Imperialism and Mr. Gladstone

[Note. – This account is from the journal of Bordeini Bey, an eminent Khartoum merchant, who willingly gave up his large stores of grain to Gordon for the supply of the garrison. He was taken prisoner at the fall of the city.]

THE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSIBILITY (1885)

Source.– Lord Cromer's Modern Egypt, vol. i., p. 589. (Macmillans.)

It has been already shown that General Gordon paid little heed to his instructions, that he was consumed with a desire to "smash the Mahdi," and that the view that he was constrained to withdraw everyone who wished to leave from the most distant parts of the Soudan was, to say the least, quixotic. The conclusion to be drawn from these facts is that it was a mistake to send General Gordon to the Soudan. But do they afford any justification for the delay in preparing and in despatching the relief expedition? I cannot think that they do so. Whatever errors of judgment General Gordon may have committed, the broad facts, as they existed in the early summer of 1884, were that he was sent to Khartoum by the British Government, who never denied their responsibility for his safety, that he was beleaguered, and that he was, therefore, unable to get away. It is just possible that he could have effected his retreat, if, having abandoned the southern posts, he had moved northward with the Khartoum garrison in April or early in May. As time went on, and nothing was heard of him, it became more and more clear that he either could not or would not – probably that he could not – move. The most indulgent critic would scarcely extend beyond June 27 the date at which the Government should have decided on the question of whether a relief expedition should or should not be despatched. On that day the news that Berber had been captured on May 26 by the Dervishes was finally confirmed. Yet it was not till six weeks later that the Government obtained from Parliament the funds necessary to prepare for an expedition.

THE VOTE OF CENSURE (1885)

Source.—Hansard, Third Series, vol. 294, col. 1311. (House of Lords debate on Egypt, February 26, 1885.)

The Marquis of Salisbury: … The conduct of Her Majesty's Government has been an alternation of periods of slumber and periods of rush, and the rush, however vehement, has always been too unprepared and too unintelligent to repair the damage which the period of slumber has effected… The case of the bombardment of Alexandria, the case of the abandonment of the Soudan, the case of the mission of General Graham's force – they are all on the same plan, and all show you that remarkable characteristic of torpor during the time when action was needed, and hasty, impulsive, ill-considered action when the time for action had passed by. Their further conduct was modelled on their action in the past. So far was it modelled that we were able to put it to the test which establishes a scientific law. I should like to quote what I said on the 4th of April, when discussing the prospect of the relief of General Gordon. What I said was this: "Are these circumstances encouraging to us when we are asked to trust that, on the inspiration of the moment, when the danger comes, Her Majesty's Government will find some means of relieving General Gordon? I fear that the history of the past will be repeated in the future; and just again, when it is too late, the critical resolution will be taken; some terrible news will come that the position of Gordon is absolutely a forlorn and hopeless one, and then, under the pressure of public wrath and Parliamentary censure, some desperate resolution of sending an expedition will be formed too late to achieve the object which it is desired to gain." I quote these words to show that by that time we had ascertained the laws of motion and the orbits of those erratic comets who sit on the Treasury Bench. Now the terrible responsibility and shame rests upon the Government, because they were warned in March and April of the danger to General Gordon, because they received every intimation which men could reasonably look for that his danger would be extreme, and because they delayed from March and April right down to the 15th of August before they took a single measure to relieve him. What were they doing all that time? It is very difficult to conceive. What happened during those eventful months? I suppose some day the memoirs will tell our grandchildren, but we shall never know. Some people think there were divisions in the Cabinet, and that after division on division a decision was put off, lest the Cabinet be broken up. I am rather inclined to think it was due to the peculiar position of the Prime Minister. He came in as the apostle of the Midlothian campaign, loaded with all the doctrines and all the follies of that pilgrimage. We have seen on each occasion, after one of these mishaps, when he has been forced by events and by the common sense of the nation to take some active steps – we have seen his extreme supporters falling foul of him, and reproaching him with having deserted their opinions and disappointed the ardent hopes which they had formed of him as the apostle of absolute negation in foreign affairs. I think he has always felt the danger of that reproach. He always felt the debt he had incurred to those supporters. He always felt a dread lest they should break away; and he put off again and again to the last practical moment any action which might bring him into open conflict with the doctrine by which his present eminence was gained. At all events, this is clear – that throughout those six months the Government knew perfectly well the danger in which General Gordon was placed. It has been said that General Gordon did not ask for troops. I am surprised at that defence. One of the characteristics of General Gordon was the extreme abnegation of his nature. It was not to be expected that he should send home a telegram to say, "I am in great danger, therefore send me troops" – he would probably have cut off his right hand before he would have sent a telegram of that sort. But he sent home telegrams through Mr. Power, telegrams saying that the people of Khartoum were in great danger; that the Mahdi would succeed unless military succour was sent forward; urging at one time the sending forward of Sir Evelyn Wood and his Egyptians, and at another the landing of Indians at Suakin and the establishment of the Berber route, and distinctly telling the Government – and this is the main point – that unless they would consent to his views the supremacy of the Mahdi was assured… Well, now, my Lords, is it conceivable that after two months, in May, the Prime Minister should have said that they were waiting to have reasonable proof that Gordon was in danger? By that time Khartoum was surrounded, the Governor of Berber had announced that his case was hopeless, which was too surely proved by the massacre which took place in June; and yet in May Mr. Gladstone was still waiting for "reasonable proof" that the men who were surrounded, who had announced that they had only five months' food, were in danger… It was the business of the Government not to interpret General Gordon's telegrams as if they had been statutory declarations, but to judge for themselves of the circumstances of the case, and to see that those who were surrounded, who were only three Englishmen among such a vast body of Mohammedans, and who were already cut off from all communications with the civilized world by the occupation of every important town upon the river, were really in danger, and that if they meant to answer their responsibilities they were bound to relieve them. I cannot tell what blindness fell over the eyes of some members of Her Majesty's Government…

MORE FENIANISM (1885)

Source.—The Times, January 26

The "dynamite war," as it is called by the disloyal Irish and the Irish-American outrage-mongers, was continued in London on Saturday with some success to the perpetrators. Accepting the privilege accorded to all comers to view the Houses of Parliament and the Tower of London, they cunningly placed charged machines of dynamite in the Crypt leading out of Westminster Hall, in the House of Commons chamber itself, and caused, almost at the same time, an explosion in the Tower of London. The first explosion at Westminster was in the Hall itself. Some visitors were passing through the Crypt, when one noticed a parcel on the ground. It is described as the usual "black bag." … The nearest police-constable, Cole by name, picked up the smoking parcel, and brought it to the entrance of the Crypt, where, from its heat or some other cause, he dropped it. It was fortunate for him that he did so, for in an instant a terrific explosion burst from the parcel… The stone flooring was shattered, and the rails round the Crypt were somewhat twisted by the immediate blow of the explosion. Its secondary effect was to break some of the windows, and shake down from the vast beams of Irish oak, forming the roof, the accumulated dust of ages… The chamber of the House of Commons presented the scene of a complete wreck from the second explosion. The benches of the Government side were torn up, and some of the seats had been hurled up into the gallery above… The explosion at the Tower of London was the most serious in its effects of the three, for several persons were injured, some damage was done to the building, and a fire ensued, lasting an hour… The explosive was placed between the stands of arms in the ancient banqueting-room of the Tower.

NEW LABOUR MOVEMENTS (1885)

Source.—The Times, January 31Industrial Remuneration Conference

Yesterday the delegates held their concluding sitting at Prince's Hall, Piccadilly, when the subject set down for discussion was: Would the more general distribution of capital or land, or the State management of capital or land, promote or impair the production of wealth and the welfare of the community?..

The discussion on the papers was begun by Mr. Williams (Social Democratic Federation), who said that if they left all the machinery, all the railways, and all the mines in the hands of the rich capitalists, the working classes would still continue to be oppressed. They must either say that the Government had no right to interfere with anything, or they must admit that the State must equally interfere between the landlord, the capitalist, and the labourer. He compared the part played by politicians like Mr. Chamberlain, who directed their attacks exclusively against the landlords, and spared the rich capitalists, to that sustained by the Artful Dodger in "Oliver Twist."

Mr. B. Shaw (Fabian Society) said he had no desire to give pain to the burglar – if any of that trade were in the room – or to the landlord or the capitalist, pure and simple; all he could say was that all three belonged to the same class, and that the injury each inflicted on the community was precisely of the same nature.

[Note. – The Social Democratic Federation had been founded in 1881; the Fabian Society, a few weeks before this conference met.]

THE UNEMPLOYED (1885)

Source.—The Times, February 17

Yesterday afternoon three or four thousand of the unemployed of London held a demonstration on the Embankment near Cleopatra's Needle, and afterwards marched to Westminster, carrying banners. From Whitehall a large number of the crowd passed into Downing Street near the Premier's residence, where a Cabinet meeting was being held at the time, but at the request of the police, of whom an extra force were in attendance, the crowd moved round to King Street, where they were addressed in somewhat inflammatory terms by some of their speakers, who wore red badges. One speaker clung to the top of a lamp-post, and thence harangued the crowd; another spoke from a window-sill. Meantime, in the absence of Sir Charles Dilke, who was at the Cabinet Meeting, Mr. G. W. E. Russell, Parliamentary Secretary of the Local Government Board, received a small deputation of the leaders… At the close of the interview the crowd marched back to the Embankment, where the following resolution was passed unanimously: "That this meeting of the Unemployed, having heard the answer given by the Local Government Board to their deputation, considers the refusal to start public works to be a sentence of death on thousands of those out of work, and the recommendation to bring pressure to bear on the local bodies to be a direct incitement to violence; further, it will hold Mr. G. W. E. Russell and the members of the Government, individually and collectively, guilty of the murder of those who may die in the next few weeks, and whose lives would have been saved had the suggestions of the deputation been acted on."

(Signed) John Burns, Engineer.John E. Williams, Labourer.William Henry, Foreman.James Macdonald, Tailor.

WORKING MEN MAGISTRATES (1885)

Source.—The Manchester Guardian, May 14

We understand that it is in contemplation to raise a number of workmen to the magisterial bench in the Duchy of Lancaster. The first of the appointments is that of Mr. H. R. Slatter to the Commission of the peace for the City of Manchester. He is Secretary to the Provincial Typographical Association, and a member of the Manchester School Board. It is understood that similar offers of appointment to the magistracy have been made to Mr. T. Birtwistle, of Accrington, Secretary to the Operative Weavers' Association of North and North-east Lancashire, and Mr. Fielding, of Bolton, who holds the post of Secretary to the local branch of the Operative Cotton Spinners' Association.

TORY OLIVE-BRANCH TO IRELAND (1885)

Source.—Hansard, Third Series, vol. 298, col. 1658. (House of Lords, July 6, 1885.)

The Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland (The Earl of Carnarvon): My Lords, my noble friend [Lord Salisbury] has desired that I should state to your Lordships the general position that Her Majesty's Government are prepared to occupy with regard to Irish affairs, and I hope to do so in comparatively few sentences. I need not tell your Lordships what everyone in this House knows, the nature of the events which have brought us to the present position. It will be perhaps sufficient if, by quoting a few figures, I show what the state of agrarian crime was a few years ago, what it has since been in the interval, and what it is at the present time. In 1878 agrarian crime in Ireland stood at 301 cases. In the following year there were 860, and in the three following years – 1880, 1881, and 1882 – the cases reached the enormous totals of 2,580, 4,439, and 3,433 respectively. In 1883, after the Crimes Act had passed, agrarian crimes fell to 870, and last year to 762. I ought perhaps to supplement that statement by saying that in 1884 I think that there was no case of the worst form of agrarian crime. I think that there was not one case of actual murder, and the calendars promise to be of a comparatively, if not singularly, light character. The substance therefore of the statement is that, whereas crime rose in those three years to an enormous figure, it has since fallen to what I do not call an absolutely normal level, but to the same level – in fact, below the level of 1879. In these circumstances the question has naturally arisen – what Her Majesty's Government are to do; and it is impossible to conceive a graver or more serious matter on which to deliberate. Within a very short time – indeed, within a time to be numbered by weeks – the Crimes Act expires, and the question is, What course should be taken? Three courses are possible. Either you may re-enact the Crimes Act in the whole, or you may re-enact it in part, or you may allow it to lapse altogether. I think very few persons would be disposed to advocate its re-enactment as a whole. The more serious and practical question is whether it shall be re-enacted in part. The Act having produced, as all agree, its effect, and three years having lapsed, it seems hard to call on Parliament once more to re-enact it. I believe for my part that special legislation of this sort is inexpedient. It is inexpedient while it is in operation, because it must conjure up a sense of restlessness and irritation; and it is still more inexpedient when it has to be renewed at short intervals, and brings before the mind of the people of the country that they are to be kept under peculiar and exceptional coercion. Now I have looked through a good many of the Acts that have been passed, I may say, during the last generation for Ireland, and I have been astonished to find that ever since the year 1847, with some very short intervals which are hardly worth mentioning, Ireland has lived under exceptional and coercive legislation. No sane man can admit that this is a satisfactory or wholesome state of things. It does seem to me that it is very desirable, if possible, to extricate ourselves from this miserable habit, and to aim at some wholesome and better solution. But, more than being undesirable, I hold that such legislation is practically impossible, if it is to be continually and indefinitely re-enacted. I think it was Count Cavour who said that it is easy to govern in a state of siege. It may be easy to govern in a state of siege for a time, but to attempt to govern permanently is, I believe, utterly impossible. It may be said that this is a question of trust. No doubt it is a question of trust; but trust begets trust, and it is after all the only foundation upon which we can hope to build up amity and concord between the two nations. I know of nothing more sad than to see how, instead of diminishing under the healing process of time, there has been a growth of ill-will between these two nations; and I think it is time to try how far we may appeal to better feelings. I for my part believe that Ireland will justify the confidence which is shown her when this Act is allowed to lapse. If I am asked further as to policy, I will speak generally in these terms. So far as the mere administration of the law is concerned, it is our hope and intention to administer the ordinary law firmly and effectually. So far as the larger field of Government, which includes law, and more than law, is concerned, I hope we shall deal justly, and that we shall secure perhaps a somewhat better, wholesomer, and kindlier relation, I will not say merely between classes, creeds, or races, but between the rulers and the ruled. I cannot and will not lightly believe that the combination of good feeling to England and good government to Ireland is a hopeless task. My Lords, I do not believe that with honesty and single-mindedness of purpose on the one side, and with the willingness of the Irish people on the other, it is hopeless to look for some satisfactory solution of this terrible question. My Lords, these I believe to be the views and opinions of my colleagues. And just as I have seen in English colonies across the sea a combination of English, Irish, and Scotch settlers bound together in loyal obedience to the law and the Crown, and contributing to the general prosperity of the country, so I cannot conceive that there is any irreconcilable bar here in their native home and in England to the unity and amity of the two nations.

THE FIRST SUBMARINE (1885)

Source.—The Times, October 1

The interest excited by the recent trials of the Nordenfeldt submarine boat is sufficiently shown by the presence at Landskrona of thirty-nine officers, representing every European Power, together with Brazil and Japan. The Nordenfeldt boat, the first of its class, was built at Stockholm about two years ago. The boat is cigar-shaped, with a coffin-like projection on the top amidships, formed by vertical combings supporting a glass dome or conning tower, 1 foot high, which enables the commander to see his way. The dome, with its iron protecting cover, stands on a horizontal lid, which can be swung to one side to allow the crew of three men to get in or out without difficulty. The length of the hull is 64 feet, and the central diameter 9 feet. It is built of Swedish mild steel plates ⅝ inch thick at the centre, tapered to ⅜ inch at the ends… In order to prepare for action, enough sea-water is taken in to reduce the buoyancy to 1 cwt., which suffices to keep the conning tower well above the surface. In order to sink the boat further, the vertical propellers are set in motion, and by their action it is held at the required depth. Thus to come to the surface again it is merely necessary to stop the vertical propellers, in which case the reserve of buoyancy at once comes into play… The motive power is steam alone. For submarine work, as stoking is, of course, impossible, the firebox has to be sealed. It is therefore necessary to store the requisite power beforehand, and this is done by heating the water in two tanks placed fore and aft, till a pressure of about 150 pounds per square inch is obtained. With about this initial pressure the boat has been driven for sixteen miles at a speed of three knots… No compressed air is carried, and the crew depend therefore for existence on the amount of air sealed up in the hull. With this amount of air only, four men have remained for a period of six hours without any special inconvenience.

THE UNAUTHORIZED PROGRAMME (1885)

Source.– Morley's Life of Gladstone, vol. iii., pp. 173, 174, 220-226. (Macmillans.)

Mr. Chamberlain had been rapidly advancing in public prominence, and he now showed that the agitation against the House of Lords was to be only the beginning and not the end. At Ipswich (January 14) he said this country had been called the paradise of the rich, and warned his audience no longer to allow it to remain the purgatory of the poor. He told them that reform of local government must be almost the first reform of the next Parliament, and spoke in favour of allotments, the creation of small proprietors, the placing of a small tax on the total property of the taxpayer, and of free education. Mr. Gladstone's attention was drawn from Windsor to these utterances, and he replied that though he thought some of them were "on various grounds open to grave objection," yet they seemed to raise no "definite point on which, in his capacity of Prime Minister, he was entitled to interfere and lecture the speaker." A few days later, more terrible things were said by Mr. Chamberlain at Birmingham. He pronounced for the abolition of plural voting, and in favour of payment of members, and manhood suffrage. He also advocated a bill for enabling local communities to acquire land, a graduated income-tax, and the breaking up of the great estates as the first step in land reform…

Mr. Gladstone made a lenient communication to the orator, to the effect that "there had better be some explanations among them when they met." … He recognized by now that in the Cabinet the battle was being fought between old time and new. He did not allow his dislike of some of the new methods of forming public opinion to prevent him from doing full justice to the energetic and sincere public spirit behind them…

The address to his electors … was given to the public on September 17. It was, as he said, as long as a pamphlet… The Whigs, we are told, found it vague, the Radicals cautious, the Tories crafty; but everybody admitted that it tended to heal feuds… Mr. Chamberlain, though raising his own flag, was respectful to his leader's manifesto. The surface was thus stilled for the moment; yet the waters ran very deep…

[Gladstone] goes on to say that the ground had now been sufficiently laid for going to the election with a united front, that ground being the common profession of a limited creed or programme in the Liberal sense, with an entire freedom for those so inclined to travel beyond it, but not to impose their own sense upon all other people… If the party and its leaders were agreed as to immediate measures … were not these enough to find a Liberal administration plenty of work … for several years?..

An advance was made in the development of a peculiar situation by important conversations with Mr. Chamberlain [at Hawarden: these] did not materially alter Mr. Gladstone's disposition [but the first crisis which promptly developed tended to obscure the direct issue].

THE IRISH VOTE (1885)

Source.– Morley's Life of Gladstone, vol. iii., pp. 188-245. (Macmillans.)

On May 15 Mr. Gladstone announced … that they proposed to continue what he described as certain clauses of a valuable and equitable description in the existing Coercion Act.