Memoirs of the Duchesse de Dino (Afterwards Duchesse de Talleyrand et de Sagan), 1836-1840

Her Majesty's Government has therefore invariably asserted that the Powers which are anxious to preserve the integrity of the Turkish Empire and to maintain the independence of the Sultan should unite in helping the latter to re-establish his direct authority over Syria.

The French Government, on the other hand, has asserted that if Mehemet Ali were once assured of the permanent occupation of Egypt and Syria he would remain a faithful subject and become the strongest support of the Sultan; that the Sultan could not govern if the Pasha were not in possession of this province, the military and financial resources of which would then be of greater use to him than if they were in the hands of the Sultan himself; that every confidence might be placed in the sincerity with which Mehemet Ali had renounced all ulterior views, and in his protestations of faithful devotion to his Sovereign; that the Pasha is an old man, and upon his death, even if his rights are recognised as hereditary, the totality of his acquired power would revert to the Sultan, because all possessions in Mohammedan countries, of whatever nature, are in reality held only upon tenure for lifetime.

The French Government has also maintained that Mehemet Ali will never be willing to evacuate Syria of his own accord and that the only means by which European Powers could use force would be operations by sea which would be inadequate, or by land which would be dangerous; that these operations by sea would not expel the Egyptians from Syria and would merely rouse Mehemet Ali to begin an attack upon Constantinople; while the measures which might be taken in such a case to defend the capital and in particular any operations on land undertaken by the troops of the allied Powers to expel the army of Mehemet Ali from Syria, would be more fatal to the Turkish Empire than the state of things could possibly be which these measures would be intended to remedy.

To these objections Her Majesty's Government replied that no reliance could be placed upon the recent protestations of Mehemet Ali; that his ambition is insatiable and would only be increased by success; and that to provide him with the opportunity of invading, or to leave within his reach the objects of his desire would be to sow the seeds of inevitable collisions; that Syria is no further from Constantinople than a large number of well-administered provinces are from their capitals in other States and can be as well governed from Constantinople as from Alexandria; that it is impossible for the resources of this province to be of any use to the Sultan in the hands of a governor who might turn them against his master at any moment and that they would be more useful if they were in the hands or at the disposal of the Sultan himself; that, as Ibrahim had an army at his orders, he had also the means, upon the decease of Mehemet Ali, of securing his own succession to any power of which the latter might be possessed at his death; that it was not fit that the Great Powers should advise the Sultan to conclude a public arrangement with Mehemet Ali, with the secret intention of hereafter breaking the arrangement upon the first occasion that might seem opportune.

None the less the French Government maintained its opinion and refused to take part in an arrangement which included the use of coercive measures.

But the French Memorandum laid down that in the course of recent circumstances no positive proposal has been made to France upon which she was called to explain her attitude and that consequently the resolution which England communicated to her in the Memorandum of July 17, doubtless in the name of the four Powers, must not be considered as actuated by refusals which France has not made. This passage obliges me briefly to remind you of the general course of negotiations.

The original opinion conceived by Her Majesty's Government, of which the five Powers were informed, including France, in 1839, was that the arrangement between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali which might secure a permanent state of peace in the Levant, would be of a nature to confine the power delegated to Mehemet Ali to Egypt alone and would re-establish the direct authority of the Sultan throughout Syria, both in Candia and in all the towns of the Holy Land; thus interposing the desert between the direct power of the Sultan and the province of which the administration would be left to the Pasha. And Her Majesty's Government proposed that by way of compensation for the evacuation of Syria, Mehemet Ali should receive an assurance that his male descendants should succeed him as governors in Egypt, under the sovereignty of the Sultan.

To this proposal the French Government raised objections saying that such an arrangement would doubtless be the best if there were any means of executing it, but that Mehemet Ali would offer resistance and that any measures of violence which the allies might employ to reduce him, would produce effects which might be more dangerous to the peace of Europe and to the independence of the Porte, than the actual state of affairs between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali could possibly be; that although the French Government thus refused to agree to England's plan, during the long space of time which had subsequently elapsed, it had not proposed any plan of its own. Further, in September 1839, Comte Sébastiani, the French Ambassador at the Court of London, proposed to draw a line from the east to the west of the sea, nearly from Beyrout to the desert near Damascus and to declare that all the land to the south of this line should be administered by Mehemet Ali and that all to the north should be under the immediate authority of the Sultan. The French Ambassador then gave Her Majesty's Government to understand that if such an arrangement were admitted by the five Powers, France would unite with the four Powers, in case of need, for the use of coercive measures, with the object of forcing Mehemet Ali to submission.

I pointed out to Comte Sébastiani that such an arrangement was open, though in a less degree, to all the objections applicable to the present relative position of the two parties and that consequently Her Majesty's Government could not accede to it. I observed that it seemed inconsistent on the part of France to express her willingness to force Mehemet Ali to agree to an arrangement which would obviously be incomplete and inadequate to secure the proposed object, while objecting to coercive measures when they were proposed for the purpose of forcing consent to the arrangement desired by Her Majesty, the execution of which, as France admitted, would entirely fulfil the desired object.

To these arguments Comte Sébastiani replied that the objections advanced by the French Government to the employment of coercive measures against Mehemet Ali, were founded upon considerations of domestic government, and that these objections would be removed if the French Government was enabled to prove to the nation and to the Chambers that it had obtained the best possible conditions for Mehemet All and that he had refused to accept them.

As this insinuation was not admitted by Her Majesty's Government, the French Government communicated officially on September 27, 1839, its own plan, which was that Mehemet Ali should become a hereditary governor of Egypt and of all Syria, and governor for life of Candia, surrendering nothing but the district of Adana and Arabia. The French Government did not say a word as to its knowledge of Mehemet Ali's inclination to adhere to this arrangement, nor did it declare that if he refused to agree, France would take coercive measures to compel him.

Obviously Her Majesty's Government could not consent to this plan, which was open to more objections than the present state of things, the more so as the gift to Mehemet Ali of the legal and hereditary title to a third of the Ottoman Empire, which he now occupies only by force, would have been to begin the positive dismemberment of the Empire.

Her Majesty's Government, therefore, being desirous to show its readiness to come to an agreement with France upon these questions, stated that it would yield its well-founded objection to any extension of Mehemet Ali's power beyond Egypt and would join the French Government in recommending the Sultan to grant to Mehemet Ali, apart from the pashalik of Egypt, the administration of the lower part of Syria, to be bounded on the north by a line drawn from Cape Carmel to the southern extremity of the Lake of Tiberias, and by a line from this point to the Gulf of Akaba, provided that France would join the four Powers in coercive measures if Mehemet Ali refused this offer. This proposal, however, was not accepted by the French Government, which now declared its inability to join in coercive measures or to be a party to an arrangement to which Mehemet Ali would not consent.

While these discussions were proceeding with France, separate negotiations were in progress between England and Russia, of which full details and information have been sent to the French Government. Negotiations with France were suspended for a time at the outset of this year, firstly because a change of Ministry was expected, and secondly because a change of Ministry took place.

In the month of May, however, Baron von Neumann and myself resolved, upon the advice of our respective governments, to make a last effort with the object of inducing France to begin a treaty which was to be concluded with the other four Powers, and we submitted to the French Government, through M. Guizot, another proposal for an arrangement between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali. One objection put forward by the French Government to the last proposals of England was that although it was proposed to give Mehemet Ali the strong position extending from Mount Carmel to Mount Tabor, he would be deprived of the fortress of Acre.

To overcome this objection Baron von Neumann and myself proposed that the northern frontiers of the part of Syria to be administered by the Pasha should extend from Cape Nakhora to the furthest point of the Lake of Tiberias, thus including within the boundary the fortress of Acre; and that the eastern frontier should extend along the western coast of the Lake of Tiberias and thence to the Gulf of Akaba. We declared that the government of this part of Syria could be granted to Mehemet Ali for life only, and that neither England nor Austria would consent to grant Mehemet Ali hereditary rights over any part of Syria. I further declared to M. Guizot that I could go no further in the way of concessions in the hope of securing the co-operation of France, and that this was our last proposal. Baron von Neumann and myself communicated these facts separately to M. Guizot: Baron von Neumann first, and myself the next day. M. Guizot told me he would inform his Government of this proposal and of the facts which I had laid before him, and that he would let me know the answer as soon as he had received it. A short time afterwards the plenipotentiaries of Austria, Prussia, and Russia informed me that they had every reason to believe that the French Government, instead of deciding upon the proposal for themselves, had sent it to Alexandria to learn the decision of Mehemet Ali; that the four Powers who had undertaken the business were thus confronted, not with France, but with Mehemet Ali; that, apart from the inevitable delay, this was an action which their respective courts had never intended to take and one to which they would never consent; and that the French Government had thus placed the plenipotentiaries in a very embarrassing position. I agreed with them that their objections were justified with regard to the conduct which they attributed to the French Government, but that M. Guizot had said not a word to me of what would be done. Mehemet Ali had been informed that the French Government at that moment was fully occupied with parliamentary questions and could naturally ask for time before sending an answer to our proposals, and that in any case delay could do no great harm. About June 27, M. Guizot came to me and read me a letter addressed to him by M. Thiers, containing the answer of the French Government to our proposal. This answer was a formal refusal. M. Thiers said that the French Government positively knew that Mehemet Ali would not consent to a division of Syria unless he were forced to do so; that France could not co-operate in coercive measures against Mehemet Ali under these conditions, and that therefore she could not become a party to the proposed arrangement.

As France had thus refused to yield to England's ultimatum, the plenipotentiaries were bound to consider what steps should be adopted by their Governments. The position of the five Powers was this: the five had declared their conviction that in the interests of the balance of power and of the peace of Europe it was essential to preserve the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire under the reigning dynasty; all five had declared that they would use all their influence to maintain this integrity and this independence; but France, on the one hand, insisted that the best means to secure this result was to abandon the Sultan to the mercies of Mehemet Ali and to advise him to submit to the conditions which Mehemet might impose upon him in order to preserve peace sine qua non; while on the other side the four Powers regarded any further military occupation of the Sultan's provinces by Mehemet Ali as likely to destroy the integrity of the Turkish Empire and to be fatal to its independence; they therefore thought that it was advisable to confine Mehemet Ali within narrower limits.

After about two months of deliberations, France not only refused to consent to the plan proposed by the four Powers as an ultimatum upon their part, but further declared that she would not become a party to any arrangement to which Mehemet Ali did not voluntarily consent without the use of force. It only remained then for the four Great Powers to adopt as an alternative the principle laid down by France, which consisted in the complete submission of the Sultan to the demands of Mehemet Ali; or to act upon their principles and force Mehemet Ali to accept an arrangement compatible in form with the rights of the Sultan, and compatible in content with the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. If the former alternative were adopted, the co-operation of France would be secured; in the latter alternative the hope of that co-operation must be abandoned.

The keen desire of the four Powers to secure the co-operation of France has been shown by the fact that they have continued their efforts for several months in the course of negotiations. They are well aware of the value of French support, not only for the particular object which they have in view, but also with reference to the general and permanent interests of Europe. But what they failed to secure, and what they esteemed, was the co-operation of France in the maintenance of peace to secure the eventual safety of Europe and the practical execution of the principles to which the five Powers had declared their agreement. They desired the co-operation of France, not only for themselves and for the advantage and opportunity of the moment, but also for the good which it might have conferred, and for the future consequences which might have resulted from it. They wished to co-operate with France to do good, but they were not prepared to co-operate with her in doing evil.

Thinking, therefore, that the policy advised by France was unjust, and in no way judicious with regard to the Sultan; that it might become the cause of misfortunes in Europe; that it was inconsistent with the public engagement undertaken by the five Powers, and that it was incompatible with the principles which they had wisely emphasised, the four Powers felt that they could not make the sacrifice demanded of them, and buy the help of France at so high a price – if, indeed, that could be called co-operation which merely consisted in allowing events to follow their natural course. As the four Powers were thus unable to adopt the views of France, they determined to accomplish their mission.

This determination, however, was not unexpected and the probable eventualities had not been hidden from France. On the contrary, upon several occasions during the course of negotiations, and no later than October 1 last, I had pointed out to the French Ambassador that our desire to remain united with France must have a limit, that we were anxious to go forward with France but not disposed to come to a standstill with her, and that if she could not contrive to act in harmony with the four Powers, she must not be astonished if she saw them come to an understanding between themselves and acting apart from France.

Comte Sabastiani told me that he foresaw that we should thus act, and that he could predict the result; that we were bound to try and conclude our arrangements without the help of France, and that we should find that our means were inadequate; that France would be a passive spectator of events; that after a year or eighteen months of useless efforts we should recognise that we had been mistaken, and that we should then apply to France; that this Power would then co-operate to settle these matters upon a friendly basis with as much friendliness after our failure as she would have shown before our attempt, and that she would then probably persuade us to agree to conditions to which we refused our consent at the moment.

Similar indications were given to M. Guizot with regard to the line which would probably be taken by the four Powers if they were unsuccessful in coming to an arrangement with France. The French Government has therefore refused the ultimatum of the four Powers, and by the act of refusal has enounced afresh a principle of action which it knew could not be adopted by the four Powers: a principle which consisted in the idea that no settlement of the difficulties between the Sultan and his subject could take place except under conditions which the subject could accept voluntarily, or, in other terms, could dictate; hence, the French Government must have been prepared to see the four Powers determined to act apart from France; and when the four Powers had come to this determination, they could not be represented as breaking with France, or as excluding France from the arrangement of a war to be carried on by Europe. On the contrary, it was France who broke with the four Powers, for it was France who laid down for herself a principle of action which made co-operation with the other Powers impossible.

At this point, without attempting further controversial observations with reference to the past, I feel obliged to point out that the voluntary retirement on the part of France was not entirely due to the course of negotiations at London, but that, unless Her Majesty's Government has been strangely misled, it was decided even more definitely in the course of negotiations at Constantinople. The five Powers declared to the Sultan by a Collective Note, which was handed to the Porte on July 27, 1839, by their representatives at Constantinople, that their unanimity was complete, and these representatives requested the Porte to refrain from any direct negotiations with Mehemet Ali, and to make no arrangement with the Pasha without the concurrence of the five Powers. However, Her Majesty's Government has good reason to believe that during the last few months the French representative at Constantinople has decisively isolated France from the other four Powers, and has energetically and repeatedly pressed the Porte to negotiate directly with Mehemet Ali, and to conclude an arrangement with the Pasha, not only without the concurrence of the four great Powers, but under the mediation of France alone, and in accordance with the special views of the French Government.

As regards the line of conduct followed by Great Britain, the French Government must recognise that the views and opinions of Her Majesty's Government have never varied, from the outset of these negotiations, except in so far as Her Majesty's Government has offered to modify its views with the object of securing the co-operation of France. These views have been from time to time frankly expressed to the French Government, and have been continually supported in the most urgent manner by arguments which seemed conclusive to Her Majesty's Government. From the very outset of the negotiations, the declarations of principle made by the French Government induced Her Majesty's Government to believe that the two Governments had only to agree upon the means of carrying out their common principles. If the intentions of the French Government concerning these means differed from the views of England even at the outset of the negotiations, France has certainly not the right to refer to the difference between France and England as unexpected, seeing that the French Government recognised its existence a long time previously. If the intentions of the French Government with regard to the measures to be taken have undergone a change since the opening of negotiations, France certainly has not the right to impute to Great Britain a change of political intention which proceeds from France, and not from England.

But in any case, when four out of five Powers have agreed upon a definite line of conduct, and when the fifth has resolved to pursue an entirely different policy, it would be unreasonable to require the four to abandon, in deference to the fifth, opinions to which they are daily more resolved to adhere and which refer to a question of vital importance for the chief and future interests of Europe.

But as France continues to maintain the general principles which she laid down at the outset and continues to consider the maintenance of the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire as necessary to preserve the balance of power; as again France has never refused to admit that the arrangement which the four Powers wished to introduce between the Sultan and the Pasha would be the best solution if it could be secured, and as again the objections of France referred not to the object proposed but to the means by which it is to be gained, her opinion being that the end is good, but that the means are inadequate and dangerous; Her Majesty's Government is confident that the isolation of France, which no one regrets more than Her Majesty's Government, will not be of long duration.

When the four Powers, in concert with the Sultan, have succeeded in introducing an arrangement of this nature between the Porte and his subjects, there will then be no further point of disagreement between France and her allies, nor will there be any obstacle to prevent France from undertaking with the other Powers such engagements for the future as may seem necessary to secure the good results of an intervention by the four Powers in favour of the Sultan, and to preserve the Ottoman Empire from any recurrence of the dangers to which it is exposed.

Her Majesty's Government impatiently awaits the moment when France will be able to resume her position in the concert of the Powers and trusts that that moment will be accelerated in the interests of the full development of the moral influence of France. Although the French Government, for reasons of its own, has refused to participate in the coercive measures to be employed against Mehemet Ali, this Government certainly cannot object to the employment of such measures with the object of inducing the Pasha to submit to the arrangements which are to be placed before him, and it is obvious that more than one argument might be adduced and that more than one prudential consideration might be urged upon the Pasha with more efficacy by France as a neutral Power and a non-participant in this affair, than by the four Powers which are actively engaged in the prosecution of coercive measures.

In any case Her Majesty's Government is confident that Europe will recognise the justice of the proposal which has been put forward by the four Powers, for their purpose is just and disinterested. They are not seeking to gather any advantage for themselves or to establish any exclusive sphere of influence, or to acquire any territory, and the object which they have in view should be as profitable to France as to themselves, because France, like themselves, is interested in the maintenance of the balance of power and in the preservation of the general peace.

You will send officially to M. Thiers a copy of this despatch.

I am, &c.,(Signed) Palmerston.(From the Journal des Débats of October 2.)

V

Manifesto to the Spanish Nation