Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. I (of 2)

It is easy to discover a series of strong impressions in the phenomena relating to reproduction; but although they presuppose the action of some one of the five senses, they nevertheless belong to a different order. No physiological studies are necessary to prove that these affections depend on the organization, and that they are greatly influenced by age, health, temperament, food, climate, and the seasons.

103. There is a difference between sentiments and sensations which, though it does not change the fact physiologically and psychologically considered, still greatly modifies it in its intellectual and moral relations. The passions are commonly excited by an animate and sensible object, whence it would seem that there is more communication between mind and mind, between soul and soul, than there is between one body and another. The sad and mournful appearance not only of a man, but even of an animal, immediately excites in our breast the sentiment of compassion, because it expresses the suffering of a living being. This only proves that nature has mysterious ways by which it transmits to us the knowledge of hidden things; but this transmission is made by the medium of a body which affects in some way our organic constitution. There is here, if you please, a more admirable, more penetrating, and more spiritual a magic than that of the senses alone; but the difference is in the degree, not in the nature of the phenomena.

It is certain that living beings, and those of the same species in particular, are in a constant communication which mutually excites their affections, and that these affections frequently suppose a mysterious correspondence with unknown agencies. Physical nature is full of fluids whose qualities are daily becoming known through scientific observation. The phenomena of electricity and galvanism have revealed secrets of which we had no suspicion before. Who can tell by what means the functions of this vast and complicated system of animal life, spread over the universe, are performed? It is probable that there are profound secrets in the correspondence and relation of organisms and in the way in which they influence one another yet to be discovered; perhaps they will remain forever veiled to the eyes of mortality.

104. Is it true that sensible beings can alone excite the passions? or have not inanimate causes repeatedly affected our organs? Why are we sometimes joyful and sometimes sad, at some times peaceful and at others irritable, when we have had no communication with any living being? It is clear that this depends on the affections of our organism, and has no relation to the state of other sensible beings.

105. Therefore, besides the impressions caused by the five senses, there are others which proceed from purely corporeal and inanimate objects. Besides the phenomena of ordinary sensations, there are others which differ from them only in the kind of impression and the organ affected; and there is no more difference between these sensations and the former than there is between the impressions of one and those of another of the five senses. Therefore it is not correct to say that there are only five kinds of sensation.

CHAPTER XVIII.

SOLUTION OF LAMENNAIS' OBJECTION

106. From the preceding observations we shall now deduce an important consequence, – the solution of the difficulty presented by Lamennais. The existence of new senses would involve new sensations, it is true; but they would not disturb the harmony of those we already have. We have shown that bodies affect our organs in a different manner, and produce impressions different from those of the five senses; but this does not disturb the agreement of our sensations, nor change our ideas. Consequently, the supposition of Lamennais would not involve the disorder which he suspects.

107. Sensations in themselves are mere affections of the soul, and have no external object which corresponds to them except the existence and extension of bodies. Therefore a new order of sensations would only be a new order of affections, which would in nowise alter our ideas.

From what we have hitherto said, it is easy to see that the supposition of Lamennais is already realized; for there are sensations different from those of the five senses; therefore this supposition does not contradict the nature and order of our ideas, nor the certainty of our knowledge.

A musical instrument beautifully fashioned has charms for the ear, the eye, and the touch, none of these impressions destroys the other; if we suppose it placed in new relations with our organs, so as to produce in the soul new impressions, why is it impossible that they should accord? Does the melody of its sound cease because our soul experiences new affections whose nature has no connection with it? Certainly not. Why then fear the overthrow of our knowledge by the introduction of a new order of sensations? Why give such importance to a supposition, the effects of which we can very well calculate, and which, if we examine the phenomena of our present sensations, we find already realized?

108. It is true that we know of no other means of placing ourselves in contact with external objects than the five senses; but it is equally true, that this contact existing, the impressions in the soul correspond mysteriously to the external objects; so that, while we observe the sensations by which the communication is established, it is still impossible for us to explain them.

Let us examine the magical effects of music. They are of two orders; the purely auditive, and the intellectual or moral. The first stop at the ear, the second pass to the brain and to the heart; and one may be admirably organized for the former, yet unable to appreciate the latter. Two persons listen to a sonata, both hear the material music, but the intellectual and moral effects are not the same on both. Both perceive the least defect in the time or in the instrument, both admire the art of the composer, both are charmed; but while the heart of one is unmoved, the brain and the heart of the other are bounding with delight, the power of his fancy is multiplied, thoughts and images crowd upon his mind, as though he had caught inspiration from the magic notes of the music. His heart is transported with tenderness, melancholy, hatred, love, anger, generosity, and courage. He is under a magical influence which, moves him in spite of himself; the vibrations of a chord have raised in his heart a mysterious tempest which the might of reason can hardly quiet.

109. From this we must conclude, that besides the ordinary relations between objects and the organs of the senses, there are other relations still more intimate and more delicate between these objects and our organic system, and that these latter are as certain as the former. In them there is greater variety of individuals, and the conditions necessary to produce determinate results are less known, but there can be no doubt of their existence, and this in the eyes of sound philosophy is sufficient to dissipate those absurd suppositions which would pretend to undermine the edifice of our knowledge.

110. Thus, then, the objection is answered, which says: "If we had another sense, what would it tell us?" Nothing which would destroy the certainty of our knowledge, or the nature and order of our ideas. The only new result would be one more added to the many ways in which objects now affect us. The same thing would happen to us as to a man who after being deprived of the sense of smell, should suddenly regain it: he would have one sensation more; the same thing would happen to us as to a man who experiences a new sentiment which he had not known before: he has one affection more. New impressions have their own rank, neither interfering with, nor changing those which previously existed.

BOOK THIRD.

EXTENSION AND SPACE

CHAPTER I.

EXTENSION INSEPARABLE FROM THE IDEA OF BODY

1. Having seen that among the objects of our sensations, extension alone has any external existence for us as any thing more than a principle of causality, let us now try to understand what extension is.

The idea of extension seems to be inseparable from that of body; at least, I am unable to conceive a body without extension. Take away extension, and the parts disappear, and with them all that has relation with our senses; there is no longer an object, or, if the object remains, it is something altogether different from what is contained in the idea of body. Imagine an apple, for instance, from which you suddenly take away extension. What will remain of it?

I am not now going to examine whether Descartes is right when he says, that the essence of body consists in extension; all that I here assert is that a body cannot be conceived without extension. I do not affirm the identity of two things, but only the inseparability of two ideas in our mind. It is not an opinion, but a fact asserted by consciousness, which is now under discussion.

Abstracting extension, I can conceive, it is true, a substance, or, to speak more generally, a being; but, then, there is no idea of body, unless we confound this idea with, that of substance or of being, in general.

2. All our notions of bodies are obtained through the senses, but without extension no sensation is possible; for without it there can be no color, no sound, no touch, no smell, and no taste; therefore, without extension there remains only something of which we have no idea, a vague notion which cannot enable us to distinguish one object from another, a pure abstraction, and nothing more.

3. To solve the difficulties which attend the separation of the two ideas of extension and of body, it is necessary to determine the essence of body. When we can distinguish the essence of a body from its extension, the difficulty will be overcome, but not until then.

4. In order to understand the reason of this inseparability, it is necessary to remember what was said before, that extension is the basis of all other sensations; it is the substratum which is confounded with none, depends on none of them in particular, yet is an indispensable condition of them all.

I look at an apple, and examine the mutual relations of the sensations which it produces.

It is evident that though I abstract the smell, I do not thereby destroy any of the other sensations which it causes. Though it lose its odor, it is still extended, colored, it has a taste, and may produce a sound. I may also, in like manner, abstract its taste, its color, and all that relates to the sight, but I have still an object which is tangible, and consequently extended, figured, and possessed of all its other properties which affect the touch.

If instead of abstracting what relates to the sight, I abstract what belongs immediately to the touch, I may do this without destroying the other sensations; for I can still see the apple, its extension, form, and color.

I may even go farther, and strip the apple of all its sensible qualities, of its taste, smell, color, hardness, and whatever the senses can perceive, still there remains extension, not indeed sensible, but conceivable. Extension exists abstracted from its visibility, since it exists for the blind man: abstracted from its tangibility, since it exists for the sight; abstracted from odor, taste, and sound, since it exists for those who are deprived of these sensations, so long as they have sight or touch.

5. Here a difficulty arises. There seems to be a mistake in what we have said of the existence of extension abstracted from other sensations; for, although in making this abstraction we conceive ourselves to be deprived of these sensations, still we retain the imagination of them; thus, when I strip the apple of all light and color, it is still extended; but that is because I still imagine a color, or, if I make a strong effort to destroy the color, it appears to me like a black object, on a ground of greater or less darkness, distinct from the apple. Does not this prove that there is an illusion in such abstractions, and that there is no complete abstraction, since the reality which we abstract is succeeded by the imagination of the same qualities, or of others which supply their place, so as to make the extension perceptible?

This objection is specious, and it would be difficult to give a satisfactory answer if the existence of men deprived of sight did not instantly dissipate it. No such imagination is possible in the case of a blind man, for him there is no color, no shade, no light, no darkness, nor anything which relates to sight, and still he conceives extension.

6. But at least, some one will answer, it must be confessed that the idea of extension is necessarily dependent on the sensations of touch; blind men also possess this sense, and by it they acquire the idea of extension. Therefore the idea of extension is inseparable from the sensations of touch. This argument is no better than the other; for, although we may acquire the idea of extension by the sense of touch, and this sense is all that is required to produce it, it is not true that this idea can only be acquired by touch. I have already proved that sight is sufficient of itself alone to produce the idea of the three dimensions which constitute a solid or extension in its full complement. But here I do not need the idea of a solid, that of a surface is sufficient; the extension of a surface is inseparable from sight. There is no sight without color, or light of some kind or other, and this cannot even be imagined without a surface.

I have another argument. Geometricians, doubtless, conceive extension, and yet they abstract all its relations to sight or touch; therefore, there is no necessary connection between them.

In any object submitted to the sight, what quality relating to the touch is necessary in order to produce the idea of extension? If we examine it closely, we shall find that there is none. Let us take a liquid; is its fluidity the necessary quality? No; for when congealed extension remains. Is it heat or cold? No; for without destroying its extension we may change its temperature as much as we please, no alteration is perceptible. Whatever quality relative to touch we may take, we shall find that it may be varied, modified, or entirely destroyed, without visibly affecting the extension.

It often happens that we have a clear and definite idea of the extension of an object without knowing any thing of its qualities in relation to touch. I see an object at a distance, I distinguish its color and its form, but I know not of what material it is, whether it is of marble, or wood, or wax, nor whether this material is hard or soft, moist or dry, warm or cold. I do not even know if it is tangible, as in the case of figures formed by vapors which are imperceptible to the touch.

7. Without extension there can be neither sight, nor touch, nor any other sensation. As to taste, it is clear that it requires touch, and cannot exist without it. Our assertion is less clear with regard to sound and smell; for, although we cannot separate these sensations from the idea of extension as they always involve this idea in one way or another, we do not know how it would be with a man who was deprived of all the other senses, and retained only those of smelling and hearing. But without speculating on this hypothesis, it is enough to know:

I. That nothing which is not extended can act upon our organs, unless by means wholly unknown to us, and which would give no idea of what we understand by body.

II. That even supposing the sensations of smelling and hearing to be possible without the idea of extension, they would in that case be only simple phenomena of our being, and would not place us in communication with the external world, as we now perceive it; because, if we should not know that they proceeded from another cause, we could have no more consciousness of them than that which we have of the me; and if we should know it, this cause would be represented to us only as an agent influencing us, and not by any means as a being having any thing similar to what we understand by body.

III. That in such a case we should have no idea of our own organization, nor of the universe; for it is clear that every thing being reduced to mere internal phenomena, and their relation to the agents producing them, and the idea of extension wanting, neither the universe nor our own body would be to us what they now are. What would the universe, – what would our body be without extension?

IV. That for the present we limit ourselves to the demonstration of the dependence which in the present system, of things, all sensations have in relation to extension; and this demonstration holds good, even though we suppose the man who possesses only the sense of smelling or that of hearing not to form any idea of extension, and not to need it in order to experience its sensations.

V. That even on this supposition, the proposition before established, that the idea of extension is independent of the other sensations, still remains unassailed.

VI. That the truth which we are principally endeavoring to demonstrate, that for us the idea of extension is inseparable from that of body, also stands firm.

8. This inseparability is so certain, that theologians explaining the august mystery of the Eucharist, distinguish in the extension of bodies the relations of the parts to each other, and their relation to place, in ordine ad se, et in ordine ad locum; and they say that the sacred body of our Lord Jesus Christ is in this august Sacrament, by extension in ordine ad se, though not by extension in ordine ad locum. This proves that the theologians saw that it is not possible for man to lose all idea of extension, without at the same time losing all idea of body; and thus they invented this ingenious distinction, of which I shall speak at greater length in another place.

CHAPTER II.

EXTENSION NOT PERCEPTIBLE AS THE DIRECT AND IMMEDIATE OBJECT OF SENSATIONS

9. Extension has the remarkable peculiarity of being perceived by different senses. As regards sight and touch this is evident; it is also true as far as concerns the other senses. We perceive taste in different parts of the palate, and we refer sound and smell to distinct points in space, and this involves the idea of extension.

But what is more strange is, that although extension is the indispensable basis of all sensations and therefore perceived by all the senses, it is, in itself, and separated from every other quality, imperceptible to them all. The eye perceives only light, and the ear sound, the palate taste, the smell odor, and the object of touch is that which is warm or cold, moist or dry, solid or liquid, etc. None of these objects is extension, none in particular is necessary for the perception of extension; for we constantly find it separated from each of these qualities, and yet it is still perceptible. No one in particular is necessary for the perceptibility of extension, but some one is indispensable; for, unless accompanied by some one of them, it is imperceptible to the senses.

Hence, extension is a necessary condition of our sensations, but is not itself perceived by the senses. Still it is not therefore unknown, and this brings me to some other reflections which take us out of the phenomenal into the transcendental order, and give rise to very serious and difficult questions, which have hitherto been insolvable, and it is to be feared must ever remain so.

10. We have seen that extension in itself is not the direct object of sensation. What, then, is it? What is its nature?

There are two things which may be considered in the idea of extension: that which it is in us, and that which it represents to us; or, in other words, its relation to the subject, and its relation to the object. The first being subject to immediate observation, inasmuch as it exists within us, is difficult but not impossible to explain. The second is more difficult, and almost impossible to explain, because it is a very abstract and transcendental idea, and also requires a series of arguments, the thread of which may be broken without the one who reasons perceiving it.

11. Extension in us is not a sensation, but an idea. Sometimes we imagine it under a sensible form, confounding it with a determinate object; at other times we picture it to ourselves as a vague obscurity in which bodies are placed; but these are only fictions of the imagination. A man born blind can have none of these internal representations, and yet he forms a very good conception of extension. We ourselves in thinking of extension abstract all these forms under which we imagine it.

Two different sensations, those of sight and touch, produce the same idea of extension. This is conclusive proof that extension is rather intelligible than sensible.

Whatever may be the relation of extension to sensation, we cannot deny that it is an idea if we reflect that it is the foundation of the whole science of geometry. Thus, although we form various images of extension, they are only the particular forms with which the mind clothes the idea, if we may use the expression, according to the circumstances of the case. That which is fundamental and essential in the idea, is of a different and higher order, and has nothing in common with the applications which the mind makes in order to explain and apply it. This idea includes dimensions, but not determined or applied; they are mere conceptions which represent nothing in particular.

12. The idea of extension is a primitive fact of our mind. It is not produced by sensations, but precedes them, if not in time, at least in the order of being. There is no ground for asserting that the idea of extension exists in the mind prior to the first impression of the senses, but unless extension serves as their basis these impressions are inconceivable. Whether this idea is innate or developed, or produced in the mind by the impressions, there can be no doubt that it is distinct from them, necessary to them, and independent of any one of them in particular.

It may be that when these impressions are first received extension may not be known as a separate idea; but it is certain that it is afterwards separated and stripped of the corporeal form, and spiritualized, and that this phenomenon may be occasioned but not caused by the sensation.

In sight, abstracting extension, there is color, but we cannot discover in it any thing from which we can produce so fruitful an idea as that of extension. Even at first we see that the color itself is not perceptible without extension, and so far from extension being produced by color, it is on the contrary an indispensable condition without which color cannot be perceived.

Colors as the objects of sensation are only individual phenomena, which have no connection with one another nor with the general idea of extension. What has been said of them will equally apply to all the impressions of touch.

CHAPTER III.

SCIENTIFIC FRUITFULNESS OF THE IDEA OF EXTENSION

13. In order to understand the superiority of the idea of extension over mere sensations; or rather, in order to understand that there is a true idea of extension considered in itself, and that there is no such idea of the direct and immediate objects of sensation, I wish to call attention to the fact that among all the objects of the senses, extension alone gives origin to a science.

This is a very important fact; – to explain it as it deserves, I shall establish the following propositions:

FIRST PROPOSITION.

Extension is the basis of geometry.

SECOND PROPOSITION.

Not only is extension the basis of geometry, but all that we know of the nature of bodies may be reduced to the manifestations, applications, and modifications of extension, with the addition of the ideas of number and time.

THIRD PROPOSITION.

Whatever we know of sensations that deserves the name of science is included in the modifications of extension.

FOURTH PROPOSITION.

We can form no fixed idea of corporeal objects, nor make any observation on the sensible world, unless we are guided by the rule of extension.

These four propositions are nothing more than the enunciation of certain facts, the mere exposition of which is a sufficient demonstration.