History of Civilization in England, Vol. 3 of 3

708

‘Upon his return to England in the autumn of 1766, he went to reside with his mother at his native town of Kirkaldy, and remained there for ten years. All the attempts of his friends in Edinburgh to draw him thither were vain; and from a kind and lively letter of Mr. Hume upon the subject, complaining that, though within sight of him on the opposite side of the Frith of Forth, he could not have speech of him, it appears that no one was aware of the occupations in which those years were passed.’ Brougham's Life of Adam Smith, p. 189. Occasionally, however, he saw his literary friends. See Dugald Stewart's Biographical Memoirs, p. 73, Edinb. 1811, 4to.

709

‘He was certainly not fitted for the general commerce of the world, or for the business of active life. The comprehensive speculations with which he had been occupied from his youth, and the variety of materials which his own invention constantly supplied to his thoughts, rendered him habitually inattentive to familiar objects and to common occurrences; and he frequently exhibited instances of absence, which have scarcely been surpassed by the fancy of La Bruyère.’ Stewart's Biographical Memoirs, p. 113. See also Ramsay's Reminiscences, 5th edit. Edinb. 1859, p. 236. Carlyle, who knew him well, says, ‘he was the most absent man in company that I ever saw, moving his lips, and talking to himself, and smiling, in the midst of large companies.’ Autobiography of the Rev. Alexander Carlyle, 2nd edit. Edinb. 1860, p. 279.

710

A Scotch philosopher of great repute, but, as it appears to me, of ability not quite equal to his repute, has stated very clearly and accurately this favourite method of his countrymen. ‘In examining the history of mankind, as well as in examining the phenomena of the material world, when we cannot trace the process by which an event has been produced, it is often of importance to be able to show how it may have been produced by natural causes.’ … ‘To this species of philosophical investigation, which has no appropriated name in our language, I shall take the liberty of giving the title of Theoretical or Conjectural History; an expression which coincides pretty nearly in its meaning with that of Natural History as employed by Mr. Hume, and with what some French writers have called Histoire Raisonnée.’ Dugald Stewart's Biographical Memoirs, pp. 48, 49. Hence (p. 53), ‘in most cases, it is of more importance to ascertain the progress that is most simple, than the progress that is most agreeable to fact; for, paradoxical as the proposition may appear, it is certainly true, that the real progress is not always the most natural. It may have been determined by particular accidents, which are not likely again to occur, and which cannot be considered as forming any part of that general provision which nature has made for the improvement of the race.’

711

Part of this view is well expressed in Hume's Treatise of Human Nature, book iii. part ii. ‘This, however, hinders not but that philosophers may, if they please, extend their reasoning to the supposed state of nature; provided they allow it to be a mere philosophical fiction, which never had, and never could have, any reality.’ … ‘The same liberty may be permitted to moral, which is allowed to natural philosophers; and ’tis very usual with the latter to consider any motion as compounded and consisting of two parts separate from each other, though, at the same time, they acknowledge it to be in itself uncompounded and inseparable.’ Philosophical Works, vol. ii. p. 263.

712

And, conversely, that whatever was ‘demonstratively false,’ could ‘never be distinctly conceived by the mind.’ Philosophical Works, vol. iv. p. 33. Here, and sometimes in other passages, Hume, though by no means a Cartesian, reminds us of Descartes.

713

‘Here, then, is the only expedient from which we can hope for success in our philosophical researches, to leave the tedious, lingering method, which we have hitherto followed, and instead of taking now and then a castle or a village on the frontier, to march up directly to the capital, or centre of these sciences, to human nature itself; which, being once masters of, we may every where else hope for an easy victory. From this station we may extend our conquests over all those sciences which more immediately concern human life, and may afterwards proceed, at leisure, to discover more fully those which are the objects of pure curiosity.’ Hume's Philosophical Works, vol. i. p. 8. See also, in vol. ii. pp. 73, 74, his remarks on the way ‘to consider the matter à priori.’

714

‘No kind of reasoning can give rise to a new idea, such as this of power is; but wherever we reason, we must antecedently be possessed of clear ideas, which may be the objects of our reasoning.’ Hume's Philosophical Works, vol. i. p. 217. Compare vol. ii. p. 276, on our arriving at a knowledge of causes ‘by a kind of taste or fancy.’ Hence, the larger view preceding the smaller, and being essentially independent of it, will constantly contradict it; and he complains, for instance, that ‘difficulties, which seem unsurmountable in theory, are easily got over in practice.’ vol. ii. p. 357; and again, in vol. iii. p. 326, on the effort needed to ‘reconcile reason to experience.’ But, after all, it is rather by a careful study of his works, than by quoting particular passages, that his method can be understood. In the two sentences, however, just cited, the reader will see that theory and reason represent the larger view; while practice and experience represent the smaller.

715

‘’Tis certainly a kind of indignity to philosophy, whose sovereign authority ought every where to be acknowledged, to oblige her on every occasion to make apologies for her conclusions, and justify herself to every particular art and science, which may be offended at her. This puts one in mind of a king arraigned for high treason against his subjects.’ Hume's Philosophical Works, vol. i. pp. 318, 319.

716

‘A barbarous, necessitous animal (such as a man is on the first origin of society), pressed by such numerous wants and passions, has no leisure to admire the regular face of nature, or make inquiries concerning the cause of those objects to which, from his infancy, he has been gradually accustomed. On the contrary, the more regular and uniform, that is the more perfect, nature appears, the more is he familiarized to it, and the less inclined to scrutinize and examine it. A monstrous birth excites his curiosity, and is deemed a prodigy. It alarms him from its novelty, and immediately sets him a trembling, and sacrificing, and praying. But an animal complete in all its limbs and organs is to him an ordinary spectacle, and produces no religious opinion or affection. Ask him whence that animal arose? He will tell you, from the copulation of its parents. And these, whence? From the copulation of theirs. A few removes satisfy his curiosity, and set the objects at such a distance that he entirely loses sight of them. Imagine not that he will so much as start the question, whence the first animal, much less whence the whole system, or united fabric of the universe arose. Or, if you start such a question to him, expect not that he will employ his mind with any anxiety about a subject so remote, so uninteresting, and which so much exceeds the bounds of his capacity.’ Natural History of Religion, in Hume's Philosophical Works, vol. iv. p. 439. See also pp. 463–465.

717

‘By degrees, the active imagination of men, uneasy in this abstract conception of objects, about which it is incessantly employed, begins to render them more particular, and to clothe them in shapes more suitable to its natural comprehension. It represents them to be sensible, intelligent beings like mankind; actuated by love and hatred, and flexible by gifts and entreaties, by prayers and sacrifices. Hence the origin of religion. And hence the origin of idolatry, or polytheism.’ Hume's Philosophical Works, vol. iv. p. 472. ‘The primary religion of mankind arises chiefly from an anxious fear of future events,’ p. 498.

718

‘It seems certain, that, according to the natural progress of human thought, the ignorant multitude must first entertain some grovelling and familiar notion of superior powers, before they stretch their conception to that perfect Being who bestowed order on the whole frame of nature. We may as reasonably imagine, that men inhabited palaces before huts and cottages, or studied geometry before agriculture, as assert that the Deity appeared to them a pure spirit, omniscient, omnipotent, and omnipresent, before he was apprehended to be a powerful though limited being, with human passions and appetites, limbs and organs. The mind rises gradually from inferior to superior. By abstracting from what is imperfect, it forms an idea of perfection; and slowly distinguishing the nobler parts of its own frame from the grosser, it learns to transform only the former, much elevated and refined, to its divinity. Nothing could disturb this natural progress of thought, but some obvious and invincible argument, which might immediately lead the mind into the pure principles of theism, and make it overleap, at one bound, the vast interval which is interposed between the human and the Divine nature. But though I allow, that the order and frame of the universe, when accurately examined, affords such an argument, yet I can never think that this consideration could have an influence on mankind, when they formed their first rude notions of religion.’ Natural History of Religion, in Philosophical Works, vol. iv. p. 438.

719

Not that he was by any means devoid of genius, though he holds a rank far below so great and original a thinker as Hume. He had, however, collected more materials than he was able to wield; and his work on the Intellectual System of the Universe, which is a treasure of ancient philosophy, is badly arranged, and, in many parts, feebly argued. There is more real power in his posthumous treatise on Eternal and Immutable Morality.

720

‘I once believed this doctrine of ideas so firmly, as to embrace the whole of Berkeley's system in consequence of it; till, finding other consequences to follow from it, which gave me more uneasiness than the want of a material world, it came into my mind more than 40 years ago, to put the question, What evidence have I for this doctrine that all the objects of my knowledge are ideas in my own mind? From that time to the present, I have been candidly and impartially, as I think, seeking for the evidence of this principle but can find none, excepting the authority of philosophers.’ Reid's Essays on the Powers of the Human Mind, edit. Edinburgh, 1808, vol. i. p. 172. And, in a letter which he wrote to Hume in 1763, he, with a simple candour which must have highly amused that eminent philosopher, confesses that ‘your system appears to me not only coherent in all its parts, but likewise justly deduced from principles commonly received among philosophers; principles which I never thought of calling in question, until the conclusions you draw from them in the “Treatise on Human Nature” made me suspect them.’ Burton's Life and Correspondence of Hume, vol. ii. p. 155.

721

‘Suppose a man to be found dead on the high-way, his skull fractured, his body pierced with deadly wounds, his watch and money carried off. The coroner's jury sits upon the body, and the question is put, What was the cause of this man's death, was it accident, or felo de se, or murder by persons unknown? Let us suppose an adept in Mr. Hume's philosophy to make one of the jury, and that he insists upon the previous question, whether there was any cause of the event, or whether it happened without a cause.’ Reid's Essays on the Powers of the Mind, vol. ii. p. 286. Compare vol. iii. p. 33: ‘This would put an end to all speculation, as well as to all the business of life.’

722

‘The obligation of contracts and promises is a matter so sacred, and of such consequence to human society, that speculations which have a tendency to weaken that obligation, and to perplex men's notions on a subject so plain and so important, ought to meet with the disapprobation of all honest men. Some such speculations, I think, we have in the third volume of Mr. Hume's “Treatise of Human Nature,” and in his “Enquiry into the Principles of Morals;” and my design in this chapter is, to offer some observations on the nature of a contract or promise, and on two passages of that author on this subject. I am far from saying or thinking, that Mr. Hume meant to weaken men's obligations to honesty and fair dealing, or that he had not a sense of these obligations himself. It is not the man I impeach, but his writings. Let us think of the first as charitably as we can, while we freely examine the import and tendency of the last.’ Reid's Essays on the Powers of the Mind, vol. iii. p. 444. In this, as in most passages, the italics are my own.

723

‘Without repeating what I have before said of causes in the first of these Essays, and in the second and third chapters of this, I shall here mention some of the consequences that may be justly deduced from this definition of a cause, that we may judge of it by its fruits.’ Reid's Essays, vol. iii. p. 339.

724

‘Bishop Berkeley surely did not duly consider that it is by means of the material world that we have any correspondence with thinking beings, or any knowledge of their existence, and that by depriving us of the material world, he deprived us at the same time of family, friends, country, and every human creature; of every object of affection, esteem or concern, except ourselves. The good bishop surely never intended this. He was too warm a friend, too zealous a patriot, and too good a Christian to be capable of such a thought. He was not aware of the consequences of his system’ (poor, ignorant Berkeley), ‘and therefore they ought not to be imputed to him; but we must impute them to the system itself. It stifles every generous and social principle.’ Reid's Essays, vol. ii. pp. 251, 252.

725

In his Essays, vol. i. p. 179, he says of Berkeley, one of the deepest and most unanswerable of all speculators, ‘But there is one uncomfortable consequence of his system which he seems not to have attended to, and from which it will be found difficult, if at all possible, to guard it.’

726

‘This doctrine is dishonourable to our Maker, and lays a foundation for universal scepticism. It supposes the Author of our being to have given us one faculty on purpose to deceive us, and another by which we may detect the fallacy, and find that he imposed upon us.’ … ‘The genuine dictate of our natural faculties is the voice of God, no less than what he reveals from heaven; and to say that it is fallacious, is to impute a lie to the God of truth.’ … ‘Shall we impute to the Almighty what we cannot impute to a man without a heinous affront? Passing this opinion, therefore, as shocking to an ingenuous mind, and, in its consequences, subversive of all religion, all morals, and all knowledge,’ &c. Reid's Essays, vol. iii. p. 310. See also vol. i. p. 313.

727

‘His reasoning appeared to me to be just; there was, therefore, a necessity to call in question the principles upon which it was founded, or to admit the conclusion.’ Reid's Inquiry into the Human Mind, p. v. ‘The received doctrine of ideas is the principle from which it is deduced, and of which, indeed, it seems to be a just and natural consequence.’ p. 53. See also Reid's Essays, vol. i. pp. 199, 200, vol. ii. p. 211.

728

‘The laws of nature are the most general facts we can discover in the operations of nature. Like other facts, they are not to be hit upon by a happy conjecture, but justly deduced from observation. Like other general facts, they are not to be drawn from a few particulars, but from a copious, patient, and cautious induction.’ Reid's Inquiry into the Human Mind, pp. 262, 263.

729

‘Such discoveries have always been made by patient observation, by accurate experiments, or by conclusions drawn by strict reasoning from observations and experiments; and such discoveries have always tended to refute, but not to confirm, the theories and hypotheses which ingenious men had invented.’ Reid's Essays, vol. i. p. 46.

730

‘This is Mr. Hume's notion of a cause.’ … ‘But theory ought to stoop to fact, and not fact to theory.’ Reid's Essays, vol. iii. p. 276.

731

‘But yet there seems to be great difference of opinions among philosophers about first principles. What one takes to be self-evident, another labours to prove by arguments, and a third denies altogether.’ Reid's Essays, vol. ii. p. 218. ‘Mr. Locke seems to think first principles of very small use.’ p. 219.

732

‘All reasoning must be from first principles; and for first principles no other reason can be given but this, that, by the constitution of our nature, we are under a necessity of assenting to them.’ Reid's Inquiry, p. 140. ‘All reasoning is from principles.’ … ‘Most justly, therefore, do such principles disdain to be tried by reason, and laugh at all the artillery of the logician when it is directed against them.’ p. 372. ‘All knowledge got by reasoning must be built upon first principles.’ Reid's Essays, vol. ii. p. 220. ‘In every branch of real knowledge there must be first principles, whose truth is known intuitively, without reasoning, either probable or demonstrative. They are not grounded on reasoning, but all reasoning is grounded on them.’ p. 360.

733

‘For, when any system is grounded upon first principles, and deduced regularly from them, we have a thread to lead us through the labyrinth.’ Reid's Essays, vol. ii. p. 225.

734

‘I call these “first principles,” because they appear to me to have in themselves an intuitive evidence which I cannot resist.’ Reid's Essays, vol. iii. p. 375.

735

‘If any man should think fit to deny that these things are qualities, or that they require any subject, I leave him to enjoy his opinion, as a man who denies first principles, and is not fit to be reasoned with.’ Reid's Essays, vol. i. p. 38.

736

‘No other account can be given of the constitution of things, but the will of Him that made them.’ Reid's Essays, vol. i. p. 115.

737

Reid's Essays, vol. i. pp. 36, 37, 340, 343, vol. ii. p. 245.

738

Reid's Essays, vol. i. pp. 115, 116, 288–299, vol. ii. p. 251.

739

Or, as he expresses it, ‘our belief of the continuance of the laws of nature.’ Reid's Inquiry, pp. 426–435; also his Essays, vol. i. p. 305, vol. ii. p. 268.

740

Reid's Essays, vol. ii. p. 259.

741

Reid's Inquiry, p. 422; and his Essays, vol. ii. p. 266.

742

‘Another first principle is, “That the natural faculties by which we distinguish truth from error are not fallacious.”’ Reid's Essays, vol. ii. p. 256.

743

‘Another first principle I take to be, “That certain features of the countenance, sounds of the voice, and gestures of the body, indicate certain thoughts and dispositions of mind.”’ Reid's Essays, vol. ii. p. 261. Compare his Inquiry, p. 416.

744

‘We have taken notice of several original principles of belief in the course of this inquiry; and when other faculties of the mind are examined, we shall find more, which have not occurred in the examination of the five senses.’ Reid's Inquiry, p. 471.

745

‘And if no philosopher had attempted to define and explain belief, some paradoxes in philosophy, more incredible than ever were brought forth by the most abject superstition, or the most frantic enthusiasm, had never seen the light.’ Reid's Inquiry, p. 45.

746

Reid's Essays, vol. i. p. 329, 334, vol. ii. p. 247.

747

Reid's Essays, vol. i. pp. 9, 71, 303, 304.

748

Reid's Essays, vol. ii. p. 60.

749

‘I see no reason to think, that we shall ever be able to assign the physical cause, either of instinct, or of the power of habit. Both seem to be parts of our original constitution. Their end and use is evident; but we can assign no cause of them, but the will of Him who made us.’ Reid's Essays, vol. iii. p. 119.

750

‘I know of no ideas or notions that have a better claim to be accounted simple and original, than those of space and time.’ Reid's Essays, vol. i. p. 354.

751

‘I do not at all affirm that those I have mentioned are all the first principles from which we may reason concerning contingent truths. Such enumerations, even when made after much reflection, are seldom perfect.’ Reid's Essays, vol. ii. p. 270.

752

‘Why sensation should compel our belief of the present existence of the thing, memory a belief of its past existence, and imagination no belief at all, I believe no philosopher can give a shadow of reason, but that such is the nature of these operations. They are all simple and original, and therefore inexplicable acts of the mind.’ Reid's Inquiry, p. 40. ‘We can give no reason why the retina is, of all parts of the body, the only one on which pictures made by the rays of light cause vision; and therefore we must resolve this solely into a law of our constitution’ p. 258.

753

In a recent work of distinguished merit, an instance is given of the loose manner in which he took for granted that certain phenomena were ultimate, in order that, instead of analyzing them, he might reason from them. ‘Dr. Reid has no hesitation in classing the voluntary command of our organs, that is, the sequence of feeling and action implied in all acts of will, among instincts. The power of lifting a morsel of food to the mouth, is, according to him, an instinctive or pre-established conjunction of the wish and the deed; that is to say, the emotional state of hunger, coupled with the sight of a piece of bread, is associated, through a primitive link of the mental constitution, with the several movements of the hand, arm, and mouth, concerned in the act of eating. This assertion of Dr. Reid's may be simply met by appealing to the facts. It is not true that human beings possess, at birth, any voluntary command of their limbs whatsoever. A babe of two months old cannot use its hands in obedience to its desires. The infant can grasp nothing, hold nothing, can scarcely fix its eyes on anything.’ … ‘If the more perfect command of our voluntary movements implied in every art be an acquisition, so is the less perfect command of these movements that grows upon a child during the first year of life.’ Bain on the Senses and the Intellect, London, 1855, pp. 292, 293.

754

See Reid's Inquiry, pp. 436, 446, as well as other parts of his works: see also an extract from one of his letters to Dr. Gregory, in Stewart's Biographical Memoirs, p. 432.

755

‘The idea of prosecuting the study of the human mind on a plan analogous to that which had been so successfully adopted in physics by the followers of Lord Bacon, if not first conceived by Dr. Reid, was, at least, first carried successfully into execution in his writings.’ Stewart's Biographical Memoirs, p. 419. ‘The influence of the general views opened in the Novum Organon, may be traced in almost every page of his writings; and, indeed, the circumstance by which they are so strongly and characteristically distinguished, is that they exhibit the first systematical attempt to exemplify, in the study of human nature, the same plan of investigation which conducted Newton to the properties of light, and to the law of gravitation.’ p. 421. From this passage one might hazard a supposition that Dugald Stewart did not understand Bacon much better than he did Aristotle or Kant. Of the two last most profound thinkers, he certainly knew little or nothing, except what he gathered secondhand. Consequently, he underrates them.