History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery, Vol. 1

These pages, concerning the early days of the Academy, suggest the difference between those days and the present. And in thoroughly analysing that difference, the feeling grows stronger that two changes are inevitable. Inevitable, because the principle of justice is involved; but difficult to bring about speedily, on account of the strength of Academy traditions. So long ago as 1792, these traditions were strong enough to defeat a scheme for liberalizing the scientific officering of the Regiment. Again, in 1855, the same traditions urged many to oppose a similar change. And yet, as sure as anything can be, the moment that the Universities realize that their sons are debarred from entering the Artillery and the Engineers, by conditions as to age, and by the long technical Academy curriculum, from that moment an agitation will commence, which will sweep all obstructions away. In the early days of the Academy, the cadets acquired all the education they ever had, under its roof; not merely technical, but general. But in these later days, the cadet enters the Academy at a more advanced age, and with a sound and liberal education. Is it absolutely necessary that he should spend so long a time as he does there, on the technical part of his schooling? Would not the officers of the corps be of a much higher scientific tone, if they spent a longer time at the University, and a shorter at the Academy? While admitting the fact that from the Academy there have come officers who have so pressed forward with the great army of Science, that they have become Captains and Generals in its ranks, it would be flattery to say that the Academy could ever be a rival to the Universities, although it might certainly be an honoured and useful helpmate. When it is remembered that an officer remains for months in a state of professional pupilage after he obtains his commission, in addition to the time spent at the Academy, the question instinctively rises: "Is there not a danger of the technical part of education receiving more than its fair share?" For although it is easy to add the technical to the general, it is not easy to reverse the operation; and in the division of a young man's training life, which is now made in preparing the officers of the Scientific Corps, there is a danger lest we may produce, to a certain extent, scientific soldiers; but not what is also wanted in the Artillery of these days – scientific and highly educated men.

The other change which must come is in the officering from one source, of two corps, which are at once sister and rival. At the time the Academy was founded, it was never imagined that the small Engineer element then in our service was to develope itself into the large regiment which now exists. Nor was it ever believed probable, that one of the two Scientific Corps would have such pecuniary advantages over the other, as to tempt many into its ranks who might otherwise have been indifferent. But both these events having taken place, the Artilleryman, who sees the best cadets tempted away every year to the sister corps, may with justice ask whether he is not paying somewhat dearly for the relationship. Without any violent divorce, there must come some friendly separation before many years are over; and it is more likely to be friendly, if the difficulty is looked in the face at once, instead of having it urged in language of harsh misfortune hereafter. The only way of maintaining the present system with justice would be by equalizing the pecuniary prospects of officers in both corps; but this would be more difficult than the obvious remedy suggested above. At present, the case stands thus: – in order that Engineer officers may acquire the amount of Artillery education which will be necessary for them hereafter, they are educated under the same roof with the future officers of the Artillery; and the highest and most accomplished cadets in each class are invited to join the Royal Engineers. This invitation, being backed by parents who have a natural eye to their children's future income, is very generally accepted.

In this plain statement of facts, he who runs may read a grievance to the Royal Artillery, which may develope itself into a Regimental, if not a national misfortune.

CHAPTER XI.

A Sterner School

The same year which saw the foundation of the Royal Military Academy witnessed the commencement of a seven years' schooling, which was to leave an indelible mark on the Regiment. In the West Indies and in Flanders, as well as in the disturbances at home in 1745, officers and men learnt lessons, and acquired an esprit de corps, to which they had hitherto been strangers. It is at once pleasing and amusing to read in the old order-books, framed at Woolwich during the years between the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle and the commencement of the Seven Years' War, reminders of the school of war and discipline represented by the years between 1741 and 1748. "The same as we wore in Flanders" was a favourite way for describing a particular dress for parade. And the word "we" is poetry to the student, who is searching for signs of an awakening Regimental esprit.

No history of a Regiment like the Royal Artillery could be compressed into any reasonable dimensions, if every campaign in which it was engaged were described in detail. It must suffice to sketch the campaigns, but to paint in body colours the Artillery's share. The gradual increase of the proportion of this arm; the occasions on which it more particularly distinguished itself; the changes in dress and equipment; and the officers whose services in the successive campaigns were most conspicuous; these are the details which will form the foreground of the Regiment's History. But even these are so numerous that most careful sifting will be required to prevent the story from becoming wearisome.

The same year, then, which saw the warrant issued for the foundation of the Royal Military Academy saw also the despatch to the West Indies of one of the most formidable expeditions, both in a naval and a military sense, which had ever left the shores of England. The squadron consisted of 115 vessels, well armed and manned, and the troops were in number over 12,000. The Royal Artillery was commanded by Colonel Jonas Watson – a brave and experienced officer, who did not live to return to England, being killed at the bombardment of Carthagena, – and was divided into trains for service on shore, and detachments for service on board the numerous bomb-vessels which formed part of the squadron.

The troops were to have been commanded by Lord Cathcart, but unfortunately this officer died of fever, on the arrival of the expedition at Dominica, and his successor, General Wentworth, was totally unfit for the duties which devolved upon him. To this circumstance, and the want of harmony between him and the naval commander, Admiral Vernon, the ultimate failure of the expedition was due. Notwithstanding additional reinforcements from England, so reduced was this force in two years by disaster and disease, that not a tenth part returned to England; "and thus ended in shame, disappointment, and loss, the most important, most expensive, and the best concerted expedition that Great Britain was ever engaged in, leaving this melancholy proof, that if dissension is the misfortune of a State, it is the ruin of any military undertaking."11

In reading the accounts of this expedition, more especially of the attack on Carthagena, there is a positive relief in turning from the passages relating to the quarrels between the naval and military commanders to those painful but proud episodes, in which the obedience and bravery of the troops and seamen were so gloriously manifested; and although the first service of the Royal Artillery on the Western side of the Atlantic was neither profitable nor pleasant, it can be studied with satisfaction, as far as their performance of their duties and endurance of hardship are concerned. As for the blunders which were committed by the commanders, the blame must lie with them, not with the executive.

To return, however, to Europe. The war of the Austrian succession had commenced, and England felt obliged to support Maria Theresa, which she did partly by a grant of money, and partly by sending an expedition to Flanders under the aged Earl of Stair. The force employed amounted to 16,000 men; and the Artillery comprised a considerable staff, three companies, and thirty guns, 3-pounders.

At this time the Regiment was distributed as follows: – One company at Minorca, one in Gibraltar, one at Newfoundland, two at Woolwich, and three in Flanders.

Although the Artillery was at Ghent in July, 1742, no military operations were carried on that year, owing to the backwardness of the Dutch to fulfil their part of the contract; and the English lay in Flanders, inactive until the following year.

The commanding officer of the Royal Artillery, at first, was Colonel Thomas Pattison, and the following is a nominal list of the combatant officers who served under him: —

Major George Michelson,

Captain William Sumpter,

Captain Withers Borgard,

First Lieutenant James Pattison,

Captain Thomas Flight,

Second Lieutenant Samuel Cleaveland,

Lieutenant-Fireworker John Northall,

Lieutenant-Fireworker Nathaniel Marsh,

Lieutenant-Fireworker Thomas Broadbridge,

Lieutenant-Fireworker Edward Bullock,

Adjutant Joseph Broome.

In November, 1742, Captain James Deal was appointed Lieutenant-Colonel to the train; Lieutenant Archibald Macbean was appointed Bridge-master; and Lieutenant Charles Stranover joined as Lieutenant of Miners.

The number of non-combatants was very great, and the total strength of the companies amounted to eighteen non-commissioned officers, sixty-four gunners, 140 matrosses, four drummers, and twenty pioneers.

On the 10th February, 1743, the train left Ghent to join the Allied Army, which was effected on the 16th May. King George met the army on the 19th June, and on the 27th was fought the Battle of Dettingen. The Artillery share in this engagement was small, the chief points of note in the battle being the gallantry of King George and of the Duke of Cumberland, and the obstinate bravery of the infantry, to which – coupled with the blunder of the Duc de Grammont – the victory was due. The hardships suffered by the Allies before the battle had been excessive, nor were they removed by success; so it was considered advisable to fall back on their supplies instead of following the enemy. The guns present with the Royal Artillery at the battle were 3-pounders, twenty-four in number.

In the following year, 1744, and also in 1745, considerable augmentations to the officers with the train had been made, many having become available by the return of the expedition from the West Indies. Among others, Colonel Jonathan Lewis was appointed Second Colonel to the train: and Captains Borgard, Michelson, and Desaguliers, Lieutenants Charlton, Bennett, and Macbean, and, somewhat later, Major William Belford, joined it. The last-named officer was appointed Major to the train, in room of Michelson deceased.

In 1744, many of the British troops had been recalled, on account of an expected invasion of England; and so greatly did the French Army in Flanders outnumber that of the Allies, that no resistance could be made to its advance, and nothing but a diversion on the part of the Austrians, which made the French King hasten to the defence of his own kingdom, prevented the complete subjugation of Holland.

In 1745, the Artillery marched with the army from Ghent, leaving on the 13th April. The Artillery marched in rear of the Army in the following order: – First, a sergeant and six miners, two and two; a tumbril drawn by three horses with miners' tools; two four-horse waggons, containing Colonel Lewis's baggage; a front guard of twenty-four gunners and matrosses; a sergeant and two drummers; Lieutenant Pattison marching in front, and Lieutenant Macbean in rear; the kettledrum; Colonel Lewis and Captain Michelson on horseback; the flag-gun, a heavy 6-pounder, on a field-carriage and limber drawn by nine horses; nine more 6-pounders, drawn as above, but by seven horses; one spare 6-pounder carriage and limber, drawn by seven horses; twelve covered tumbrils with stores, each drawn by three horses; four howitzers with five horses each; one spare howitzer-carriage and limber, also with five horses; six covered tumbrils with stores, with three horses each; ten 3-pounders on "galloping carriages," with four horses each; a travelling forge cart with three horses; twenty-three powder tumbrils; and three covered waggons with officers' tents, baggage, &c., with three horses each. The remaining officers and men marched on the flanks of the waggons and guns, a gunner marching by every gun, with a match. A Regiment of infantry formed the escort, the grenadier company marching in front, the remainder in rear. It should have been mentioned that in 1744, an increase to the armament of the train had been made, comprising ten heavy 6-pounders and four 8-inch howitzers; and in 1745 another company arrived from Woolwich.

Some of the orders issued by the Duke of Cumberland, who was in command of the Army at this time, are curious: "It is strictly ordered by His Royal Highness that none presume to shoot or hunt, whether officer or private, officers' servants or huntsmen; this to be a standing order." Again: "Besides the going out of the Provost, there are fifty Hussars ordered to patrol in the front and rear of the camp, and to cut to pieces every man that they may find beyond the limits of the camp."

At Fontenoy, such of the guns as were engaged did good service, more especially those attached to Ligonier's column, which preceded its advance, dragged along by ropes, and doing great execution. Had the Dutch troops fought as well as the British, Fontenoy would have been a victory for the Allies, instead of a defeat. The loss of the Royal Artillery was small compared with that of the English infantry. It comprised Lieutenant Bennett, one sergeant, one gunner, and four matrosses killed; one conductor, two sergeants, one corporal, six gunners, and thirteen matrosses wounded; two gunners and four matrosses missing.

The guns actually present on the field comprehended ten 6-pounders, twenty-seven 3-pounders, six 1½-pounders, – recently sent from England – and four 8-inch howitzers.

The officers present at the Battle of Fontenoy were Colonel Pattison, Lieut. – Colonel Lewis, Major Belford, Captains Michelson, Mace, Desaguliers, Flight, Captains-Lieutenant Ord, Leith, Brome, and Johnson, and Lieutenants Pattison, Campbell, Cleaveland, Tovey, Stranover, T. Smith, McLeod, Macbean, Charlton, Strachey, Northall, Maitland, Hussey, Pike, B. Smith, Bennett (killed), Mason, Durham, Knox, Farquharson, Worth, and Lindsay. Many of these had joined the train just before the battle.

The strength of the Allied Army did not exceed 53,000 men; that of the French – under Marshal Saxe, and inspirited by the presence of the King and the Dauphin – approached 80,000. Of the British troops 4000 were killed and wounded, besides 2000 Hanoverians. Fontenoy was a defeat, but hardly one which can be said to have tarnished in the slightest the British Arms.

The Duke of Cumberland withdrew his forces in good order. On the march, an order which is extant shows a novel means of confining prisoners: "The sergeant of miners is to make a black hole under ground, and the carpenter to make a door to it with a padlock; always to be clean straw for the prisoners; and if any sergeant or corporal suffer anything to go in to them, but bread and water, they shall be tried for disobedience of orders."

In October, the rebellion in Scotland had created such an alarm that the whole of the Artillery in Flanders, now amounting to four companies, was recalled to England.

Prior to their return, however, news had reached the Allied Army, near Brussels, of the successful result of the Siege of Louisbourg by the New England troops, and, as a symptom of rejoicing, a review of the Army was ordered by the Duke of Cumberland, which is mentioned by General Forbes Macbean in his MS. diary, on account of a circumstance which can best be described in his own words: "The Army was drawn up in order of battle, and reviewed by the Duke: the Park of Artillery was formed in great order on a fine extensive plain near Vilvorden: the four companies of Artillery under arms, drawn up, two on the right, and two on the left of the park: Colonel Pattison, Lieut. – Colonel Lewis, and Major Belford, posted themselves on horseback in front of the park, when they saluted His Royal Highness as he passed, by dropping their swords. The other officers, carrying fusees, only took off their hats as he passed them."

At this time – in 1745 – a company was sent to garrison Louisbourg, and another was sent to Newfoundland, the Regiment at this date having been increased to ten companies.

The interlude of the Scotch rebellion, which involved the recall of the companies from Flanders, does not require detailed mention. There was a good deal of what Albert Borgard would have called useless marching and counter-marching in England. The Artillery was successful at Carlisle and Culloden; very unsuccessful at Falkirk. At Prestonpans, the guns were not served by the Royal Artillery, but by seamen. At Falkirk, the guns were hard and fast in a bog, and were not once in action. As soon as the peasant drivers, who had been engaged with the horses, saw the Royal Army waver, they promptly fled; and of the eight guns which had accompanied the King's troops, seven fell into the hands of the enemy. At Culloden, the victory may be said to have been won by the Artillery. In the words of Sir Edward Cust, "the guns were so exceedingly well plied that they made dreadful lanes through some of the clan regiments. It was with extreme difficulty that the men could be kept in their places to stand this murderous fire." The Artillery was under the command of Colonel Belford. Only one company of the Regiment was at Culloden, the remaining five on home service being at Woolwich, whence in the preceding winter they had furnished detachments for service in England at Chester, Carlisle, and Newcastle. The guns employed during the rebellion were 6-pounders, 3-pounders, and howitzers.

It is with pleasure that one turns from the story of civil war, always painful, rarely glorious, to Flanders again, where two companies were ordered immediately after the suppression of the rebellion. But before doing so, it is impossible to avoid mentioning a coincidence which is somewhat singular. As in the Scotch rebellion of 1715, the disastrous unwieldiness, and the indifferent equipment of the Artillery trains on the old spasmodic principle, forced upon the country the idea of a permanent force of Artillery, so in the Scotch rebellion of 1745, the disaster of Falkirk forced upon the public attention the folly of a Field Artillery with no assured mobility. In a contemporary article in the 'Gentleman's Magazine,' quoted by the author of 'England's Artillerymen,' this feeling found expression; and as to one Scotch rebellion the Regiment may be said to owe its birth, so to another it may date the first step in advance made by that portion of it intended for service in the field. This coincidence suggests many questions to the student. Is public opinion necessary to bring about military reform? And is English public opinion on military questions only awakened when civil or other war thrusts military blunders in a very prominent and personal way before public attention? These questions may be answered partly in the affirmative, and partly in the negative.

It is undoubtedly a consequence of military training, to produce, in a man's mind, more of an inclination to make the best of what is, than to suggest change and improvement. And, further, as change for the better generally implies expense; and as the heads of military, as of other public departments, have a particular horror of anything involving increased outlay, it follows that suggestions in that direction, made by their own subordinates, are received with scant favour, and the would-be reformers are deterred in every way from pursuing their inclinations. But the public owes no allegiance to its officials; and the wildest schemes from an outsider receive an attention denied to the most practical suggestions from those in the employment of a department. Although, therefore, the public is often the father of military advances, it must not hastily be assumed that this is owing to a want of originality in military men.

Again, although civil war in England demonstrated military defects in a very special way, it must not be assumed either that these defects had not been apparent to soldiers before, or that so strong a measure as civil war was necessary to enlist public opinion. Apart from the cause above mentioned, which would deter an officer from recommending change, it must not be inferred that the same delicacy was shown to the peasantry of other countries, where transport was required for the Artillery, as to those who were called upon in England for assistance. Martial law, which would have been rarely, if ever, enforced upon English peasantry by English commanders, was freely exercised abroad; and, with this exercise, the want of mobility was not so frequently allowed to appear. And with regard to the necessity of an actual, bitter home-experience being required to awaken public opinion, the recent Franco-German war proves the contrary. The reports of the value of Artillery in that campaign were sufficient, without actual and personal observation, to awaken in the public mind a strong and unanimous resolution to perfect that arm in England, such as no government could have dared to thwart. When backed by public opinion in England, a Government will gladly make changes involving expense, and in fact, to refuse to do so would be folly; but when that public opinion, even if foolish and ignorant, is against change or expense, or even indifferent on the subject, the military reformer within the ranks of the Army may as well beat the air as urge his suggestions. All these considerations have to be borne in mind when studying the history of Army reforms.

The two companies which went to Flanders in 1746, were under the command of Colonel Lewis; Captain Borgard, Michelson acting as Major; Lieutenant Brome as Adjutant, and Lieutenant Stranover as Quartermaster. The number of subaltern officers with the companies seems excessive, being no less than ten, besides three Captain-Lieutenants; but a means of employing them was adopted this year, by distributing the fourteen 3-pounder guns, which were with the companies, among the seven battalions; two to each battalion under a Lieutenant. This arrangement was ordered on the 20th July, 1746; but it is soothing to the student to find on the 23rd of the following month this pernicious custom suspended, and the battalion guns ordered to join the reserve.

In 1747, there were five companies in Flanders, three having been added to the Regiment; and the following was the armament in their charge: six heavy 12-pounders; six heavy 9-pounders; fourteen heavy and twelve light 6-pounders: fourteen heavy 3-pounders: two 8-inch howitzers; and six Royal mortars.

In 1748, in addition to the above, thirty-two light 6-pounders were sent for use with the battalions.

At the battle of Roncoux, the want of Artillery was sorely felt by the British, the more so, as the enemy was in this arm particularly strong; and doubtless this led to the great increase made in 1747, both in men and guns.

The arrival of Colonel Belford to command the Artillery in the winter of 1746, and during the rest of the campaign, produced a marked and beneficial effect. Colonel Pattison and Major Lewis were allowed to retire on full-pay, in January 1748, on account of old age and infirmities: and their younger successors devoted themselves to giving a military appearance to the companies under their command. In this they were greatly assisted, not merely by the improved and better educated class of officers, now joining from the Academy; but also by an accidental circumstance which swelled the ranks with many well-trained soldiers. It is mentioned as follows by old General Macbean: "About this time, three Regiments of Cavalry being reduced to Dragoons, and the troopers having it in their option to remain as Dragoons or be discharged, many of them chose the latter; and above two hundred of them enlisted into the Artillery. From this period, the Regiment improved much in appearance, and in the size of the men, neither of which had been hitherto much attended to; but receiving at once so many tall men in the corps may be said to have given rise to the change that has taken place in regard to the height, strength, and figure of the men which now compose it." Among other means of training and disciplining the men under his command during the tedious months when the Army was in winter quarters, Colonel Belford devoted much time to practising them in the use of small-arms, and in infantry manœuvres, never yet practised in the Regiment. So successful was he, that the Duke of Cumberland reviewed the companies; on which occasion the gunners of the companies, with their field staffs, formed upon the right as a company of grenadiers; and the matrosses, with their muskets, as a battalion. There are not wanting, in the nineteenth century, men who wish that Colonel Belford's zeal had taken some other direction; who think the use of Artillerymen, even on field-days, as infantry, is a misuse; and who would remove the carbines from the Garrison Artillery, in order that more time might be allowed for their own special and varied drills. There are even scoffers, who say that the presence of a body of men in the garrison under his command, armed and equipped like infantry, is more than a General Officer can bear; that he is never at rest until he sees this body swelling his Brigade by another battalion; and that he inspects it in infantry details more minutely than in those of its own special arm. Whatever ground there may be for these complaints, there can be no doubt that Colonel Belford was innocent of any desire to divert his men from their own work: and merely availed himself of this, as of other means of disciplining and training them into habits of smartness and obedience. And among other things which he borrowed from the infantry, besides their drill, was that of an Officer's Regimental Guard over the Artillery Park, in addition to the guard furnished by the Line Regiments, a more important item than it would at first sight appear to be.