The Art of Rhetoric

THE ART OF

RHETORIC

Aristotle

CONTENTS

Title Page

History of Collins

Life & Times

Book I

Book II

Book III

Classic Literature: Words and Phrases adapted from the Collins English Dictionary

Copyright

About the Publisher

History of Collins

In 1819, millworker William Collins from Glasgow, Scotland, set up a company for printing and publishing pamphlets, sermons, hymn books and prayer books. That company was Collins and was to mark the birth of HarperCollins Publishers as we know it today. The long tradition of Collins dictionary publishing can be traced back to the first dictionary William published in 1824, Greek and English Lexicon. Indeed, from 1840 onwards, he began to produce illustrated dictionaries and even obtained a licence to print and publish the Bible.

Soon after, William published the first Collins novel, Ready Reckoner, however it was the time of the Long Depression, where harvests were poor, prices were high, potato crops had failed and violence was erupting in Europe. As a result, many factories across the country were forced to close down and William chose to retire in 1846, partly due to the hardships he was facing.

Aged 30, William’s son, William II took over the business. A keen humanitarian with a warm heart and a generous spirit, William II was truly ‘Victorian’ in his outlook. He introduced new, up-to-date steam presses and published affordable editions of Shakespeare’s works and Pilgrim’s Progress, making them available to the masses for the first time. A new demand for educational books meant that success came with the publication of travel books, scientific books, encyclopaedias and dictionaries. This demand to be educated led to the later publication of atlases and Collins also held the monopoly on scripture writing at the time.

In the 1860s Collins began to expand and diversify and the idea of ‘books for the millions’ was developed. Affordable editions of classical literature were published and in 1903 Collins introduced 10 titles in their Collins Handy Illustrated Pocket Novels. These proved so popular that a few years later this had increased to an output of 50 volumes, selling nearly half a million in their year of publication. In the same year, The Everyman’s Library was also instituted, with the idea of publishing an affordable library of the most important classical works, biographies, religious and philosophical treatments, plays, poems, travel and adventure. This series eclipsed all competition at the time and the introduction of paperback books in the 1950s helped to open that market and marked a high point in the industry.

HarperCollins is and has always been a champion of the classics and the current Collins Classics series follows in this tradition – publishing classical literature that is affordable and available to all. Beautifully packaged, highly collectible and intended to be reread and enjoyed at every opportunity.

Life & Times

The Importance of Rhetoric

Rhetoric is, in itself, a rather ambiguous term. It is variously described as the art of persuasive, impressive or effective speaking, or orating. To say something rhetorical is thus said for effect rather than to elicit a response, answer or information; hence, the term ‘a rhetorical question’, which is a remark said in the form of a question but not meant as a direct enquiry. A ‘moot point’ is also rhetorical, as it may be an irrelevant remark designed to distract or digress, or it may be an open-ended question, with the answer left open to argument or debate. A rhetorician is someone skilled in their ability to win arguments by virtue of their use of figures or speech, platitudes, hyperbole, statements and compositional techniques, rather than for simply being correct. A simple way of defining rhetoric is to describe it as eloquent expression.

Aristotle’s The Art of Rhetoric dates from the 4th century BC and is widely considered to be the most important treatise on the subject. Aristotle was interested in rhetoric because he lived at a time when convincing people about philosophical ideas required a very persuasive personality. This is largely because science was not an established concept at the time, so people drew no clear distinction between ideas that could be epistemically evidenced and those based on belief. This is illustrated by the fact that matters of the real world were described as natural philosophy, and so were perceived as akin to all other forms of wisdom or knowledge. It was therefore necessary to have great skill at rhetoric in order to have any ideas entered into the public arena for consideration. Even greater rhetoric was then required to have those ideas gain any acceptance. It was no use having good ideas if one lacked rhetorical ability, so Aristotle felt it necessary to write notes of instruction on the matter. According to Aristotelian experts, he probably didn’t write his treatise with the intention of publication, but at a later date someone thought it worth compiling the component essays into a single work.

The first English translation of The Art of Rhetoric came at the turn of the 20th century. Until then, only classical scholars were able to read Aristotle’s words and interpret his thoughts and meaning. Greek and Latin vocabularies are far smaller than English, so interpretation is a significant factor. By definition, English translations of his work are interpretations, too, so this should be borne in mind when reading the work.

Impact on Contemporary Society

One very significant theme is Aristotle’s text is that of judice, or judgement, in the context of law. As such, The Art of Rhetoric is a seminal work in judicial matters. It establishes the basic point that doing right and doing wrong need to be defined and distinguished by rhetoric in order that a fair judgement can be made. In essence, this is the seed of the established protocol of prosecution and defence in the modern court of law, which relies heavily on the rhetorical skills of the parties involved in swaying the jury one way or the other.

In fact, this basic principle forms the backbone of any debate, as it is all about weighing one view against another. In areas where empirical proof is not available, rhetoric plays a vital role in generating partiality or bias in an audience. This is certainly true in matters of a moral or ethical nature, since ethics and morals are human constructs. For example, it is necessary for society to maintain the rule that killing another person is wrong, yet there is no natural law that informs humanity of this. So, having accepted the idea that killing needs to be wrong, it then becomes a matter of judgement as to how wrong it is in different contexts. This is where rhetoric is important, as it has the effect of bringing differing views to the table where there are no absolutes. The degree of wrongdoing may range from accidental killing to self-defence to manslaughter to murder. As the very concept of wrongdoing is a moral construct, the outcome resulting from such rhetoric has consequences for the aim of avoiding further wrongdoing.

In Aristotle’s day, what we now deem science was treated in a similar way to law, as there was no established foundation of scientific practice in the form of empirical observations and experiments. As early scientific ideas were largely reliant on untested hypotheses, it was therefore a matter for the natural philosopher to apply rhetoric against the views of others. It clearly worked, as many quasi-scientific ideas, accepted in antiquity, became received wisdom for over two millennia, until eventually proven incorrect by true science. An example of this is the idea of cardinal humours, or fluids, of the body – blood, phlegm, choler and melancholy. In a world lacking in any true knowledge of the workings of the human body, the idea of cardinal humours was easily promoted by the use of rhetoric, not least because it was better than anyone else could suggest for many centuries to come. In fact, the writings of the Greeks and Romans were generally treated as unquestionable truths for a long time, including, ironically, The Art of Rhetoric.

Those who practised Aristotelian philosophy became known as the Peripatetics. The Greek prefix ‘peripat-’ loosely translates as ‘all around’ and is used in the words that describe colonnades, as were found aplenty in the Lyceum, and contemplatively wandering, as Aristotle was reputed to have done when lost in deep thought. Thus, the term ‘Peripatetic’ evolved with a double stem.

The Art of Rhetoric has been attacked by modern scholars in much the same way that classical scientific ideas have been contested. Today, people don’t take Aristotle’s ideas as the truth. Instead, they regard his ideas as part of the beginning of modern civilization, whether they are agreed with or not. The important point is that the ancient Greeks got the ball rolling, in order that subsequent scholars were able to evolve the disciplines of thought that now form the foundations of our society and culture. Above all, Aristotle’s writings are about effective communication of ideas through language, which is the linchpin of civilization. In order for ideas to become accepted parts of the collective framework of thought, they need to become memes, so that they survive by being passed from one generation to the next.

About the Author

As for Aristotle himself – we know a surprising amount about him, considering he lived such a long time ago. This is because he made quite a name for himself as an intellectual, polymath and pedagogue – he was also rather good at rhetoric!

His parenthetic years are 384 BC and 322 BC, so he lived into his sixties, which was a very good age for that era. Aristotle was the student of another famous Greek philosopher, Plato, who was in turn the student of Socrates. Aristotle established hypotheses and theories that remained largely unchallenged until the Renaissance (Re-birth), when the principals of scientific research and experimentation allowed people to break free from established beliefs by providing empirical evidence and proof. This means that European culture was based on Aristotelian philosophy for about 2,000 years, until people were ‘enlightened’ by scientific truths.

One of the reasons that Aristotle posthumously enjoyed such influence is that he had significant sway during his own lifetime. For example, he was the mentor of Alexander the Great, who went on to conquer nations and build the largest empire the world had yet seen. Such was Aristotle’s impact on ancient civilization that his thinking simply was not bettered at that time. His successor is the lesser-known Theophrastus, who came up with a number of additional ideas on the workings of the world, but was destined to be remembered in the shadow of his three predecessors, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. Following Theophrastus, the well of original thought dried up in the Athenian Lyceum, leaving the world in philosophical stasis for some time to come.

BOOK I

1

Rhetoric the counterpart of Dialectic. Both alike are concerned with such things as come, more or less, within the general ken of all men and belong to no definite science. Accordingly all men make use, more or less, of both; for to a certain extent all men attempt to discuss statements and to maintain them, to defend themselves and to attack others. Ordinary people do this either at random or through practice and from acquired habit. Both ways being possible, the subject can plainly be handled systematically, for it is possible to inquire the reason why some speakers succeed through practice and others spontaneously; and every one will at once agree that such an inquiry is the function of an art.

Now, the framers of the current treatises on rhetoric have constructed but a small portion of that art. The modes of persuasion are the only true constituents of the art: everything else is merely accessory. These writers, however, say nothing about enthymemes, which are the substance of rhetorical persuasion, but deal mainly with non-essentials. The arousing of prejudice, pity, anger, and similar emotions has nothing to do with the essential facts, but is merely a personal appeal to the man who is judging the case. Consequently if the rules for trials which are now laid down some states especially in well-governed states – were applied everywhere, such people would have nothing to say. All men, no doubt, think that the laws should prescribe such rules, but some, as in the court of Areopagus, give practical effect to their thoughts and forbid talk about non-essentials. This is sound law and custom. It is not right to pervert the judge by moving him to anger or envy or pity – one might as well warp a carpenter’s rule before using it. Again, a litigant has clearly nothing to do but to show that the alleged fact is so or is not so, that it has or has not happened. As to whether a thing is important or unimportant, just or unjust, the judge must surely refuse to take his instructions from the litigants: he must decide for himself all such points as the law-giver has not already defined for him.

Now, it is of great moment that well-drawn laws should themselves define all the points they possibly can and leave as few as may be to the decision of the judges; and this for several reasons. First, to find one man, or a few men, who are sensible persons and capable of legislating and administering justice is easier than to find a large number. Next, laws are made after long consideration, whereas decisions in the courts are given at short notice, which makes it hard for those who try the case to satisfy the claims of justice and expediency. The weightiest reason of all is that the decision of the lawgiver is not particular but prospective and general, whereas members of the assembly and the jury find it their duty to decide on definite cases brought before them. They will often have allowed themselves to be so much influenced by feelings of friendship or hatred or self-interest that they lose any clear vision of the truth and have their judgement obscured by considerations of personal pleasure or pain. In general, then, the judge should, we say, be allowed to decide as few things as possible. But questions as to whether something has happened or has not happened, will be or will not be, is or is not, must of necessity be left to the judge, since the lawgiver cannot foresee them. If this is so, it is evident that any one who lays down rules about other matters, such as what must be the contents of the ‘introduction’ or the ‘narration’ or any of the other divisions of a speech, is theorizing about non-essentials as if they belonged to the art. The only question with which these writers here deal is how to put the judge into a given frame of mind. About the orator’s proper modes of persuasion they have nothing to tell us; nothing, that is, about how to gain skill in enthymemes.

Hence it comes that, although the same systematic principles apply to political as to forensic oratory, and although the former is a nobler business, and fitter for a citizen, than that which concerns the relations of private individuals, these authors say nothing about political oratory, but try, one and all, to write treatises on the way to plead in court. The reason for this is that in political oratory there is less inducement to talk about nonessentials. Political oratory is less given to unscrupulous practices than forensic, because it treats of wider issues. In a political debate the man who is forming a judgement is making a decision about his own vital interests. There is no need, therefore, to prove anything except that the facts are what the supporter of a measure maintains they are. In forensic oratory this is not enough; to conciliate the listener is what pays here. It is other people’s affairs that are to be decided, so that the judges, intent on their own satisfaction and listening with partiality, surrender themselves to the disputants instead of judging between them. Hence in many places, as we have said already, irrelevant speaking is forbidden in the law-courts: in the public assembly those who have to form a judgement are themselves well able to guard against that.

It is clear, then, that rhetorical study, in its strict sense, is concerned with the modes of persuasion. Persuasion is clearly a sort of demonstration, since we are most fully persuaded when we consider a thing to have been demonstrated. The orator’s demonstration is an enthymeme, and this is, in general, the most effective of the modes of persuasion. The enthymeme is a sort of syllogism, and the consideration of syllogisms of all kinds, without distinction, is the business of dialectic, either of dialectic as a whole or of one of its branches. It follows plainly, therefore, that he who is best able to see how and from what elements a syllogism is produced will also be best skilled in the enthymeme, when he has further learnt what its subject-matter is and in what respects it differs from the syllogism of strict logic. The true and the approximately true are apprehended by the same faculty; it may also be noted that men have a sufficient natural instinct for what is true, and usually do arrive at the truth. Hence the man who makes a good guess at truth is likely to make a good guess at probabilities.

It has now been shown that the ordinary writers on rhetoric treat of non-essentials; it has also been shown why they have inclined more towards the forensic branch of oratory.

Rhetoric is useful (1) because things that are true and things that are just have a natural tendency to prevail over their opposites, so that if the decisions of judges are not what they ought to be, the defeat must be due to the speakers themselves, and they must be blamed accordingly. Moreover, (2) before some audiences not even the possession of the exactest knowledge will make it easy for what we say to produce conviction. For argument based on knowledge implies instruction, and there are people whom one cannot instruct. Here, then, we must use, as our modes of persuasion and argument, notions possessed by everybody, as we observed in the Topics when dealing with the way to handle a popular audience. Further, (3) we must be able to employ persuasion, just as strict reasoning can be employed, on opposite sides of a question, not in order that we may in practice employ it in both ways (for we must not make people believe what is wrong), but in order that we may see clearly what the facts are, and that, if another man argues unfairly, we on our part may be able to confute him. No other of the arts draws opposite conclusions: dialectic and rhetoric alone do this. Both these arts draw opposite conclusions impartially. Nevertheless, the underlying facts do not lend themselves equally well to the contrary views. No; things that are true and things that are better are, by their nature, practically always easier to prove and easier to believe in. Again, (4) it is absurd to hold that a man ought to be ashamed of being unable to defend himself with his limbs, but not of being unable to defend himself with speech and reason, when the use of rational speech is more distinctive of a human being than the use of his limbs. And if it be objected that one who uses such power of speech unjustly might do great harm, that is a charge which may be made in common against all good things except virtue, and above all against the things that are most useful, as strength, health, wealth, generalship. A man can confer the greatest of benefits by a right use of these, and inflict the greatest of injuries by using them wrongly.

It is clear, then, that rhetoric is not bound up with a single definite class of subjects, but is as universal as dialectic; it is clear, also, that it is useful. It is clear, further, that its function is not simply to succeed in persuading, but rather to discover the means of coming as near such success as the circumstances of each particular case allow. In this it resembles all other arts. For example, it is not the function of medicine simply to make a man quite healthy, but to put him as far as may be on the road to health; it is possible to give excellent treatment even to those who can never enjoy sound health. Furthermore, it is plain that it is the function of one and the same art to discern the real and the apparent means of persuasion, just as it is the function of dialectic to discern the real and the apparent syllogism. What makes a man a ‘sophist’ is not his faculty, but his moral purpose. In rhetoric, however, the term ‘rhetorician’ may describe either the speaker’s knowledge of the art, or his moral purpose. In dialectic it is different: a man is a ‘sophist’ because he has a certain kind of moral purpose, a ‘dialectician’ in respect, not of his moral purpose, but of his faculty.

Let us now try to give some account of the systematic principles of Rhetoric itself – of the right method and means of succeeding in the object we set before us. We must make as it were a fresh start, and before going further define what rhetoric is.

2

Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion. This is not a function of any other art. Every other art can instruct or persuade about its own particular subject-matter; for instance, medicine about what is healthy and unhealthy, geometry about the properties of magnitudes, arithmetic about numbers, and the same is true of the other arts and sciences. But rhetoric we look upon as the power of observing the means of persuasion on almost any subject presented to us; and that is why we say that, in its technical character, it is not concerned with any special or definite class of subjects.

Of the modes of persuasion some belong strictly to the art of rhetoric and some do not. By the latter I mean such things as are not supplied by the speaker but are there at the outset – witnesses, evidence given under torture, written contracts, and so on. By the former I mean such as we can ourselves construct by means of the principles of rhetoric. The one kind has merely to be used, the other has to be invented.

Of the modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word there are three kinds. The first kind depends on the personal character of the speaker; the second on putting the audience into a certain frame of mind; the third on the proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words of the speech itself. Persuasion is achieved by the speaker’s personal character when the speech is so spoken as to make us think him credible. We believe good men more fully and more readily than others: this is true generally whatever the question is, and absolutely true where exact certainty is impossible and opinions are divided. This kind of persuasion, like the others, should be achieved by what the speaker says, not by what people think of his character before he begins to speak. It is not true, as some writers assume in their treatises on rhetoric, that the personal goodness revealed by the speaker contributes nothing to his power of persuasion; on the contrary, his character may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion he possesses. Secondly, persuasion may come through the hearers, when the speech stirs their emotions. Our judgements when we are pleased and friendly are not the same as when we are pained and hostile. It is towards producing these effects, as we maintain, that present-day writers on rhetoric direct the whole of their efforts. This subject shall be treated in detail when we come to speak of the emotions. Thirdly, persuasion is effected through the speech itself when we have proved a truth or an apparent truth by means of the persuasive arguments suitable to the case in question.