History of Civilization in England, Vol. 3 of 3

616

Ray, who visited Scotland in 1661, could not suppress a little professional envy, when he saw how much higher ecclesiastics were rated there than in England. He says, ‘the people here frequent their churches much better than in England, and have their ministers in more esteem and veneration.’ Ray's Memorials, edited by Dr. Lankester for the Ray Society, p. 161.

617

‘Believing ignorance is much better than rash and presumptuous knowledge. Ask not a reason of these things, but rather adore and tremble at the mystery and majesty of them.’ Binning's Sermons, vol. i. p. 143. Even Biblical criticism was prohibited; and Dickson says of the different books of the Bible, ‘We are not to trouble ourselves about the name of the writer, or time of writing of any part thereof, especially because God of set purpose concealeth the name sundry times of the writer, and the time when it was written.’ Dickson's Explication of the Psalms, p. 291.

618

‘Christ from heaven proposeth a syllogism to Saul's fury.’ Rutherford's Christ Dying, p. 180. ‘The conclusion of a practical syllogism, whereby the believer concluded from the Gospel that he shall be saved.’ Durham's Law Unsealed, p. 97. ‘All assurance is by practical syllogism, the first whereof must needs be a Scripture truth.’ Gray's Precious Promises, p. 139.

619

Bower (History of the University of Edinburgh, vol. i. p. 217) says, ‘The history of the universities and of the church is, in modern Europe, and perhaps in every other civilized portion of the globe, very nearly connected. They are more nearly connected in Scotland than in any other civilized country called Protestant; because the General Assembly have the legal power of inquiring into the economy of the institutions, both as it respects the mode of teaching, and the doctrines, whether religious, moral, or physical, which are taught.’ Spalding, under the year 1639, gives an instance of the power of the General Assembly in ‘the College of Old Aberdeen.’ Spalding's History of the Troubles, vol. i. p. 178. See also, on the authority exercised by the General Assembly over the universities, a curious little book, called The Government and Order of the Church of Scotland, Edinburgh, 1690, p. 25.

620

In 1632, the ‘ministers’ of Perth were greatly displeased because John Row was made master of the grammar-school without their consent. The Chronicle of Perth, p. 33, where it is stated that, consequently, ‘thair wes much outcrying in the pulpett.’

621

See, for instance, Minutes of the Presbyteries of St. Andrews and Cupar, pp. 66, 83, 84, 118. One of the entries is, that in January 1648, ‘The Presbyterie ordained that all young students, who waittes on noblemen or gentlemen within thir bounds, aither to teach ther children, or catechise and pray in ther families, to frequent the Presbyterie, that the brether may cognosce what they ar reading, and what proficiencie they make in ther studies, and to know also ther behaviour in the said families, and of their affectione to the Covenant and present religione.’ p. 118. Compare Selections from the Registers of the Presbytery of Lanark, pp. 56, 65.

622

This I have already touched upon in the first volume, pp. 808, 809. Hereafter, and in my special history of the English mind, I shall examine it carefully and in detail. The revival of the old logic is a great symptom of it. Works like those of Whately, De Morgan, and Mansel, could not have been produced in tho eighteenth century, or, at all events, if by some extraordinary combination of events they had been produced, they would have found no readers. As it is, they have exercised a very extensive and very salutary influence; and, although Archbishop Whately was not well acquainted with the history of formal logic, his exposition of its ordinary processes is so admirably clear, that he has probably contributed more than any other man towards impressing his contemporaries with a sense of the value of deductive reasoning. He has, however, not done sufficient justice to the opposite school, and has, indeed, fallen into the old academical error of supposing that all reasoning is by syllogism. We might just as well say that all movement is by descent.

623

See a letter from Sir James Mackintosh to Parr, in Mackintosh's Memoirs, London, 1835, vol. i. p. 334. ‘To Hutcheson the taste for speculation in Scotland, and all the philosophical opinions (except the Berkleian Humism) may be traced.’ M. Cousin (Histoire de la Philosophie, première série, vol. iv. p. 35, Paris, 1846) observes, that before Hutcheson ‘il n'avait paru en Ecosse ni un écrivain ni un professeur de philosophie un peu remarquable.’

624

Tytler's Memoirs of Kames, Edinburgh, 1814, vol. i. p. 223. Hutcheson's Moral Philosophy, vol. i. p. iii. London, 1755, 4to.

625

‘The intention of Moral Philosophy is to direct men to that course of action which tends most effectually to promote their greatest happiness and perfection; as far as it can be done by observations and conclusions discoverable from the constitution of nature, without any aids of supernatural revelation: these maxims or rules of conduct are therefore reputed as laws of nature, and the system or collection of them is called the Law of Nature.’ Hutcheson's Moral Philosophy, vol. i. p. 1.

626

‘The natural understanding is the most whorish thing in the world.’ … ‘The understanding, even in the search of truth amongst the creatures, is a rash, precipitate, and unquiet thing.’ Rutherford's Christ Dying, p. 181. ‘Innocent Adam,’ indeed, says Boston, ‘Innocent Adam had a stock of gracious abilities, whereby he might have, by the force of moral considerations, brought himself to perform duty aright. But where is that with us?’ Boston's Sermons, p. 65.

627

‘A like natural right every intelligent being has about his own opinions, speculative or practical, to judge according to the evidence that appears to him. This right appears from the very constitution of the rational mind, which can assent or dissent solely according to the evidence presented, and naturally desires knowledge. The same considerations show this right to be unalienable: it cannot be subjected to the will of another: though where there is a previous judgment formed concerning the superior wisdom of another, or his infallibility, the opinion of this other, to a weak mind, may become sufficient evidence. As to opinions about the Deity, religion, and virtue, this right is further confirmed by all the noblest desires of the soul; as there can be no virtue, but rather impiety in not adhering to the opinions we think just, and in professing the contrary.’ Hutcheson's Moral Philosophy, vol. i. pp. 295, 296. See also vol. ii. p. 311. ‘Every rational creature has a right to judge for itself in these matters: and as men must assent according to the evidence that appears to them, and cannot command their own assent in opposition to it, this right is plainly unalienable.’

628

‘Thus no man can really change his sentiments, judgments, and inward affections, at the pleasure of another, nor can it tend to any good to make him profess what is contrary to his heart.’ Hutcheson's Moral Philosophy, vol. i. pp. 261, 262.

629

‘Arians and Socinians are idolaters and denyers of God, say the orthodox. They retort upon the orthodox, that they are Tritheists; and so do other sects; and thus they spirit up magistrates to persecute. While yet it is plain that in all these sects there are all the same motives to all social virtues from a belief of a moral providence, the same acknowledgments that the goodness of God is the source of all the good we enjoy or hope for, and the same gratitude and resignation to him recommended. Nor do any of their schemes excite men to vices, except that horrid tenet, too common to most of them, the right of persecuting.’ Hutcheson's Moral Philosophy, vol. ii. p. 316. See also vol. i. p. 160; and Hutcheson's Inquiry into our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, London, 1738, p. 283.

630

‘We all know the notions entertained by the vulgar concerning all hereticks; we know the pride of schoolmen and many ecclesiasticks; how it galls their insolent vanity that any man should assume to himself to be wiser than they in tenets of religion by differing from them.’ Hutcheson's Moral Philosophy, vol. i. p. 167.

631

‘As he had occasion every year in the course of his lectures to explain the origin of government, and compare the different forms of it, he took peculiar care, while on that subject, to inculcate the importance of civil and religious liberty to the happiness of mankind.’ Leechman's Life of Hutcheson, p. xxxv., prefixed to Hutcheson's Moral Philosophy.

632

‘The ideas of beauty and harmony, like other sensible ideas, are necessarily pleasant to us, as well as immediately so.’ Hutcheson's Inquiry into our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, p. 11. ‘Our sense of beauty seems designed to give us positive pleasure.’ p. 71. ‘Beauty gives a favourable presumption of good moral dispositions.’ p. 257. ‘But it is plain we have not in our power the modelling of our senses or desires, to form them for a private interest; they are fixed for us by the Author of our nature, subservient to the interest of the system; so that each individual is made, previously to his own choice, a member of a great body, and affected with the fortunes of the whole; or at least of many parts of it; nor can he break himself off at pleasure.’ Hutcheson's Essay on the Passions, pp. 105, 106.

633

‘Fille de la scholastique, la philosophie moderne est demeurée longtemps étrangère aux grâces, et les Recherches d'Hutcheson présentent, je crois, le premier traité spécial sur le beau, écrit par un moderne. Elles ont paru en 1725. Cette date est presque celle de l'avénement de l'esthétique dans la philosophie européenne. L'ouvrage du père André, en France, est de 1741, celui de Baumgarten, en Allemagne, est de 1750. Ce n'est pas un petit honneur à Hutcheson d'avoir le premier soumis l'idée du beau à une analyse méthodique et régulière.’ Cousin, Histoire de la Philosophie, première série, vol. iv. p. 84.

634

In his Inquiry into Beauty and Virtue, p. 107, he so completely opposed the prevailing notions, as to assert that ‘our perception of pleasure is necessary, and nothing is advantageous or naturally good to us, but what is apt to raise pleasure, mediately, or immediately.’ Compare what he says at p. 91 respecting ‘superstitious prejudices against actions apprehended as offensive to the Deity.’

635

‘Hence a taste for the ingenious arts of musick, sculpture, painting, and even for the manly diversions, is reputable.’ Hutcheson's Moral Philosophy, vol. i. p. 83. At p. 129 he says, that in them ‘our time is agreeably and honourably employed.’ See also vol. ii. p. 115.

636

‘Wealth and power are truly useful, not only for the natural conveniences or pleasures of life, but as a fund for good offices.’ Hutcheson's Moral Philosophy, vol. i. p. 104. Compare Hutcheson on Beauty and Virtue, pp. 93–95; and his Essay on the Passions and Affections, pp. 8, 9, 99. ‘How weak also are the reasonings of some recluse moralists, who condemn in general all pursuits of wealth or power, as below a perfectly virtuous character; since wealth and power are the most effectual means, and the most powerful instruments, even of the greatest virtues, and most generous actions.’

637

‘The chief happiness of any being must consist in the full enjoyment of all the gratifications its nature desires and is capable of.’ Hutcheson's Moral Philosophy, vol. i. p. 100. ‘The highest sensual enjoyments may be experienced by those who employ both mind and body vigorously in social virtuous offices, and allow all the natural appetites to recur in their due seasons.’ p. 121. ‘Nay, as in fact it is for the good of the system that every desire and sense natural to us, even those of the lowest kinds, should be gratified as far as their gratification is consistent with the nobler enjoyments, and in a just subordination to them; there seems a natural notion of right to attend them all.’ pp. 254, 255.

638

‘’Tis pleasant to observe how those authors who paint out our nature as a compound of sensuality, selfishness, and cunning, forget themselves on this subject in their descriptions of youth, when the natural temper is less disguised than in the subsequent parts of life. ’Tis made up of many keen, inconstant passions, many of them generous; ’tis fond of present pleasure, but ’tis also profusely kind and liberal to favourites; careless about distant interests of its own; full of confidence in others; studious of praise for kindness and generosity; prone to friendships, and void of suspicion.’ Hutcheson's Moral Philosophy, vol. ii. p. 11. ‘Men are often subject to anger, and upon sudden provocations do injuries to each other, and that only from self love without malice; but the greatest part of their lives is employed in offices of natural affection, friendship, innocent self love, or love of a country.’ Hutcheson's Essay on the Passions, pp. 97, 98. And at p. 165: ‘There are no doubt many furious starts of passion, in which malice may seem to have place in our constitution; but how seldom and how short, in comparison of years spent in fixed kind pursuits of the good of a family, a party, a country?’ … ‘Here men are apt to let their imaginations run out upon all the robberies, piracies, murders, perjuries, frauds, massacres, assassinations, they have ever either heard of, or read in history; thence concluding all mankind to be very wicked; as if a court of justice were the proper place for making an estimate of the morals of mankind, or an hospital of the healthfulness of a climate. Ought they not to consider that the number of honest citizens and farmers far surpasses that of all sorts of criminals in any state; and that the innocent or kind actions of even criminals themselves, surpass their crimes in numbers? That it is the rarity of crimes, in comparison of innocent or good actions, which engages our attention to them, and makes them be recorded in history; while incomparably more honest, generous, domestic actions are overlooked, only because they are so common; as one great danger, or one month's sickness, shall become a frequently repeated story, during a long life of health and safety.’

639

In 1731, Wodrow, who was the last really great specimen of the old Presbyterian divines, and who was not a little shocked at the changes he saw going on around him, writes: ‘When Dr. Calamy heard of Mr. Hutcheson's being called to Glasgow, he smiled, and said, I think to Thomas Randy, that he was not for Scotland, as he thought from his book; and that he would be reckoned there as unorthodox as Mr. Simson. The Doctor has a strange way of fishing out privat storyes and things that pass in Scotland.’ Wodrow's Analecta, vol. iv. p. 227. It is interesting to compare with this, the remarks which that worldly-minded clergyman, the Rev. Alexander Carlyle, has made upon Hutcheson. See Carlyle's Autobiography, Edinburgh, 1860, 2d edit. pp. 82–85.

640

In his Moral Philosophy, vol. i. p. 52, he calls it ‘an original determination or sense in our nature, not capable of being referred to other powers of perception.’

641

‘This moral sense from its very nature appears to be designed for regulating and controlling all our powers.’ Hutcheson's Moral Philosophy, vol. i. p. 61.

642

See, in his Moral Philosophy, vol. i. p. 79, his complaint against those who ‘would reduce all our perceptive powers to a very small number, by one artful reference or another.’

643

‘’Tis in vain here to alledge instruction, education, custom, or association of ideas, as the original of moral approbation.’ Hutcheson's Moral Philosophy, vol. i. p. 57. Compare his work on Beauty and Virtue, p. 84.

644

‘To him may also be ascribed that proneness to multiply ultimate and original principles in human nature, which characterised the Scottish School till the second extinction of a passion for metaphysical speculation in Scotland.’ Mackintosh's Dissertation on Ethical Philosophy, edit. Whewell, Edinburgh, 1837, p. 208.

645

See his ingenious chapter, entitled ‘A deduction of the more special laws of nature and duties of life, previous to civil government, and other adventitious states.’ Moral Philosophy, vol. i. p. 227; and compare vol. ii. pp. 294–309, ‘How civil power is acquired.’

646

See, for example, his remarks on ‘the right of possession.’ Moral Philosophy, vol. i. p. 344; on ‘rights by mortgage,’ p. 350; and on inheritance, p. 356.

647

In his Moral Philosophy, vol. ii. pp. 346, 347, he sums up a long argument on ‘the nature of civil laws,’ by saying: ‘Thus the general duties of magistrates and subjects are discoverable from the nature of the trust committed to them, and the end of all civil power.’

648

That is, so far as the facts are concerned. Geometry, considered in the most elevated manner, rests on ideas, and from that point of view is impregnable, unless the axioms can be overthrown. But if geometricians will insist on having definitions as well as axioms, they gain, no doubt, increased clearness, but they lose something in accuracy. I apprehend that, without definitions, geometry could not be a science of space, but would be a science of magnitudes, ideally conceived and consequently as pure as ratiocination could make it. This does not touch the question as to the empirical origin of the axioms.

649

‘Our continual observations upon the conduct of others, insensibly lead us to form to ourselves certain general rules concerning what is fit and proper either to be done or to be avoided.’ … ‘It is thus that the general rules of morality are formed. They are ultimately founded upon experience of what, in particular instances, our moral faculties, our natural sense of merit and propriety, approve or disapprove of. We do not originally approve or condemn particular actions; because, upon examination, they appear to be agreeable or inconsistent with a certain general rule. The general rule, on the contrary, is formed by finding from experience that all actions of a certain kind, or circumstanced in a certain manner, are approved of or disapproved of.’ Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, vol. i. pp. 219, 220. At p. 153: ‘We either approve or disapprove of our own conduct according as we feel that, when we place ourselves in the situation of another man, and view it, as it were, with his eyes and from his station, we either can or cannot entirely enter into and sympathize with the sentiments and motives which influenced it.’

650

‘Were it possible that a human creature could grow up to manhood in some solitary place, without any communication with his own species, he could no more think of his own character, of the propriety or demerit of his own sentiments and conduct, of the beauty or deformity of his own mind, than of the beauty and deformity of his own face.’ Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, vol. i. p. 154. ‘Our first moral criticisms are exercised upon the characters and conduct of other people.’ p. 156.

651

‘As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no idea of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like situation.’ Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, vol. i. p. 2.

652

‘That imaginary change of situation, upon which their sympathy is founded, is but momentary.’ Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, vol. i. p. 21. Compare vol. ii. p. 206.

653

‘I will venture to affirm that, when there is no envy in the case, our propensity to sympathize with joy is much stronger than our propensity to sympathize with sorrow.’ Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, vol. i. p. 58. ‘It is because mankind are disposed to sympathize more entirely with our joy than with our sorrow, that we make parade of our riches, and conceal our poverty.’ p. 65.

654

‘Upon this disposition of mankind to go along with all the passions of the rich and the powerful, is founded the distinction of ranks, and the order of society. Our obsequiousness to our superiors more frequently arises from our admiration for the advantages of their situation, than from any private expectations of benefit from their good will.’ Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, vol. i. p. 69. See also vol. ii. p. 72.

655

See the striking remarks in Theory of Moral Sentiments, vol. i. p. 70–72.

656

Theory of Moral Sentiments, vol. ii. pp. 23 seq.

657

Theory of Moral Sentiments, vol. ii. pp. 131–244. This sketch of the different systems of philosophy is perhaps the ablest part of the book, notwithstanding two or three errors which it contains.

658

Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, vol. i. pp. 89, 92, 115, 116. The utmost which he will concede to the notion of social convenience, is that ‘we frequently have occasion to confirm our natural sense of the propriety and fitness of punishment, by reflecting how necessary it is for preserving the order of society.’ p. 122.

659

Theory of Moral Sentiments, vol. i. pp. 172–174.

660

‘Humanity is the virtue of a woman, generosity of a man. The fair sex, who have commonly much more tenderness than ours, have seldom so much generosity.’ Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, vol. ii. p. 19. Sufficient facts have not yet been collected to enable us to test the truth of this remark, and the loose experience of individual observers is worth very little on so wide a subject. Still, I venture to doubt the truth of Adam Smith's distinction. I suspect that women are, on the whole, more generous than men, as well as more tender. But to establish a proposition of this sort, would require the most extensive research, made by a careful and analytic mind; and, at present, there is not even any tolerably good work on the mental characteristics which distinguish the sexes, and there never will be one until physiology is united with biography.

661

Theory of Moral Sentiments, vol. ii. pp. 115–122.

662

‘Sympathy, therefore, does not arise so much from the view of the passion, as from that of the situation which excites it.’ Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, vol. i. p. 6.

663

‘What is called affection, is, in reality, nothing but habitual sympathy.’ Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, vol. ii. p. 63. ‘In some tragedies and romances, we meet with many beautiful and interesting scenes, founded upon what is called the force of blood, or upon the wonderful affection which near relations are supposed to conceive for one another, even before they know that they have any such connection. This force of blood, however, I am afraid, exists nowhere but in tragedies and romances.’ p. 66.