The History of Antiquity, Vol. 6 (of 6)

The hopes which the Greek cities might have built upon the rebellion of the Lydians were quickly broken. The mother country had refused any help. Sparta would not come to their assistance, and Athens, torn as she was by internal dissensions, could not. No one in the cantons of the Greek peninsula roused themselves to give aid to an important section of the Greek nation, to the colonies which had outstripped the mother country in their development, or strove to save the most vigorous centres of Greek nationality from subjection to a foreign people, which had come out of the remote part of Asia. If the voice of a common blood and the sense of nationality failed to warn the Greeks beyond the sea against giving over to strangers for plunder such rich and flourishing cities, was there no one in Hellas who foresaw that if the establishment of the Persian dominion on the coasts of Asia Minor were not prevented, and the cities of the coast with their navy were allowed to fall into the hands of the Persians, Greece itself would not be safe from their attack, and they would be able to visit the coasts of Hellas in Greek ships? Yet even without assistance the power of the Hellenic cities would have sufficed for a considerable resistance to the Persians – for the position of affairs in Asia did not allow Cyrus to bring any great force against these distant coasts – if they had been able to understand and take to heart the lessons of their own past. If they had neglected to unite their forces against the Lydians, such union was now doubly necessary. They had learned from experience the evil of delay, and the danger was now greater than ever. The Greek cities were in uncontested possession of the sea,37 and thus in a position to give help in common to any city which the Persians might attack. An organisation which permitted the whole force of the city to be used for the benefit of each one, would have given a prospect of successful resistance. But no step whatever was taken in this direction. Each city turned its attention to strengthening its own walls, and awaiting the attack of the Persians.

After the subjugation of the Lydians, Mazares, as Herodotus tells us, turned his arms against "those who had besieged Tabalus along with Pactyas." He invested Priene, took the city, and reduced the inhabitants to slavery; then the plain of the Maeander was laid waste, the city of Magnesia taken, and its inhabitants enslaved. After the capture of Magnesia Mazares fell sick and died. Cyrus sent Harpagus the Mede as his successor. He marched northwards from the valley of the Maeander; in the first instance against Phocaea, which appeared to have taken the leading part in resistance, or at any rate had done most to gain the help of Sparta; after Miletus it was the most powerful city of the Ionians. The trade in the Adriatic and the Tyrrhene sea, on the coasts of Gallia and Iberia, was in the hands of the Phocaeans. A strong and magnificent wall, well built of large stones, surrounded the city, the circuit of which, as Herodotus says, reached "not a few stadia." Harpagus invested Phocaea, and threw up works round the walls; he then sent intelligence to the Phocaeans that he should be content if they would pull down but one tower, and solemnly give up to him the possession of one dwelling. The Phocaeans must have thought that they could no longer hold the city or repulse an attack. According to Herodotus, they answered the offer of Harpagus with a request that he would allow them a day for consideration, and for that day would lead his army from the wall. Harpagus replied that he knew very well what their intentions were, but he would give them time for consideration. When Harpagus led his forces from the wall, the Phocaeans drew their ships to the sea, put upon them their wives and children, and everything that they could carry away, even the images of the gods and the votive offerings, and then embarked and sailed to Chios. It was their intention to purchase from the Chians the Oenussæ, islands lying off Chios, and to settle there. But the Chians refused to sell them, fearing that their trade would go there. Then the Phocaeans turned their course back to Phocaea; Harpagus had taken possession of the empty city and left a garrison in it. This the Phocaeans cut down; then they sunk a large mass of iron in the sea, with an oath that they would not return again to the city till the iron should float, and shaped their course to the distant Western sea, for the island of Cyrnus (Corsica), where twenty years previously they had founded the colony of Alalia. Harpagus is said to have burnt Phocaea, thus punishing the houses and temples for the attack on the garrison.38 After the capture of this city, he besieged Teos, and gained possession of the walls by means of the works which he threw up. The Teians then went on board their ships, one and all, sailed to the north, and settled on the coast of Thrace opposite Thasos, where they founded Abdera.39 "So all the Ionians," says Herodotus, "with the exception of the Milesians, who had come to terms with Cyrus, fought against Harpagus, and showed themselves brave warriors, each for his own city; but Harpagus took them one after the other by investing them and throwing up works against the walls. Thus conquered they remained in their cities, with the exception of those exiles, and did what they were bid." After the subjugation of the Ionians, Harpagus turned to the North, reduced the cities of the Aeolians, and bade their military forces join his army.

The line of conquest had now reached the Dorian cities of the coast, the Carians and Lycians. The Dorians and Carians made but little resistance.40 The Greeks of Asia had not only been abandoned by their kinsmen beyond the sea, but also by their gods, or at any rate by their oracles. As Apollo of Miletus had bidden the Cymaeans to give up Pactyas, so Apollo of Delphi bade the Cnidians to desist from making their city impregnable. Cnidus lay on the western edge of a long and narrow promontory. The inhabitants had begun to cut a channel through the land with a view of securing themselves against the attack of the Persians. But though a large number of hands were engaged, the work did not make progress in the hard rock; and as many of the workmen were injured the city sent to Delphi to inquire the cause of their misfortunes. The priestess answered, according to the Cnidian account: "Ye must not fortify the Isthmus, nor cut through it; Zeus would have made it an island if he had wished."41 The Cnidians desisted, and surrendered without a struggle to Harpagus on his approach. Among the Carians, the Pedasians alone, who had fortified Mount Lida, made a vigorous resistance; it cost Harpagus much trouble to take this fortification. The Lycians, who had never been subject to the kings of the Lydians, marched out against Harpagus. In the open field they fought bravely, though few against many. When conquered and driven into their city Xanthus (Arna, I. 577), they brought their wives and children, their servants, and their goods into the citadel and set them on fire; then they bound themselves by an oath, fell upon the Persian army, and maintained the conflict to the last man. Then the remaining towns of the Lycians, being robbed of their best defenders, submitted. The Caunians alone, as Herodotus tells us, followed almost exactly the example of the city of Xanthus.42 Even the sea put no limit to the supremacy of the Persians. The Greeks of the islands of Chios and Lesbos voluntarily submitted to them, though, as Herodotus assures us, "they had nothing to fear," "for the Persians were not mariners, and the Phenicians were not their subjects at that time."43 The two islands would not give up all hope of the possession of the districts on the coasts opposite.

About three years after Cyrus had left Sardis in the spring of the year 548 B.C. his power in Lydia was not only firmly founded, but the whole western coast, with all its harbours and landing-places, together with two considerable islands, was subject to him. As Aeschylus tells us, he had reduced Ionia by force. The East had again overpowered the colonists of the West on its western edge. Asia Minor, beyond the Halys, was subjugated to Cyrus in even greater extent than to Crœsus; in fact it was wholly in his power.44 He placed two viceroys over it. One, the viceroy of Phrygia, was to govern the north-eastern; the other, the viceroy of Lydia, was to govern the south-western half of this wide region. The first took up his position at Dascyleum, not far from the shore of the Propontis; the other in the citadel at Sardis.45 Among the cities of the Greeks, Priene and Magnesia on the Maeander had been destroyed, and their inhabitants enslaved; Phocaea had been burned. The rest had not been injured by Harpagus after their capture; he had not placed any Persian governors over them, nor introduced garrisons. It was not intended in any way to destroy their nationality or their religious worship. Their social life, their forms of government, their autonomy remained; even the common sacrifices and assemblies of the Ionian cities at Mycale were permitted to continue. They had only to recognise the supreme authority of the king of the Persians and his viceroys, to pay yearly tribute to the king, the amount of which each city fixed for itself, and furnish a contingent to the army when called upon by the viceroy to do so. When the Ionians again met at the common place of sacrifice for the first time after their subjugation, Bias of Priene, who had escaped the destruction of his country, proposed that all the Ionian cities should follow the example of the Phocaeans and Teians; that there should be a general emigration to Sardinia, in order that all might obtain a new country there. They were then to form one great community; one city was to be founded by all in common. Had this proposal been carried out, the achievements of Cyrus would have exercised a far deeper influence over the distant West, than the mere settlement of the Phocaeans in Alalia, who moreover were not able to maintain themselves in their new settlement. The centre of Hellenic colonisation would have been transplanted from East to West, and the fate of Italy would have been changed; the Greeks would have retired before the supremacy of the East in order to establish a strong insular power among the weak communities of the West. But the Ionians could not rise to the height of such a revolution. Among the Greeks, the attachment to their ancient soil, their homes and temples, was peculiarly strong. If men could and would forget independence, the supremacy of the Persians did not seem very oppressive. It limited the trade of the Greeks as little as it repressed their social life; on the contrary, it rather advanced commerce, which now received the protection of the Persian king throughout the whole of his wide dominions. The ruin of Phocaea also aided the trade of Miletus which had suffered neither war nor siege.

Yet the cities of the Greeks were essentially weakened by the war and their subjugation. In Phocaea, it is true, a community again grew up. Half of the emigrants, in spite of their solemn vow, were seized with a longing for their ancient home; they returned to their desolated city. But for fifty years after this time the new Phocaea would or could furnish no more than three ships of war. In Priene also and Teos sufficient inhabitants gradually assembled to establish small communities.46 Other circumstances weighed more heavily even than their natural losses. Cyrus knew well that it would not be easy to retain in secure obedience cities so distant in situation, so important in population and military resources. At such a distance isolated garrisons would have been exposed to great danger; yet without them the cities would have closed their gates to the Persians at any moment, manned their walls, and entered into combinations beyond the sea. Every rebellion of this kind made new sieges necessary, and these were the more difficult as Persia had no fleet, and could only use the ships of the Greeks. Situated at the extreme edge of the kingdom, and supported by the opposite shore of the Ægean, each of the larger cities could offer a long resistance. With the unerring political insight which distinguished him, Cyrus saw that he must gain adherents within the cities, and have on his side influential interests of sufficient weight to keep the cities in obedience. Yet he did not aim at supporting one or other of the parties who contended in the Greek cities for the leadership of the community; on the other hand, his favour and that of his viceroys was given to this or that party-leader. His allegiance was to be secured and certain advantages were held out in prospect to the city when led by him. Cyrus intended to govern the cities of the Greeks by Greeks, who were not to be his officers, but to rule the cities as their lords and princes for their own advantage and profit. By their position, which they owed to the favour of Persia, and could only maintain with the help of Persia against their fellow-citizens, by the interested desire to retain this power in their families and bequeath it to their children, by the concentration of the princely authority, as opposed to the republican institutions and republican spirit of their cities – which authority rested on the Persian court, and was closely connected with it – these rulers in union with the viceroys and their troops must be in a position to secure the subjection of the cities. Thus it came to pass that not in Cyme only, the most important city of the Aeolians, but in almost all the towns of the Greeks, men were raised to power by the favour and support of the Persian satraps, who managed the public affairs, and in the place of autonomous communities came despotisms and principalities, in reality if not in name. How correct Cyrus was is proved by the result.47 He was able to secure the obedience of the Lydians also. He caused the land to be stripped of its arms, even to the extent of taking away the cavalry horses,48 and so abandoned all thought of forcing the Lydians to serve in his army. The disuse of arms and the lapse of time did their work, aided as they were by a vigorous trade, which in Lydia was due not only to the natural wealth and the gold of the soil, but to a long-established and skilful industry. In these pursuits and a luxurious life the Lydians forgot their old days and ancient deeds. Persia had never again to contend with a rebellion of the Lydians.

The tradition of the Greeks has not omitted to illustrate the important events of the extension and establishment of the Persian dominion in Asia Minor by a series of pointed anecdotes and stories. Among these is the reply which Cyrus is said to have given to the Greek cities, when they offered their submission after the fall of Sardis (p. 50). At that time Cyrus, as Herodotus tells us, narrated the following story with reference to their refusal of his first request: – A flute-player once played to some fishes in the sea in order to entice them out. As they did not come, he took them out with a net, and when they leapt about, he said, Cease dancing now; ye did not dance out of the water when I played. Diodorus puts the transaction later, and with him it is not Cyrus, but Harpagus, who, as we saw, received the command against the cities after Mazares, who told the following apologue to the ambassadors: – He had once asked a maid of her father in marriage, but the father betrothed her to a man of greater importance. When he afterwards found out that the man whom he had despised as a son-in-law was in favour with the king he brought him his daughter, and Harpagus took her not for his wife, but for his concubine. By this Harpagus meant that as the Greeks had not become friends of the Persians when Cyrus wished it, they could not any longer be allies but only servants.49 When Lacrines brought to Cyrus from the Spartans the command that he must not attack any Greek city, Herodotus represents Cyrus as answering, in the pride of his absolute power, that he had never been afraid of men who met in the market-places and deceived each other by speeches and promises. If he remained in health, they would not have to lament over the sorrows of the Ionians, but over their own.50 Here also Diodorus gives another version: – To the command of the Spartans that he must not attack the Hellenes in Asia who were their kinsmen, Cyrus answered, that he would acquaint himself with the bravery of the Spartans when he sent one of his servants to subjugate Hellas.51

The account which Herodotus gives of the negotiations of Harpagus with the Phocaeans is not historical. If the resistance of the Phocaeans was so difficult to overcome that Harpagus descended to the concession that only one tower need be pulled down and a single habitation given up to him, the Phocaeans had no reason to abandon their city. But if they were in such a condition that they must abandon the defence, the lapse of one day would certainly not suffice for them to get the ships in order, and put on board the whole population with their goods, the images of their gods, and the votive offerings. Still more inconceivable would be the folly of Harpagus in drawing off his army from the city and thus allowing the Phocaeans to destroy his siege works, so that he had to begin them all anew.

The striking change which took place in the Lydian character after the suppression of the rebellion under Pactyas, the contrast between the horse-breeding Lydians of the Homeric poems, between the mounted squadrons which once pressed so heavily on the Greek cities, reduced Asia Minor, and offered such a brave resistance to the Medes and Persians, and the peace-loving, effeminate, submissive Lydians of the fifth century B.C., was explained by the Greek tradition after its own manner. When in his return from Sardis to Ecbatana, Cyrus received the intelligence of the rebellion of the Lydians, he confided to Crœsus, as Herodotus tells us, that it seemed to him the best plan to make all the Lydians slaves. "I have dealt with them," so Herodotus represents Cyrus as saying, "as one who spares the children when he has slain the father. I have captured you who have been more to them than a father, and left them their city, and now I wonder that they rebel." Crœsus replied: "What you say is just, but let your anger pass by; do not destroy an ancient and guiltless city. What took place before was my doing, and the guilt lies on my shoulders; what has happened now is due to Pactyas to whom you yourself entrusted Sardis. Punish him, but spare the Lydians. Forbid them to carry weapons for the future, order them to wear coats under their mantles, shoes with high heels, and to train their boys in playing and singing and in trade. You will soon make them women instead of men, and they will never revolt or be a source of alarm." Crœsus gave this advice with the double object of turning aside the vengeance of Cyrus from the Lydians – for even such a life was better than slavery – and of preserving the Lydians for the future from bringing about their own destruction by new rebellions. Cyrus followed the advice of Crœsus. This story is repeated by Polyaenus. When the Lydians had revolted, Cyrus bade Mazares take away their weapons and horses, and allow them no longer any practice in throwing the spear and riding; on the contrary, he was to compel them to wear women's clothes, to weave, and play the lute. In this way the Lydians became the most unwarlike people, though previously they had been the most warlike.52 The new dress which Cyrus, on the advice of Crœsus, commanded the Lydians to wear, was the hereditary dress of the Lydians (who are called soft-footed in the response of the Delphic priestess (p. 9), because they wore shoes), and practice in playing and singing were old customs of the Lydians which previously had done no harm to their martial valour. The narrative is invented, though not by Herodotus, to glorify the wisdom of Crœsus and give a reason for the clemency which Cyrus showed after the rebellion – and at the same time to explain the contrast between the Lydians of antiquity and their descendants.

CHAPTER VIII

THE FALL OF BABYLON

When the kingdom of the Lydians had succumbed to the arms of Cyrus, Babylonia alone was left of the three states which had joined in the overthrow of Assyria. It was a region of very considerable extent, reaching from the Tigris to the coasts of Syria, and from the foot of the Armenian and Cilician mountains to the deserts of Arabia; the population was united, and a strong centre was not wanting. As we saw, Nebuchadnezzar had not only greatly increased the agriculture and trade of his kingdom, but had also erected the strongest barriers for the protection of his native land and the metropolis. In this he had only the Median power in view, but owing to the victory of Cyrus over Astyages a stronger power had taken the place of Media, and neither his wisdom nor his energy had descended to his successors. After a reign of two years his son Evilmerodach fell by the hand of his own brother-in-law, Neriglissar, who sat but four years on the throne which he had thus acquired. The boy whom Neriglissar left behind was murdered by the conspirators who in the year 555 B.C. elevated Nabonetus to the throne. Of this king we only know that he did not belong to the race of Nabopolassar. Neriglissar had continued the fortification of the metropolis, and Nabonetus completed the walls which were intended to enclose the two parts of the city of Babylon on the east and west of the Euphrates towards the river. He continued the buildings of Nebuchadnezzar at the temples at Ur (Mugheir), and restored the ancient temple of Bilit (Mylitta) at that place. His inscriptions entreat the god Sin that his works may continue as the heavens, and commend his first-born son Belshazzar (Bil-sarussur) to the favour of the moon-god. To the city of Tyre he gave a new king, Hiram of the race of Ethbaal, in the year 551 B.C.53

We cannot ascertain what position Nabonetus took up towards the growing power of Cyrus. According to the statement of Trogus Pompeius, Babylon was at war with Cyrus, when Crœsus went to her aid. Cyrus repelled this attack, came to terms with Babylonia, and carried on war against Asia Minor. Xenophon represents Crœsus as beginning the war against Cyrus at the request of the king of Babylon (p. 17). Herodotus, as has been mentioned above, repeatedly assures us that Crœsus was in league with the king of Babylon, whom he calls Labynetus (p. 20). As we saw, Cyrus left Sardis and Asia Minor in the spring of 548 B.C., before the nations of the western coast, the Carians and Lycians, had been subjugated; and Herodotus remarks that he intended to march against Babylon. For Babylonia there could certainly be no more favourable moment for carrying on the war with the Persians than the time at which Cyrus lay opposite the army of Crœsus at Pteria in Cappadocia, before he advanced upon Sardis. A march of the Babylonian army up the river Euphrates would have cut off the communications of the Persian army with their own home, and compelled Cyrus to abandon the Lydians and to turn upon Babylon. We do not know whether Nabonetus looked idly on at the fall of Crœsus in spite of the league, or whether a second Persian army compelled him to leave events to take their course in Asia Minor, or whether Cyrus, on his return to Ecbatana, after the overthrow of Crœsus, as Herodotus tells us, marched against Nabonetus. All that we know from Herodotus is that Harpagus subdued lower Asia, i. e. Asia Minor, and Cyrus himself upper Asia, passing from one nation to another without any exception.

"The greater part of their achievements," Herodotus continues, "I will omit; I will only narrate that feat which cost the most trouble and is the most worthy of notice. When Cyrus had reduced the whole of the continent he attacked the Assyrians. Now Assyria had many other large cities, but the most famous and strongest of them was Babylon, where their kings dwelt after the destruction of Nineveh. Labynetus was ruler of the Assyrians, and against him Cyrus marched." According to this more exact statement, Cyrus did not march against Babylon directly after the Lydian war, but only "when the whole of upper Asia had been reduced to subjection." That Elam and the land between the lower Tigris and the mountains of Persia was subject to Cyrus before he attacked Babylonia, follows from the statements of a prophet of the Jews.54 Berosus says quite distinctly: "When Cyrus had subjugated the whole of Asia, he set out with a great power from Persia against Babylon in the seventeenth year of the reign of Nabonetus."55 We can establish the correctness of this date from other sources, and prove that the war between Babylon and Persia, which Herodotus sets himself to describe in the words quoted, took place ten years after the Lydian war. Yet it remains doubtful whether Babylonia and Persia had already met in arms, before, during, or immediately after the Lydian war. So much only is certain, that if a collision of this kind had previously taken place, it was indecisive. Nor can we make it clear what motives caused Nabonetus to allow Cyrus to attack Babylonia at a time most convenient to himself; whether this attitude was due to the experience of previous failures, or to a feeling of confidence that the natural and artificial barriers of the Babylonian land offered a better prospect of success under any circumstances, than an attack on Persia.