The Turkish Empire, its Growth and Decay

In the following year, 1697, Mustapha again marched with his army from Belgrade into Hungary, without any definite plans as to what he proposed to do. After many councils of war and much irresolution, it was decided to advance northwards to the River Theiss. The Austrian army was now under command of Prince Eugène of Savoy, who, we have seen, made his début at the siege of Vienna. He was the ablest general of his time. The two armies met at Zenta on the River Theiss, about sixty miles above its junction with the Danube. The Turks had erected a bridge over the river at this point. The Sultan and his cavalry, and a great part of the artillery, had already crossed the bridge. The infantry were still on the other side. Prince Eugène with his army, coming suddenly upon them, caught the Turkish army in flagrante delicto, divided by the river. Advancing in a wide crescent, he attacked the whole line of the Ottoman infantry who had not crossed the river. There was great confusion in the ranks of the Ottomans and discord among the leading officers and a want of direction. A large body of Janissaries mutinied on the field of battle and began to massacre their officers. There ensued an overwhelming defeat of the Ottomans. Twenty-six thousand Turks were slain on the battlefield and ten thousand were drowned in their attempt to cross the river.

The Grand Vizier, four other viziers, and a great number of pashas and thirty aghas of Janissaries were killed; four hundred and twenty standards were captured. The Sultan, who had witnessed the battle from the other side of the river in comparative safety, was able to escape with some of his cavalry to Temesvar, and thence he returned to Belgrade and Constantinople. This experience satisfied his military ardour, and he never again appeared at the head of his army. An immense booty fell into the hands of the Austrians. All the Turkish guns were captured. What remained of the army defeated at Zenta found its way to Belgrade, and thence returned to Adrianople, while Prince Eugène crossed the Danube into Bosnia and made himself master of the greater part of that province. This great victory of the Austrians, after fourteen years of almost uninterrupted success, decided not only the campaign but the war in their favour, and marked irrevocably the decadence of the military power of the Ottoman Empire.

Six days after the battle the Sultan, in his peril, turned once more to the Kiuprili family for help. In place of the Grand Vizier, who had been killed at Zenta, he appointed Hussein Kiuprili, a son of the elder brother of Mahomet Kiuprili, and therefore a cousin of Ahmed. Until the siege of Vienna he had given himself up to a life of pleasure, but after that grave defeat of the Turks he filled with great distinction many high posts in the government. He was the fourth member of his family to hold the position of Grand Vizier, and showed himself fully capable of bearing the burden.

In the course of the following winter of 1697-8, many efforts were made to bring about peace. Lord Paget, the British Ambassador, offered the mediation of Great Britain and Holland on the principle of Uti possidetis– that each of the Powers concerned, Austria, Venice, and Poland, were to retain what they had wrested from Turkey. Hussein Kiuprili summoned a great Council of State to consider this. He had personally fought at St. Gotthard and other battles, and fully recognized the superiority of the Austrian army. The Ottomans, since the siege of Vienna, had been defeated by them in nine great battles, and had lost by siege nine fortresses of the first rank. He felt that if the war were prolonged there would be further reverses of the same kind. At his instance, it was decided by the Council to accept the mediation of Great Britain and Holland. The other Powers, with the exception of Russia, were equally willing. The Czar, Peter the Great, alone objected, and warned the other Powers not to trust in Great Britain and Holland, who, he said, were only thinking of their own commercial interests. In spite of his efforts, it was decided to hold a Peace Congress, at which all these Powers, including Russia, eventually were represented. It was held at Carlowitz, not far from Peterwardein, on the Danube, and after seventy-two days’ discussion and negotiation it resulted in peace on the basis suggested by Lord Paget. Austria, it was finally agreed, was to retain possession of Transylvania and Sclavonia and of all Hungary north of the River Marosch and west of the River Theiss. This left to the Ottomans only about one-third of their previous dominions in Hungary. The Emperor also was relieved from payment of tribute in respect of Hungary and Transylvania. The Republic of Venice was to retain the Morea and Albania, but was to give up its conquests north of the Isthmus of Corinth – the only departure from the principle of Uti possidetis. The Republic was also relieved from payment of tribute to the Porte in respect of the island of Zante. Poland was to retain Podolia. Russia was to have Azoff and the districts north of the Sea of Azoff which were actually in her occupation. The Czar Peter was dissatisfied with this and refused to enter into a treaty upon these terms. He would only agree to an armistice for two years on this basis. The other three Powers concerned entered into treaties of peace for twenty-five years.

This treaty of Carlowitz was of supreme importance in the international relations of Europe. It recognized for first time that the status of the Ottoman Empire was a matter for the concern of all the Powers of Europe, and not only of those at war with it. It established the principle of equality of the Powers concerned, and rejected finally the pretensions of the Ottoman Empire, founded on its long career of conquest. Thenceforth there was no longer any fear of the invasion of Central Europe by the Turks. The settlement was not so ignominious to them as the later treaties of Passarowitch, Kainardji, Adrianople, and Berlin, but not the less it was a great triumph for the Christian Powers of Europe. In view of the long series of defeats of the Ottoman army and the exhausted state of the Empire, Hussein Kiuprili acted the part of a wise statesman in assenting to the treaty. If his advice and that of other members of his family had been followed, and the Christian subjects of the Empire had been treated with justice, later humiliations might have been avoided, and the Empire might have survived intact to a much later date.

Hussein Kiuprili retained the post of Grand Vizier for three years after the treaty of Carlowitz. During this time he showed that he had most of the qualities of his more distinguished relative, Ahmed Kiuprili. He was a man of high culture and public spirit. He did his best by wise and salutary reforms to stem the growing evils of the State. He aimed at curbing the mutinous power of the Janissaries. He endeavoured in many ways to improve the deplorable condition of the rayas. His reforms met with violent opposition from reactionaries. His health broke down under the stress and he was compelled to resign his post. He died within a few weeks, in 1702. His reforms did not survive him. His successor, Daltaban Pasha, was a man of a totally different type, a savage Serbian, who could neither read nor write, and who had acquired a reputation for gross cruelty which he fully justified in his more exalted position.

Once again, in 1710, another member of the Kiuprili family, Nououman Kiuprili, was appointed Grand Vizier, but though he had many of the virtues of his race he did not prove to be equal to the post. He insisted on attempting to do too much. He interfered with every detail of the State and accumulated the hostility of all his subordinates. The affairs of the government fell into confusion and he was in consequence deposed after a very few months. The names of five other members of the same family appear in the history of the next few years as generals and governors of provinces.

It may be doubted whether in the annals of any country a single family has produced so many distinguished men, owing their position, not to personal favour, but to their own merits and to the exigencies of the State. The case is unique in the history of Turkey, where it would be difficult to find another instance where two members of any family rose to distinction.

XIV

TO THE TREATY OF PASSAROWITCH

1702-18

Mustapha did not long survive as Sultan the death of his great Vizier, Hussein, the fourth of the Kiuprilis. He had not fulfilled the early expectation of his reign, when, against the advice of the Divan, he took command of his army in the field. Disappointed and discouraged by his failure, he fell back on a life of indolence and debauchery. After the death of Hussein Kiuprili there was widespread discontent throughout the Empire, and in most parts imminent danger of rebellion. Mustapha had not the courage to cope with it. He abdicated the throne and retired voluntarily to the Cage. He was succeeded by his brother, Achmet III, at the age of thirty, who reigned for twenty-seven years till he was deposed at the instigation of the Janissaries.

Achmet had not been subjected by his uncle to the customary seclusion. He came to the throne, therefore, with greater knowledge of the world. He was not a warrior. He did not attempt to lead his armies in the field. But he did not allow the affairs of State to fall into the hands of women of his harem. Neither did he permit ambitious Viziers to monopolize power. He changed them so often that this was impossible. During the first fifteen years of his reign there were twelve Grand Viziers. It was imputed to him that these frequent changes were due to his want of money and the extravagances of his harem. It was the custom for Grand Viziers, on their appointment, to make very large presents in money to the Sultan, and Achmet looked on this as a source of income. But during their short tenures of office he interfered very little with them. He was, however, personally in favour of a policy of peace, and supported his Viziers in its maintenance. The first six years and the last twelve years of his reign were periods of almost unbroken peace to the Empire. In the other nine years there were many important events bearing on the extension or reduction of his Empire. Territory formerly in the possession of the Ottomans was reconquered, and provinces long held by them were lost. The city of Azoff and its adjoining territory – important for the protection of the Crimea – were recovered from Russia. The Morea and Albania were reconquered from the Republic of Venice. By agreement with Russia a partition was made of important provinces belonging to Persia, some of which had formerly been in the possession of the Porte. On the other hand, as the result of war with Austria, the remaining part of Hungary, not included in the cession made by the treaty of Carlowitz, and considerable parts of Serbia and Wallachia were lost to the Empire. The gains in territory exceeded in area the losses. But there can be little doubt that the loss of prestige by the Ottomans from the defeats of their armies by the Austrians under Prince Eugène was not compensated for by victories over the Venetians and Persians, or over the very inferior army of Peter the Great.

The first of the wars thus referred to was that with Russia, then under the rule of Peter the Great. He was ambitious of extending his Empire by the acquisition of the Crimea, and of thus getting access to the Black Sea. It was only after the defeat of Charles XII, the King of Sweden, at the battle of Pultowa in 1709, and the consequent conquest of Livonia, that his hands were free for aggression elsewhere. Russia was already in possession of the important fortress of Azoff, on the north-east shore of the sea of that name. The Czar had also fortified Taganrog and other places threatening the Crimea. The Porte was alarmed by these manifest preparations for war. The relations of the two Governments were also embittered by the fact that the Swedish King, Charles XII, after his defeat at Pultowa, sought refuge in Turkey, and that the Sultan accorded a generous hospitality to him, and with great magnanimity refused the demand of Peter for his extradition. It followed that, in 1711, the Porte anticipated the undoubted hostile intention of the Czar, and declared war against Russia. An army was sent by the Sultan across the River Pruth into Moldavia, under command of Grand Vizier Baltadji. This pasha had risen to his post from the humble position of woodcutter at the palace, through the intrigues of his wife, who had been a slave in the Sultan’s harem. The Czar, on his part, had collected his forces in the south of Poland and marched into Moldavia. The two armies met on the River Pruth. The Russian army, already greatly reduced in number by want of food and disease, numbered no more than twenty-four thousand men. The Ottomans, who had been reinforced by a large body of Tartars, under the Khan of the Crimea, were at least five times more numerous. The Czar Peter, unaware that the Ottomans had crossed the Danube, advanced rashly on the right bank of the Pruth, and was posted between that river and an extensive marsh not far from Zurawna. The position was dominated by hills, which the Grand Vizier occupied in force, and his numerous and powerful guns swept the position of the Russians, cut off their access to the river, and completely hemmed them in. Their plight is best described in a letter which the Czar wrote to the Russian Senate at Moscow from his camp at this point: —

I announce to you that, deceived by false intelligence and without blame on my part, I find myself shut up in my camp by a Turkish army. Our supplies are cut off, and we momentarily expect to be destroyed or taken prisoners, unless Heaven should come to our aid in some unexpected manner. Should it happen to me to be taken prisoner by the Turks you will no longer consider me as your Czar and Sovereign, nor will you pay any attention to any orders that may be brought to you from me, not even if you recognize my handwriting; but you will wait for my coming in person. If I am to perish here, and you receive well confirmed intelligence of my death, you will then proceed to choose as my successor him who is most worthy among you.

There can be no doubt that the Russian army was completely at the mercy of the Ottomans, and might have been entirely destroyed or captured. It was saved from either fate by the Czar’s wife, Catherine. She was the daughter of a peasant, married in the first instance to a dragoon in the Russian army, and later the mistress of Prince Menschikoff. Peter, smitten by her beauty and wit had recently married her, and she was with him on this campaign. This lady, with great presence of mind, collected what money she could, to the value of a few thousand roubles, and sent it and her jewellery with a letter to the Kiaya of the Grand Vizier, suggesting a suspension of hostilities with a view to terms of agreement. In this way relations were established between the two generals, and a treaty of peace was agreed to. Its terms were very humiliating to Russia. Azoff and its surrounding district were to be surrendered to the Porte. Taganrog and some other fortresses were to be dismantled. The Russian army was to withdraw from Poland. The King of Sweden was to be allowed safe conduct through Russia to his own country. There was to be no Russian ambassador in the future at Constantinople. In return for these great concessions the Russian army was to be permitted to retreat without molestation.

The preamble to the treaty contained the following remarkable admission of the predicament in which the Czar and his army were placed: —

By the grace of God, the victorious Mussulman army has closely hemmed the Czar of Muscovy with all his troops in the neighbourhood of the River Pruth, and the Czar has asked for peace, and it is at his request that the following articles are drawn up and granted.

It was also declared in the treaty by the Grand Vizier “that he made the peace by virtue of full powers vested in him, and that he entreated the Sultan to ratify the treaty, and overlook the previous evil conduct of the Czar.”

The signing of the treaty of the Pruth was vehemently opposed by the King of Sweden, who was in the Ottoman camp, and by the Khan of the Crimea. They doubtless had good reasons of their own for wishing the war with Russia to be prolonged. It was due to their intrigues at Constantinople that violent opposition was roused to the ratification of the treaty. Baltadji found on his return that, instead of being received with acclamation for having recovered Azoff and other territory, of which the Porte had been deprived a few years previously, he was dismissed from his office with disgrace. The Kiaya Osman and the Reis Effendi Omer, who were believed to be largely responsible for the treaty, were put to death by order of the Sultan.

The Porte refused to ratify the treaty, and preparations were made for a renewal of the war with Russia. But wiser counsels ultimately prevailed, largely through the advice of the British Ambassador, Sir R. Sutton; and two years later, after long negotiation, another treaty was concluded with the Czar, which embodied all the terms of that effected by Baltadji which had been so much objected to.

Many historians have found fault with Baltadji for having neglected the opportunity of destroying or capturing the Russian army and the Czar Peter himself, and for having allowed them to escape by concluding the treaty. It has been suggested that he was bribed by the Empress Catherine. It is, however, inconceivable that one in the high position of Grand Vizier, where there were such immense opportunities for enrichment, could have sold himself and his country for so small a price. It is more probable that the presents of the Empress were made to the subordinate of the Grand Vizier for the purpose of opening negotiations with him. It is also more reasonable to conclude that Baltadji was convinced that no better terms could be obtained by a prolongation of the war. The destruction of the Russian army or its capture, together with the Czar, would have roused the Russian people to a great effort to avenge such a disaster. It is significant that the Sultan, while putting to death the Kiaya and Reis Effendi, spared the life of Baltadji, who was mainly responsible, and simply dismissed him from the office of Grand Vizier. This seems to indicate that the Sultan had given authority in advance to Baltadji, as stated in the treaty, to agree to terms such as were actually obtained. It seems to be unlikely that Sultan Achmet desired to extend his Empire beyond the territory of Azoff into the heart of Russia. What better terms, then, could have been obtained by prolonging the war?

It has also been contended by some historians that it was unwise policy to impose such a humiliation on the Czar as that embodied in the treaty; that it was certain to lead to a renewal of the war for the purpose of avenging it. But the Czar himself did not apparently take this view of the case. After the escape of his army from disaster he showed no inclination to renew the war. He was willing, two years later, to re-enact the treaty, in spite of its humiliating terms. He did not break peace with the Turks in the remaining ten years of his reign. He did not bear a grudge against them and after a few years he entered into an arrangement with the Sultan for the partition of a large part of Persia.

On a review of the whole transaction, we must conclude that the Grand Vizier Baltadji was fully justified in effecting the treaty of the Pruth, and that it was no small achievement, by the skilful manœuvring of his army and without the loss of a single life, to impose terms on the Czar, under which the Ottoman Empire recovered Azoff and its district, the key to the Crimea, and obtained the other valuable concessions embodied in the treaty.

In 1715 the Porte embarked on another war, this time against the Republic of Venice, with the object of recovering the Morea, which sixteen years previously had been conquered by the Republic, when in alliance with Austria, and the possession of which had been confirmed to the Republic by the treaty of Carlowitz. Morosini, the Venetian general by whom this conquest had been achieved, was now dead. It was thought that Austria would not intervene. A pretext for the war was found in the assistance which the Republic rendered to the Montenegrins in an insurrection against the Porte. The army, which had been equipped for war with Russia, was now available for other purposes. The Grand Vizier Damad, who was also otherwise known as Coumourgi, son-in-law of the Sultan, took command of an army of a hundred thousand men. A fleet of one hundred sail co-operated by sea. The Sultan himself accompanied the army as far as Larissa, in Thessaly, but no farther. He left the direction of it wholly in the hands of Damad, who showed great ability in the conduct of the war. It commenced with the siege of Corinth, which, after a brave defence of three weeks, capitulated on July 7, 1715, on favourable terms. But a powder magazine blew up during the evacuation of the fortress, killing six or seven hundred of the Turkish soldiers. This afforded an excuse for breaking the agreement, and for a general massacre of Venetians and Greeks, whether of the garrison or inhabitants – much to the disapproval of Damad. This siege of Corinth formed the subject of Lord Byron’s well-known poem, in which Damad is referred to under the name of Coumourgi: —

Coumourgi – can his glory cease,That latest conqueror of Greece,Till Christian hands to Greece restoreThe freedom Venice gave of yore?A hundred years have rolled awaySince he refixed the Moslem sway.

With poetic licence Byron attributes to the Venetian governor of Corinth the setting fire to the powder magazine and the fearful destruction of life which it caused: —

When old Minotti’s handTouched with the torch the train —’Tis fired.

There seems to have been no more justification in fact for this than for the statement that the Venetians gave liberty to the Greeks. Nothing is more certain than that the Greeks hated the rule of Venice as more oppressive than that of the Turks.

After the capture of Corinth the Ottoman army, in two divisions, invaded the Morea, and had no difficulty in capturing all the Venetian fortresses there, such as Modon, Coron, and Navarino. The Greek inhabitants gave no assistance to their Venetian masters. They welcomed the Turks as their deliverers from an odious tyranny.

The reconquest of the Morea occupied Damad and his army for only a hundred and one days. There was no pitched battle with the Venetians. The campaign consisted of a succession of sieges of fortresses. It was the intention of the Ottomans to complete the expulsion of the Venetians by the capture of Corfu and the other Ionian islands, but at this stage the Emperor of Austria, Charles VI, intervened, and entered into a defensive alliance with the Republic of Venice. It was too late, however, to save the Morea. There was much difference of opinion at the Court of the Sultan whether the action of Austria should be treated as a casus belli. The Grand Vizier Damad vehemently contended that it was a breach of the treaty of Carlowitz. He was a man of great force of character and very eloquent. But there was strong opposition to him. The debates in the Divan, in presence of the Sultan, have been recorded and are interesting reading. The Mufti, when consulted on the subject, gave his judgment in favour of Damad. This decided the Council. War was declared against Austria, and in 1716 an army of a hundred and fifty thousand was sent, under command of Damad, to attack the Austrians. It reached Belgrade in September. A council of war was then held to decide whether to advance towards Temesvar or Peterwardein. There was again difference on the subject. Damad ultimately gave his decision in favour of the latter project.

The Turks crossed the River Saave by a bridge of boats, and then marched along the bank of the Danube towards Peterwardein. Their van came in contact with that of the Austrians at the village of Carlowitz, where, sixteen years before, the last treaty had been signed. From Carlowitz to Peterwardein the distance is only two leagues. The Austrian army, greatly inferior in numbers to that of the Turks, was posted in front of the great fortress, behind entrenchments which had been made by Siawousch Pasha in the last war. It was again commanded by Prince Eugène of Savoy, who, in the interval, had gathered fresh laurels in many hard-fought battles for Austria, and who was second to no living general, save only the Duke of Marlborough, by whose side he fought so many battles. The two armies came to issue on August 10, 1716. At first the battle went in favour of the Ottomans. Their redoubtable Janissaries broke the line of the Austrian infantry opposed to them. Prince Eugène then brought up his reserve of cavalry. They charged the Janissaries with irresistible force, and retrieved the fortunes of the day. Damad Pasha, when he saw that the tide of battle was turning against him, put himself at the head of a band of officers and galloped into the thick of the battle, in the hope of infusing fresh courage in his army. He was struck down and was carried from the field to Carlowitz, where he died.