Imperialism and Mr. Gladstone

[Note. – Mahdi signifies "the guided" in the hadaya or true way of salvation, hence "the guide." In the tenets of all sects of the Moslems there is an intimate connection between the Mahdi and Jesus Christ.]

END OF CAREY THE INFORMER (1883)

Source.—The Times, July 31

James Carey has not long escaped those who, it was well known, had resolved to slay him at the first opportunity. According to telegrams received from Durban and Cape Town he was shot dead on Sunday, on board the liner Melrose, by an Irishman named O'Donnell. The vessel had got into harbour at Port Elizabeth, and was discharging her passengers and cargo, when Carey was shot. Fully warned of the intention to murder him, the authorities at Dublin had taken pains to conceal his movements. When he quitted Kilmainham, it was stated that he had resolved to brave the worst, and settle down in Dublin to his old occupations. Then it was said that he had been seen in London. According to another account he had sailed for Canada, and had actually landed at Montreal under the escort of two detectives. If these tales were circulated with the hope of putting the Invincibles on a false scent, they signally failed. His enemies were too astute to be deceived by pious frauds. Carey's death is a public misfortune. He had indeed been a principal in a cruel and barbarous murder. He behaved with supreme callousness and repulsive levity throughout the trials; and he was in every way one of the worst specimens of a bad type. But he was the instrument by which the Phœnix Park murderers were brought to justice, and it would have been well had he lived to defy the machinations of the Invincibles. But this misfortune is only a consequence of facts which, as a rule, serve as a safeguard and protection to society. Gibbon has forcibly described the unhappy condition of the wretch who tried to flee from the power of a Roman Emperor. There was no escape from it: he confronted it wherever he fled. No better are the chances of flight of one who, in these days of publicity, of photographs and illustrated newspapers, tries to hide himself from the gaze of those who know him. All this told against Carey's chances of escape. He had made himself the object of bitter hatred of secret societies, which have ramifications through many parts of the world. During the long trials at Dublin, portraits of him in all attitudes were published. His very marked features became familiar to everyone. Disguise himself as he might – and it is stated that when he was shot he was disguised – he could not help being recognized wherever he went.

SLAUGHTER OF HICKS PASHA'S ARMY (1883)

Source.– Sir Reginald Wingate's Mahdiism and the Egyptian Soudan, pp. 85, 88-90. (Macmillans.)

Mohammed Ahmed, on hearing of the departure of the army of Hicks Pasha from Khartoum, sent spies to watch their movements, and on learning that the latter had arrived at Duem, and intended advancing on El Obeid, he sent a force of 3,000 men under the emir Abd el Halim and Abu Girgeh to follow in rear of the Egyptian army and close up the wells as they advanced, so that retreat would be impossible. Abd el Halim, on arrival at Rahad, at once rode off to El Obeid and personally informed the Mahdi of the strength and probable movements of the Egyptian force. On receipt of this news Mohammed Ahmed forthwith despatched all his fighting men towards Rahad to join Abd el Halim's force, but on their way they met Abd el Halim retiring from Alluba, and, having joined him, the whole force, amounting to some 40,000, encamped in the forest of Shekan, and there awaited the advance of the Egyptian troops… At 10 a.m. on Monday morning, November 5, the troops marched out of the zariba and formed up in three squares, the whole formation resembling a triangle. Each square had its own transport and ammunition in the centre. Hicks Pasha with his staff led the way, followed by four guns of the artillery, then the first square, which was supported to the right and left rear by the other two squares, some 300 yards distant from the square and from each other. Ala ed Din Pasha commanded the right square and Selim Bey the left. The exposed flanks of the squares were covered by cavalry, and a detachment of horsemen brought up the rear. In this formation the troops steadily advanced, and half an hour later reached a fairly open valley, interspersed here and there with bush, while on either side were thick woods full of the enemy… Now all was ready, and Mohammed Ahmed patiently awaited the arrival of the troops, which could already be seen advancing in the distance. He assembled his emirs for the last final instructions, and, rising from his prayer, drew his sword, shouted three times, "Allahu akbar! You need not fear, for the victory is ours." On came the squares. The first had reached the wooded depression, when up sprang the Arabs with their fierce yells. Startled and surprised, the square was broken in a moment. The flanking squares now fired wildly at the Arabs fighting hand to hand with the Egyptians, and in their efforts must have killed numbers of their own comrades. But almost at the same instant the Arabs simultaneously attacked from the woods on both sides and from front and rear. The wildest confusion followed; squares fired on each other, on friends or enemies. While the surging mass of Arabs now completely encircled the force and gradually closed in on them, a massacre of the most appalling description took place. In little over quarter of an hour all was over. Hicks Pasha with his staff, seeing that he could do nothing, cut his way through on the left and reached some cultivated ground. Here he was surrounded by some Baggara horsemen, and for a time kept them at bay, fighting most gallantly till his revolver was empty, and then committing most terrible execution with his sword. He was the last of the Europeans to fall, and one savage charge he made on his assailants is memorable to this day in the Soudan, and a body of Baggara who fled before him were called by their tribesmen "Baggar Hicks," or the cows driven by Hicks. But at last he fell, pierced by the spear of the Khalifa Mohammed Sherif. His cavalry bodyguard fought gallantly, and though repeatedly called on to surrender replied, "We shall never surrender, but will die like our officers, and kill many of you as well." And soon all were killed. Ala ed Din Pasha was killed trying to make his way from the right square to join Hicks Pasha. Genawi Bey lay dead in the square beside his horse. It is said that as he fell mortally wounded he, with his own sword, hamstrung his horse, saying, "No other shall ever ride on you after me." The whole force, with the exception of some 300 men, and most of these wounded, had now been completely annihilated… The news of the Mahdi's victory spread far and wide, and if there had been some doubts previous to what was now termed a miracle, the complete annihilation of a whole army soon dispelled them, and from the Red Sea to the confines of Waddai the belief was universal that at last the true Mahdi had appeared.

[Note. – Sir R. Wingate's account is quoted from two sources – one, Mohammed Nur el Barudi, who was cook to Hicks Pasha, and was one of the wounded prisoners after the battle; and the other, Hassan Habashi, a former Government official at El Obeid, who had fallen into the Mahdi's hands on the capture of that place. Hence the story is complete on both sides.]

TRANSVAAL CONVENTION (1884)

Source.—Parliamentary Papers, "Transvaal," C 3,947 of 1884, p. 47A Convention between Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the South African Republic

Whereas the Government of the Transvaal State, through its delegates, consisting of Stephanus Johannes Paulus Kruger, President of the said State, Stephanus Jacobus Du Toit, Superintendent of Education, and Nicholas Jacobus Smit, a member of the Volksraad, have represented that the Convention signed at Pretoria on the 13th day of August, 1881, and ratified by the Volksraad of the said State on the 25th October, 1881, contains certain provisions which are inconvenient, and imposes burdens and obligations from which the said State is desirous to be relieved, and that the south-western boundaries fixed by the said Convention should be amended, with a view to promote the peace and good order of the said State and of the countries adjacent thereto; and whereas Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland has been pleased to take the said representations into consideration.

Now, therefore, Her Majesty has been pleased to direct, and it is hereby declared, that the following articles of a new Convention, signed on behalf of Her Majesty by Her Majesty's High Commissioner in South Africa, the Right Honourable Sir Hercules George Herbert Robinson, Knight Grand Cross of the most distinguished Order of St. Michael and St. George, Governor of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, and on behalf of the Transvaal State (which shall hereinafter be called the South African Republic) by the above-named delegates, Stephanus Johannes Paulus Kruger, Stephanus Jacobus Du Toit, and Nicholas Jacobus Smit, shall, when ratified by the Volksraad of the South African Republic, be substituted for the articles embodied in the Convention of 3rd August, 1881; which latter, pending such ratification, shall continue in full force and effect.

[Note. – The word "Preamble" is not prefixed to the opening passage of this Convention. When the suzerainty question arose in 1898 the British argument was that the 1884 Convention only altered the articles of the 1881 Convention, and left the Preamble in force; the Boer argument was that the 1884 Convention had a preamble, and therefore the earlier one must have been superseded.]

GORDON'S MISSION TO KHARTOUM (1884)

I

Source.—Parliamentary Papers, "Egypt," No. 2 of 1884, C 3,845P. 2. The Cabinet's Instructions to General Gordon

Her Majesty's Government are desirous that you should proceed at once to Egypt, to report to them on the military situation in the Soudan, and on the measures which it may be advisable to take for the security of the Egyptian garrisons still holding positions in that country, and for the safety of the European population in Khartoum. You are also desired to consider and report upon the best mode of effecting the evacuation of the interior of the Soudan, and upon the manner in which the safety and good administration by the Egyptian Government of the ports on the sea coast can best be secured. In connection with this subject, you should pay especial consideration to the question of the steps that may usefully be taken to counteract the stimulus which it is feared may possibly be given to the Slave Trade by the present insurrectionary movement and by the withdrawal of the Egyptian authority from the interior.

II

Source.—Parliamentary Papers, "Egypt," No. 6 of 1884, C 3,878Further Instructions by the Egyptian Government

I have now to indicate to you the views of the Egyptian Government on two of the points to which your special attention was directed by Lord Granville. These are (1) the measures which it may be advisable to take for the security of the Egyptian garrisons still holding positions in the Soudan, and for the safety of the European population in Khartoum. (2) The best mode of effecting the evacuation of the interior of the Soudan. These two points are intimately connected, and may conveniently be considered together. It is believed that the number of Europeans at Khartoum is very small, but it has been estimated by the local authorities that some 10,000 to 15,000 people will wish to move northwards from Khartoum only when the Egyptian garrison is withdrawn. These people are native Christians, Egyptian employés, their wives and children, etc. The Government of His Highness the Khedive is earnestly solicitous that no effort should be spared to insure the retreat both of these people and of the Egyptian garrison without loss of life. As regards the most opportune time and the best method for effecting the retreat, whether of the garrisons or of the civil populations, it is neither necessary nor desirable that you should receive detailed instructions… You will bear in mind that the main end to be pursued is the evacuation of the Soudan. This policy was adopted, after very full discussion, by the Egyptian Government, on the advice of Her Majesty's Government. It meets with the full approval of His Highness the Khedive, and of the present Egyptian Ministry. I understand, also, that you entirely concur in the desirability of adopting this policy, and that you think it should on no account be changed. You consider that it may take a few months to carry it out with safety. You are further of opinion that "the restoration of the country should be made to the different petty Sultans who existed at the time of Mehemet Ali's conquest, and whose families still exist"; and that an endeavour should be made to form a confederation of those Sultans. In this view the Egyptian Government entirely concur. It will, of course, be fully understood that the Egyptian troops are not to be kept in the Soudan merely with a view to consolidating the power of the new rulers of the country. But the Egyptian Government has the fullest confidence in your judgment, your knowledge of the country, and in your comprehension of the general line of policy to be pursued. You are, therefore, given full discretionary power to retain the troops for such reasonable period as you may think necessary, in order that the abandonment of the country may be accomplished with the least possible risk to life and property.

Sir E. Baring, in forwarding the copy of the instructions to Lord Granville, wrote:

I read the draft of the letter over to General Gordon. He expressed to me his entire concurrence in the instructions. The only suggestion he made was in connection with the passage in which, speaking of the policy of abandoning the Soudan, I had said, "I understand also that you entirely concur in the desirability of adopting this policy." General Gordon wished that I should add the words, "and that you think it should on no account be changed." These words were accordingly added.

III

Source.– Lord Cromer's Modern Egypt, vol. i., p. 428. (Macmillans.)

Looking back at what occurred after a space of many years, two points are to my mind clear. The first is that no Englishman should have been sent to Khartoum. The second is that, if anyone had to be sent, General Gordon was not the right man to send. The reasons why no Englishman should have been sent are now sufficiently obvious. If he were beleaguered at Khartoum, the British Government might be obliged to send an expedition to relieve him. The main object of British policy was to avoid being drawn into military operations in the Soudan. The employment of a British official at Khartoum involved a serious risk that it would be no longer possible to adhere to this policy, and the risk was materially increased when the individual chosen to go to the Soudan was one who had attracted to himself a greater degree of popular sympathy than almost any Englishman of modern times.

DIFFICULTIES OF GORDON'S CHARACTER (1884)

I

Source.– Lord Cromer's Modern Egypt, vol. i., p. 432. (Macmillans.)

I must, for the elucidation of this narrative, state why I think it was a mistake to send General Gordon to Khartoum. "It is impossible," I wrote privately to Lord Granville on January 28, 1884, "not to be charmed by the simplicity and honesty of Gordon's character." "My only fear," I added, "is that he is terribly flighty and changes his opinions very rapidly…" Impulsive flightiness was, in fact, the main defect of General Gordon's character, and it was one which, in my opinion, rendered him unfit to carry out a work which pre-eminently required a cool and steady head. I used to receive some twenty or thirty telegrams from General Gordon in the course of the day when he was at Khartoum, those in the evening often giving opinions which it was impossible to reconcile with others despatched the same morning. Scarcely, indeed, had General Gordon started on his mission, when Lord Granville, who does not appear at first to have understood General Gordon's character, began to be alarmed at his impulsiveness. On February 8 Lord Granville wrote to me: "I own your letters about Gordon rather alarm. His changes about Zobeir are difficult to understand. Northbrook consoles me by saying that he says all the foolish things that pass through his head, but that his judgment is excellent." I am not prepared to go so far as to say that General Gordon's judgment was excellent. Nevertheless, there was some truth in Lord Northbrook's remark. I often found that, amidst a mass of irrelevant verbiage and amidst many contradictory opinions, a vein of sound common sense and political instinct ran through General Gordon's proposals. So much was I impressed with this, and so fearful was I that the sound portions of his proposals would be rejected in London on account of the eccentric language in which they were often couched, that, on February 12, I telegraphed to Lord Granville: "In considering Gordon's suggestions, please remember that his general views are excellent, but that undue importance must not be attached to his words. We must look to the spirit rather than the letter of what he says."

II

Source.– Lord Cromer's Modern Egypt, vol. i., p. 488. (Macmillans.)

On February 26th, thirty-nine days had elapsed since General Gordon had left London, thirty-one days since he had left Cairo, and eight days since he had arrived at Khartoum. During that period, leaving aside points of detail, as to which his contradictions had been numerous, General Gordon had marked out for himself no less than five different lines of policy, some of which were wholly conflicting one with another, whilst others, without being absolutely irreconcilable, differed in respect to some of their most important features. On January 18 he started from London with instructions which had been dictated by himself. His wish then was that he should be merely sent to "report upon the best means of effecting the evacuation of the interior of the Soudan." He expressed his entire concurrence in the policy of evacuation. This was the first and original stage of General Gordon's opinions. Before he arrived in Egypt, on January 24, he had changed his views as to the nature of the functions he should fulfil. He no longer wished to be a mere reporter. He wished to be named Governor-General of the Soudan with full executive powers. He supplemented his original ideas by suggesting that the country should be handed over to "the different petty Sultans who existed at the time of Mehemet Ali's conquest." This was the second stage of General Gordon's opinions. Fifteen days later (February 8) he wrote from Abu Hamed a memorandum in which he advocated "evacuation but not abandonment." The Government of Egypt were to "maintain their position as a Suzerain Power, nominate the Governor-General and Moudirs, and act as a supreme Court of Appeal." This was the third stage of General Gordon's opinions. Ten days later (February 18) General Gordon reverted to the principles of his memorandum of the 8th, but with a notable difference. It was no longer the Egyptian but the British Government which were to control the Soudan administration. The British Government were also to appoint a Governor-General, who was to be furnished with a British commission, and who was to receive a British decoration. Zobeir Pasha was the man whom General Gordon wished the British Government to select. This was the fourth stage of General Gordon's opinions. Eight days later (February 26), when General Gordon had learnt that the British Government were not prepared to approve of Zobeir Pasha being sent to the Soudan, he proposed that the Mahdi should be "smashed up," and that, to assist in this object, 200 British Indian troops should be sent to Wadi Halfa. This was the fifth stage of General Gordon's opinions. In thirty-nine days, therefore, General Gordon had drifted by successive stages from a proposal that he should report on the affairs of the Soudan to advocating the policy of "smashing up" the Mahdi. It would, he said, be "comparatively easy to destroy the Mahdi."

ZOBEIR PASHA (1884)

I

Source.—Parliamentary Papers, "Egypt," No. 12 of 1884P. 71. Major-General Gordon to Sir E. Baring. Telegraphic, Khartoum, February 18, 1884

I have stated that to withdraw without being able to place a successor in my seat would be the signal for general anarchy throughout the country, which, though all Egyptian element was withdrawn, would be a misfortune and inhuman… I distinctly state that if Her Majesty's Government gave a Commission to my successor, I recommend neither a subsidy nor men being given. I would select and give a Commission to some man, and promise him the moral support of Her Majesty's Government and nothing more… As for the man, Her Majesty's Government should select one above all others – namely, Zobeir. He alone has the ability to rule the Soudan, and would be universally accepted by the Soudan. He should be made K.C.M.G., and given presents… Zobeir's exile at Cairo for ten years, amidst all the late events, and his mixing with Europeans, must have had great effect on his character…

II

P. 72. Extract from Sir E. Baring's Despatch commenting on the Above

I believe Zobeir Pasha to be the only possible man. He undoubtedly possesses energy and ability, and has great local influence. As regards the Slave Trade, I discussed the matter with General Gordon when he was in Cairo, and he fully agreed with me in thinking that Zobeir Pasha's presence or absence would not affect the question in one way or the other. I am also convinced from many things that have come to my notice that General Gordon is right in thinking that Zobeir Pasha's residence in Egypt has considerably modified his character. He now understands what European power is, and it is much better to have to deal with a man of this sort than with a man like the Mahdi… I cannot recommend that he should be promised the "moral support" of Her Majesty's Government. In the first place, he would scarcely understand the sense of the phrase, and, moreover, I do not think that he would attach importance to any support which was not material. It is for Her Majesty's Government to judge what the effect of his appointment would be upon public opinion in England, but except for that I can see no reason why Zobeir Pasha should not be proclaimed Ruler of the Soudan with the approbation of Her Majesty's Government.

III

P. 95. Earl Granville to Sir E. Baring. February 22, 1884

Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the gravest objections exist to the appointment by their authority of a successor to General Gordon. The necessity does not, indeed, appear to have yet arisen of going beyond the suggestions contained in General Gordon's Memorandum of the 22nd ultimo, by making special provision for the government of the country. In any case the public opinion of this country would not tolerate the appointment of Zobeir Pasha.

SOME OF GORDON'S TELEGRAMS (1884)

Source.—Parliamentary Papers, "Egypt," No. 12 of 1884P. 156. Major-General Gordon to Sir E. Baring. Khartoum, March 3, 1884

… I am strongly against any permanent retention of the Soudan, but I think we ought to leave it with decency, and give the respectable people a man to lead them, around whom they can rally, and we ought to support that man by money and by opening road to Berber. Pray do not consider me in any way to advocate retention of Soudan; I am quite averse to it, but you must see that you could not recall me, nor could I possibly obey, until the Cairo employés get out from all the places. I have named men to different places, thus involving them with Mahdi: how could I look the world in the face if I abandoned them and fled? As a gentleman, could you advise this course? It may have been a mistake to send me up, but that having been done I have no option but to see evacuation through, for even if I was mean enough to escape I have no power to do so.