Memoirs of General Count Rapp, First aide-de-camp to Napoleon

This position was only a temporary one—it was too extended: I only took it to avoid retiring suddenly behind the town, and thus allowing the enemy to penetrate between that place and Saverne, which Lieutenant-general Desbureaux occupied with a battalion of the line, some partisans, and a few lancers.

General Rottembourg was intrusted with the task of observing the Rhine on our rear and on the right.—I had only been able to allow him a brigade, which I had left at Seltz; out of this I was obliged to withdraw the 40th regiment the moment the Austrians appeared. There only remained with him the 39th, whose second battalion formed the advanced posts, and the reserve. The first, a company of sappers and eight pieces of cannon, composed the line of battle for more than half a league of ground. The situation, without being bad in itself, had nothing particularly encouraging in it. The small town of Seltz, supported on the Rhine, is situated on the two banks of the Seltzbach. This river is pretty secure for about 400 yards, but farther up it is fordable every where, and the woods on its banks render the passage of it still more easy. On the other hand, I feared a landing which the enemy could easily effect behind the right, and to which I could make but a feeble opposition, whilst all my attention was wanted to the front, which, as I have said, extended to a great distance.

In this alternative General Rottembourg decided on keeping a watch on the Rhine only by means of patroles, and he sent a company to guard the fords from the mill at Seltz to Nideradern. He placed his artillery on a small eminence on the right bank, to the left of the town; and what remained of his soldiers he sent forward to support the second battalion, which occupied the advanced posts and the wood.

At eleven o'clock the enemy, having assembled his masses, commenced the attack by a well-sustained fire of musquetry, which he supported with eight pieces of cannon. The opposition of our troops was obstinate, and for a long time was effectual, but at last this small advanced post was compelled to retreat into the wood. It maintained itself there with heroic courage, and resisted for a long time the efforts of from 8 to 9000 men, aided by a numerous artillery. In fine, after a few hours of the finest resistance, this handful of valiant troops retreated in the greatest order, and rejoined the first battalion.

Emboldened by this success our adversaries brought down their masses. They debouched by the main road, and marched on Seltz, of which they thought to get possession without difficulty. We allowed them to come up under the fire of our batteries; as soon as they could play, a tremendous discharge carried death into their ranks. Encouraged by their numbers, they nevertheless continued to advance, and the combat recommenced with more vigour than before. But, constantly repelled by the valour of our soldiers, and mowed down by the French artillery, the Austrians in the end gave way, and retired in confusion into the wood. Their movements from that time became uncertain, and they hesitated a long time what they should do. Our cannon continued to carry destruction into their ranks. Attack was not more dangerous than inaction; they again advanced, and succeeded in getting possession of the part of the town situated on the left bank. But this triumph cost them dear: a few shells, thrown on the houses of which they were in possession, compelled them to leave them, and to regain, in a great hurry, their first place of shelter: our batteries fired with increased fury, and the fugitives suffered an immense loss.

This was not the only attack in which they failed. At the commencement of the action they had advanced by the main road from Weissembourg to Haguenau on Surbourg, which was occupied by a battalion of the 18th, under the command of Colonel Voyrol. This village was valiantly defended: for more than two hours the enemy could not penetrate into it; but they at last brought up forces so considerable, that under the apprehension of seeing the position turned, General Albert ordered it to be evacuated. Our soldiers withdrew behind the Saare, where they joined the remainder of the regiment. Attacked in this position by some chosen troops of the Austrian army, they remained immoveable. Wearied with so many fruitless attacks, and convinced that they could not succeed in forcing men who appeared determined to die at their post, nor in getting possession of the avenues of the forest, the Allies at last decided on retreating.

We had three hundred men killed and wounded. The Austrians, by their own account, had lost 2000 men, and had two pieces of cannon dismounted.

Our troops had scarcely taken a few hours rest, when I was obliged to put them again on their march. The Allied army of the Upper Rhine was advancing on Strasburg; I had received this news during the action. I had not a moment to lose: I marched immediately towards that place, and the result has shewn whether this measure was proper.

CHAPTER XLVII

It was during this retreat that the soldiers heard of the disastrous battle of Waterloo, and the Emperor's abdication, which, to that moment, I had carefully concealed from them. These events produced an universal discouragement, and desertion soon found its way among them. Fatal projects entered the minds even of those who were least carried away by passion. Excited by malevolence, some wished to return to their homes; others proposed to throw themselves as partisans into the Vosges.

I was immediately informed of these intentions. I directly foresaw what terrible consequences they might produce. I issued an order of the day; it succeeded; their minds were tranquillized, but it was not long before anxiety revived. When we reached Haguenau, the … regiment, formerly so illustrious, loudly proclaimed the design of quitting the army, and of repairing with its artillery into the mountains. The cannon were already harnessed, and one battalion had taken up its arms. I was informed of it; I rushed to the spot; I took in my hand the eagle of the rebels, and placing myself in the midst of them, "Soldiers," I cried, "I learn that it is proposed among you to desert us. In an hour's time we shall fight; do you wish the Austrians to think that you have fled from the field of honour? Let the brave swear never to quit their eagles or their general-in-chief. I grant permission to the cowards to depart." At these words, all exclaimed, "Long live Rapp! long live our general!" Every one swore to die by his standard, and tranquillity was restored.

We immediately began our march, and reached the Souffel, two leagues in advance of Strasburg. The fifteenth division had its right on the river Ill, its centre at Hoenheim, its left at Souffelweyersheim, and extended to the road from Brumpt; the sixteenth occupied Lampertheim, Mundolsheim, the three villages of Hausbergen, with its left resting on the road from Saverne: lastly, the seventeenth was in columns on the road from Molsheim, with two regiments of cavalry; two others were placed in the rear of the fifteenth division at Bischeim. Such was the situation of our troops on the morning of the 28th, when the enemy attacked with impetuosity the village of Lampertheim, which was occupied by a battalion of the 10th, under the command of General Beurmann. This battalion alone sustained for a long time the attacks of 8000 infantry, and the continued firing of six pieces of cannon. However, as the number of the assailants was continually increasing, it withdrew behind the river, and, conformably to its orders, stationed itself at Mundolsheim.

The enemy's columns, from 40 to 50,000 men strong, advanced immediately by the roads from Brumpt and Bishweiller. All these arrangements, and the masses of cavalry which covered the first of these roads, announced that their project was to separate the divisions of Generals Rottembourg and Albert, in order to overwhelm the latter. I did not mistake the design of the Allies, but I had not the power of uniting my troops, which had deployed in an immense plain, and were already engaged throughout the whole line. There only remained one expedient; I adopted it immediately, fortunately it was a most fatal one for the enemy. I closed the 10th regiment into columns, in the very midst of the firing; I ordered the 32d to advance; and I moved it en echelon after having formed it into a square. The rest of the division of Albert remained in reserve on the height of Hiderhausbergen.

Defending the ground foot by foot, General Rottembourg changed the front of his division, throwing his left wing into the rear, and proceeded to cover the villages of Hoenheim, Bischeim and Schittigheim, threatening the flank of the troops which were engaged between these two divisions. This was according to his orders.

The 103d was placed on the road from Brumpt, and the 36th left Souffelweyersheim to support it; but scarcely had it begun to march when the Allies attacked the village. I immediately despatched a company to defend this important position. Our soldiers advanced to it, running, but our adversaries had taken possession of it before they could arrive. Captain Chauvin supported with extraordinary courage the fire of a cloud of sharpshooters, and thus gave time for General Fririon to come up. This officer left a battalion and four pieces of cannon to cover the road, and advanced in charging time with the rest of his forces. General Gudin seconded this movement, and manœuvred on the road from Bischweiller: the Austrians gave way, and withdrew; but the reinforcements which they every moment received left our troops no chance of maintaining their position. On the other hand, the assailants had outflanked the 10th, and the moment had arrived for effecting the movement which I had ordered. Consequently the 16th division wheeled back its left wing perpendicularly to the rear, while it preserved the head of Hoenheim, from whence our artillery raked the enemy in flank and rear. At the same time the gallant General Beurmann, attacked on every side and already surrounded, sallied forth from Mundolsheim at the head of the 10th, and retreated without disorder towards the division.

The Austrians on their side advanced on the road from Brumpt with enormous masses of cavalry and infantry, supported by a formidable artillery. They penetrated between the two divisions, and arrived without obstacle on four pieces of cannon which had been continually pouring discharges of grape-shot on their columns. They were taken; but the enemy presented his flank to the troops of General Rottembourg, and to two regiments of cavalry which were on his front. I took advantage of this circumstance: put myself at the head of the 11th dragoons, and the 7th horse chasseurs. I made a rapid charge: I routed the first line, penetrated the second, and overthrew every thing that offered me any resistance. We made a dreadful slaughter of the Austrian and Wurtemburg cavalry. At the same time the 32d came up at the charge in close columns, and prevented them from rallying. They were thrown back on their own infantry, whom they put to flight.

General Rottembourg, on his side, pushed forward his right wing, and opened on the enemy, who defiled in confusion before his columns, a most destructive fire of artillery and musquetry; in an instant the field of battle is covered with the slain, and the immense army of the Prince of Wurtemburg is routed. The defeat was so complete that baggage, which was two leagues in the rear, was attacked and plundered, and the Prince himself lost his equipages. The confusion extended itself as far as Haguenau, and would have gone still farther if 30,000 Russians, who came up from Weissembourg, had not by their presence encouraged the fugitives. The night which came on, and the risk that there would have been in adventuring against forces so superior to our own, prevented us from profiting by our successes. We could not retake our artillery, the enemy had made haste to remove it to his rear.

It cost him very dear to keep it. He had from 1500 to 2000 men killed, and a still more considerable number wounded. On our side there were about 700 killed and wounded. Of this number were two Captains of light artillery, Favier and Dandlau, both wounded in defending their cannon, and Colonel Montagnier, who performed such signal service on this occasion.

The enemy's General revenged himself for this defeat by devastation. The day after the battle he set on fire the village of Souffelweyersheim, under pretext that the peasants had fired on his troops. This was not the fact, and the name of the Prince of Wurtemburg will remain for ever sullied by an action which plunged a multitude of families into misery.

Whether the vigour with which we had repulsed all their attacks had given them a distaste for making new ones, or from some other motive, our adversaries remained some days without undertaking any thing. I took advantage of this repose to provision Strasburg, and to fortify myself in my positions. I also had time to give to all commanders of places, who were under my command, the most precise instructions.

Meantime the allied army continued to increase; fresh corps arrived every day to swell its numbers: very soon 70,000 men deployed before us, and pressed us on every side. Flags of truce came one after the other, without having any marked object in view. I proposed to the enemy's General a suspension of arms, during which I might send an officer to Paris, and receive orders from the government. The Prince of Wurtemburg refused, without however renouncing the system of communication that he had adopted.

It was about this time that he sent for the pastor of Wendenheim, a respectable man and an excellent patriot. "Are you acquainted," he said to him, "with General Rapp?"—"Yes, my Lord."—"Will you undertake a mission to him?"—"Assuredly, if its object is in no respect contrary to the interests of my country."—"Well then, go, and tell him that if he will deliver up Strasburg to me for the King of France, wealth and honours shall be showered on him."—"My Lord, General Rapp is an Alsacian, and consequently a good Frenchman; never will he consent to dishonour his military career. I consequently beseech your Highness to entrust some one else with this message." At these words the venerable pastor bowed and departed, leaving the Prince astonished and confused at having proposed in vain this piece of meanness. Nevertheless, his Highness was not discouraged. On the 3d of June, he despatched General Vacquant to me, with a flag of truce, to demand of me in the name of the King of France the surrender of Strasburg. In order to inspire more confidence, the Austrian officer wore an enormous white ribband and the decoration of the lily. I asked him whether he came from the King; he replied that he did not. "Well then," I said to him, "I will not give up the place till my soldiers shall have eaten the thighs of Austrians, as those I had at Dantzic ate those of Russians." Importuned by the insignificant communications which the commander of the allied forces was every day sending me, I endeavoured to penetrate into his motives. With this object a general reconnoissance was made on the 6th on the Austrian positions. Our soldiers took some posts of cavalry, cut others to pieces, and returned to the camp, after having made all the enemy's army get under arms.

Having heard, two days after, a heavy cannonade in the direction of Phalzburg, I resolved to make a second reconnoissance, as well to make myself precisely acquainted with the forces that I had before me, as to hinder the Prince of Wurtemburg from detaching troops against that place. Albert's division and the cavalry marched against the entrenched camp, which the Austrians had formed all the way from the strong position of Oberhausbergen to Hiderhausbergen. The attack commenced at three o'clock in the morning: it was impetuous, and crowned with the most complete success. The enemy's cavalry were repulsed and put to flight by the brigade of General Grouvel; the principal villages were taken at the point of the bayonet, and the entrenchments carried by force. Several officers were taken in their beds, and others at the very moment they were rushing to arms. Some generals escaped in their shirts, and owed their safety only to the darkness which protected them.

The 10th light infantry, commanded by the gallant Colonel Cretté, displayed in this affair the same valour as at the battle of the 28th. The 18th, under the orders of Colonel Voyrol, one of the most intrepid officers in the French army, made itself master of the village of Mittelhausbergen, where he withstood for a long time numerous forces, and incessant attacks on every point.

The signal for retreat having been given, General Albert ordered the 57th to form in echelon towards the attack on the right, and the 32d towards that on the left. We retired in the best order. The enemy endeavoured to disturb us; he attacked our troops. The 57th received him without wavering, and opened a fire at musquet-length which disorganized his columns. Twice the allied cavalry returned to the charge, twice was it repulsed with loss. General Laroche, who led it on, was wounded, and fell under the feet of the horses; he would have perished if the French had not come to his assistance. "Friends," cried he, "I once served in your ranks, save me." He was immediately taken up, and restored to his own men. A troop of cuirassiers had nearly surprised the 18th in its retrograde movement, but the chief of the staff, Colonel Schneider, having skilfully opposed to it a battalion that he had by him, broke their shock, and saved the regiment from an inevitable defeat.

The Allies, convinced that they could not succeed in cutting us off, left us peaceably to continue our march. Our troops returned to their camp, after having accurately ascertained the immense superiority of the forces that they had to contend with. Both parties entered into cantonments. A military convention was signed a few days afterwards, and hostilities ceased throughout all Alsace.

CHAPTER XLVIII

Inactivity soon engendered sedition. Other armies, other corps, which had not the excuse of being misled by a political combination, had trampled under foot military discipline. Is it strange that, in the midst of the general effervescence, my soldiers should for a moment have forgotten themselves? this episode is painful to me. I ought neither to write it, nor omit it. I can well bear the blame which Joubert, Massena, and so many other Generals, whom I do not pretend to equal, have incurred. The following are the terms in which this act of disobedience is related by an anonymous writer:—he has not thought proper to tell every thing, but it is my own conduct that is concerned; I must imitate his reserve. I submit, moreover, to the judgment which he has delivered.

"The Austrians, despairing of ever getting possession of Strasburg by force of arms, endeavoured to form an understanding with a party in the town. They succeeded by their sagacity in the application of the two means which act the most powerfully on the heart of men—gold and terror. They decoyed some by the attraction of riches, they subdued others by making them dread the vengeance of the government. When they were in this manner assured of all those whom they thought open to seduction, they hastened to execute their perfidious designs.

"From the commencement of the campaign our soldiers had been in a state of irritation, well calculated to promote the secret views of the enemy: they were acquainted with the disastrous affair of Waterloo, they knew all the details of it; but they had too much confidence in the skill of that celebrated man, with whom they had five times triumphed over all Europe—they had too often seen him, by sudden inspirations, regain his hold of victory when she was escaping from him, to believe that his military genius had on the sudden abandoned him; they were perpetually thinking of this disaster, and they could never think of it without rage. Persuaded as they were that our troops had continued the same, and that they had to do with the same enemies, such a defeat appeared to them inconceivable. Not knowing the true cause of it, they attributed all our misfortunes to treason. Traitors had given intelligence of our plans; traitors had commanded false manœuvres, traitors had raised the cry of sauve qui peut! There were traitors among the generals, among the officers, among the soldiers; and who knew whether there were none but in the army of the north? Who knew whether the corps, of which they were a part, their regiment, their company, were not infested with them? Could they reckon on their chiefs, on their comrades? Every one was suspected, it was necessary to distrust every one!

"Such was the language in which anger found vent, which malevolence caught up, magnified, envenomed, and which every soldier in the end repeated and believed. This idea soon became the medium through which every thing was explained. Accustomed to keep the field, they saw themselves with pain compelled to retreat before an enemy whom they despised. It would have been natural to attribute his progress to an immense numerical superiority. They chose to explain it otherwise; their chiefs were in correspondence with the Austrians. Several circumstances, as unfortunate as they were unavoidable, concurred to give to this opinion an appearance of probability, in the prejudiced eyes of these soldiers. The first of these was the order which General Rapp received, to disband the army, and to dismiss each soldier separately, without money and without arms. The next was, an injunction sent to him by the government to deliver to the Russian commissioners ten thousand musquets taken from the arsenal at Strasburg. These two despatches obliged him to enter into a correspondence with the Allies. The frequent interchange of messengers which took place on this occasion produced a bad effect on their minds. The mystery which the General was obliged to observe, to conceal from the troops the removal of the firearms, increased the irritation; malevolence raised it to its height. It was loudly said that Count Rapp had sold himself, that he had received several millions of francs from the Austrians to introduce them into the fortress, and that if he discharged the soldiers individually, and without arms, it was in consequence of an agreement to deliver them up to the enemy.

"As soon as these seeds of discontent had been once sown in the different corps, they were developed of themselves; the instigators had nothing more to do than to observe their progress, to combine the incidents calculated to augment the disorders, and to render inevitable the catastrophe which they were preparing.

"Although General Rapp was far from suspecting such a plot, he had taken, in some way, all the measures that he could take to frustrate it. As soon as the ministerial despatch relative to the disbanding the troops reached him, he had despatched with all speed to Paris one of his aides-de-camp, the chief of squadron Marnier. This officer saw the ministers repeatedly, and represented to them into what violence the army would be led, if the whole amount of the pay due to it was not discharged; but he could only obtain, notwithstanding the most earnest solicitations, a bill for 400,000 francs, on the chest of the war department. His return with this trifling sum, destroyed all the hopes that had been excited. The General-in-chief, who saw the troops getting more and more exasperated, left nothing untried to allay the storm. The want of money was the principal cause of dissatisfaction. To put an end to this source of discontent, Count Rapp endeavoured to raise a loan in Strasburg. The inhabitants having demanded of him a security, he solicited from the minister of Finance authority to pledge the stores of tobacco in the town: the minister refused it. Nevertheless, by the interposition of General Semelé, who commanded the fortress, a sum of 160,000 francs was obtained. Such slight supplies could not satisfy the soldiers, who were inflamed by false reports, and among whom the insurrection was not slow in breaking out. It was sudden and general, and presented a character quite peculiar. I will enter into all the details of it, because they will serve to make the spirit of the French soldiery better known.

"On the 2d of September, about eight in the morning, about sixty subaltern officers of different regiments met in one of the bastions of the place. They agreed on a plan of obedience to the orders for the disbanding of the army, but on conditions, from which they resolved not to swerve. This declaration began in the following manner.