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Copyright: Its History and Its Law
Quotation
Whether simple quotation constitutes an infringement or is "fair use," depends upon extent and in some respects upon purpose. In 1892 Justice North, in the English Court of Chancery, in Walter v. Steinkopff, held that the use by the St. James Gazette of two fifths of an article by Kipling, copyrighted by the Times, was beyond "fair use" of quotations, notwithstanding the newspaper custom of copying from one another. On the other hand, quotations in a review of a book made to reasonable extent for the purposes of criticism, have usually been considered "fair use," provided they do not go to the extent of a description or abridgment which would be measurably a substitute for the book.
Private use
The multiplication of copies by handwriting or other process for private use, as among the members of an orchestra or in a business office, has been held an infringement in English decisions, though prohibition of the making of a single copy for personal use would be an extreme application of this doctrine, and such use is specifically permitted in the new English code.
The doctrine of "unfair competition"
Beyond the purview of copyright law, there is a means of legal remedy for the copyright proprietor which can be enforced by state as well as by federal courts, resting either upon statutes outside the copyright law, or on the general principles of equity. This is the application of the doctrine of "unfair competition" especially in cases involving "fraud" or fraudulent representation, direct or implied, leading the purchaser to buy something other than what he supposes he is buying. Thus if a publisher prints and binds a book with a title and in a style that leads a purchaser to suppose that it is another book which he is buying, the publisher of the other book has the right to obtain equitable relief by an injunction from the transgressor on the ground of unfair competition without any reference to copyright law, although this doctrine is more applied in the case of patents, trade-marks and copyrights than perhaps any other field.
The doctrine of deceptive intent
There is also evident a growing tendency on the part of the courts to protect the public from possible deception especially if done with fraudulent intent, where some distinctive name or symbol or form associated with some line of product is used for another line of product of different origin and character, though there may be here no direct competition; but this comparatively new doctrine is more likely to be used in regard to trade-mark articles than in respect to literary and like property. It might, however, apply in a case where a well-known publishing house had published, for instance, a popular series of school books as Smith's Arithmetical Readers and another firm containing the same name had started to publish a Smith's Algebraic Readers – but the application would be extremely doubtful.
The "Chatterbox" cases
In the Chatterbox cases, 1884-1887, previously referred to, the final decision of Judge Shipman emphasized the view that the use of the title "Chatterbox" on a similar publication was misleading to the public, thus bringing both trade-mark law and common law protection to the rescue against unfair competition.
Encyclopædia Britannica cases
In the series of Encyclopædia Britannica cases, 1890-1904, the English publishers Black or their American representatives Scribner sought to protect in this country the English edition, or an American authorized edition, under the copyright law previous to 1891, copyrighted articles by Americans being included, and under common law because of the alleged fraudulent misuse of the name to mislead the public. In 1893, in Black v. Allen, Judge Townsend held that the use of copyrighted material in a non-copyright work did not vitiate the copyright, that the American author was entitled to secure and protect copyright even though the right to use was assigned to an English house which could not directly secure copyright, and that the fact of discrepancy in the title of the copyrighted articles as registered for copyright on separate publication and deposit and in the cyclopædia, did not endanger the copyright. In 1904, in Encyclopædia Britannica Co. v. Tribune Association, Judge Lacombe in the U. S. Circuit Court enjoined condensations of the copyrighted American articles. But in Black v. Ehrich and other cases, the complainants were not successful in obtaining an injunction against the use of the title Encyclopædia Britannica on reprints of non-copyright material which did not mislead the public.
Webster Dictionary cases
In the Webster Dictionary cases in 1890-1909, a long litigation between the Merriams, as authorized publishers of Webster, and Ogilvie and other defendants, the courts held that the use of the name Webster or the title Webster's Dictionary could not be restrained when used in connection with a reprint of the original Webster Dictionary, then out of copyright, or otherwise in a manner not likely to mislead the public; but injunctions were granted and sustained against the use of these names on dictionaries issued in form so like the Merriam editions as to deceive the public, or in connection with misleading advertisements or circulars.
"Old sleuth" cases
In 1888-1890 George Munro, publisher of the "Old sleuth" detective series, sought in actions against several defendants to protect the use of the name "Sleuth" and was upheld in the N. Y. Supreme Court in separate decisions by Judges Andrews, O'Brien, and Patterson, while in one of the cases Judge Ingraham held that "sleuth" was a dictionary word and could not be protected; in 1889 the N. Y. Court of Appeals through Chief Judge Parker decided that the name "Sleuth" was protectable, and in 1890 Judge Macomber of the N. Y. Supreme Court held that "Sleuth" was properly a subject of trade-mark. But in 1890 also, Judge Shipman in the U. S. District Court dismissed the complaint in another Munro case, as to an illustration picturing "Old Sleuth," on the ground that though of the same subject it was not of the same character. These cases illustrate the difficulty of decisions in this borderland of equity.
Other title decisions
In 1894 Judge Green, in the U. S. Circuit Court in New Jersey, in Social Register Association v. Howard, protected on grounds of equity the title "Social register" as descriptive of a social directory covering Orange, N. J., and enjoined the use of "Howard's Social register" as unfair competition. In 1887 the Harper house, as publishers of the Franklin Square Library, obtained from the U. S. Circuit Court, through Judge Waite, an injunction against the Franklin Square Library Company for violation of their trade-mark rights in the name.
Rebound copies
Where the American Book Co. brought suit against Doan & Hanson, who had restored and rebound used copies of school books, the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals held in 1901 that there was no violation of law, but required notice that the books were second-hand copies by conspicuous stamp on the cover. In 1891 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Dodd v. Smith, declined to grant Dodd, Mead & Co. an injunction against rebinders who had purchased from them sheets of a fifty-cent paper-covered edition of a novel by E. P. Roe and bound these in cloth to sell at sixty cents in competition with the plaintiff's $1.50 cloth edition.
The Kipling case
In 1899 G. P. Putnam's Sons purchased from Kipling's authorized publishers sheets of twelve volumes, added three volumes of non-copyright or otherwise authorized material and published the fifteen volumes, "Brushwood edition," of Kipling's works, with the design of an elephant's head on the binding. Kipling sought an injunction for infringement of copyright, use of trade-mark and unfair competition with the "Outward bound edition" of his works, which also bore an elephant's head. In 1903 the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals, through Judge Coxe, affirmed a decision holding as "a well-recognized principle of law" that "the defendants, having purchased unbound copyrighted volumes, were at liberty, so far as the copyright statute is concerned, to bind and resell them"; that the elephant's head, not being a registered trade-mark, could not be protected as a trade-mark; and that there was no similarity of editions constituting unfair competition. But in 1907, in Dutton v. Cupples & Leon, the plaintiffs obtained damages for a series of books closely imitating the get-up of their "Gem" or "Dainty" series. Passing off, however, cannot be made ground of action when material protectable by copyright has not been copyrighted, as was held in 1908, in Bamforth v. Douglas Post Card Co., by Judge McPherson in the U. S. Circuit Court.
Burlesqued title
The suit to enjoin the use of a reversed or burlesque title, when the Boston Herald printed, under the title of "Letters of a son to his self-made father," a skit on Lorimer's "Letters of a self-made merchant to his son," was denied by Judge Morton in the Massachusetts Supreme Court in 1903 as involving no deception.
The Drummond case
In 1894 Henry Drummond, a British subject, obtained from Judge Dallas, in the U. S. Circuit Court, an injunction restraining Henry Altemus from publishing what purported to be exact reports of twelve lectures, of which eight only had been imperfectly reported in the British Weekly, on the ground that the author had a common law right to restrain the publication "of any literary matter as the plaintiff's, which was not actually his creation, and to prevent fraud."
The new British code
The new British measure comprehensively defines infringement as the doing without consent of the owner of the copyright of "anything the sole right to do which is by this act conferred on the owner of the copyright," but specifically excepts (1) fair dealing for private study, research, criticism, review or newspaper summary; (2) use by an artist of sketches, etc., made for a work of which he has sold the copyright, provided he does not repeat or imitate that work; (3) graphic reproduction of objects, or photographing of paintings, etc., in a public place; (4) limited extracts for use in school books; (5) report of lectures unless prohibited by placard; (6) reading or recitation of reasonable extracts.
XV
REMEDIES AND PROCEDURE
Protection and procedure
It was for the protection of copyrights that the statute of Anne was passed and that statutory law thus began to replace English common law – a gain to authors sadly offset by its losses. But it was undoubtedly true that without statutory provision the proprietor of literary and similar property could not obtain the protection necessary for the enforcement of his rights. The new American code is comprehensive, detailed and specific in its legal provisions for protection and procedure, and in respect to punishment far beyond any copyright legislation on the statute books of any other nation.
Injunction
The first protection given by the statute is the injunction usual in equity proceedings, following the precedent of early legislation.
Damages
Under previous American law, damages were levied primarily on infringing copies found in possession of the infringer or his agents, with the unfortunate result that when an infringer was successful in selling his edition, few, if any, copies were found on which to levy damages. The new code thoroughly corrects this defect by providing for specified damages on infringing copies "made or sold by or found in the possession of the infringer or his agents or employees." The plaintiff is entitled to damages and all profits and is required only to prove sales, while the defendant is required to prove the elements of cost. The damages – assessed as such and not as penalties so as to free copyright litigation from the restrictions of penal proceedings – are stated as one dollar for each infringing copy, except copies of a painting, statue or sculpture on which they are ten dollars per copy; fifty dollars for each infringing delivery of an oral work; one hundred dollars for the first and fifty dollars for each subsequent infringing performance of a dramatic, dramatico-musical, choral or orchestral work; and ten dollars for each infringing performance of any other musical work. These damages shall not be less than $250 or more than $5000 in any one case, with the exception that for a newspaper reproduction of a photograph the minimum shall be fifty dollars and the maximum two hundred dollars, a concession insisted upon by newspaper proprietors.
One suit sufficing
Injunction, damages and profits, and delivery of infringing copies or means of production, are covered in the single suit to protect the copyright.
Deposit of infringing articles
During the pendency of an action the defendant may be required to deposit all articles alleged to infringe copyright, making oath that he has deposited all such, under regulations for his protection prescribed, as the law directs, by the Supreme Court, which regulations are given in full in the appendix of this volume; and when such articles are adjudged to be infringements, he must deliver up for destruction not only such infringing copies or devices, but also all plates, molds, matrices or other means for making such infringing copies as the court may order, making oath that he has delivered up all such.
The text covering these provisions, with the exception of subsection (e), referring to mechanical musical reproductions, given in the chapter on that subject, is as follows:
"(Sec. 25.) That if any person shall infringe the copyright in any work protected under the copyright laws of the United States such person shall be liable:
Remedies specified
"(a) To an injunction restraining such infringement;
"(b) To pay to the copyright proprietor such damages as the copyright proprietor may have suffered due to the infringement, as well as all the profits which the infringer shall have made from such infringement, and in proving profits the plaintiff shall be required to prove sales only and the defendant shall be required to prove every element of cost which he claims, or in lieu of actual damages and profits such damages as to the court shall appear to be just, and in assessing such damages the court may, in its discretion, allow the amounts as hereinafter stated, but in the case of a newspaper reproduction of a copyrighted photograph such damages shall not exceed the sum of two hundred dollars nor be less than the sum of fifty dollars, and such damages shall in no other case exceed the sum of five thousand dollars nor be less than the sum of two hundred and fifty dollars, and shall not be regarded as a penalty:
"First. In the case of a painting, statue, or sculpture, ten dollars for every infringing copy made or sold by or found in the possession of the infringer or his agents or employees;
"Second. In the case of any work enumerated in section five of this Act, except a painting, statue, or sculpture, one dollar for every infringing copy made or sold by or found in the possession of the infringer or his agents or employees;
"Third. In the case of a lecture, sermon, or address, fifty dollars for every infringing delivery;
"Fourth. In the case of dramatic or dramatico-musical or a choral or orchestral composition, one hundred dollars for the first and fifty dollars for every subsequent infringing performance; in the case of other musical compositions, ten dollars for every infringing performance;
Impounding
"(c) To deliver up on oath, to be impounded during the pendency of the action, upon such terms and conditions as the court may prescribe, all articles alleged to infringe a copyright;
"(d) To deliver up on oath for destruction all the infringing copies or devices, as well as all plates, molds, matrices, or other means for making such infringing copies as the court may order;
Supreme Court rules
"Rules and regulations for practice and procedure under this section shall be prescribed by the Supreme Court of the United States," for which see appendix.
Court jurisdiction
The Circuit Court, or District or other courts having circuit jurisdiction, of the United States, have original jurisdiction "of all suits at law or in equity arising under the patent or copyright laws of the United States" with appeal or writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States. Copyright cases are brought in the first instance before a single judge sitting in Circuit Court or District Court, and thence are appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals consisting of three or more circuit judges, and thence again to the United States Supreme Court, the final authority. These federal courts have sole jurisdiction under the copyright law as such; but copyright cases are often adjudicated in State courts on questions arising under the law of contracts or other statute or common law, regard being always given to the decisions of the federal courts as to copyright questions proper which may be involved. In other words, the State courts do not pass upon copyright law, but may apply, within the respective states, the copyright decisions of federal courts. Thus in Hoyt v. Bates, in 1897, Judge Putnam in the U. S. Circuit Court in Massachusetts remanded the case back to the State courts because the question was not under the copyright law as such, but regarding the ownership of copyright property. In this case the author of a play "A black sheep," containing a song "Sweet Daisy Stokes," licensed the defendant to print the song. The defendant copyrighted the song and the plaintiff sued to compel him to assign his copyright. The case illustrates the respective jurisdictions of federal and State courts in copyright matters.
Limitation
The United States courts have authority to enter the decrees necessary to enforce the remedies provided by the law. Important provisions of the new code provide that civil action in copyright cases may be brought "in the district of which the defendant or his agent is an inhabitant or in which he may be found" – thus preventing avoidance by the defendant possible under earlier law; and also that any injunction granted in any one district may be operative throughout the United States – a provision adopted into the law from recent legislation intended to prevent the evasion of injunctions, particularly by "fly by night" dramatic companies passing from one state or court jurisdiction into another, but usefully applicable also throughout the whole range of copyright infringements. Criminal proceedings under the copyright act may not be brought after three years from the commission of the offense.
Under the former laws the District courts also had certain – or uncertain – jurisdiction. The distinction between the District courts and the Circuit courts of the United States, both of which are courts of first instance, has been so complicated and uncertain as to be practically impossible of statement – a situation which has led to a measure for the abolition of the distinction and the provision of a single court in each federal district having original jurisdiction in the first instance, from which appeal will go to the Circuit Court of Appeals and thence to the U. S. Supreme Court, or in certain cases direct to the Supreme Court.
Text of procedure provisions
The text of these provisions is as follows:
"(Sec. 26.) That any court given jurisdiction under section thirty-four of this Act may proceed in any action, suit, or proceeding instituted for violation of any provision hereof to enter a judgment or decree enforcing the remedies herein provided.
Proceedings united in one action
"(Sec. 27.) That the proceedings for an injunction, damages, and profits, and those for the seizure of infringing copies, plates, molds, matrices, and so forth, aforementioned, may be united in one action."
Jurisdiction in copyright cases
"(Sec. 34.) That all actions, suits, or proceedings arising under the copyright laws of the United States shall be originally cognizable by the circuit courts of the United States, the district court of any Territory, the supreme court of the District of Columbia, the district courts of Alaska, Hawaii, and Porto Rico, and the courts of first instance of the Philippine Islands.
"(Sec. 35.) That civil actions, suits, or proceedings arising under this Act may be instituted in the district of which the defendant or his agent is an inhabitant, or in which he may be found.
Injunction provisions
"(Sec. 36.) That any such court or judge thereof shall have power, upon bill in equity filed by any party aggrieved, to grant injunctions to prevent and restrain the violation of any right secured by said laws, according to the course and principles of courts of equity, on such terms as said court or judge may deem reasonable. Any injunction that may be granted restraining and enjoining the doing of anything forbidden by this Act may be served on the parties against whom such injunction may be granted anywhere in the United States, and shall be operative throughout the United States and be enforceable by proceedings in contempt or otherwise by any other court or judge possessing jurisdiction of the defendants.
"(Sec. 37.) That the clerk of the court, or judge granting the injunction, shall, when required so to do by the court hearing the application to enforce said injunction, transmit without delay to said court a certified copy of all the papers in said cause that are on file in his office.
Appeal
"(Sec. 38.) That the orders, judgments, or decrees of any court mentioned in section thirty-four of this Act arising under the copyright laws of the United States may be reviewed on appeal or writ of error in the manner and to the extent now provided by law for the review of cases determined in said courts, respectively.
No criminal proceedings after three years
"(Sec. 39.) That no criminal proceeding shall be maintained under the provisions of this Act unless the same is commenced within three years after the cause of action arose."
Strict compliance requisite
The copyright statutes are construed strictly, by the letter of the law, in respect to procedure as well as to other features. This is especially the case in respect to forfeiture and penalties, as where, in Falk v. Heffron, in 1893, 2400 copies of a copyright portrait of Lillian Russell had been lithographed, twenty-one on a sheet. Judge Wheeler in the U. S. Circuit Court in New York held with the jury that only one dollar per sheet could be recovered as penalty, because the law specified "sheets." In McDonald v. Hearst, in 1899, in the U. S. Circuit Court in California, Judge DeHaven held that the proprietor of the San Francisco Examiner could not be held liable for copyright penalties because an employer could not be held to penal responsibility for the act of his agent. In a suit to obtain damages based on forfeiture, in Wheeler v. Cobbey, in 1895, Judge Shiras in the U. S. Circuit Court in Nebraska sustained a demurrer on the ground that the damages asked for depended on forfeiture and could not be obtained unless the actual forfeiture was had within the statutory limit of two years. In Morrison v. Pettibone, in 1897, in the U. S. Circuit Court in Illinois, Judge Seaman held that certain sheets, seized during the process of lithographing, when only one color had been printed, were not exact copies and therefore could not be forfeited. In Bennett v. Boston Traveler Co., in 1900, the Circuit Court of Appeals, through Judge Colt, refused relief because the plaintiff had alleged infringement of a cartoon published in the New York Herald, which was not specifically copyrighted, instead of alleging infringement of the copyrighted newspaper of which it was a part. An extreme case was that of Child v. N. Y. Times Co., in 1901, where the plaintiff had purchased infringing copies from the defendant, in which case Judge Hazel in the U. S. Circuit Court in New York held that as these were not literally "found in possession" of defendant, a penalty could not be collected. Several of these cases illustrate escapes from justice which will not be possible under the code of 1909, which uses broader phraseology. In Walker v. Globe Newspaper Co., in 1908, where no copies of a pirated map were found in possession of the defendants, the U. S. Supreme Court held that outside of statutory remedies no suit for damages could be maintained.