History of Julius Caesar Vol. 2 of 2

Every day, at sunrise, the chiefs who composed the council of Vercingetorix repaired to him in order to make their reports or to receive his orders. Every day, also, he tried in slight engagements488 the courage of his cavalry mixed with archers. The Gauls occupied, as an advanced post, but by a weak garrison, La Roche-Blanche, which, scarped on three sides, presented an extremely strong position; Cæsar judged that, by taking possession of this hill, he would deprive the Gauls almost entirely of forage and water, for they could no longer descend to the Auzon, the only considerable stream in the neighbourhood. He started from the camp in the silence of the night, drove away this post before it could be succoured from the town, took the position, and placed two legions upon it. The Roche-Blanche became his smaller camp;489 it was joined to the larger one by a double ditch of twelve feet, which allowed the troops to communicate in safety, even singly, without fear of being surprised by the enemy. (See Plate 22.)

During this time, the Æduan Convictolitavis, who, as we have seen, owed the supreme magistracy to Cæsar, seduced by the money of the Arverni, resolved to abandon the party of the Romans, and entered into communication with several young men, at whose head was Litavicus and his brothers, descended from an illustrious family. He shares with them the price of his treason; exhorts them to remember that, born free, they are made to command in their country; proves to them that the lukewarmness of the Ædui alone delayed the general insurrection; and that they ought to value above everything the independence of their country. Seduced by such discourses and by the bait of gold, those young men occupy themselves only with the means of executing their project; yet, mistrusting the inclination of the people to be drawn into war, they decide that Litavicus shall take the command of the 10,000 men who were to join the Roman army, and induce them to revolt on the road, whilst his brothers go before them to Cæsar.

Litavicus began his march. At thirty miles from Gergovia (probably at Serbannes), he halts his troops, assembles them, and, spreading the report that Cæsar has caused the Æduan nobility and knights who were in his pay to be massacred, among others Eporedorix and Viridomarus, he easily persuades them to go and join the Arverni at Gergovia, instead of proceeding to the Roman camp. But, before taking this determination, he gives up to plunder the convoy of provisions which marched under his guard, causes the Romans who conducted it to be put to death with tortures, and then sends messengers to raise the whole country of the Ædui, by means of the same imposture. Eporedorix and Viridomarus, whose death he had falsely announced, were with Cæsar, who, by special favour, had raised Viridomarus from a very low to a high dignity. The former, informed of the design of Litavicus, came in the middle of the night to acquaint the proconsul with it, imploring him not to allow the folly of a few young men to detach his country from the Roman alliance. It would be too late when so many thousands of men had embraced the contrary party.

Cæsar, more affected by this news as he had always favoured the Ædui, takes immediately four legions, without baggage, and all the cavalry; he waits not even to contract the compass of the two camps, for everything depends upon celerity. His lieutenant, C. Fabius, is left to guard them, with two legions. He orders the brothers of Litavicus to be placed under arrest, and learns that they have just passed over to the enemy. His soldiers, encouraged to support the fatigues of the march, follow him with ardour, and at about twenty-five miles from Gergovia (near Randan, on the road which Litavicus had to follow to join Vercingetorix) they meet the Ædui. The cavalry, sent in advance, have orders to stop them without using their arms. Eporedorix and Viridomarus, who had been reported as dead, step forth from the ranks, speak to their fellow-citizens, and are recognised. As soon as the deception practised by Litavicus is discovered, the Ædui throw down their arms, ask for pardon, and obtain it. Litavicus flies to Gergovia, with his clients, who, in Gaul, never abandoned their patrons, not even in their worst fortunes.

Cæsar sent to the Ædui to represent to them how generously he had acted towards men whom the laws of war authorised him to put to death; and, after having given his army three hours’ rest during the night, he returned to his quarters before Gergovia. Half-way, horsemen came to inform him of the perilous position of Fabius. The camps had been attacked by troops which were unceasingly renewed. The Romans were exhausted by unceasing labour, for the great extent of the enclosure obliged them to remain continually on the vallum. The arrows and missiles of all sorts thrown by the barbarians had wounded a great number; but, on the other hand, the machines had been of great help in supporting the defence. After the retreat of the enemies, Fabius, expecting to be again attacked next day, had hastened to block up the gates of the great camp, with the exception of two, and to add a palisade to the vallum. On receiving this information, Cæsar hurried his march, and, seconded by the ardour of his soldiers, arrived at the camp before sunrise (having thus performed fifty miles, or seventy-four kilomètres, in twenty-four hours).490

While these events were taking place at Gergovia, the Ædui, also deceived by the news which Litavicus had spread, fall upon the Roman citizens, plunder their goods, kill some, and drag others to prison. It is Convictolitavis, also, who prompts these violences. The military tribune M. Aristius, who was on his way to join his legion, as well as the foreign merchants who resided in the country, are compelled to leave Cabillonum (Châlon-sur-Sâone). An escort is promised to protect them; but they have hardly started when they are attacked and stripped. They defend themselves, and their resistance, which lasts during twenty-four hours, calls a greater multitude to arms. However, as soon as the Ædui hear of the new submission of their troops, they exert themselves to the utmost to obtain their pardon; they have recourse to Aristius, throw the blame of the outbreak upon a few, order the plundered goods to be collected, and confiscate those of Litavicus and his brothers. They send deputies to Cæsar to excuse themselves. Their object, in acting thus, was to obtain the free disposal of their troops, for the consciousness of their treason and the fear of punishment made them, at the same time, conspire in secret with the neighbouring states.

Although informed of these secret plots, Cæsar received their deputies with kindness, declaring that he did not hold the nation responsible for the fault of some individuals, and that his feelings towards the Ædui were not changed. Nevertheless, as he foresaw a general insurrection of Gaul, which would surround him on all sides, he entertained serious thoughts of abandoning Gergovia, and again effecting the concentration of his whole army; but it was of importance that his retreat, caused by the sole fear of a general defection, should not appear to be a flight.

In the midst of these cares, the besieged offered him a favourable chance, of which he sought to take advantage. As he was visiting the little camp to inspect the works, he perceived that a hill (no doubt the hill marked A, which forms part of the mountain mass of Rissoles, see Plate 21), which was almost hidden from sight by the masses of enemies on the previous days, was clear of troops. Astonished at this change, he inquired the cause of the deserters, who came every day in crowds to surrender to him. All agreed in saying, as his scouts had already reported to him, that the mountain ridge to which this hill belonged (the top of the heights of Risolles) was almost flat, was connected with the town, and gave access to it by a narrow and wooded defile. (See Plates 21 and 22.) This point caused particular anxiety to the enemy; for if the Romans, already masters of La Roche-Blanche, gained possession of the mountain mass of Risolles, the Gauls would be almost entirely invested, and could neither escape nor go to forage. This was the reason why Vercingetorix had decided upon fortifying these heights, and had called thither all his troops.491

In accordance with this information, Cæsar sends in this direction, towards the middle of the night, several detachments of cavalry, with orders to scour with great noise the country in every direction at the foot of the heights of Risolles. At break of day, he sends out of the great camp many horses and mules without pack-saddles, and causes the muleteers to mount them, who put on helmets, so as to assume the appearance of mounted troopers. He enjoins them to wind round the hills, and a few cavalry who are joined with them have orders to spread wide over the country, so as to increase the illusion. Finally, they are all, by a long circuit, to move towards the spots which have just been mentioned. These movements were perceived from the town, which overlooked the camp, but at too great a distance to distinguish objects accurately. Cæsar sends towards the same mountain mass one legion, who, after having marched for a short distance, halt in a hollow, and pretend to hide in the woods (towards Chanonat), so as to feign a surprise. The suspicions of the Gauls increase; they take all their forces to the spot threatened. Cæsar, seeing the enemy’s camp deserted, orders the military ensigns (plumes, shields, &c.) to be covered, the standards to be lowered, and the troops to pass in small detachments from the great to the little camp, behind the epaulment of the double fosse of communication, so that they cannot be perceived from the oppidum.492 He communicates his intentions to the lieutenants placed at the heads of the legions, recommends them to take care to prevent the soldiers from allowing themselves to be carried away by the ardour of the combat or the hope of plunder, and draws their attention to the difficulties of the ground. “Celerity alone,” he says, “can enable us to overcome them; in fact, it is to be an attack by surprise, and not a fight.” Having communicated these directions, he gives the signal, and, at the same time, sends the Ædui out of the great camp, with orders to climb the eastern slopes of the mountain of Gergovia, to effect a diversion to the right. (See Plate 21.)

The distance from the wall of the oppidum to the foot of the mountain, where the ground is almost flat, was 1,200 paces (1,780 mètres) in the most direct line; but the way was longer, on account of the circuits it was necessary to make to break the steepness.493 Towards the middle of the southern slope, in the direction of its length, the Gauls, taking advantage of the character of the ground, had, as we have said, built a wall of large stones, six feet high, a serious obstacle in case of attack. The lower part of the slopes had remained free; but the upper part, up to the wall of the oppidum, was occupied with camps placed very near together. When the signal is given, the Romans reach rapidly the wall, scale it, and take three camps with such promptitude, that Teutomatus, king of the Nitiobriges, surprised in his tent where he was taking his repose in the middle of the day, fled half naked; his horse was wounded, and he escaped with difficulty from the hands of the assailants.

Cæsar, satisfied with this success, ordered the retreat to be sounded, and made the tenth legion, which accompanied him, halt (from an examination of the ground, the spot where Cæsar stood is the knoll which rises to the west of the village of Merdogne). (See Plate 21, first position of the tenth legion.) But the soldiers of the other legions, separated from him by a rather wide ravine, did not hear the trumpet. Although the tribunes and the lieutenants did all they could to restrain them, excited by the hope of an easy victory, and by the recollection of their past successes, they thought nothing was insurmountable to their courage, and persisted in the pursuit of the enemy up to the walls and gates of the oppidum.

Then an immense cry arises in the town. The inhabitants of the most remote quarters believe that it is invaded, and rush out of the walls. The matrons throw from the top of the walls their precious objects to the Romans, and, with breasts bare and hands extended in supplication, implore them not to massacre the women and children, as at Avaricum. Several even, letting themselves down from the walls, surrender to the soldiers. L. Fabius, centurion of the 8th legion, excited by the rewards given at Avaricum, had sworn to be the first to mount to the assault; he is lifted up by three soldiers of his company, reaches the top of the wall, and, in his turn, helps them to mount one after the other.

Meanwhile the Gauls, who, as we have seen, had proceeded to the west of Gergovia to raise retrenchments, hear the cries from the town; repeated messages announce the capture of the oppidum. They immediately hurry towards it, sending their cavalry before them. As they arrive, each man takes his stand under the wall and joins the combatants, and their number increases every moment; while the same women who just before implored the pity of the besiegers, now excite against them the defenders of Gergovia, displaying their dishevelled hair and showing their children. The place as well as the numbers rendered the struggle unequal; the Romans, fatigued with their run and the length of the combat, resisted with difficulty troops which were still fresh.

This critical state of things inspired Cæsar with alarm; he ordered T. Sextius, who had been left to guard the little camp, to bring out the cohorts quickly, and take a position at the foot of the mountain of Gergovia, on the right of the Gauls, so as to support the Romans if they were repulsed, and check the enemy’s pursuit. He himself, drawing the 10th legion a little back494 from the place where he had posted it, awaited the issue of the engagement. (See Plate 21, second position of the 10th legion.)

When the struggle was most obstinate, suddenly the Ædui, who had been sent to divert the attention of the enemy by an attack from another side, appeared on the right flank of the Romans. The resemblance of their arms to those of the Gauls caused a great alarm; and although they had their right shoulders bare (dextris humeris exsertis), the ordinary mark of the allied troops, it was taken for a stratagem of the enemy. At the same moment, the centurion L. Fabius, and those who had followed him, are surrounded and thrown down from the top of the wall. M. Petronius, centurion of the same legion, overwhelmed by numbers in his attempt to burst the gates, sacrifices himself for the safety of his soldiers, and meets his death in order to give them time to join their ensigns. Pressed on all sides, the Romans are driven back from the heights, after having lost forty-six centurions; nevertheless, the 10th legion, placed in reserve on more level ground (see Plate 21, third position), arrests the enemies, who are too eager in their pursuit. It is supported by the cohorts of the 13th, who had just taken position on a commanding post (Le Puy-de-Marmant), under the command of the lieutenant T. Sextius. As soon as the Romans had reached the plain, they rallied, and formed front against the enemy. But Vercingetorix, once arrived at the foot of the mountain, ventured no further, but led back his troops within the retrenchments. This day cost Cæsar nearly 700 men.495

Next day, Cæsar assembled his troops, and reprimanded them for their rashness and for their thirst for plunder. He reproached them with having “wished to judge for themselves of the object to be attained, and of the means of attack, and not listening either to the signal of retreat or to the exhortations of the tribunes and lieutenants. He pointed out to them all the importance of the difficulties caused by the inequalities of the ground; and reminded them of his conduct at Avaricum, where, in presence of an enemy without chief and without cavalry, he had renounced a certain victory rather than expose himself to loss, though slight, in a disadvantageous position. Much as he admired their bravery, which had been checked neither by the retrenchments, nor by the steepness of the ground, nor by the walls, he blamed no less their disobedience and their presumption in believing themselves capable of judging of the chances of success and calculating the issue of the undertaking better than their general. He demanded of the soldiers submission and discipline, no less than firmness and bravery; and, to revive their courage, he added that their want of success was to be attributed to the difficulties of the ground much more than to the valour of the enemy.”496

Observations.

VII. In the foregoing account, which is taken almost literally from the “Commentaries,” Cæsar skilfully disguises a defeat. It is evident that he hoped to take Gergovia by a sudden assault, before the Gauls, drawn by a false attack to the west of the town, had time to come back to its defence. Deceived in his expectation, he ordered the retreat to be sounded, but too late to be executed in good order. Cæsar does not appear to be sincere when he declares that he had attained his object the moment his soldiers reached the foot of the wall. This could not have been the case, for what use could it be to him to take camps almost without troops in them, if the consequence was not to be the surrender of the town itself? The defeat appears to have been complete, and, according to some, Cæsar was for a moment a prisoner in the hands of the Gauls; according to others, he had only lost his sword. Servius, indeed, relates the following rather incomprehensible anecdote: when Cæsar was taken away prisoner by the Gauls, one of them began to cry out Cæsar, which signifies in Gaulish let him go, and thus he escaped.497 Plutarch gives another version: “The Arverni,” he says, “still show a sword hung up in one of their temples, which they pretend to be a spoil taken from Cæsar. He saw it there himself subsequently, and only laughed at it. His friends engaged him to take it away, but he refused, pretending that it had become a sacred object.”498 This tradition proves that he was sufficiently great to bear the recollection of a defeat, in which he was very different from Cicero, whom we have seen stealthily taking away from the Capitol the brass plate on which was engraved the law of his banishment.

Cæsar leaves Gergovia in order to join Labienus.

VIII. Cæsar, after the check he had suffered before Gergovia, persisted all the more in his intentions of departure; but, not to have the appearance of flight, he drew out his legions, and placed them in order of battle on an advantageous ground. Vercingetorix did not allow himself to be drawn into the plain; the cavalry only fought, and the combat was favourable to the Romans, who afterwards returned to their camp. The next day the same manœvre was repeated with the same success. Thinking that he had done enough to abate the boasting of the Gauls, as well as to strengthen the courage of his men, Cæsar left Gergovia, and took his way towards the country of the Ædui.

His withdrawal did not draw out the enemies in pursuit; and he arrived on the third day (that is, his second day’s march, reckoning from the assault on Gergovia) on the banks of the Allier, rebuilt one of the bridges, no doubt that of Vichy, and crossed the river in haste, in order to place it between him and Vercingetorix.

There Viridomarus and Eporedorix urged upon him the necessity of their presence among the Ædui, in order to maintain the country in obedience, and to be beforehand with Litavicus, who had gone thither with all the cavalry to excite a revolt. Notwithstanding the numerous proofs of their perfidy, and the suspicion that the departure of those two chiefs would hasten the revolt, he did not think proper to detain them, as he wished to avoid even the appearance of violence or of fear. He confined himself to reminding them of the services which he had rendered to their country, and of the state of dependence and abasement from which he had drawn them, to raise them to a high degree of power and prosperity, and then dismissed them; and they proceeded to Noviodunum (Nevers). This town of the Ædui was situated on the banks of the Loire, in a favourable position. It contained all the hostages of Gaul, the stores, the public treasury, nearly all the baggage of the general and the army, and, lastly, a considerable number of horses bought in Italy and Spain. Eporedorix and Viridomarus heard there, on their arrival, of the revolt of the country, of the reception of Litavicus in the important town of Bibracte by Convictolitavis and a great part of the Senate, as well as of the steps taken to draw their fellow-citizens into the cause of Vercingetorix. The occasion appears favourable to them: they massacre the guards of the dépôt of Noviodunum and the Roman merchants, share amongst themselves the horses and the money, burn the town, send the hostages to Bibracte, load boats with all the grain they can take away, and destroy the rest by water and fire; then they collect troops in the neighbourhood, place posts along the Loire, spread their cavalry everywhere in order to intimidate the Romans, to cut off their supply of provisions, and to compel them through famine to retire into the Narbonnese – a hope which was so much the better founded, as the Loire, swollen by the melting of the snow, appeared to be nowhere fordable.

Cæsar was informed of these events during his march from the Allier towards the Loire. His position had never been more critical. Suffering under a severe defeat, separated from Labienus by a distance of more than eighty leagues, and by countries in revolt, he was surrounded on all sides by the insurrection: he had on his rear the Arverni, elated with their recent success at Gergovia; on his left the Bituriges, irritated by the sack of Avaricum; before him the Ædui, ready to dispute the passage of the Loire. Was he to persevere in his design, or retrograde towards the Province? He could not resolve on this latter course, for not only would this retreat have been disgraceful, and the passage of the Cévennes full of difficulties, but, above all, he felt the greatest anxiety for Labienus and the legions which he had entrusted to him. He therefore persevered in his first resolutions; and in order to be able, in case of need, to build a bridge across the Loire before the forces of the enemies were increased, he proceeded towards that river by forced marches day and night, and arrived unexpectedly at Bourbon-Lancy.499 The cavalry soon discovered a ford which necessity made them consider practicable, although the soldiers had only above water their shoulders and their arms to carry their weapons. The cavalry was placed up the stream, in order to break the current, and the army passed without accident before the enemy had time to recover from his first surprise. Cæsar found the country covered with the harvest and with cattle, with which the army was largely provisioned, and he marched towards the land of the Senones.500

Expedition of Labienus against the Parisii.

IX. Whilst the centre of Gaul was the scene of these events, Labienus had marched with four legions towards Lutetia, a town situated on an island in the Seine, the oppidum of the Parisii. After leaving his baggage at Agedincum (Sens)501 under the guard of the troops recently arrived from Italy to fill up the voids, he followed the left bank of the Yonne and of the Seine, wishing to avoid all important streams and considerable towns.502 At the news of his approach, the enemy assembled in great numbers from the neighbouring countries. The command was entrusted to Aulercus Camulogenus, who was elevated to this honour, notwithstanding his great age, on account of his rare ability in the art of war. This chief, having remarked that a very extensive marsh sloped towards the Seine, and rendered impracticable all that part of the country which is watered by the Essonne, established his troops along the side of this marsh, in order to defend the passage. (See Plate 23.)

When Labienus arrived on the opposite bank, he ordered covered galleries to be pushed forward, and sought, by means of hurdles and earth, to establish a road across the marsh; but, meeting with too many difficulties, he formed the project of surprising the passage of the Seine at Melodunum (Melun), and, when once on the right bank, of advancing towards Lutetia by stealing a march upon the enemy. He therefore left his camp in silence, at the third watch (midnight), and, retracing his steps, arrived at Melun, an oppidum of the Senones, situated, like Lutetia, on an island in the Seine. He seized about fifty boats, joined them together, filled them with soldiers, and entered into the place without striking a blow. Terrified at this sudden attack, the inhabitants, a great part of whom had answered to the appeal of Camulogenus, offered no resistance. A few days before, they had cut the bridge which united the island with the right bank; Labienus restored it, led his troops over it, and proceeded towards Lutetia, where he arrived before Camulogenus. He took a position near the place where Saint-Germain-l’Auxerrois now stands. Camulogenus, informed by those who had fled from Melun, quits his position on the Essonne, returns to Lutetia, gives orders to burn it and to cut the bridges, and establishes his camp on the left bank of the Seine, in front of the oppidum, that is, on the present site of the Hotel de Cluny.