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The Influence of sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire 1793-1812, vol I
1
Martin, Histoire de France, vol. xix. p. 370.
2
Nineteenth Century Review, June, 1887, p. 922.
3
Lord John Russell's Life of Fox, vol. ii. p. 137.
4
Annual Register, vol. 27, p. 10.
5
See Annual Register, 1769, pp. 2-4; 1770, pp. 27-41, 67, 71, 75.
6
Annual Register, 1788, p. 59.
7
King's Message, March 29, 1781.
8
Fox's Speeches (London, 1815), vol. iv. p. 178.
9
Parl. Hist., vol. xxix. pp. 75-79.
10
Annual Register, 1791, p. 102.
11
Annual Register, 1793; State Papers, p. 118.
[12]
[66]
12
Annual Register, 1793; State Papers, pp. 127, 128.
13
Annual Register, 1793; State Papers, pp. 127, 128.
14
Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous la République, p. 49.
15
Nap. to Decrès, Aug. 29, 1805.
16
Troude, Batailles Nav., vol. iii. p. 370.
17
Moniteur, Jan. 19, 1790, p. 82.
18
Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous la République, p. 11.
19
Ibid., p. 12.
20
Guérin, Histoire de la Marine, vol. iii. p. 156 (1st ed.).
21
Troude, Batailles Nav. de la France, vol. ii. p. 201.
22
Guérin, Hist. Mar., vol. iii. p. 195 (1st ed.).
23
Troude, Bat. Nav., vol. 2, p. 320.
24
Guérin, vol. iii. p. 213.
25
Guérin, vol. iii. p. 153.
26
See Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous la République, pp. 20-23.
27
The decree of April 22 is in the Moniteur of the 23d. That of the 28th is not; but it will be found in the "Collection Générale des Décrets rendus par l'Ass. Nat." for April, 1791.
28
The word entretenu, here rendered "paid," is difficult to translate. The dictionary of the French Academy explains it to mean an officer kept on pay, without necessarily being employed. Littré says that an officer "non entretenu" is one not having a commission. The word carries the idea of permanence. By the decree of April 28, "enseignes non entretenus" had no pay nor military authority, except when on military service; nor could they wear the uniform, except when so employed.
29
Troude, Bat. Nav., vol. ii. p. 260.
30
Troude, Bat. Nav., vol. ii. pp. 261, 262.
31
Troude, Bat. Nav., vol. ii. p. 397.
32
Troude, Bat. Nav., vol. ii. p. 396.
33
Guérin, Hist. de la Mar., vol. iii. p. 411 (note). (Ed. 1848.)
34
Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous la Rép., p. 126.
35
Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous la Rép., p. 126.
36
Jurien de la Gravière, Guerres Mar., vol. i. p. 138 (1st ed.).
37
Ibid., vol. i. p. 139 (1st ed.).
38
Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous la Rép., pp. 51, 52.
39
Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous la Rép., pp. 97-101.
40
Chevalier, p. 42.
41
Chevalier, Rép. p. 219.
42
Tronde, Bat. Nav., vol. ii. p. 423.
43
Letter of the Ordonnateur de la Marine, Najac; Jurien de la Gravière, Guerres Mar. (4th ed. App.).
44
Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous le Consulat, p. 47.
45
Ibid., p. 49.
46
Troude, Bat. Nav., vol. iii. p. 337.
47
La Gravière, Guerres Mar., p. 51.
48
Chevalier, Rép., p. 132.
49
See Chapter VI.
50
Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous le Consulat, p. 43.
51
Collingwood's Correspondence, p. 48. (First American from fourth London edition.)
52
Nelson's Dispatches, vol. vi. p. 480.
53
Collingwood's Correspondence, pp. 265, 266.
54
Collingwood's Correspondence, p. 208.
55
Brenton's Naval History, vol. i. p. 415. (Ed. 1823.)
56
Brenton's Naval History, vol. i. p. 455.
57
James' Nav. Hist. vol. i. p. 53 (ed. 1878). This system had been adopted in France a century before by Colbert (Revue Mar. et Coloniale, September, 1887, p. 567).
58
Brenton's Nav. Hist., vol. ii. p. 105.
59
James' Nav. Hist., vol. i. pp. 57, 58.
60
Guerres Mar., vol. i. p. 49 (1st ed.).
61
James, vol. i. p. 55.
62
Guerres Mar., vol. i. p. 164 (note).
63
Nels. Disp. i. 309-311.
64
Nels. Disp., i. p. 312.
65
Ibid., ii. pp. 70, 77, 241.
66
Life of Sir Jahleel Brenton.
67
James' Nav. Hist., vol. i. p. 54. (Ed. 1878).
68
James' Nav. Hist., vol. i. p. 54. (Ed. 1878).
69
For example, that any captain surrendering to a force less than double his own should suffer death; and if of a ship-of-the-line, to any number of enemies unless the vessel was actually sinking. The same fate awaited him who, in a fleet action, allowed the line to be broken. So also the decree not to give quarter. See Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous la Rép., p. 128; Guérin, Hist. de la Mar., vol. iii. p. 395.
70
The Peninsular War, so brilliant in many of its features and in the end so triumphantly successful, has some analogies to the smaller expeditions here criticised, and may be thought to refute the remarks in the text. The analogy, however, fails in some very decisive points. The landing and base of operations at Lisbon were in the territory of an ally of long standing; the projected advance was into a country in general insurrection against foreign rule; above all, the position of Lisbon and its distance from France imposed upon the French, in case they advanced against it in great force as they did in 1810, a long and very difficult line of communication, while the British had the sea open. Toulon, in 1793, was disadvantageous to the British as compared with Lisbon in 1809, because farther from England and in France. For remarks on Peninsular War see note at end of this chapter.
71
For the strategic discussion of the British naval dispositions on the occasion of the Irish Expedition of 1796, see Chapter XI.
72
Brenton's Life of St. Vincent, vol. i. p. 295.
73
Of the thirty ships-of-the-line in Toulon when occupied by the allies, three or four had been sent to Rochefort without guns, carrying French prisoners whom it was inconvenient to keep.
74
The author is keenly aware that this policy, of garrisoning several somewhat separated ports, is seemingly inconsistent with sound military principles as to concentration, as well as with what he himself has elsewhere said about the proper dispositions for maintaining military control of a maritime region. It is, therefore, well to explain that those principles and dispositions apply where the belligerent navies are so far equal as to create a real struggle. This was not the case in the French Revolution. Great Britain had undisputed naval supremacy in the West Indies, and the question before her was, not to beat the enemy's fleet, but to secure her own commercial routes. To this end it was necessary to disseminate, not concentrate her ships, and to provide them with convenient centres of refuge and supply along the routes. The case was analogous to the police arrangements of a city. In ordinary quiet times the police are distributed to cope with individual offenders; when a mob gathers and threatens the peace they are concentrated in large bodies.
75
Macpherson's Annals of Commerce, vol. iv. p. 454.
76
Ardouin, Études sur l'Hist. de Haïti, vol. iv. p. 45.
77
Account of Jamaica, London, 1808, pp. 51, 52.
78
Troude, Bat. Nav., vol. ii. p. 326.
79
Troude, Bat. Nav., vol. ii. p. 327. James says May 6.
80
See ante p. 101.
81
A ship is said to be hove-to when some of the sails are so arranged as to move her ahead and others to force her astern,—the result being that she remains nearly in the same spot, but drifts slowly to leeward.
82
Villaret had been joined on the 19th of May by a ship-of-the-line, which had separated from Nielly's squadron; this raised his force from twenty-five to twenty-six.
83
A raking shot is one that passes from end to end, lengthwise, of a ship, instead of across, from side to side. It not only ranges through a greater space within, but attacks more vital parts, particularly about the stern, where were the rudder and the more important officers of a ship.
84
Another advantage in engaging to leeward was that the lower-deck batteries, which contained the heaviest guns, were so near the water that a ship heeling over with a strong breeze could not always open her lee ports. The lee ship of two opponents, using her weather guns, would escape this inconvenience and have a proportionate advantage. On the First of June the weather was too moderate to affect the use of the lower-deck batteries; but on the 29th of May, the "Queen Charlotte," using her lee as well as her weather guns as she broke through the French line, had the lower deck full of water. One of her officers, Lieutenant (afterwards Admiral) Codrington, being knocked down by the recoil of a gun and thrown to the lee side of the deck, could, when leaning on his left arm, barely keep his head out of water. (Life of Admiral Codrington.)
85
A whimsical incident is told as occurring in this grim scene of slaughter and destruction. "The 'Brunswick' had a large figurehead of the Duke, with a laced hat on. The hat was struck off by a shot during the battle. The crew of the ship sent a deputation to the quarter-deck to request that Captain Harvey would be pleased to order his servant to give them his laced cocked-hat to supply the loss. The captain, with great good-humor, complied, and the carpenter nailed it on the Duke's head, where it remained till the battle was finished." (Barrow's Life of Howe.)
86
Official narrative of the loss of the "Vengeur," by the survivors. Troude, Bat. Nav., vol. ii. p. 355.
87
The speech of Barrère in the National Convention was as follows: "Imagine the 'Vengeur' ship-of-the-line pierced with cannon shot, opening in all directions, and surrounded by English tigers and leopards, a crew composed of wounded and dying men, battling against the waves and the cannon. All at once the tumult of the action, the fear of danger, the pain-stricken cries of the wounded cease; all mount or are carried upon deck. Every flag, every pennant is hoisted. Cries of 'Vive la République!' 'Vive la Liberté et la France!' are heard on all sides; it is the touching and animated spectacle of a civic festival, rather than the terrible moment of a shipwreck. For a moment they must have thought upon their fate. But no, citizens, our brothers thought no more upon that, they see only the English and their country. They choose rather to be engulfed than to dishonor her by a surrender. They hesitate not an instant. Their last prayers are for liberty and for the Republic. They disappear."
88
The French accounts state that he remained until eight P.M., during all which time he might have been attacked. The English on the contrary say that the whole French fleet was out of sight by quarter past six. The question is not material, for it is certain that Villaret did remain for some time, and that he would not have been attacked had he stayed longer.
89
Life of Admiral (then Lieutenant) Codrington.
90
Barrow's Life of Lord Howe, p 256. There are similar statements as to the bearing of Howe and Curtis made by Admiral Codrington.
91
At noon of June 1, by the "Queen Charlotte's" log-book, the island of Ushant bore east one-half north, distant 429 miles.
92
The carelessness with which naval affairs are too often described by general historians may be illustrated by the account of this battle given by one of the most distinguished. "Lord Howe gained so decisive a success from the adoption of the same principles which gave victory to Frederic at Leuthen, to Napoleon at Austerlitz, and to Wellington at Salamanca, viz.: to direct an overwhelming force against one half of the enemy's force, and making the attack obliquely, keeping the weather gage of the enemy, to render it impossible for the ships to leeward to work up to the assistance of those engaged. By this means he reduced one half of the enemy's fleet to be the passive spectators of the destruction of the other.... Had he succeeded in penetrating the line at all points, or had his captains implicitly obeyed his directions in that particular, and engaged the whole to leeward, he would have brought twenty ships-of-the-line to Spithead." (Alison's "History of Europe.") How an attack upon one half of the line is consistent with penetrating the same line at all points does not clearly appear; but the statement concerning Lord Howe's principle of action on the 1st of June is absolutely contrary to all the facts, although Alison had James's painstaking work before him and refers to it frequently. His statement is that of Jomini's "Guerres de la Révolution Française;" but the latter author writes only as a military man, introduces naval matters merely incidentally, and was doubtless misled in the scanty information attainable when he wrote.
93
It is a curious coincidence, though not necessarily significant, that the number of men hit in each of these ships was nearly the same. The "Royal Sovereign" lost fifty-four, the "Queen" fifty-four, and the "Glory" fifty-two.
94
Brenton, in his naval history of Great Britain, tells an amusing story of the captain of one of the ships a little to Howe's left, which at once characterizes a type of officer and illustrates the above remark. He was, Brenton says, so occupied with preserving his station by the azimuth compass that he lost sight of his intended antagonist, and in the smoke never found him.
95
James, Nav. Hist., vol. i. p. 144. (Ed. 1878.)
96
Troude says that he reached his station on the 21st of May. Bat. Nav., vol. ii. p. 330.
97
Many years later Admiral Villaret was governor of Martinique. When that island was taken by the British in 1809, he went to England as a passenger in a ship commanded by Capt. E. P. Brenton. This officer in his naval history states that Villaret told him that Robespierre's orders were to go to sea, and that, if the convoy fell into Howe's hands, his head should answer for it. Therefore he avoided action so long, and endeavored to draw Lord Howe out of the track of the convoy. The loss of the ships taken was to him a matter of comparative indifference. "While your admiral amused himself refitting them, I saved my convoy, and I saved my head."
98
Troude, Bat. Nav., vol. ii. p. 337. Chevalier, Hist. de la Mar. Fran. sous la Rép., p. 144.
99
Ross's Life of Saumarez, vol. i. p. 146.
100
Page 140.
101
Martin, Hist. de France depuis 1789, vol. ii. p 240.
102
Nels. Disp., ii., p. 32.
103
Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous la Rép. p. 216. Life of Adm. Codrington, vol. i. pp. 36, 37.
104
See post, Chap. VIII., Martin's actions with Hotham.
105
Jomini, Guerres de la Rév., livre viii. p. 74.
106
Jomini, Guerres de la Rév., livre ix. p. 341.
107
L'horrible route de la Corniche sous le feu des cannonières anglaises.—Jomini, Guerres de la Rév., livre x. p. 62.
108
Life of Lord Minto, vol. ii. p. 274.
109
Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous la Rép., p. 174.
110
Nels. Disp., vol. ii. p. 26.
111
Mar. Fran. sous La Rép., p. 186.
112
Nels. Disp., vol. ii. p. 50.
113
See ante, p. 176.
114
"We cannot get another mast this side of Gibraltar." (Nels Disp., May 4, 1795.)
115
James, vol. i. p. 297. Nelson says six. (Nels. Disp., vol. ii. p 47.)
116
Jomini, Guerres de la Rév., livre viii. p. 75.
117
The effects were, however, very severely felt in France. (Corr. de Nap., vol. i., pp. 65, 79, 95.)
118
Nels. Disp., vol. ii. p. 84.
119
The Austrian generals say, and true, they were brought on the coast at the express desire of the English to co-operate with the fleet, which fleet nor admiral they never saw.—Nels. Disp., vol. ii. p. 213.
120
Nels. Disp., vol. ii. p. 98a. See also p. 110.
121
Nels. Disp., June 6, 1800.
122
Ibid., vol. ii., p. 64.
123
For Nelson's complaints about the force under his command, see ibid., pp. 106-114.
124
Nels. Disp., vol. ii. p. 118.
125
Nels. Disp., vol. ii. p. 63.
126
Commentaires de Nap., vol. i. p. 112.
127
Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous la Rép. p. 251.
128
Comment. de Nap., vol. i. p. 71.
129
Nels. Disp., vol. ii. p. 128.
130
Corr. de Nap., vol. i. p. 465.
131
For O'Hara's characteristics, see life of Lord Minto, vol. ii. pp. 190, 195.
132
See Nelson's Disp., vol. ii. p. 258, note.
The letter of the Admiralty to Admiral Mann may possess some interest as an example of the official correspondence of the day, as well as an expression of disapprobation too profound for reproach:—
Sir,—I have received and communicated to my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty your letter to me of the 29th December, giving an account of your proceedings and of the severe [several?] occurrences which have taken place during your passage from Gibraltar, with the squadron under your command; and I have their Lordships' commands to acquaint you that they cannot but feel the greatest regret that you should have been induced to return to England with the squadron under your orders, under the circumstances in which you were placed.
I have their Lordships' further commands to acquaint you that orders will be to sent to you, either by this or to-morrow's post, to strike your flag and come on shore.
I am, &c.,Evan Nepean,Secretary to the AdmiraltyTucker's St. Vincent, vol. i. p. 216.
133
Life of Lord Minto, vol. ii. p. 358.
134
This was Jervis's opinion. (See Life of St. Vincent by Tucker, vol. i. p. 240; also Nelson's Dispatches, vol. ii. p. 294.)
135
Napoleon's Correspondence, vol. ii. p. 76. See also generally pp. 73-80. The relief obtained by Bonaparte from the departure of the British crops out on every page.
136
Life of Lord Minto, vol. ii. p. 373.
137
The project of forcing the entrance to the Tagus by a squadron from Brest had been openly discussed in France. (Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous la République, p. 258.)
138
An exciting incident occurred during this chase. In the height of it a man fell overboard. A boat was lowered and picked him up; but the enemy's ships were so close it became doubtful whether the British frigate could afford to await her return. Nelson, always generous to the verge of rashness, backed a topsail, saying "I won't let Hardy go," and succeeded in carrying him off. The anecdote gains in interest when it is remembered that Hardy, who was taken in the prize of December 20, had just been released from Spain; and that, as captain of the flag-ship at Trafalgar, he was witness of Nelson's fall and death-scene.
139
The distinguishing flag which shows a commodore is on board the ship.
140
A favorite project with the Directory, as with Napoleon, was to mass the French and Spanish navies in one great body; as had several times been done under Louis XVI. during the American Revolution. Such a combination was hoped for the Irish expedition of 1796; and, though too late for that purpose, the movement from Cartagena to Cadiz was regarded by the Directory as a step toward uniting the fleets. This was one of the objects of Bruix's adventurous sortie from Brest in 1799, when he actually brought back to that port in his train fifteen Spanish ships,—nominal allies, actual hostages. The combination at Trafalgar is well known. Later on the Emperor sought to build up a patch-work fleet out of all the minor navies of the Continent, as he pieced together out of all the nations the immense army which was swallowed up in his Russian enterprise. But here, as usually, a homogeneous body, centrally placed, triumphed over an incongruous coalition.
141
The stringent exactions of the close-hauled line-of-battle imposed upon a fleet, in the presence of an enemy, the tactical necessity of rectifying the order with any considerable change of wind,—an evolution whose difficulty increased in direct proportion to the number of the ships; and in a more than geometrical progression, when they were badly drilled.
142
Tucker's Life of St. Vincent, vol. i. p. 255.
143
James's Nav. Hist., vol ii. p. 37.
144
