correspondence, vol. iii. p. 346.

155

Martin, Hist. de France depuis 1789, vol. ii. p. 479.

156

Corr. de Nap., vol. ii. p. 590.

157

See page 235.

158

Corr. de Nap., vol. ii. p. 622.

159

Ibid., vol. iii. p. 21.

160

Ibid., vol. iii. p. 73.

161

Ibid., p. 89.

162

Corr. de Nap., May 26, 1797, vol. ii. pp. 86, 87.

163

Ibid., Sept. 13, 1797, vol. ii. p. 392.

164

Ibid., Aug. 16, 1797, vol. ii. p. 311.

165

Bonaparte to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Corr., vol. iii. p. 392.

166

Corr. de Nap., vol. iii. p. 313.

167

"Upon reaching Venice, Commodore, you will call, in company with the commanding general and the Minister of France, on the provisional government. You will tell them that the conformity of principles existing between the French and Venetian republics, and the protection granted by us to them, exact the prompt equipment of their navy, in order to concert with us, to maintain the mastery of the Adriatic and the islands; that for this purpose I have sent troops to Corfu, to preserve it to the Venetian Republic; and that henceforth it is necessary to work actively to put their navy in good condition.

"You will get possession of everything under this pretext; having continually on your tongue the unity of the two republics, and using always the name of the Venetian Navy.... It is my intention to seize for the (French) Republic all the Venetian ships, and all the stores possible for Toulon." To Commodore Perrée, June 13, 1797.—Napoleon's Correspondence, vol. iii. p. 155. See also instructions to Admiral Brueys, ibid., p. 291.

168

Corr. de Nap., vol. iii. pp. 519, 520.

169

Corr. de Nap., vol. iii. p. 597.

170

Ibid., vol. iii. p. 609 (Dec. 14, 1797).

171

Ibid., p. 644 (Feb. 23, 1798).

172

Corr. de Nap., vol. iii. p. 643.

173

Jurien de la Gravière, Guerres Maritimes (4th ed.), vol. i. p. 350.

174

So moderate a man as Collingwood wrote (Jan. 26, 1798): "The question is not merely who shall be conqueror, … but whether we shall be any longer a people,—whether Britain is still to be enrolled in the list of European nations."—Collingwood's Memoirs.

175

See Correspondence of Brueys with Bonaparte; Jurien de la Gravière, Guerres Maritimes (Appendix, 4th ed.).

176

"There are fitting out at Brest but ten ships-of-the-line, which have no crews, and are still far from being in condition to keep the sea.... The expedition against England would appear not to be possible before next year." (Corr. de Nap., vol. iii. p. 644, Feb. 23, 1798.) The British Channel fleet at this time numbered forty-seven of the line, exclusive of sixteen in the North Sea.

177

Nelson's Dispatches, vol. iii. p. 35.

178

Marmont attributes the approach to Candia to a wish to give the shelter of the island to the numerous coasters in the convoy. (Mémoires du Duc de Raguse, vol. i. p. 362.)

179

Bonaparte in his preparations laid special stress on having enough small vessels. "It is indispensable to have with the squadron the greatest attainable number of corvettes and despatch vessels. Send orders to all the ports for all such to join the fleet."—Corr. de Nap., vol. iv. pp. 79, 80.

180

This statement is based on the plate in the "Commentaires de Napoléon," vol. ii. p. 190. There are evident inaccuracies in the British positions there given (e.g., for June 22, and in the approach to Alexandria); but that of the 25th seems probable. James states that on the night of June 22 the tracks of the two fleets crossed, but at a sufficient interval of time to prevent a meeting,—the more so as a constant haze prevailed. (Nav. Hist., vol. ii. p. 177.)

181

Narrative in Naval Chronicle, vol. i. p. 48.

182

Corr. de Nap., vol. iv. pp. 275-277.

183

In a chart of the old port of Alexandria, made in 1802 by Major Bryce of the Royal Engineers, attached to Abercromby's expedition, it is said that not less than five fathoms will be found throughout the middle passage. The directions add that heavy ships cannot get out unless with good weather for warping. This was Brueys's great objection to entering, and it was well taken; but the alternative of destruction was worse.

184

Nelson's Dispatches, vol. iii. p. 128.

185

See Coast Map, Alexandria to Rosetta, and Plan of the Battle of the Nile.

186

Chevalier, Mar. Fran, sous la République, p. 365.

187

A spring is a rope taken from the stern of a ship at anchor and fastened either to the riding cable or to an anchor suitably placed, so as to turn the broadside in the direction wished. Owing to the boats being away to get water when Nelson appeared, to the failure of many of them to return, and to the rapidity with which the attack was made, these precautions were not carried out.

188

Mahan's "Influence of Sea-Power upon History," pp. 469-478. Plates XVIII. and XIX.

189

Letter of DeGrasse to Kerguelen, Jan. 8, 1783. Hood "ranged his vessels in very close order (très-serrés), and it was impossible to pass between the land and them, as I wished."—Kerguelen's Guerre Maritime de 1778, p. 259.

190

Letter of Brueys to Bonaparte, July 13, 1798; La Gravière, Guerres Maritimes, vol. i. p. 367. This is a somewhat singular example of following a rule, the principle of which is not grasped. The rear of a column of sailing ships under way was the weaker end, because less easily helped by the van; but in a column of ships at anchor, head to wind, the weather ships were incomparably more exposed, the lee having a very hard pull to get up to them.

191

Narrative of Sir Edward Berry. See Naval Chronicle, vol. i. p. 52.

192

James, ii. p. 177. The Vanguard's Journal, quoted by Sir Harris Nicolas, Nelson's Disp. vol. iii. p. 49, says 4 P. M.

193

The ships-of-the-line needed nearly five fathoms in smooth water, more if there was much sea.

194

James's Naval History, vol. ii. p. 184 (ed. 1878). In the main, the author has followed James in the details of this and other battles, though not without careful comparison with other sources of information accessible to him.

195

Until after the middle of this century there were in the British navy three flags of the same general design, but with red, white, and blue grounds. Admirals were divided into three classes, of the Red, the White, and the Blue; and, according to their classification, ships under their immediate command showed the corresponding ensign. Nelson being at this time a rear-admiral of the Blue, his ships would usually carry the blue flag, almost invisible at night.

At the present day all British naval vessels wear the white flag, and merchant ships the red.

196

The first attack of the thirteen British ships (counting among them the "Leander," fifty,) was confined to the eight head ships of the French line, down to and including the "Tonnant." As these were one by one crushed, the British dropped down and engaged those in the rear,—but with a vigor necessarily diminished by the injuries they had themselves received, not to speak of the physical fatigue induced by the labor and excitement of the previous hours. Nevertheless the "Mercure," when she hauled down her flag, had lost one hundred and five killed and one hundred and forty-eight wounded, and had but six guns that could be used. The loss of the "Heureux" is not stated, but she had nine feet of water in her hold. (Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous la Rép., pp. 376, 377.)

197

Jurien de la Gravière, Guerres Maritimes, vol. i. pp. 228-230; Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous la République, pp 386-388. A letter from Villeneuve, justifying his inaction, is to be found in the former work, p. 231, and in Troude, Batailles Navales, vol. iii. p. 121.

198

Corr. de Nap., vol. iv. p. 520.

199

The two that escaped were captured by Lord Nelson's squadron before July, 1800, when he resigned the Mediterranean command.

200

Chevalier, p. 381.

201

Nels. Disp., vol. iii. p. 10.

202

Nelson's Dispatches, vol. iii. p. 84.

203

For this discussion see Nelson's Dispatches and Letters, vol. iii. pp. 62-65; also App. p. 474.

204

Ross's Life of Saumarez, vol. i. p. 228.

205

Nelson's Disp., vol. iii.; Appendix, p. 474. Letter of Admiral Browne.

206

The American novelist and naval historian, Fenimore Cooper, in the preface to the "Two Admirals," has attributed the whole tactical combination to the captains, on the authority of Captain Ball of the "Alexander," speaking to the late Commodore Morris of the United States Navy, who in turn was Cooper's informant. This constitutes a perfectly respectable oral tradition, coming through intelligent men of unquestioned integrity; but when opposed to the contemporary written statement of Captain Berry, Nelson's flag-captain, who had the fullest opportunity of knowing the facts, it becomes impossible to doubt that somewhere in the chain of witnesses there has been a misunderstanding. That Captain Foley conceived on the moment the plan he executed is perfectly credible; but that the whole body of captains were inspired to carry out, as by mutual consent, a combination of which there had been no previous mention, is a marvel of which Berry's account of Nelson's constant discussions and explanations with his officers effectually disposes. (See Narrative of an Officer of Rank, etc. Naval Chronicle, vol. i. p. 52.)

207

Marine Fran. sous la République, p. 381.

208

Commentaires de Napoléon, vol. ii p. 350.

209

"Good gunners would assuredly have modified the issue of these sinister dramas, for they would have crushed the English fleet at the first act." (Jurien de la Gravière, Guerres Mar., vol. ii. p. 225, 1st ed.). "If Nelson had led in upon an American fleet, as he did upon the French at the Nile, he would have seen reason to repent the boldness of the experiment." (Cooper, preface to "The Two Admirals.")

210

Annual Register, 1798; State Papers, pp. 267-272.

211

Martin, Histoire de France depuis 1789, vol. iii. p. 6.

212

Martin, Hist. de France depuis 1789, vol. iii. p. 9.

213

Ibid., p. 11.

214

Martin, Hist. de France depuis 1789, vol. iii. p. 16.

215

Martin, Hist. de France depuis 1789, vol. iii. p. 24.

216

See post, Chapter XVII.

217

Annual Register, 1798; State Papers, p. 237.

218

Ibid. Martin, Hist. de France, vol. iii. p. 23.

219

Corr. de Nap., vol. iv. pp. 226, 233.

220

Annual Register, 1798; State Papers, p. 276.

221

Martin, Hist. de France, vol. iii. p. 27.

222

Ibid. pp. 24, 25.

223

Jurien de la Gravière, Guerres Maritimes, vol. i. p. 229 (1st ed.).

224

Nelson's Dispatches, vol. iii. p. 105.

225

This division consisted of the "Vanguard," flag-ship, which had not had proper lower masts since she was dismasted immediately after entering the Mediterranean (p. 256); the "Culloden," that had beaten heavily on Aboukir reef for seven hours during the battle; and the "Alexander," both masts and hull in very bad order.

226

Corr. de Nap., vol. iv. p. 660.

227

Nels. Disp., vol. iii. p. 160.

228

Ibid., p. 204.

229

Commentaires de Napoléon, vol. iii. pp. 19, 20.

230

Of all obstacles that can cover the frontiers of an empire, a desert like that of Suez is indisputably the greatest. It is easy to understand that a fort at El Arish, which would prevent an enemy from using the wells and encamping under the palm-trees, would be very valuable.—Commentaires de Napoléon, vol. iii. p. 16.

231

For a graphic account of the anxieties of the French officers in Toulon, illustrated by letters, see Jurien de la Gravière's Guerres Maritimes (4th edition), pp. 352-362. (Appendix.)

232

Corr. de Nap., vol. v. p. 276.

233

Ibid., vol. iv., Letter to Directory, Sept. 8, 1798 (postscript).

234

Corr. de Nap., vol. v. pp. 385, 391, 392. It is interesting to note that by this mail Bonaparte seems first to have heard the word "conscript," applied to the system of which he later made such an insatiable use (p. 387).

235

Instructions pour le citoyen Beauchamp, Corr. de Nap., vol. v. pp. 260-263.

236

Commentaires de Napoléon, vol. iii. p. 24.

237

The roadstead of Aboukir is not safe in winter. It can protect a squadron during the summer. (Commentaires de Nap., vol. ii. p. 235.) In Abercromby's expedition, 1801, "all the pilots accustomed to the Egyptian coast declared that till after the equinox it would be madness to attempt a landing." (Sir R. Wilson's History of British Expedition to Egypt, 2d edition, p. 6.) The fleet then lay in Aboukir Bay from March 2 to March 8, before landing could be made.

238

Corr. de Nap., vol. v. p. 402, where the reasons for the Syrian expedition are given categorically, and can probably be depended upon as truthful.

239

Barrow's Life of Sir Sidney Smith, vol. i. p. 244.

240

The opinion of a French officer may be worth quoting. "Although every one knows what he is, I will nevertheless say a word about Sir Sidney Smith. He has something at once of the knight and of the charlatan. A man of intelligence, yet bordering upon insanity, with the ability of a leader, he has thought to honor his career by often running absurd risks, without any useful end, but only to be talked about. Every one ridicules him, and justly; for in the long run he is wearisome, though very original." (Mémoires du Duc de Raguse (Marmont), vol. ii. p. 30.)

241

The melodramatic painting of Sir Sidney Smith in the breach at Acre represents graphically the popular impression of his character. See frontispiece to Barrow's Life of Sir Sidney Smith.

242

Smith escaped from Paris on the 25th of April; Bonaparte left Paris May 2; Nelson sailed from Cadiz on his great mission May 2,—a very singular triple coincidence.

243

Brenton's Life of Lord St. Vincent, vol. ii. p. 6; Barrow's Life of Sir Sidney Smith, vol. i. p. 236.

244

Nelson's Dispatches, vol. iii. p. 216. The Admiralty, upon remonstrance, emphatically denied any such purpose. (Ibid., p. 335.)

245

For Nelson's attitude until he received orders (Feb. 1, 1799) from St. Vincent to take Smith under his orders, see Dispatches, vol. iii. pp. 223, 224.

246

Nels. Disp., vol. iii. pp. 204, 205.

247

Mémoires de Bourrienne, vol. ii. pp. 243-245.

248

"The siege of Acre lasted sixty-two days. There were two periods. The first from March 19 to April 25, thirty-six days, during which the artillery of the besiegers consisted of two carronades, 32 and 24 pound, taken from British boats, and thirty-six field guns. The second period was from April 25 to May 21, twenty-six days." (Commentaires de Napoléon, vol. iii., p. 63.) "During the latter period the park was increased by two 24-, and four 18-pounders." (Ibid, p. 82.)

249

Nelson's Dispatches, vol. iii. p. 351.

250

Corr. de Nap., June 26, 1799, vol. v. p. 617.

251

Commentaires de Napoléon, vol. iii. pp. 81, 82. It is only fair to say that an attempt was made by Perrée a few weeks later to land ammunition back of Mt. Carmel, when he was discovered and chased off. (Barrow's Life of Sir Sidney Smith, vol. i. p. 300.) Napoleon may have confused the two circumstances. His own correspondence (vol. v., pp. 517, 518) contradicts the landing near Acre. The guns were put on shore at Jaffa and thence dragged to Acre.

252

Schomberg's Naval Chronology. Appendix No. 374.

253

Ibid. Appendix No. 376.

254

See map of Brest in next chapter.

255

Naval Chronicle, vol. i. p. 537.

256

Ibid., p. 539.

257

Ibid., vol. ii. p. 81. Osler's Life of Lord Exmouth, p. 191.

258

Brenton's Life of St. Vincent, vol. ii. p. 17.

259

"Admiral Bruix, being able to rely more on the devotion of his captains than upon their exactitude and precision in manœuvring, took pains before sailing to lay down the duties of a captain under all circumstances; carefully refraining, however, from making a special application of these lessons to any one individual, that their self-love might not be wounded. This wise precaution did not prevent new mistakes, whose consequences would have been much aggravated had we been obliged, by meeting the enemy, to manœuvre either to avoid or compel action." (Journal of Captain Moras, special aide-de-camp to Admiral Bruix. La Gravière, Guerres Maritimes, vol. i. p. 373. Appendix, 4th edition.)

The gunnery, apparently, was equally bad. "I will cite only one fact to give an idea of the effects of our artillery. When Admiral Bruix was bringing to Brest the French and Spanish fleets, at least nine hundred guns were fired in very fine weather at an Algerian corsair without doing any harm. I do not believe that ever, in a combat of that kind, was so much useless firing done." (Article by "an officer of marine artillery;" Moniteur, 3 Fructidor, An 8 [Aug. 20, 1800].)

260

Two months later Lord Keith, having succeeded St. Vincent in the command, wrote to Nelson: "If Minorca is left without ships it will fall." (Nelson's Dispatches, vol. iii. p. 415, note.)

261

Bruix did not have over a thousand troops with him, the pressure on the land frontiers by the Second Coalition demanding all the force that could be raised to resist it; but the fleet carried twenty-four thousand seamen or artillerists, a force capable by itself of accomplishing much. The reputation of the admiral caused both officers and men to flock to his flag.

262

"Port Mahon is a very narrow harbor, from which you cannot get out without great difficulty." (Collingwood's letters, August 18, 1799.) "Ships had better be under sail off Port Mahon than in the harbor." (Nelson's Dispatches, May 12, 1799.)

263

Brenton's St. Vincent, vol. i. p. 493.

264

"I had the happiness to command a band of brothers." (Nelson's Dispatches, vol. iii. p. 230) The best of his Nile captains were, for the most part, still with him.

265

Nelson's Dispatches, vol. iii. pp. 366, 374.

266

See ante, p. 306.

267

Jurien de la Gravière, Guerres Maritimes, vol. i. p. 288 (4th edition); also James, Naval History, vol. ii. p. 264 (edition 1847). Other authorities say the 8th. The reconcilement seems to be that Bruix did not take his fleet to Genoa, but only a detachment; the main body anchoring in Vado Bay. He would thus leave Genoa the 6th, Vado the 8th.

268

"We avoided the enemy by skirting very close, and under cover of foggy weather, the coasts of Piedmont and Provence." (Journal of Captain Moras, special aid to Bruix. La Gravière, Guerres Maritimes, vol. i. p. 376. Appendix, 4th edition.)