The Teaching of Epictetus

– “Whither?”

To nothing dreadful, but to the place from whence thou camest – to things friendly and akin to thee, to the elements of Being. Whatever in thee was fire shall go to fire; of earth, to earth; of air, to air; of water, to water;94 no Hades, nor Acheron, nor Coeytus, nor Phlegethon, but all things are full of Gods and Powers.95 Whoso hath these things to think on, and seeth the sun and the moon and the stars, and rejoiceth in the earth and the sea, he is no more solitary than he is helpless.

– “What, then, if one come and find me alone and slay me?”

Fool! not thee, but thy wretched body.

3. Thou art a little soul bearing up a corpse.

4. What solitude, then, is there any longer, what lack? Why do we make ourselves worse than children, which, when they are left alone, what do they? – they take shells and sand and build up somewhat, and then throw it down, and again build up something else, and so they never lack pastime. And shall I, if ye sail away from me, sit down and weep for that I am left alone and solitary? Shall I have no shells nor sand? But children do these things through their folly, and we through our wisdom are made unhappy.

CHAPTER X

against the contentious and revengeful

1. To suppose that we shall become contemptible in the eyes of others, unless in some way we inflict an injury on those who first showed hostility to us, is the character of most ignoble and thoughtless men. For thus we say, that a man is to be despised according to his inability to do hurt; but much rather is he to be despised according to his inability to do good.

2. The wise and good man neither strives with any himself, nor in the measure of his power will he allow another to strive. And in this, as in all other things, the life of Socrates is set before us as an example; who did not only himself fly all contention, but also forbade it to others. See in Xenophon’s Symposium how many quarrels he ended; and, again, how he bore with Thrasymachus, and how with Polus and with Callicles; and how he endured his wife, and how his son, which opposed him with sophistical arguments. For he remembered very well that no man can command the ruling faculty of another.

3. How, then, is there yet any place for contention in one so minded? For what event can amaze him? what appear strange to him? Doth he not look for even worse and more grievous things at the hands of evil men than do befall him? Doth he not count everything for gain which is short of the extreme of injury? Hath such a one reviled thee? Much thanks to him that he did not strike thee. But he did also strike me. Much thanks that he did not wound thee. But he did also wound me. Much thanks that he did not slay thee. For when did he learn, or from whom, that he was a tame animal, and affectionate to others, and that to the wrongdoer the wrong-doing itself is a heavy injury? For since he hath not learned these things, nor believes them, wherefore should he not follow that which appears to be his advantage? Thy neighbor hath flung stones! Hast thou, then, sinned in aught? But he has broken things in the house? And art thou a household vessel? Nay – but a Will.

4. What, then, hath been given thee for this occasion? To a wolf it were given to bite – to fling more stones. But if thou seek what is becoming for a man, look into thy stores, see what faculties thou hast come here furnished withal. Hast thou the nature of a wild beast? the temper of revenge?

5. When is a horse in wretched case? When he is bereaved of his natural faculties; not when he cannot crow, but when he cannot run. When is a dog? Not when he cannot fly, but when he cannot track. Is not a man, then, also thus wretched, not when he cannot strangle lions or embrace statues96– for to this he came endowed with no faculties by Nature – but when he hath lost his honesty, his faithfulness? Surely we should meet together and lament over such a man; so great are the evils into which he hath fallen. Not, indeed, that we should lament for his birth, or for his death, but in that while yet living he hath suffered the loss of his own true possessions. I speak not of his paternal inheritance, not of his land, or his house, or his inn, or his slaves (for not one of these things is the true possession of a man, but all are alien, servile, subject, given now to some, now to others, by those that can command them); but of his human qualities, the stamps of his spirit wherewith he came into the world. Even such we seek for also on coins, and if we find them we approve the coins, and if not, we cast them away. What is the stamp of this sestertius? The stamp of Trajan. Then give it me. The stamp of Nero.97 Fling it away – it will not pass, it is bad. And so here too. What is the stamp of his mind? He is gentle, social, forbearing, affectionate. Come, then, I receive him, I admit him to citizenship, I receive him as a neighbor, a fellow-traveler. See to it only that he have not Nero’s stamp. Is he wrathful, revengeful, complaining? Doth he, when it may seem good to him, break the heads of all who stand in his way? Why, then, didst thou say he was a man? Shall everything be judged by the bare form? If so, then say that a wax apple is a real apple, and that it has the smell and taste of an apple. But the outward shape doth not suffice, nor are eyes and nose enough to make a man, but he is a man only if he have a man’s mind. Here is one that will not hear reason, that will not submit when he is confuted – he is an ass. In another, reverence hath died – he is worthless, anything rather than a man. This one seeketh whom he may meet and kick or bite – so that he is not even a sheep or an ass, but some kind of savage beast.

6. But this is the nature of every creature, to pursue the Good and fly the Evil; and to hold every man an enemy and a plotter for our woe, were it even a brother, or son, or father, who takes away from us the one, or brings us into the other. For nothing is nearer or dearer to us than the Good. It remains, therefore, if outward things be good and evil, that a father is no longer the friend of his sons, nor the brother of his brother, but every place is full of enemies and plotters and slanderers. But if the only Good is that the Will should be as it ought to be, and the only Evil as it ought not, where is there then any place for strife, for reviling? For about what things shall we strive? about those that are nothing to us? and with whom? with the ignorant, the unhappy, with men who are deceived concerning the greatest things?

7. Remembering these things, Socrates managed his own household, enduring a most shrewish wife and an undutiful son. For these doctrines make love in a household, and concord in a State, peace among nations, and gratitude towards God, with boldness in every place, as of one who hath to do with things alien to him, and of no estimation. And we are the men to write and read these things, and to applaud them when they are delivered to us, but to the belief of them we have not even come near. And therefore that saying concerning the Lacedæmonians,

“Lions at home, but in Ephesus foxes,”98

will fit us too – lions in the school and foxes without.

End of Book III

BOOK IV

CHAPTER I

of religion

1. Of religion towards the Gods, know that the chief element is to have right opinions concerning them, as existing and governing the whole in fair order and justice; and then to set thyself to obey them, and to yield to them in each event, and submit to it willingly, as accomplished under the highest counsels. For so shalt thou never blame the Gods, nor accuse them, as being neglectful of thee.

2. But this may come to pass in no other way than by placing Good and Evil in the things that are in our own power, and withdrawing them from those that are not; for if thou take any of these things to be good or evil, then when thou shalt miss thy desire, or fall into what thou desirest not, it is altogether necessary that thou blame and hate those who caused thee to do so.

3. For every living thing was so framed by Nature as to flee and turn from things, and the causes of things, that appear hurtful, and to follow and admire things, and the causes of things, that appear serviceable. For it is impossible that one who thinketh himself harmed should delight in that seemeth to harm him, even as he cannot delight in the very harm itself.

4. And thus it comes that a father is reviled by his son when he will not give him of the things that appear to be good. And this it was that set Polyneices and Eteocles at war with each other – the opinion, namely, that royalty is a good. And through this the Gods are railed on by the husbandman and the sailor, by the merchant, and men who lose their wives or children. For where advantage is, there also is religion. Thus he who is careful to pursue and avoid as he ought, is careful, at the same time, of religion.

5. But it is fitting also that every man should pour libations and offer sacrifices and first-fruits after the customs of his fathers, purely, and not languidly nor negligently, nor, indeed, scantily, nor yet beyond his means.

CHAPTER II

of providence

1. Concerning the Gods, there are some who say that a Divine Being does not exist; and others, that it exists indeed, but is idle and uncaring, and hath no forethought for anything; and a third class say that there is such a Being, and he taketh forethought also, but only in respect of great and heavenly things, but of nothing that is on the earth; and a fourth class, that he taketh thought of things both in heaven and earth, but only in general, and not of each thing severally. And there is a fifth class, whereof are Odysseus and Socrates, who say, Nor can I move without thy knowledge.99

2. Before all things, then, it is necessary to investigate each of these opinions, whether it be justly affirmed or no. For if there be no Gods, how can the following of the Gods be an end? And if there are Gods, but such as take no care for anything, then also how can the following of them be truly an end? And how, again, if the Gods both exist and take care for things, yet if there be no communication from them to men, yea, by Zeus, and even to mine own self? The wise and good man, having investigated all these things, will submit his own mind to Him that governeth the Whole, even as good citizens to the laws of their State.

3. But a certain man having inquired how one could be persuaded that every one of his actions is observed by God, Doth it not appear to you, said Epictetus, that all things are united in One?

– “It doth so appear.”

What then? Think you not that a sympathy exists between heavenly and earthly things?

– “I do think it.”

For how else do plants, as if at the command of God, when He bids them, flower in due season? and shoot forth when He bids them shoot, and bear fruit when He bids them bear? and ripen when He bids them ripen? and again they drop their fruit when He bids them drop it, and shed their leaves when He bids them shed them? and how else at His bidding do they fold themselves together, and remain motionless and at rest? And how else at the waxing and waning of the moon, and the approach and withdrawal of the sun, do we behold such a change and reversal in earthly things? But are the plants and our bodies so bound up in the whole, and have sympathy with it, and are our spirits not much more so? And our souls being thus bound up and in touch with God, seeing, indeed, that they are portions and fragments of Him, shall not every movement of them, inasmuch as it is something inward and akin to God, be perceived by Him? But you are able to meditate upon the divine government, and upon all divine and all human affairs, and to be affected at the same time in the senses and in the intellect by ten thousand things, and at the same time to assent to some and dissent to others, or suspend your judgment; and you preserve in your mind so many impressions of so many and various things, and being affected by them, you strike upon ideas similar to earlier impressions, and you retain many different arts, and memories of ten thousand things; and shall not God have the power to overlook all things, and be present with all, and have a certain communication with all? But is the sun able to illuminate so great a part of the All, and to leave so little without light, – that part, namely, which is filled with the shadow of the earth – and shall He who made the sun, and guideth it in its sphere – a small part of Him beside the Whole – shall He not be capable of perceiving all things?

4. But I, saith the man, cannot take heed of all these things at once. And who said you could do this? that you had equal powers with God? But, nevertheless, He hath placed at every man’s side a Guardian, the Genius of each man,100 who is charged to watch over him, a Genius that cannot sleep, nor be deceived. To what greater and more watchful guardian could He have committed us? So, when ye have shut the doors, and made darkness in the house, remember never to say that ye are alone; for ye are not alone, but God is there, and your Genius is there; and what need have these of light to mark what ye are doing? To this God it were fitting also that ye should swear an oath, as soldiers do to Cæsar. But those indeed who receive pay swear to prefer the safety of Cæsar before all things; but ye, receiving so many and great things, will ye not swear? or swearing, will ye not abide by it? And what shall ye swear? Never to disobey, never to accuse, never to blame aught that He hath given, never unwillingly to do or suffer any necessary thing. Is this oath like unto that other? The soldiers swear to esteem no other man before Cæsar; ye to esteem yourselves above all.

CHAPTER III

of providence

1. Marvel not if the other animals have all things that are needful for the body without preparation, not alone food and drink, but sleeping places also, and they have no need of shoes, nor bedding, nor raiment, while all these things must needs be added to us. For these creatures exist not for themselves, but for service; it were not expedient that they had been made with need of such additions. For, look you, what a task it were for us to take thought, not for ourselves alone, but also for the sheep and the asses, how they should be clad, how shod, how they should eat, how they should drink! But as soldiers are ready for their commands, shod, and clothed, and accoutred, and it would be a grievous thing if each captain of a thousand must go round and shoe or clothe his thousand; so also hath Nature formed the animals that are made for service, ready equipped, and needing no further care. And thus one little child with a rod will drive the sheep.

2. But now we, neglecting to be grateful, for that we need not attend to the animals equally with ourselves, do accuse God for our own lack. And yet, by Zeus and all the Gods, there is no one thing in the frame of Nature but would give, at least to a reverent and grateful spirit, enough for the perceiving of the Providence of God. And to speak of no great things now, consider this alone, how milk is produced from grass, and cheese from milk, and wool from skins. Who is he that hath made these things or planned them? No one, sayest thou? O monstrous impudence and dullness!

3. Well, then, let the large works of Nature pass, and let us look only at her by-works. Is there aught more useless than the hairs on the chin? What then? hath she not made such use even of these, that nothing could be comelier? hath she not by them distinguished male from female? Doth not the nature of every man cry aloud even at a distance, I am a man, thus shalt thou approach me, thus speak to me, look for nothing else; behold the tokens! And again in women, as Nature hath mingled something of softness in the voice, so she hath taken away the hairs. Nay, will you say? but every creature should have been left undistinguished, and each of us should proclaim, “I am a man?” But how beautiful is not the token, and becoming, and reverend? how much more beautiful than the cock’s comb? how much more becoming than the lion’s mane? Wherefore it behooveth us to preserve God’s tokens, nor to fling them away, nor to confound, as far as in us lies, the things that distinguish the sexes.

4. Are these the only works of Providence in us? – but what may suffice to rightly praise and tell them? For had we understanding thereof, would any other thing better beseem us, either in company or alone, than to hymn the Divine Being, and laud Him and rehearse His gracious deeds? Should we not, as we dig or plow or eat, sing this hymn to God, Great is God, who hath given us such instruments whereby we shall till the earth; great is God, who hath given us hands, and swallowing, and the belly; who maketh us to grow without our knowledge, and to breathe while we sleep. These things it were fitting that every man should sing, and to chant the greatest and divinest hymns for this, that He hath given us the power to observe and consider His works and a Way wherein to walk.101 What then? since the most of you have become blind, should there not be one to fill this place, and in the name of all to sing this hymn to God? For what else can I do, an old man and lame, than sing hymns to God? If I were a nightingale I would do after the nature of a nightingale; if a swan, after that of a swan. But now I am a reasoning creature, and it behooves me to sing the praise of God: this is my task, and this I do, nor, as long as it is granted me, will I ever abandon this post. And you, too, I summon to join me in the same song.

CHAPTER IV

god in man

1. God is beneficial. But the Good is also beneficial. It is likely, then, that where the essence of God is, there also should be the essence of the Good. And what is the essence of God? Flesh? God forbid. A property in land? God forbid. Fame? God forbid. Mind, Intelligence, Right Reason? Even so. Here, then, once for all, seek the essence of the Good. For surely you will in no wise seek it in a plant? Nay. Or in any unreasoning creature? Nay. If, then, it is sought in a reasoning creature, wherefore continue to seek it anywhere else than in the difference between reasoning and unreasoning creatures?

2. The plants have not so much as the use of appearances, therefore we speak not of the Good in their regard. The Good, then, needs the power of using appearances. And this alone? Nay; for if so, say then that Good and Happiness and Unhappiness are with the lower animals too. But this you will not say, and you are right; for though they possessed the use of appearances in the highest degree, yet the observing and considering of this use they do not possess, and naturally so, for they exist to serve others, nor have any supreme object in themselves.102 For the ass was not made for any supreme object in himself? Nay, but he was made able to bear, because we had need of a back; and, by Zeus, we had need moreover that he should walk; wherefore he received also the power to use appearances, else had he not been able to walk. And thereupon the matter stopped. For had he also received the observing and considering of the use of appearances, it is clear that in reason he could no longer have been subject to us, nor have served those needs of ours, but he had been our equal and our like.

3. For use is one thing, and observation and study is another. God had need of the other animals to use appearances, but of us to observe and study appearances. Wherefore it is enough for them to eat and drink, and rest and breed, and do whatever else each of them performs, but to us, to whom the faculty of observing and studying hath also been given, these things are not enough; but unless we act after a certain manner and ordinance, and conformably to the nature and constitution of man, we shall never attain the end of our being. For where the constitution is different, different there also is the task and the end. When, therefore, the constitution is one for use alone, then the use, of whatever kind it be, is enough; but where there is also observing and studying of the use, then, unless the due employment of this faculty be added, the end shall never be gained. What then? God hath constituted every other animal, one to be eaten, another to serve for tilling the land, another to yield cheese, another to some kindred use; for which things what need is there of the observing and studying of appearances, and the ability to make distinctions in them? But man he hath brought in to be a spectator of God and of His works, and not a spectator alone, but an interpreter of them. Wherefore it is shameful for a man to begin and to end where creatures do that are without Reason; but rather should he begin when they begin, and end where Nature ends in ourselves. But she ends in contemplation, in observing and studying, in a manner of life that is in harmony with Nature. See to it, then, that ye die not without having been spectators of these things.

4. Seek, then, the essence of the Good there, where if it be not, thou wilt not say that the Good is in any other thing.

5. But what? are not those creatures also works of God? Surely; yet not supreme objects, yet not parts of the Gods. But thou art a supreme object, thou art a piece of God, thou hast in thee something that is a portion of Him. Why, then, art thou ignorant of thy high ancestry? Why knowest thou not whence thou camest? Wilt thou not remember, in thine eating, who it is that eats, and whom thou dost nourish? in cohabiting, who it is that cohabits? in converse, in exercise, in argument, knowest thou not that thou art nourishing a God, exercising a God? Unhappy man! thou bearest about with thee a God, and knowest it not! Thinkest thou I speak of some God of gold and silver, and external to thee? Nay, but in thyself thou dost bear Him, and seest not that thou defilest Him with thine impure thoughts and filthy deeds. In the presence even of an image of God thou hadst not dared to do one of those things which thou dost. But in the presence of God Himself within thee, who seeth and heareth all things, thou art not ashamed of the things thou dost both desire and do, O thou unwitting of thine own nature, and subject to the wrath of God?

6. Why, then, do we fear in sending forth a young man from the school into some of the business of life, lest he should do wrong in anything, and be luxurious or profligate, and lest a wrapping of rags degrade him, or fine raiment uplift him? Such a one knoweth not his own God, nor with whom he is setting out. But can we have patience with him, saying, Would that I had you with me!103 And hast thou not God with thee there? or having Him, dost thou seek for any other? or will He speak other things to thee than even these?

7. But wert thou a statue of Pheidias, an Athena or Zeus, then wert thou mindful both of thyself and of the artist; and if thou hadst any consciousness, thou wouldst strive to do nothing unworthy of thy maker nor of thyself, nor ever to appear in any unseemly guise. But now that Zeus hath made thee, thou carest therefore nothing what kind of creature thou showest thyself for? And yet, is the one Artist like the other artist, or the one work like the other work? And what kind of work is that which hath in itself the faculties that were manifest in the making of it? Do not artists work in stone or brass or gold or ivory? and the Athena of Pheidias, when she hath once stretched out her hand and received upon it the figure of Victory, standeth thus for all time? But the works of God have motion and breathing, and the use of appearances and the judgment of them. Wilt thou dishonor such a Maker, whose work thou art? Nay, for not only did He make thee, but to thee alone did He trust and commit thyself. Wilt thou not remember this too, or wilt thou dishonor thy charge? But if God had committed some orphan child to thee, wouldst thou have neglected it? Now He hath given thee to thyself, and saith, I had none more worthy of trust than thee; keep this man such as he was made by nature – reverent, faithful, high, unterrified, unshaken of passions, untroubled. And thou wilt not.

8. But they may say: Whence doth this fellow bring us that eye of scorn and solemn looks? I have it not yet as I should, For I am yet unbold in those things which I have learned and assented to; I yet fear my weakness. But let me be bold in them, and then ye shall see such a look, such a guise, as behooveth me to wear. Then shall I show you the statue when it is perfected and polished. What look ye for? – an eye of scorn? God forbid! For doth the Zeus in Olympia look scornfully? – nay, but his glance is steadfast, as becometh him who will say,