Kaliningrad – an ambivalent transnational region within a European-Russian scope

As I turned to the issue of the region and to Kaliningrad region as an example of it, than would be taken into account that the meaning attached to region can vary quite dramatically depending on the perspective from which it is considered. As Michael Keating notes, «there is consensus that the term refers to space, the notion of space itself can have several meanings: territorial space; political space and the space of social interaction; economic space; functional space»79.

Identity is considered being a very versatile and controversial, capacious concept, which occupies a key place in the discourse of Kaliningrad (inside) and about Kaliningrad (from outside). The inevitable background of this discourse is the border modality of the region. If I turn to Barth, who pointed out that the differences between cultures, and their historic boundaries and connections, have been given much attention, I recognize that his study provided a significant impetus to expand the horizons of the state of research in the second half of the 20th century, with a focus on the «constitution of ethnic groups, and the nature of the boundaries between them»80, which have not been correspondingly investigated before. Opinion that the borders are «meaning-making and meaning-carrying entities, parts of cultural landscapes which often transcend the physical limits of the state and defy the power of state institutions»81 finds justification in a place like the ambivalent region of Kaliningrad.

Martinez82 based his concept of the borderlands milieu, on the study of the US-Mexico border. Such «milieu» can be affected by many cross-border and national factors, which can be grouped in such a way as to produce a typology of borderlands interaction. In the assumption of the concept of Matinez, depending on the political conjuncture the Kaliningrad region as borderland can be attributed to two groups. First, coexistent borderland is present when neighbouring states reduce tensions to a manageable level, and modest cross-border interaction occurs. Second is interdependent borderland, which involves a symbiotic relationship between border regions in adjacent countries. There is a binational economic, social and cultural system at work between the two border regions, and perhaps between their states, but a number of policies retain state separation at the boundary83. The existence of binational economic, social and cultural system at work on the level of the two border regions allows us to stress, that the Kaliningrad region nowadays can move towards the tendency of an interdependent borderland.

In the issue, anthropological research on border cultures contributes to our knowledge of identity formation84. Taking into account the concept of Martinez, it is worth to note that the Kaliningrad borderland is bears the imprint of ambivalence, which is reflected, cultivated and maintained in the mindsets of young Kaliningradians. Because of their transborder and transnational linkages, these border cultures are often treated suspiciously by states and their agents, many of whom believe in the traditional view of the convergence of state, nation, identity and territory85. As we know the stronger rulers belief was that strict control of the frontier was essential to the maintenance of their power86. The above is manifested in the Kaliningrad regional culture, forms it and affects the everyday practices.

It is certainly a commonplace in the interdisciplinary field of border studies that the border can only be conceptualized as being shaped and produced by a multiplicity of actors, movements and discourses. But most of these studies still perceive the practices of doing borderwork and making borders as «acts and techniques of state»87, more specifically state political institutions. Then from the empirical point, the politicization of cultural identity requires people to react against their own felt disadvantage and denigration, as well as occurring in characteristic economic and political circumstances88.

During my empirical study I asked my respondents about the format of interaction within political, economic and cultural dimensions in the space of the borderland region and whether it is legitimate to talk about the hierarchy or the interdependence of these measurements. I have collected very different answers, which made the basis of empirical research in the light of the idea that the culture is but one element in the definition and reproduction of a political system.

I consider the point of Strassoldo relevant who concluded that the ambivalence of border life is a defining feature of border societies in several respects89. Border people may demonstrate ambiguous identities because economic, cultural and linguistic factors pull them in two directions. They are also pulled two ways politically, and may display only a weak identification with the nation-state in which they reside. This ambivalent border identity affects the role that border communities play in international cooperation and conflict90. Everyday practice of young Kaliningradians and empirical research logically fall on this theoretical basis.

For Anderson, borders are both institutions and processes. Anderson also stresses that «borders are markers of identity, and have played a role in this century in making national identity the pre-eminent political identity of the modern state»91.

The frontiers are markers of identity, in the twentieth century usually of national identity, although political identities may be larger or smaller than the «nation» state. Frontiers, in this sense, are part of political beliefs and myths about the unity of the people and sometimes myths about the «natural» unity of a territory92. These «imagined communities», to use Anderson’s93 phrase, are now a universal phenomenon and often have deep historical roots. These communities are defined by imagined boundaries, if we follow Cohen’s remark, that «where cultural difference was formerly underpinned also by structural boundaries, these have now given way to boundaries which inhere in the mind: symbolic boundaries»94. To accept this assumption, we must proceed from the fact that «human consciousness and social organization are profoundly conditioned by territory and frontiers»95. I note the importance, of how Cohen estimates symbols as a resource for identity. According to his point of view they are «pragmatic devices which are invested with meaning through social process of one kind or another, they are potent resources in the arenas of politics and identity»96.

I share the view, that in certain circumstances the frontier acquired a mythic significance in building nations and political identities, becoming, as Anderson signalized, the mythomoteur of a whole society97.

For Barth98, ethnic groups are socially designed using individuals who adjust their cultural identity by emphasizing or underplaying it according to current context. Individuals can cross the boundaries between groups if they find it advantageous to do. Moreover they can maintain regular relations across them, but this does not affect the durability and stability of the boundaries themselves. Accordingly, «cultural emblems and differences are thus significant only in so far as they are socially effective, as an organizational device for articulating social relations»99.

Here it is necessary to bear in mind that according to the discourse of anthropology the «boundary» is the word with the most general application; whereas the term «border» item is situationally specific and «frontier» has come to be reserved to fairly strictly limited geopolitical and legal applications100. At that point following question has considerable importance, «why inter-group boundaries are sharply marked even as people cross them and even as the cultural differences between the groups change»101.

In this regard, I share the view of Sezneva who, in writing about Kaliningrad, takes the point that «there are no reasons to believe that a certain behavioral pattern will automatically lead to the formation of a particular political attitude, or learning about a history will automatically form a particular identity. How people categorize and identity the social world and themselves within it, and how these categories impact on their behavior are not the same issue. Categories of self-understanding do not always provide a basis for collective action and the formation of collective subject-ness»102.

As Barth stressed, the critical focus of investigation should be «the ethnic boundary that defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses»103. As known, Barth emphasizes that boundary-making involves two phenomena: self-ascription and ascription by others. But he tends to focus on one side rather than the other, emphasizing internal identification rather than external constraint and the shaping influence of wider structures, such as those of class and the state. However, it makes sense to distinguish «between two analytically distinct processes of ascription: group identification and social categorization. The first occurs inside the… boundary, the second outside and across it»104.

Cohen takes the similar point as Barth. He stresses that «culture, identity and symbolism all converge on the concept of ethnicity» and makes a critic of the last one: «In some respects, this is the most difficult word of the three, since it appears to mean something – indeed, has been imported into lay usage for this reason – but, in practice, means either everything or nothing at all. Ethnicity has become the politicization of culture»105.

Cooper and Brubaker argue that «identity» is always «situated» and «contextual»106. This related to approach of viewing identity as «a process that is a temporal and dynamic phenomenon, which has a history, and even is itself situated in history as experience»107.

A combination of historical memory and geography provides a sense of commonality resulting in a perceived, distinct kind of groupness108. Does this thesis holds true in Kaliningrad? If Kaliningrad’s territorial isolation engenders a sense of «boundedness»? Borders operate as hard geographic facts and geographic borders translated into social boundaries. If the choice with whom to distinguish themselves (Russian or Europeans) is a choice between two temporalities for Kaliningradians?109 These questions need to find their answer in this thesis.

Structure of thesis

The main part of the thesis consists of three chapters.

The first is «The Kaliningrad region and its historical background» illuminates the issues of historical background and birth of the Kaliningrad Oblast’. Significant attention paid to migration flows as a source of demographic capacity before the collapse of the USSR and the formation of regional society.

For a comprehensive review of the historical context attention is paid to the deportation of German population and analysis of the settlement of first Kaliningradians. In this regard, important sources are archival materials and the results of the project «Settlers tell» of Kaliningradian historians led by Kostyashov.

We have in the focus the period of formation of the urban landscape of Kaliningrad, its perception by residents and public authorities. During this period of time, the establishment of Kaliningrad as a typical Soviet city based on official model of development of socialistic urban communities occurred. Migration dynamics is experiencing fluctuations and has changed the essence of the regional society in 1950—1980’s.

The developing of generational change and perception of cultural and historical heritage among Kaliningradians and followed change of cultural paradigm are resulted from a complex social und public process. It may be distinguished the process of cognition under the signs of «complex of temporality», «outpost in the West» and «suitcase mood». Attention is given to the turn of 1960—70s, which I believe is appropriate to be designated as the beginning of the mastering of the cultural urban landscape.

This chapter also devoted to theoretical approaches to the Kaliningrad region as exclave in consequence of the collapse of the USSR.

The next two chapters are based on empirical material including interviews and participated observations. The chapter «Positioning between Europe and Russia: strategies and experiences of Europeanization and exceptionality of Kaliningrad everyday» discloses the issue under the motto «what is the European everyday life of Kaliningradians?»

The strategy of everyday practices is affected by the emotional sentiments under the slogans of «fragment of Russia», «poor neighbor» and «pilot region». The Small border traffic, which was put into practice as an example of cross-border «European» everyday life in Kaliningrad is disclosed under the title «Hallo, Lidl, hallo Bedronka». Motives, moods, expectations from trans-boundary movements are viewed through the prism of emotional perception of territorial marginality as the characteristic and inevitable property of daily life in Kaliningrad.

Through the content of the chapter come the issue of «separatist sentiment» as a manifestation of «distinctiveness» and consciousness of the «uniqueness» as part of the public discourse and issue of loyalty to state. The Spirit of «pilot-ness» among Kaliningradians plays role of justification and attribution of distinctiveness of regional culture. «Pilot-ness» is understood as a concept with mostly a positive connotation.

The issue of consciousness of the third generation of Kaliningradians is based on the historical heritage as an actor of the transformation of mentality, which nourishes the discourse about the significance of the historic core of the city and cultural heritage. We approach the potentiality to reflect the past in the present and affect the future.

During interviews the question of «how and who distinguish themselves as young Kaliningradians» was articulated, as well as the adequacy and applicability of the issue «periphery» and metaphor of «bridge» on the boundary of Russian-EU landscape.

Appeal to the issue of the Kaliningradian identification on the transnational space takes place through the prism of All-Russian National Census 2010, which uncovered and marked the phenomenon of nationality «Kaliningradian» as reflection of marginality, rootlessness, and ambivalence.

The last chapter «Kaliningrad regional culture: self-consciousness (Selbstverständigung) in transnational space» reveals positioning and self-identification in the context of Kaliningradians boundary modalities. The historical context and cultural transborder’s dialog plays a role through the prism of migration mobility after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The issue of borderland communities occupies a prominent place in the theory of anthropology and sociology. In this chapter, extensive attention is paid to the perception of the «space» and the aspiration of self-identity, as well as to the theme of Kaliningrad regional culture as a component (periphery) of the Russian national culture and as a link to the European cultural space.

The final part of the last chapter is devoted to empirical research in the «remote field» in relation to the «home field». During two years I had numerous interviews with Kaliningradians, which temporarily or permanently live in Berlin and find the field for the implementation of their motivations, ideas and projects. My respondents were young specialists and teams of professionals who implement and develop their startup initiatives and projects in the field of culture and innovative technologies.

I has spent considerable time searching for relevant respondents and localization of participating observation, because Kaliningradians in Berlin are not numerous and scattered among different co-working spaces and events. A process of search revealed that the consolidating center or space does not exist and is not even forming.

I study the role of startup scene as a channel of transnational mobility for young Kaliningradians and analyzed this role, within entrepreneurs’ initiatives of Kaliningradians in the Berlin startup-scene through theories of self-identity and transmigration.

2. The Kaliningrad region and its historical background

2.1. Birth of the Kaliningrad Oblast

The Kaliningrad regional culture is marked by the presence of ethno-cultural, geopolitical, and historical phenomena. It represents intensive cross-cultural interaction so that it has a considerable sociocultural dynamics and increasing cultural uncertainty. This comprehension is important for the study of the features of ethno-cultural particularity of the Kaliningrad region in terms of European neighbourhood. In this regard, the issues of correlation of national, local, and regional dimensions acquire urgency. The establishment of the region almost 70 years ago as a Soviet Oblast initiated the formation of peculiar social and cultural phenomenon.

The 20th century is characterized by significant and momentous changes on the map of Europe, which suddenly affected the way of life of millions of people and their domicile. The Kaliningrad region is one of the smallest regions of the Russian Federation, which has found a new history, cultural, and social profile due to incorporation to the Soviet Union in 1945. This fact was possible in consequence of World War II and of the diplomatic negotiations that took place between the US, Great Britain, and the USSR.

An intent look at this history is a significant step to grasp a full-scale perspective on the issue. How has the fate of former East Prussia been decided that resulted on the map of Europe a new territorial entity, the Kaliningrad region? Familiarity with this history provides an understanding of how ambiguous the process was. Appeal to the history helps us to understand the peculiarities of perception of this area by the first settlers and official Soviet authorities after the war, to estimate the origins of the contemporary post-Soviet identity of Kaliningradians and their interests in the neighbourhood countries of the European Union and their territorial isolation from the «large Russia».

The issue of East Prussia has appeared in the records of high-level diplomatic negotiations in the initial phase of World War II, when the outcome of the war was not known. On 5 December 1941, during the meeting with the Soviet ambassador in London, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill has explained his idea: «The main challenge is to once and for all eliminate the German threat. This task requires the complete disarmament of Germany at least within of one generation and the fragmentation of Germany, especially separation of Prussia»110.

On 16 December 1941, Joseph Stalin in Moscow during negotiations with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden proposed to add to the draft agreement on joint actions the secret protocol on separation of Germany after the war into few independent states. The part of East Prussia with Königsberg he proposed to transfer to the USSR under a term of 20 years as a guarantee of reimbursement of incurred losses from the war with Germany111. This attempt to probe English colleagues was not accident: In fact, it was based on the point of view of Churchill, who expressed his opinion a little earlier in conversations with Soviet representatives in London.

During negotiations, Anthony Eden said that Great Britain promised Poland that its borders would be settled at the final peace conference after the war. Stalin suggested that «the western border of Poland will include East Prussia and Corridor (Gdansk). Poland’s eastern border with the Soviet Union has to go along the river Neman, and Tilsit should be in the hands of Lithuania, which is constituted as a portion of the USSR. Further to the south this border should go roughly along the Curzon line112, which can be partially modified to a certain point»113. By insisting on the immediate recognition of borders of the USSR by the British government, Stalin stated unequivocally that he «puts the conclusion of any kind of Anglo-Soviet agreement under condition of an agreement on this issue»114.

Thus, from the very beginning of the war the issue of East Prussia became a part of the Polish question, which was of strategic importance for the Great Powers in framing East European policy. Despite East Prussia being part of Germany, the fate of Konigsberg in times of negotiations was dependent on the Polish question.

The dynamics of the negotiations on the subject can be tracked in the course of major conferences and meetings of representatives of the USSR, the USA, the UK, as well as those of the Polish government-in-exile.

At one of the meetings of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the USA and the UK (19—30 October 1943), which was actually a rehearsal for the Tehran conference, the issue of the fate of Germany was considered. This question was raised on the initiative of the US. Eden laid out the plan of the British government on the future of Germany: «We would like to divide the Germany into separate states; in particular, we would welcome the detachment of Prussia from the rest of Germany»115. According to Eden, Franklin Roosevelt told him about the need of formation on the territory of Germany of three new states – Prussia, the Federation of Rhineland, and the South-German Union. The US government was divided on the question of the forms of decentralization of Germany, but its influential members were in favour of the fragmentation of Eastern Prussia.

Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov in reply said that the public opinion of the Soviet Union, «speaks for the dismemberment of Germany by addressing this issue on top of allies»116.

The reference to public opinion in the Soviet Union is cynical, as it is obvious that it had no place and could not have any. However, this is a very important point, which is worth paying attention to. At that time, the military, party staff, and the civilian population began to form an idea of Prussia as a ’centuries-old bridgehead for aggression on Russia’, as «the main source of German militarism».

At the fourth session of the Tehran conference of the three Allied powers – the USSR, the USA and the UK (28 November – 1 December 1943), American President Roosevelt offered to discuss the issue of the partition of Germany. He said that in order to ’stimulate’ the debate on this issue, he would like to present the «plan for the dismemberment of Germany into five states» drawn up by him two months ago117. He suggested, «Prussia must be weakened and possibly reduced in size»118.

In Tehran, from the start of negotiations on the post-war borders in Europe, the issue of East Prussia was considered by the Allied powers as part of the Polish question.

Churchill strongly sought to reach the agreements that he could present to the representatives of the Polish Government-in-exile in London. According to his suggestion, a new Polish state should be located between the Curzon Line and the Oder, including East Prussia.

Stalin said, «Russians have no ice-free ports on the Baltic Sea. Therefore, Russians would need to have ice-free ports of Konigsberg, Memel and some part of the East Prussia. Moreover, historically this is originally Slavic lands. If the British agreed to transfer us mentioned area, then we will agree with the formula proposed by Churchill»119. Churchill reacted to this proposal with benevolent curiosity: «This is a very interesting suggestion, which I will look into»120.

Indeed, the agreement reached in Tehran largely determined the post-war fate of Eastern Prussia. However, at that moment the Western Allies believed that much was still to come and that they would be able to win back some positions. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union took the irrevocable and uncompromising course for the future inclusion of Poland and East Prussia into its own sphere of influence.

The prevailing practice of the international law permitted withdrawal of certain parts of the state aggressor as a sanction against this state. In this case, the sanction was imposed primarily on the territory, which was used as a springboard for attack to prevent the revival of aggression in future.

On 1 February 1944, Churchill informed Stalin in a message about the meeting with representatives of the Polish Government-in-exile in London: «I told them that we went to war to protect Poland, we went for it not because of any particular borderline, but for the establishment of a strong and independent Poland…»121